LARRY DEAN HOSKINS v. DAVID DIETZ
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002551-MR
LARRY DEAN HOSKINS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE GREGORY A. LAY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00668
v.
DAVID DIETZ
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE:
Larry Hoskins appeals from a November 15,
2005, judgment of the Laurel Circuit Court establishing the
boundary between a tract of land Hoskins owns in Laurel County
near London and an adjoining tract owned by David Dietz, the
Appellee.
A portion of a garage Hoskins built in 2001 lies
across the boundary line, and the court ordered Hoskins both to
remove the encroachment and to pay Dietz damages for timber
Hoskins removed from Dietz’s land in the course of construction.
Hoskins contends that Dietz should be estopped from complaining
of the encroachment, or, if not, that the encroachment is not as
extensive as the trial court found.
Convinced that Dietz in no
way induced Hoskins’s trespass and that the trial court’s
boundary determination was not clearly erroneous, we affirm.
This case concerns a scrivener’s error in the parties’
deeds.
The parties concede the error, but dispute its
consequences.
In 1976, a Mr. and Mrs. Prewitt conveyed an
approximately 2.9 acre tract at the northwest corner of Reed
Road and Blackwood Lane in Laurel County, about one-half mile
north of Ky. Highway 80, to a Mr. and Mrs. Tomlinson.
This
tract was a portion of a larger tract that had been conveyed to
the Prewitts in 1974.
With the calls numbered for the sake of
reference, the deed from the Prewitts to the Tomlinsons
described the 2.9 acre tract as follows:
(1) Beginning at a stake at the RW line of
County Road [Reed Road];
(2) thence with RW of said road, S. 3.30 W.
90.69 feet to a stake;
(3) thence with RW S. 61.22 W. 52 feet to a
stake at RW;
(4) thence with RW S. 42.40 W. 73.8 feet to
a stake [emphasis added];
(5) thence with RW S. 32.46 W. 96 feet to a
stake in RW;
(6) thence with RW S. 23.08 W. 81 feet to a
stake in RW;
(7) thence with RW S. 17.03 W. 75 feet to a
stake in RW;
(8) thence leaving RW N. 85.27 W. 315 feet
to a stake;
(9) thence N 30.25 E. 465 feet to a stake;
(10) thence S. 85.39 E. 300 feet to the
beginning corner, containing 2.9 acres, more
or less.
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This description was based on a survey made by Larry
Jervis in 1976 apparently for the sake of severing the 2.9 acre
tract from the Prewitts’ larger tract.
It should be noted,
however, that the calls along Reed Road, nos. 1 – 7 (with the
exception of the length of 7), also appear in the 1974 deed to
the Prewitts.
In 1981 the Tomlinsons conveyed the 2.9 acre
tract, as described by the Jervis survey, to the Mintons.
And
in 1983, the Mintons conveyed approximately 2 of the 2.9 acres
to a Mr. and Mrs. Bunch.
The deed to the Bunches was based on a
1983 survey by Ace Hensley and described the two-acre property
as follows:
(1) Beginning at a stake at the right of way
of the county road; thence 5 lines with the
west right of way of the road;
(2) S. 3.30 W. 90.7 feet;
(3) S. 61.22 W. 52.0 feet;
(4) S. 24.40 W. 73.8 feet [emphasis added];
(5) S. 32.46 W. 96.0 feet;
(6) S. 23.08 W. 20.0 feet to a stake;
(7) thence leaving the road; N. 84.25 W.
315.0 feet to a stake;
(8) thence N. 30.25 E. 305.0 feet to a
stake;
(9) thence S. 85.39 E. 300.0 feet, to the
point of beginning, containing 2.0 acre[s]
the same to be more or less by survey by Ace
Hensley on July 12, 1983.
As we have emphasized, the fourth call of the Hensley
description contains what is clearly a scrivener’s error by
reversing the digits of “42.”
Following a series of five
intervening conveyances, all of which incorporate the erroneous
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Hensley description, Hoskins acquired the two-acre tract in
April 1997.
In the meantime, in September 1992, the Mintons
conveyed the approximately 0.9 acre remainder of their original
2.9 acre tract to Appellee Dietz.
The deed to Dietz describes
his conveyance as the entire 2.9 acres less the 2.0 acre prior
conveyance and incorporates both of the above descriptions,
including the discrepant fourth calls.
trailer on his property.
Hoskins resides in a
The Dietz property is unimproved, and
apparently Dietz visited the land infrequently, primarily on
holidays.
The present controversy arose in the fall of 2001,
when Hoskins constructed a three-bay garage near the
southeastern corner of his tract, where it abuts Reed Road to
the east and Dietz’s tract to the south.
As Hoskins’s
deposition testimony makes clear, he had no idea who owned the
property to his south before he commenced building.
He had
never seen Dietz and made no attempt to apprise him of the
building plan.
Nor did he consult a surveyor to locate his
southern boundary, or even his deed description, but instead
relied solely on his four-year-old recollection of where his
realtor had pointed out a wooden stake—long gone—ostensibly
marking the southeastern corner of the property.
In September
2001 Hoskins cleared trees from the construction site, and
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construction began about October 11, 2001.
The garage was
complete by early November 2001.
Dietz testified that he heard that someone may have
been cutting timber on his land, so in early October he
investigated.
He found Hoskins’s garage well underway, the roof
and walls already complete, and was concerned that a portion of
it extended onto his tract.
He also noted tree stumps on what
he believed was his land, and piles of brush and construction
debris.
He knocked on Hoskins’s door that day, but received no
answer.
Because he was unsure about the boundary between his
land and Hoskins’s, he promptly hired a surveyor to make that
determination.
The surveyor, George Adams, testified that he visited
the property soon thereafter in October 2001.
The garage was
still under construction, and he encountered Hoskins at the
site.
Although Hoskins later testified that Adams claimed to be
surveying Hoskins’s western boundary, Adams testified that,
while he may not have identified Dietz as his client, he made it
clear that he was trying to determine the line between Hoskins’s
land and Dietz’s land to the south.
Indeed, he testified that
Hoskins pointed out what Hoskins believed were both of his
southern corners.
Adams eventually located the beginning point
of the above deed descriptions and using the calls from the
parent deed—the S. 42.40 W. call above—determined that Hoskins’s
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southeast corner lay under the front of the new garage and that
about a third of the garage extended across the boundary line
onto Dietz’s property.
When Adams had completed his survey,
Dietz approached Hoskins, on Thanksgiving Day 2001, and told him
that he believed Hoskins’s garage was encroaching.
Hoskins thereupon hired his own surveyor, Ralph
Peters, who, beginning from the same starting point but using
the calls from the erroneous Hensley survey—the S. 24.40 W.
call—fixed Hoskins’s southeast corner several feet east and
south of the corner Adams determined.
Even using Peters’s
corner Hoskins’s garage encroaches on Dietz’s property, but the
encroachment is less.
According to Peters, the garage
encroaches about eight-and-a-half square feet onto Dietz’s
property.
The conflicting surveys left the parties at an
impasse, with the result that in July 2002 Dietz brought the
present suit seeking injunctive and monetary relief.
The matter
was submitted to the trial court on the basis of depositions,
and, as noted, the court, although it deemed Hoskins’s trespass
mistaken rather than willful, adopted the boundary line
determined by Dietz’s surveyor, Adams, ordered Hoskins to remove
his encroachments from Dietz’s property, and awarded Dietz
damages for the misappropriated timber.
Appealing from that
judgment, Hoskins first contends that Dietz should be estopped
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from complaining about the encroachment because by his own
testimony he became aware of it in October 2001 before
construction was complete, but did not object until November 22,
2001, by which time Hoskins had expended additional funds to
complete the building.
The trial court did not err by rejecting
this contention.
It is true, as Hoskins notes, that a boundary line may
“become fixed by the operation of an estoppel.”
A landowner who knows the true line and
silently permits an adjoining owner to make
substantial improvements unknowingly past
the line is estopped to claim to the true
boundary.
Faulkner v. Lloyd, 253 S.W.2d 972, 974 (Ky. 1952).
Martin v. Gayheart, 264 S.W.2d 653 (Ky. 1954).
See also
It is no less
true, on the other hand, that an estoppel affecting title to
real property is an “extraordinary circumstance,” requiring the
one asserting it to show “an actual fraudulent representation,
concealment or such negligence as will amount to a fraud in law,
and that the party setting up such estoppel was actually misled
thereby to his injury.”
Jones v. Travis, 302 Ky. 367, 370, 194
S.W.2d 841, 842 (1946).
More particularly, as this Court has
recently reiterated,
[t]he essential elements of equitable
estoppel are:
(1) Conduct which amounts to a false
representation or concealment of material
facts, or, at least, which is calculated to
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convey the impression that the facts are
otherwise than, and inconsistent with, those
which the party subsequently attempts to
assert;
(2) intention, or at least expectation, that
such conduct shall be acted upon by the
other party;
(3) knowledge, actual or constructive, of
the real facts.
As related to the party claiming the
estoppel, they are:
(1) Lack of knowledge and of the means of
knowledge of the truth as to the facts in
question;
(2) reliance upon the conduct of the party
estopped; and
(3) action based thereon of such a character
as to change his position prejudicially.
Embry v. Turner, 185 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Ky. App. 2006) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Hoskins’s evidence fails to establish several of
these elements.
Even assuming that Dietz was somewhat negligent
in not immediately apprising Hoskins of his concerns, Dietz did
not know where the boundary was until Adams had completed his
survey, which he did with more than reasonable promptness.
Moreover, Hoskins was as privy to information about the boundary
as was Dietz, so any reliance on Dietz’s mere silence could not
be deemed reasonable.
In fact, Hoskins did not rely on Dietz’s
silence, of which he was not even aware, but relied instead on
his own mere recollection of a questionable corner marker long
since removed.
Put simply, Dietz did not induce, negligently or
otherwise, Hoskins’s rash decision regarding the location of the
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garage.
If anyone was culpably negligent in this case it was
Hoskins, whose cavalier assumption that he knew the boundary,
even after Adams told him that the boundary was in question,
resulted in his costly trespass.
The trial court did not err,
therefore, by ruling that Dietz’s complaint was not equitably
estopped.
Hoskins next contends that the trial court erred by
adopting Adams’s survey, although based on the correct call
number 4 (S. 42.40 W. 73.8 feet), instead of Peters’s survey,
which perpetuated the Hensley survey error (S. 24.40 W. 73.8
feet).
He bases his contention on the fact that Peters claimed
to have discovered two steel surveying pins within a couple of
feet of his southeastern corner, but only within about three and
one-half feet of each other and both within an inch or two of
the asphalt edge of the roadway.
other surveyor’s marks.
The pins did not have caps or
Nevertheless, Peters believed that they
were prior monuments marking that corner.
Relying on the
general rule that “monuments ordinarily are controlling over
courses and distances,” Powell v. Reid, 519 S.W.2d 388, 389 (Ky.
1975), Hoskins maintains that the corner allegedly marked by
these pins should control over the corner Adams arrived at by
courses and distances.
As the parties note, the fact finder’s
choice between conflicting surveys will be upheld on appeal
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unless clearly erroneous.
Gatliff v. White, 424 S.W.2d 843 (Ky.
1968).
In discussing the general rule just stated, the former
Court of Appeals explained “that a mark or boundary that was
visible and recognized when first mentioned in a document does
not lose its legal force merely by physical disappearance, so
long as its original site can be definitely established.”
Powell v. Reid, 519 S.W.2d at 389.
Artificial markers are not
talismans, of course, and here, as the trial court noted, even
if the pins Peters allegedly found were meant to mark Hoskins’s
property and not, say, the edge of the road, they were not
originally visible markers referred to in Hoskins’s parent deed,
but were merely artificial marks placed according to the
erroneous course-and-distance description of Hensley’s survey.
As such, Peters’s corner is really no less a course-and-distance
determination than Adams’s corner, and the pins are not entitled
to the controlling force Hoskins claims.
Another general rule
is that deeds are to be construed so as to give effect to the
intention of the parties, and obvious errors are to be
disregarded in favor of that intention.
Ky. 408, 214 S.W.2d 598 (1948).
Chrisman v. Dennis, 308
Here, the trial court correctly
determined that Hensley’s obviously erroneous call should be
disregarded in favor of the correct call from the parent deed,
and that Adams’s survey, based on the correct call, better
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reflected the parties’ intentions than Peters’s survey, which
did not incorporate that correction.
In sum, the trial court correctly held that Dietz did
not induce or unduly permit the encroachment on his property and
thus his claim is not estopped.
Furthermore, the court’s
reliance on the Adams survey was not clearly erroneous.
Accordingly, we affirm the November 15, 2005, judgment of the
Laurel Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
John T. Aubrey
Manchester, Kentucky
Mary-Ann Smyth Rush
Corbin, Kentucky
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