SONIA BARTEE v. UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; DR. CRAIG ROBERTS; DR. RANIER LENHART; HON. JOHN W. THACKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000401-WC
AND
NO. 2006-CA-000513-WC
SONIA BARTEE
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
PETITION AND CROSS-PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-96-09414
ACTION NO. WC-96-68717
UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER; DR.
CRAIG ROBERTS; DR. RANIER
LENHART; HON. JOHN W. THACKER,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; PAISLEY,1 SENIOR
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
This case concerns an award of temporary
total disability benefits following a motion to reopen filed by
the employer, University Medical Center, disputing medical
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
expenses.
Bartee alleges that the TTD award should be made from
the date of her surgery and University Medical Center crossappeals objecting to any award of TTD benefits.
We find that
under the facts the reopening statute, KRS 342.125, does not
permit an award of temporary total disabilty benefits.
Bartee suffered a work-related injury to her left knee
on May 9, 1996.
A settlement agreement was approved awarding a
16.4% impairment and Bartee was also entitled to receive
reasonable medical expenses.
In March 2004, Bartee had an MRI
performed and in April 2004, underwent arthroscopic surgery on
the same knee.
On June 8, 2004, University Medical Center filed
a motion to reopen to dispute the medical bills received for
that surgery on the basis that they were not related to the
original 1996 knee injury.
Bartee responded by acknowledging
that there were issues to be determined relating to the medical
expenses and joined in the reopening request; she did not,
however, request or address the issue of increased permanent
disability or temporary total disability benefits.
University Medical Center’s motion was sustained on
July 15, 2004, and the medical fee dispute was assigned to an
ALJ for further adjudication.
It was not until September 2004,
that Bartee filed a separate motion to reopen based on a
worsening of her condition and requesting TTD and permanent
disability benefits.
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The ALJ found that University Medical Center was
responsible for the medical expenses incurred and dismissed
Bartee’s claim for benefits based on a worsening of her
condition.
The ALJ did not address the issue of TTD benefits.
Bartee then filed a petition for reconsideration requesting an
award of TTD benefits from the date of her surgery, April 21,
2004, through June 21, 2004, the date she returned to work.
An
amended order was issued awarding TTD benefits for the entire
period requested.
University Medical Center filed a petition
for reconsideration arguing that the award of TTD benefits was
improper for any period before the date Bartee filed her motion
to reopen.
University Medical Center’s petition was denied on
the basis that the issue arose from the compensability of the
surgery; it was, therefore, University Medical Center’s motion
filed on June 8, 2004, which put the matter in issue.
The
principles of waiver and estoppel, the ALJ found, precluded
University Medical Center from contesting the award of TTD
benefits.
The Workers’ Compensation Board found that pursuant to
the plain language of KRS 342.125, TTD benefits could not be
awarded prior to the time that either University Medical Center
or Bartee filed a motion to reopen; it further found, however,
that University Medical Center’s motion to reopen to contest the
medical expenses and Bartee’s request for TTD benefits prior to
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the final resolution of the reopening proceeding permitted an
award from June 8, 2004, through June 21, 2004.
We disagree
with the Board to the extent that it found that University
Medical Center’s motion permitted an award.
We hold that
Bartee, who returned to work prior to the date she filed her
motion to reopen, is not entitled to TTD benefits.
University Medical Center filed its motion disputing
the medical bills pursuant to the reopening statute, KRS
342.125.
That statute is a “remedy for addressing certain
changes that occur or situations that come to light after
benefits are awarded” and is a procedural device for invoking
the jurisdiction of the Department of Workers’ Claims to reopen
a final award.
Dingo Coal Co., Inc. v. Tolliver, 129 S.W.3d
367, 370 (Ky. 2004).
In Westvaco Corporation v. Fondaw, 698
S.W.2d 837 (Ky. 1985), the court held that although KRS 342.125
does not directly provide a procedure for the employer to
contest medical bills, it nevertheless is the proper avenue to
pursue.
We are of the opinion that KRS 342.125 can
be construed to permit a proceeding for the
employer to challenge a medical claim. This
section provides a mechanism to reopen an
award on the ground of change of condition,
fraud, or mistake, and if there is a
procedure to cover the present case, it is
in this section of the statutes. KRS 342.035
provides that medical fees are to be
reasonable and subject to regulation by the
Board. Thus, we infer the legislature
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intended a procedure whereby disputes as to
reasonableness, etc., could be resolved.
Id. at 839.
Although the statute permits the reopening of a final
award, it states that a reopening “shall not effect the previous
order or award as to sums already paid thereunder, and any
change in the amount of compensation shall be ordered only from
the date of filing the motion to reopen.”
The unambiguous
language of KRS 342.125 prohibits a retroactive award of
compensation; any award on reopening, therefore, is effective on
the date on which the motion was filed.
Newberg v. Cash, 854
S.W.2d 791 (Ky.App. 1993); Reynolds v. Justice Coal Company, 425
S.W.2d 750(Ky. 1968).
TTD benefits, like permanent and partial disability
benefits, replace lost wages and are, therefore, payments made
replacing income.
KRS 342.0011(14).
Since an award of TTD
benefits on reopening is an award of compensation as defined
under the Workers’ Compensation Act, it can only be effective
from the date of the filing of a motion to reopen.
The unique
facts of this case present the question of whether TTD benefits
can begin from the date of an employer’s motion disputing
medical expenses or whether the claimant is required to file a
separate motion alleging one of the grounds specified in KRS
342.125.
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Although recognizing that KRS 342.125 precludes a
retroactive award of benefits, the Board found that University
Medical Center’s motion to reopen for the limited purpose of
disputing medical bills was sufficient to permit an award of
benefits from that date through the date Bartee returned to
employment.
Following the Board’s reasoning, once a claim is
brought before the ALJ for adjudication on reopening, all issues
are raised for consideration.
We disagree.
The employer is responsible for payment of only
reasonable and necessary medical expenses.
KRS 342.020(1).
The
procedure for resolving disputes regarding the employer’s
responsibility is resolved by the filing of a motion to reopen
and a Form 112.
803 KAR 25:012.
The burden is on the employer
to file the motion and to offer proof that it is not responsible
for the disputed bills.
See Peabody Coal Company v. Goforth,
857 S.W.2d 167 (Ky. 1993).
A claim for increased benefits based
on the grounds listed in KRS 342.125 is an entirely different
proceeding and requires that the motion be filed with supporting
medical reports and affidavits.
A hearing is not automatic and
is required only if the claimant proves a prima facie case.
KRS
342.125; 803 KAR 25:010; Stambaugh v. Cedar Creek Mining Co.,
488 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Ky. 1972).
Thus, a medical fee dispute and
a motion to reopen for a change in disability are two distinct
and separate procedures.
Because of the distinctions between
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the two procedures and the requirements necessary to invoke the
jurisdiction of the Department of Workers’ Claims, University
Medical Center’s filing of its motion to dispute the medical
bills did not invoke jurisdiction for the consideration of
Bartee’s claim for TTD benefits.
The Board did not address the ALJ’s finding that
University Medical Center was precluded from challenging the
award of TTD benefits based on waiver or estoppel.
We note only
that those equitable doctrines have no application to this fact
situation.
The essence of waiver is the relinquishment of a
known right.
National Sur. Marine Ins. Corp. v. Wheeler, 257
S.W.2d 573 (Ky. 1953).
The filing of the motion by University
Medical Center was not a relinquishment of a right but simply a
use of the proper procedure to dispute medical bills.
Moreover,
there is no suggestion that University Medical Center acted in a
manner that would have induced Bartee to believe she would be
paid TTD benefits.
See Carroll County Memorial Hospital v.
Yocum, 489 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1972).
We hold that a claimant is entitled to TTD benefits
only from the date a motion to reopen is filed in compliance
with KRS 342.125 requesting those benefits.
To avoid the
consequences suffered by Bartee, the claimant facing elective
surgery can file a prospective motion to reopen so that the
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procedure will be compensable and income benefits permitted from
the date of temporary total disability.
The decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board is
reversed and the case remanded to the ALJ for a decision
consistent with this opinion.
HENRY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, DISSENTING:
dissent from the majority opinion.
I respectfully
It is both illogical and
inconsistent to allow a reopening under KRS 342.125 to contest
medical expenses of the surgery after the fact and yet to bar
TTD flowing from that same surgery.
The majority opinion would
impose an additional requirement that a candidate for surgery
prospectively file a motion for TTD prior to the surgery.
The
implications as to an emergency surgery are ominous indeed.
The reasoning of the Board on this issue was a correct
and equitable interpretation of KRS 342.125.
It restricted the
award of TTD to Bartee for only that period running from the
date of the University Medical Center’s filing to reopen (June
8, 2004) through the date of her return to work (June 21, 2004).
If the statute permits one party to seek redress for changes
occurring subsequent to an award, it must be even-handed in its
application to permit all the ramifications of such changes to
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be addressed as to the other party.
The payment of TTD for this
period had nothing to do with Bartee’s previous award.
As soon
as the University Medical Center “opened the door” on this
issue, Bartee had a legitimate right to pursue a remedy as well
before the ALJ.
The Board was correct in its analysis, and we have no
basis to disturb its opinion.
Therefore, I would affirm in all
respects.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES/CROSSAPPELLANTS:
Wayne C. Daub
Louisville, Kentucky
Lyn A. Douglas
Fulton & Devlin
Louisville, Kentucky
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