K.R.L. v. P.A.C.; CABINET FOR HUMAN RESOURCES; and K.A.L., A MINOR
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-000364-ME
K.R.L.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES L. BOWLING, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-AD-00009
P.A.C.; CABINET FOR HUMAN
RESOURCES; and K.A.L.,
A MINOR
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
K.R.L. appeals from an order entered by
the Bell Circuit Court in which the trial court denied K.R.L.’s
petition for involuntary termination of parental rights.
In the
petition, K.R.L. sought to terminate the parental rights of
P.A.C., the biological father of K.R.L.’s young son.
Now, on
appeal, K.R.L. argues that she has standing to appeal the denial
of her petition; argues that the trial court’s findings of fact
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley and Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting
as Special Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section
110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
from the bench were inconsistent with its written findings of
fact; and argues that the trial court’s denial of her petition
was clearly erroneous.
Finding no error, we affirm.
K.R.L. (hereinafter referred to as “Mother”) and
P.A.C. (hereinafter referred to as “Father”) dated for
approximately three and a half years and lived together until
September of 2004.
Although the parties were never married,
their relationship resulted in the birth of K.A.L. (hereinafter
referred to as “Son”) on December 6, 2002.
According to the record, Mother and Father had a very
tumultuous relationship, and Mother had filed several petitions
for domestic violence orders in order to protect herself from
Father.
Despite this, the record in this case details only one
incident of domestic violence between the couple, which occurred
in January of 2004.
Regarding this incident, Mother claimed
that Father had severely beaten her and had held her and Son
hostage for three days.
Father admitted that he and Mother had
engaged in an altercation but denied the severity of the assault
and denied holding Mother and Son hostage.
However, it is clear
that Father did physically assault Mother and left numerous
bruises on her upper torso and arms.
Father claimed that this
altercation occurred while Son was asleep so he insisted that
the child was not exposed to his violent behavior.
On the other
hand, Mother claimed that Son, who would have been approximately
-2-
thirteen months old at the time, witnessed the assault, and that
it harmed his emotional well-being.
Mother pursued criminal
charges against Father, who ultimately pled guilty to assault in
the fourth degree.
On June 28, 2004, Father signed an agreed judgment of
paternity acknowledging that he was Son’s biological father.
The Bell District Court entered the judgment and ordered Father
to begin paying child support in the amount of $160.00 per
month.
Father acknowledged later that he made no child support
payments pursuant to the district court’s order.
According to
the record, one of Father’s income tax refunds had been seized
and had been forwarded to Mother; however, Mother had declined
to keep the money.
On October 12, 2005, Mother filed her petition for
involuntary termination of parental rights with the Bell Circuit
Court.
In the petition, Mother alleged that Father abandoned
Son for nearly two years and failed to provide essential care
for Son.
On January 11, 2006, the trial court conducted a bench
trial to resolve Mother’s petition.
Father and Mother both
testified regarding the previously mentioned facts.
Father also
testified regarding his scant employment history and his history
of illegal drug use.
He also claimed that, prior to September
of 2004, he and Son had a close relationship and that Son had
-3-
been integrated into Father’s family.
He claimed that he had
tried to maintain contact with Son but could not because, in
September of 2004, Mother had obtained an emergency protective
order against him which contained a no-contact provision.
Father further claimed that he attempted to pay child support
but was unable to do so because he had not been allowed to have
contact with Mother.
Despite claiming that he wished to pay
child support, Father admitted that he made no attempt to pay
his child support through the state.
At the hearing, Mother testified about her own
recreational drug use and testified in depth regarding the
previously mentioned assault.
She also claimed that, while she
and Father cohabited, Father provided only modest financial
support for Son, and that after September of 2004, Father simply
abandoned Son and made no attempt whatsoever to maintain
contact.
After hearing the evidence, the trial court denied
Mother’s petition.
Believing that the trial court erred, Mother
now appeals to this Court.
Before we can consider the merits of Mother’s appeal,
we must address Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 625.110, which
reads in its entirety:
Any order for the involuntary termination of
parental rights shall be conclusive and
binding on all parties, except that an
-4-
appeal may be taken from a judgment or order
of the Circuit Court involuntarily
terminating parental rights in accordance
with the Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
Under this statute, there can be an appeal in a termination of
parental rights case only if the trial court grants the petition
to terminate.
Nevertheless, Mother claims she has a
constitutional right to appeal the ruling of the trial court
denying her petition under Section 115 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
Although appeals from denials of petitions for
termination of parental rights have previously reached the
appellate courts of the Commonwealth, the issue of the statute’s
constitutionality has not been decided.
See Cabinet for Human
Resources v. J.B.B.; F.C.K., III; and J.S.B., 772 S.W.2d 646
(Ky.App. 1989); Commonwealth, Cabinet for Families and Children
v. G.C.W.; T.L.M.; and M.L.M., 139 S.W.3d 172 (Ky.App. 2004) and
C.M.C. v. A.L.W., 180 S.W.3d 485 (Ky.App. 2005).
We are now
squarely confronted with the question of whether the legislature
may constitutionally prohibit an appeal when the trial court
denies a petition to terminate parental rights.
We note that
Mother has properly notified the Attorney General of her
challenge to the statute as required by KRS 418.075.
Mother
insists that a circuit court’s decision declining to terminate
parental rights involves substantial rights equal to those which
are affected in a decision terminating parental rights.
-5-
Even
though Mother fails to identify the specific rights affected by
a denial of termination, she nevertheless maintains that such a
denial presents appealable issues.
In addition, Mother cites
the following cases: Cabinet for Human Resources v. J.B.B.;
F.C.K., III; and J.S.B., supra; Commonwealth, Cabinet for
Families and Children v. G.C.W.; T.L.M.; and M.L.M., supra;
C.M.C. v. A.L.W., supra and Day v. Day, 937 S.W.2d 717 (Ky.
1997).
Mother points out that in each of these cases, the
appellate court addressed the merits of a denial to terminate
parental rights.
Ergo, she concludes that we should address the
merits of her appeal as well.
When we consider a constitutional challenge to a
statute, we must recognize that there is a strong presumption in
favor of constitutionality.
Fischer v. State Board of
Elections, 879 S.W.2d 475 (Ky. 1994).
Having said that, we must
also acknowledge that we must follow our constitution, which is
the fundamental law of this Commonwealth.
Id.
If we were to
shirk this duty, we would breach the social compact that binds
us together and would abandon our judicial responsibility.
at 475-476.
As the Supreme Court of Kentucky so eloquently
stated:
The judiciary has the ultimate power, and
the duty, to apply, interpret, define,
construe all words, phrases, sentences and
sections of the Kentucky Constitution as
necessitated by the controversies before it.
-6-
Id.
It is solely the function of the judiciary
to do so. This duty must be exercised even
when such action serves as a check on the
activities of another branch of government
or when the court’s view of the constitution
is contrary to that of other branches, or
even that of the public.
Id. at 476.
Mother contends that KRS 625.110 runs contrary to the
constitutional mandate set forth in Section 115 of the Kentucky
Constitution.
This section states in its entirety:
In all cases, civil and criminal, there
shall be allowed as a matter of right at
least one appeal to another court, except
that the Commonwealth may not appeal from a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case,
other than for the purpose of securing a
certification of law, and the General
Assembly may prescribe that there shall be
no appeal from that portion of a judgment
dissolving a marriage. Procedural rules
shall provide for expeditious and
inexpensive appeals. Appeals shall be upon
the record and not by trial de novo.
Ky. Const § 115.
This section unequivocally mandates that all
parties in all civil and criminal cases have a constitutional
right to one appeal.
In addition, Section 115 provides for only
two exceptions: 1) the Commonwealth may not appeal from a
judgment of acquittal and 2) the General Assembly has the power
to prohibit a party from appealing the dissolution portion of a
decree dissolving a marriage.
These exceptions are very
specific, and neither applies to the denial of a petition to
terminate parental rights.
Therefore, we must conclude that KRS
-7-
625.110, as currently written, is unconstitutional to the extent
that it prohibits the right of appeal from the denial of a
petition to terminate parental rights.
Since we conclude that Mother indeed has standing to
appeal, we will now address the merits of her case.
Mother
argues that the trial court’s findings of fact made from the
bench contradicted the trial court’s written findings of fact.
She also insists that the trial court’s written findings made no
sense under the statutory scheme.
In her brief, Mother argues that, from the bench, the
trial court clearly found that Father had abandoned Son.
She
also insists that Father failed to have contact with Son for
over fifteen months and failed to pay child support for over
nineteen months.
Relying on KRS 600.020(1), Mother argues that
a parent is deemed to have abused or neglected a child when that
parent has failed to provide essential care or has failed to
provide food and clothing or has abandoned the child.
According
to Mother, the trial court failed to apply the statutory
standards in resolving her petition, and she insists that since
Father failed to have contact with Son and failed to pay child
support, Son was an abused or neglected child as defined by KRS
600.020(1).
Furthermore, Mother points out that once a circuit
court has found that a child has been abused or neglected, it
-8-
will terminate a parent’s rights if it also finds that one of
the following has occurred: 1) the parent has abandoned the
child for more than ninety days; 2) the parent has failed to
provide parental care or protection for more than six months or
3) the parent has failed to provide essential food and clothing
for the child.
She argues that Father’s behavior has met all
three criteria set forth, and insists that the trial court erred
when it refused to terminate Father’s parental rights.
When we review a termination of parental rights
decision, we are limited to the clearly erroneous standard set
forth in Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01.
R.C.R.
v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36, 38
(Ky.App. 1998).
Since Mother was the petitioner at the trial
court level, she had the burden of proof and was required to
prove by clear and convincing evidence that Father’s parental
rights should be terminated.
KRS 625.090(1).
With this in
mind, we are required to give considerable deference to the
trial court’s findings, and we will not disturb those findings
unless no substantial evidence exists in the record to support
them.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Families and Children v.
G.C.W.; T.L.M.; and M.L.M., supra at 172.
In addition, the
trial court, as the finder of fact, has the responsibility to
judge the credibility of all testimony, and may choose to
believe or disbelieve any part of the evidence presented to it.
-9-
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d 15, 16 (Ky.
1977).
To terminate parental rights, KRS 625.090 requires a
finding, by clear and convincing evidence, 1) that the child is
abused or neglected as defined in KRS 600.020(1), 2) that
termination would be in the best interest of the child and 3)
that one or more of the factors found in KRS 625.090(2)(a-j)
exists.
In this case, the trial court found that Son was not an
abused or neglected child.
The evidence clearly does not compel
a finding to the contrary.
Moreover, we note that Mother
presented no evidence to support a finding that termination of
Father’s parental rights would be in Son’s best interest.
Because the evidence does not compel a finding that Father’s
parental rights should have been terminated, the trial court’s
decision was not clearly erroneous.
The order denying Mother’s petition for termination of
parental rights is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Gerald L. Greene
GREENE & LEWIS
Pineville, Kentucky
Shea Dunn Yoakum
BOWLING & YOAKUM, P.S.C.
Middlesboro, Kentucky
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.