J.R.D., A JUVENILE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
OCTOBER 27, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2006-CA-000138-ME
J.R.D., A JUVENILE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE DOUGLAS BRUCE PETRIE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-J-00060
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
ABRAMSON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
J.R.D., a juvenile status offender, has
appealed from the Boyle Family Court’s December 7, 2006, order
committing her to the Cabinet for Families and Children with the
recommendation that she complete a residential treatment program
at Ramey-Estep Homes.
J.R.D. asserts that the family court
improperly committed her to the Cabinet for finding her in
contempt of a status offender order, while the Commonwealth
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
maintains that her commitment was as a result of her being a
habitual truant.
We affirm.
The record in this case consists of four separate
juvenile complaints/petitions filed against J.R.D.
The mother
filed the first complaint/petition on May 1, 2003, when J.R.D.
was fourteen years old.2
The mother called the police after
J.R.D. attacked her sister, as a result of which she was taken
into custody and later charged with Assault 4th – Domestic
pursuant to KRS 508.030.
She was conditionally released3 after a
detention hearing, and the matter was eventually resolved.
The
mother also filed the second complaint the same date, alleging
that J.R.D. was beyond the control of her parents in violation
of KRS 630.020(2) and citing J.R.D.’s disrespectful attitude and
her refusal to obey house rules.
That status offense charge was
later dismissed without prejudice on the Commonwealth’s motion.
The third, two-part petition was filed by a Danville
police officer on September 5, 2003.
The grounds for the
petition were an August 22, 2003, motor vehicle accident during
which J.R.D. hit a parked van in a parking lot and left the
scene of the accident.
license at the time.
2
J.R.D. did not have an operator’s
She was cited for both offenses.
At a
J.R.D.’s date of birth is December 12, 1988.
3
Some of the conditions of her release included having no unexcused absences
from school, that she must obey school and house rules, that she not have any
violent contact with any family member, and that she abide by a curfew.
-2-
later conference, J.R.D. admitted to the offense of leaving the
scene of the accident, and was ordered to complete forty hours
of community service and to pay restitution to the owner of the
van she damaged.
The charge of not having an operator’s license
was to be dismissed if she copied the driver’s manual by hand.4
A docket order dated December 4, 2003, indicated that J.R.D. had
been suspended from school, in violation of the conditions of
her release.
For this reason, we assume, the family court
stated that any violation of the conditions of release before
the next scheduled hearing date in January 2004 would result in
her immediate pick-up.
On December 18, 2003, Chuck Stallard of Danville
Schools filed an affidavit stating that J.R.D. had continued to
be defiant to authority and had skipped class.
Based upon this
affidavit, the family court entered a pick-up order that day.
A
detention hearing was held on December 29, 2003, when J.R.D.
admitted to the two pending allegations of contempt.
The family
court imposed a zero-hour curfew and scheduled a disposition
hearing for January 15, 2004.
At the disposition hearing, the
family court probated J.R.D. to the court until she reached her
eighteenth birthday.
A third contempt affidavit was filed on
October 19, 2004, which indicated that J.R.D. had been kicked
out of school, but the summons was never successfully served.
4
Her handwritten copy of the Kentucky driver’s manual is in the record.
-3-
At one of the scheduled show cause hearings, the family court
learned that J.R.D. was being home-schooled.
Prior to the filing of the contempt charges resulting
from the third petition, Chuck Stallard filed the fourth
complaint/petition on November 25, 2003, for which J.R.D. was
charged with the status offense of Habitual Truancy pursuant to
KRS 630.020(3).
J.R.D. obtained appointed counsel and denied
the allegations at her arraignment on January 7, 2004.
At the
conclusion of the January 7th court appearance, the family court
entered a Juvenile Status Offender Order, stating that J.R.D.
was alleged to be a status offender relating to Habitual
Truancy, found that it had jurisdiction over her, and ordered
her to comply with several conditions.
These conditions
required her to not leave home without custodial permission; to
obey all home rules (including the imposition of a zero hour
curfew); to attend school on time, have no unexcused absences,
and have no behavior problems at school; to not violate the law;
and to not consume alcohol, or to use or possess any alcohol,
tobacco products or illegal drugs.
The Status Offender Order
also warned that “[f]ailure to abide by this Order may result in
a contempt finding being made against you by the court which
could result in a fine and/or your being placed in a secure
detention or other alternative placement[.]”
hearing was scheduled for February 25, 2004.
-4-
An adjudication
By February 11, 2004, J.R.D. had already violated the
terms of the Status Offender Order.
Her father filed an
affidavit that day indicating that she was “running the streets,
skipping school, staying gone for days and according to the
police associating with the ‘wrong’ people.”
The family court
ordered J.R.D. to be picked up and detained, and held a
detention hearing on February 16th.
J.R.D. admitted to the
contempt, and the family court sentenced her to 10 days in
detention, credited her for two days served, and probated the
balance on the condition that she abide by the terms of the
Status Offender Order.
At the February 25, 2004, adjudication hearing on the
habitual truancy charge, J.R.D. admitted to being a habitual
truant.
The family court ordered the Cabinet to complete and
file a Pre-Dispositional Investigation Report, and set the
matter for a disposition hearing on March 31, 2004.
Pursuant to
the order, the Cabinet filed the PDI report in which it
recommended that J.R.D. enter a long-term residential treatment
program.
According to its recommendation, such treatment would
provide her with the means to become more responsible for her
behavior, and would allow her to develop and demonstrate a
healthy sense of respect for social norms and the rights of
others.
At the disposition hearing, the family court indicated
that it was ready to remove J.R.D. from her home based upon the
-5-
Cabinet’s report.
However, the Cabinet amended its
recommendation, stating that it wanted to open a six-month case
on the family and have J.R.D. probated to the Cabinet as opposed
to placed into its custody.
Based upon this amended
recommendation, the family court opted to probate J.R.D. to the
Cabinet until her eighteenth birthday under the terms of the
previously entered Status Offender Order.
The family court
specifically stated that if the situation did not improve, she
could be removed from her family.
On September 14, 2004, the family court heard this
case on a second contempt charge, this one arising from
information the court had recently learned in a domestic
violence action involving J.R.D.’s estranged parents.
During
the domestic violence hearing, a social worker testified that
J.R.D. had been drinking alcohol.
During the course of the
juvenile court appearance, the family court learned that J.R.D.
had been removed from Danville High School, was in a GED program
and was being home-schooled (all which would technically be
violations of the status offender order.)
The mother also
indicated that a few days earlier J.R.D. had returned home
drunk.
She filed an affidavit to this effect later that day.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the family court found that
the Status Offender Order was in full force and effect and
adopted the terms of a Prevention Plan entered a few days
-6-
previously in the domestic violence case.5
The family court then
entered a new Juvenile Status Offender Order, adding several
additional conditions, including that J.R.D. enroll in and
attend day treatment/GED track, that she be permitted to work at
her mother’s discretion, and that she be assessed for
drug/alcohol abuse through Comprehensive Care.
The Status
Offender Order again warned that any failure to abide by its
terms may result in a finding of contempt.
As J.R.D.’s mother was driving them home from the
September 14th court appearance, J.R.D. became upset when she was
not permitted to visit with her father that evening.
As a
result, J.R.D. punched the windshield while her mother was
driving, causing it to break.
The mother pulled over, called
the police, had J.R.D. placed into detention, and returned to
court to file a new affidavit detailing J.R.D.’s actions.
The family court held a detention hearing on September
15, 2004, on the new contempt charge.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, the family court entered the following order:
Court finds probable cause to believe that
child has committed the offense of contempt
of court for violation of Status Offender
Order. The Court further finds based upon
the fact, that if found ultimately to be in
contempt it would be the child’s third
5
The terms included requirements that no alcohol was to be consumed during
J.R.D.’s visitations with her father and that all alcohol had to be locked up
when she was there, that the parents cooperate with the Cabinet, that they
submit to random drug screenings, and that all house rules be followed.
-7-
contempt allegation and second finding.
Further, the child is alleged to have
committed the offense within an hour of her
court appearance on 9/14/2005. Accordingly,
the Court finds that detention at this time
is in the child’s best interests. In so
finding the Court has determined that there
was a valid status offender order in place
at the time the alleged offense was
committed. The Court has also directed that
CHFS file a written report, copy to court
and counsel by Tues., September 20, 2005 as
required in KRS 610.265(2)(b)4.c. PTC set
for October 12, 2005.
At the October 12, 2005, pretrial conference, the family court
ordered the Cabinet to open a case on the family, stated that
all prior orders were to remain in effect, and reset the case on
the contempt issue for December 7, 2005.
On October 31, 2005, Cabinet employee Scott Helm filed
an affidavit stating that J.R.D. tested positive for marijuana
during an October 18th drug test.
placed in detention.
J.R.D. was again picked up and
At the detention hearing on November 3,
2005, J.R.D. admitted the contempt and that there was probable
cause for the pick up.
As an alternate to detention, and
pursuant to the parties’ agreement, the family court placed
J.R.D. in the temporary custody of the Cabinet for
transportation that day to Ramey-Estep Homes for in-patient
treatment.
The family court then set a disposition hearing on
this contempt charges for the previously set December 7th show
-8-
cause hearing on the other two pending contempt charges, and
ordered the Cabinet to file another PDI report.
At the December 7, 2005, court date, the Cabinet filed
the PDI report as ordered, in which it recommended that J.R.D.
be committed to the Cabinet, that she complete the program at
Ramey-Estep Homes and earn her GED, that the parents continue
with their case plans, that J.R.D. and her father continue to
submit to random drug tests, and that J.R.D. follow the status
probationary orders as well as other orders and recommendations
of the court and the Cabinet.
During the hearing, counsel for
J.R.D. asserted that her family did not realize that the
treatment program would last several months and requested that
she be returned home to continue with her treatment.
At the
conclusion of the hearing, the family court merged the three
pending contempt charges and adopted the recommendations of the
Cabinet.
The family court decided to conditionally permit
J.R.D. to spend two days with her family over the Christmas
holiday, adding an amendment to this effect to the adopted
recommendations.
Finally, the family court entered a Juvenile
Status Disposition order, in which it found that J.R.D. was a
habitual truant and in contempt of court, and committed her to
the Cabinet with the recommendation that she complete the
treatment program at Ramey-Estep Homes.
It is from this order
that J.R.D. has taken the present appeal.
-9-
On appeal, J.R.D. argues that the family court erred
by committing her to the Cabinet for contempt of court and
because commitment to the Cabinet was not the last restrictive
alternative.
In response, the Commonwealth counters J.R.D.’s
arguments, pointing out (as did J.R.D.) that the first argument
was unpreserved, but that any error did not rise to the level of
palpable error, and that the family court committed her for
being a status offender, rather than for contempt of court.
The
Commonwealth also asserts that commitment to the Cabinet was the
least restrictive alternative in this case.
1) COMMITMENT TO THE CABINET
J.R.D. concedes that this argument was not preserved
for appeal, but nevertheless asserts that this argument must be
reviewed as it is akin to sentencing in a criminal matter, or
that it should be reviewed under the palpable error rule
pursuant to RCr 10.26.
She argues that the statutes applicable
to status offenders do not permit a court to delegate a decision
on confinement to the Cabinet, and that it was fundamentally
unfair to her for the family court to bootstrap a commitment
order to a contempt finding as she was never told that this
could be a possible outcome of violating a status offender
order.
The Commonwealth, on the other hand, asserts that this
is not a true criminal matter and that this is not a case
involving palpable error.
Furthermore, the Commonwealth argues
-10-
that the family court’s order of commitment was both authorized
and lawful.
We agree with the Commonwealth that commitment to the
Cabinet was the appropriate ruling in this matter, and we can
identify no error, palpable or otherwise.
By the terms of the
order relating to the habitual truancy charge, J.R.D. was
probated to the Cabinet until her eighteenth birthday, and the
family court specifically stated that she could be removed from
her family if the situation did not improve.
Furthermore, the
Cabinet recommended in its PDI report that J.R.D. would benefit
from long-term residential treatment.
As revealed by the
numerous contempt charges and detentions that followed, J.R.D.
clearly violated the terms of her probation, meaning that she
was subject to removal to the Cabinet.
By committing J.R.D. to
the Cabinet, the family court was simply following its order
resolving the habitual truancy charge; J.R.D. was not committed
solely for her contemptuous actions.
We perceive no error in the family court’s decision to
commit J.R.D. to the Cabinet.
2) LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVE
J.R.D. next argues that commitment to the Cabinet to
be placed into a treatment center was not the least restrictive
alternative available.
On the other hand, the Commonwealth
points out that the many other alternatives attempted had not
-11-
worked and that J.R.D.’s removal from her home served her best
interests.
While we agree with J.R.D.’s statement of the law that
a court must impose the least restrictive method of treatment,
we ultimately agree with the Commonwealth that the family court
properly committed her to the Cabinet.
The Legislature has made
it clear that “[t]he court shall show that other less
restrictive alternatives have been attempted or are not feasible
in order to insure that children are not removed from families
except when absolutely necessary[.]”
KRS 600.010(2)(c).
But
the Legislature also provided that “[w]hen all appropriate
resources have been reviewed and considered insufficient to
adequately address the needs of the child and the child’s
family, the court may commit the child to the cabinet for such
services as may be necessary.”
KRS 630.120(6).
In the present
case, the family court obviously expended a tremendous amount of
time and effort through numerous court proceedings over several
years to remedy the situation without removing J.R.D. from her
home.
Nothing was effective.
Both the Cabinet and the family
court recognized that J.R.D. needed to be removed from her home
in order for her to get the appropriate treatment.
Again, we perceive no error or abuse of discretion in
the family court’s decision to commit J.R.D. to the Cabinet, or
-12-
in its recommendation that she be required to complete the
treatment plan at Ramey-Estep Homes.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Boyle
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-13-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.