STANLEY MILLER v. MILLER BROTHERS COAL COMPANY; HON. IRENE STEEN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 15, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
MODIFIED:
SEPTEMBER 22, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2006-CA-000127-WC
STANLEY MILLER
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-01458
MILLER BROTHERS COAL COMPANY;
HON. IRENE STEEN, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; and WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
ABRAMSON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
VANMETER, JUDGE:
Stanley Miller petitions for the review of an
opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board, which affirmed the
decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) dismissing his
claim for failure to file within the time period required by KRS
342.185.
1
Miller argues that the Board erred both procedurally
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
and substantively in affirming the ALJ’s dismissal of his claim.
For the reasons hereinafter stated, we affirm.
Miller was a rock truck driver for Miller Brothers
Coal Company.
In March 2001, he went to see Dr. Ott, a
chiropractor, for back problems which Miller believed were
caused by his work.
After receiving no relief from Dr. Ott and
other medical providers, Miller quit his job in March 2002.
He
filed a claim for workers compensation benefits in July 2003.
Miller Brothers responded by claiming in part that the
injuries were not work-related and that Miller had failed to
comply with the applicable statute of limitations.2
The ALJ
dismissed the claim after finding that Dr. Timothy Kriss had
found that Miller’s low back and leg complaints were related to
diabetes, and not to work.
The ALJ made no factual findings as
to the limitations issue, as she held that her determination of
the work-relatedness issue resolved the case and rendered the
other issues moot.
On appeal to the Board, the parties only addressed the
issue of the work-relatedness of Miller’s injury.
After
determining that the ALJ had either misunderstood or
misinterpreted Dr. Kriss’s findings, the Board vacated the ALJ’s
determination and directed the ALJ on remand “to once more
review the whole record with specific focus on the medical
2
KRS 342.185(1).
-2-
opinions and AMA assessment of Dr. Kriss.
Thereafter, the ALJ
shall issue a new decision on the merits.”
On remand, the ALJ again determined that Miller’s
complaints were not work-related.
In addition, the ALJ
addressed the statute of limitations issue raised by Miller
Brothers at the original benefit review conference, finding as
follows:
The Defendant points out that the
Plaintiff had been seen for and complained
of back and leg pains for several years
prior to his ceasing work, the latest
occurring in March 2001, and the claim was
not filed until July 2003. There was no
evidence regarding any apportionment of
Plaintiff’s impairment rating that could
have been attributed to the last two years
of Plaintiff’s work and I do find that
Plaintiff had been of the frame of mind that
it was his work that caused his back pain,
yet he never notified or filed a claim in a
timely fashion. Thus, on this issue alone,
Plaintiff’s claim would be dismissed as
well.
Miller again appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Board,
which affirmed based on the statute of limitations issue.
This
petition for review followed.
Miller’s first argument is that the ALJ’s
consideration of the limitations issue exceeded the scope of the
Board’s mandate on remand.
We disagree.
-3-
The mandate rule requires a lower court to be bound by
the scope of the remand issued by a higher court.3
As the Sixth
Circuit has explained, “[t]he scope of a remand is determined by
examining the entire order or opinion, to determine whether and
how the [higher court] intended to limit a remand.”4
Further,
when a case is remanded, events often occur
that were not considered at all by the
appellate court or addressed by the remand
instructions. To name just a few examples
of such events, parties die; claims become
moot; amended pleadings create new issues
and transform old issues. And, as happened
here, parties change litigation strategy and
bring before the court new options for
resolution of the case. When the district
court deals with such events, it does not
necessarily act in violation of the court of
appeals’ instructions or exceed the scope of
the remand.5
As set forth above, the Board vacated the ALJ’s
original determination and directed the ALJ on remand “to once
more review the whole record with specific focus on the medical
opinions and AMA assessment of Dr. Kriss.
Thereafter, the ALJ
shall issue a new decision on the merits.”
Despite Miller’s
contention, the Board’s mandate did not require the ALJ to
overlook any procedural issues and simply address the
3
See Scott v. Churchill, 377 F.3d 565, 570 (6th Cir. 2004) (“basic tenet of
the mandate rule is that a district court is bound to the scope of the remand
issued by the court of appeals”). See also Buckley v. Wilson, 177 S.W.3d
778, 781 (Ky. 2005).
4
Scott, 377 F.3d at 570.
5
Giles v. Schotten, 449 F.3d 698, 703 (6th Cir. 2006).
-4-
substantive issues in the case.
Rather, the Board’s mandate
directed the ALJ to reconsider the entire record, including the
medical evidence, before issuing a new opinion.
Thus, we cannot
say that the ALJ exceeded the scope of the Board’s remand by
reconsidering all issues including the contested statute of
limitations issue.
Next, Miller argues that the Board erred by affirming
the ALJ’s decision that his claim was barred by the statute of
limitations as there was no finding, in accordance with Hill v.
Sextet Mining Corp.,6 that a medical provider had informed Miller
of his work-related injury more than two years before he filed
his claim.
We disagree.
An employer asserting the statute of limitations as a
defense has the burden of proving the elements of the defense.7
As Miller Brothers successfully proved this defense below, the
question now before us is whether substantial evidence in the
record supported the decision.8
The Kentucky Supreme Court has addressed the
calculation of time in a gradual injury case, such as the one
now before us, as follows:
6
65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. 2001).
7
Lizdo v. Gentec Equip., 74 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Ky. 2002).
8
Wolf Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984).
-5-
[W]here a claim is not filed until more than
two years after the worker's discovery of an
injury and the fact that it was caused by
work, KRS 342.185 would operate to prohibit
compensation for whatever occupational
disability is attributable to trauma
incurred more than two years preceding the
filing of the claim.9
Here, it is undisputed that Miller saw a chiropractor in March
2001 for back problems which he believed were caused by his
work.
As Miller was aware of the work-related nature of his
injury at that time, and he does not argue that he suffered any
additional work-related trauma,10 substantial evidence supports
the ALJ’s finding that the two-year limitations period began to
run in March 2001, so that Miller’s July 2003 claim was
untimely.
Miller’s reliance upon Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp.11 is
misplaced.
First, Hill dealt with whether the claimant had
given timely notice to his employer of his work-related gradual
injury as required by KRS 342.185.
By contrast, the issue here
is whether Miller’s claim for benefits was timely filed.
Second, while the claimant in Hill “was aware of
symptoms in his cervical spine and associated the periodic
flare-up of symptoms with his work[,]” he was not aware that he
9
Special Fund v. Clark, 998 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Ky. 1999).
10
See Holbrook v. Lexmark Int’l Group, Inc., 65 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Ky. 2001).
11
65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. 2001).
-6-
had a work-related gradual injury until he was informed of that
fact by one of his doctors.12
Accordingly, the claimant “was not
required to give notice that he had sustained a work-related
gradual injury to his spine until he was informed of that
fact.”13
Here, by contrast, Miller testified that he believed in
March 2001 that his back problems were work-related.
Thus,
substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that the
statute of limitations began to run at that time and expired
before Miller filed his claim in July 2003.
The Board’s opinion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
Patrick E. O’Neill
Jackson, Kentucky
12
Kamp T. Purdy
Lexington, Kentucky
Id. at 507.
13
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE MILLER
BROTHERS COAL COMPANY:
Id.
-7-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.
