DENISE MULLINS v. WILLIAM DAVID GOOCH, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER FOR THE LINCOLN COUNTY JAIL
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DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002480-MR
DENISE MULLINS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LINCOLN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE VERNON MINIARD, JR., SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00204
WILLIAM DAVID GOOCH,
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS
OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS JAILER
FOR THE LINCOLN COUNTY JAIL
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
ABRAMSON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE:
Denise Mullins filed this action
against William David Gooch in his individual capacity and in
his official capacity as jailer for the Lincoln County Regional
Jail alleging: (1) that she was wrongfully terminated from her
employment; (2) that she was denied due process under the
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
Kentucky and United States Constitutions; (3) invasion of
privacy; (4) outrageous conduct; and (5) abuse of process.
Mullins contends that the trial court erred when it entered a
directed verdict in favor of Gooch in his individual and
official capacities on all her claims. Finding no error, we
affirm.
As a part of her duties as a deputy jailer for the
Lincoln County Regional Jail, Mullins was to prepare bonds,
place the bond money in an envelope, and then drop it into a
slot in a locked box while speaking on a camera.
The camera
took pictures only at certain intervals so that the employees
were required to move slowly in order that their movements could
be recorded.
On June 29, 2002, while on duty, Mullins accepted
$504 in cash as bond money for an inmate.
The envelope
containing the money was later discovered missing.
On July 2, 2002, Mullins met with Gooch and Chief
Deputy Carl Leach who accused her of stealing the missing bond
money.
The three reviewed the video surveillance tape, which
showed that, contrary to jail procedure, Mullins could not be
seen dropping the envelope in the slot but she could be seen
moving off camera toward the direction of her purse.
The tape
also indicated that Mullins left the control room door open and
prepared the bond in the presence of an inmate.
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Gooch met with Mullins again on July 4, 2002, to
discuss the missing bond money and, following the meeting, she
was suspended without pay.
Also, Gooch allegedly demanded that
Mullins apply her current paycheck to pay back the bond money
or, he threatened, he would pursue an indictment against her.
Mullins refused, and she denied she took the money.
After Gooch
suspended Mullins, he carried through with his threat and
pursued criminal charges; the grand jury, however, did not
return an indictment.
After suspending Mullins, Gooch conducted an internal
investigation into suspected illegal drug use by Mullins.
Following receipt of a positive drug test, Gooch requested and
received a statement from Mullins’s physician that controlled
substances were contained in Mullins’s prescribed drugs.
Gooch
then made a written request for the specific dosage of her
medication.
On September 28, 2002, Gooch sent Mullins a letter
setting forth the following reasons for her dismissal: (1) theft
of $504; (2) failure to properly use the surveillance equipment;
(3) failure to keep the control room door closed and locked;(4)
abandoning the control room; (5) failure to control inmate
movement; and (6) chronic use or abuse of narcotics or
controlled substances.
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Although the Lincoln County Regional Jail had an
internal grievance procedure, Mullins did not pursue that
remedy.
Rather, she filed this action.
Following discovery,
Gooch filed a motion for summary judgment to which Mullins
objected on the basis that it was noticed to be heard just three
days prior to the scheduled trial date, February 14, 2005, and
that she did not receive proper notice.
Mullins’s objection was
overruled, and the trial was rescheduled for May 3, 2005.
Prior
to the trial, however, the presiding judge passed away and the
motion for summary judgment remained pending.
On October 18, 2005, the special judge appointed to
the case denied the motion for summary judgment.
The case
proceeded to trial and, following the close of Mullins’s case,
the trial court granted Gooch’s motion for a directed verdict on
all the claims alleged on the basis that: (1) Mullins had failed
to exhaust the jail grievance procedure prior to filing the
action; (2) there were no violations of her state or federal due
process rights; (3) there were no facts presented establishing
an invasion of privacy claim or an abuse of process claim; and
(4) Gooch was entitled to absolute immunity in his official
capacity and qualified immunity in his individual capacity.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Any attempt by Mullins to revisit the timeliness of
the motion for summary judgment cannot succeed because,
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generally, the denial of a summary judgment is an interlocutory
order that cannot be reviewed on appeal.
And it does not
preclude the court’s consideration of the same issues of law and
fact raised by way of a directed verdict.
See Transportation
Cabinet, Bureau of Highways, Commonwealth of Kentucky v.
Leneave, 751 S.W.2d 36 (Ky.App. 1988).
Once the trial is
commenced, “all matters of fact and law procedurally merge into
the trial phase, subject to in-trial motions for directed
verdict or dismissal and post-judgment motions for new trial
and/or judgment notwithstanding the verdict.”
Id. at 38.
Since the court explicitly denied the motion for
summary judgment, the standard of review is that applicable to
the granting of a directed verdict.
A trial judge cannot enter a directed
verdict unless there is a complete absence
of proof on a material issue or there are no
disputed issues of fact upon which
reasonable minds could differ. Where there
is conflicting evidence, it is the
responsibility of the jury to determine and
resolve such conflicts. A motion for
directed verdict admits the truth of all
evidence favorable to the party against whom
the motion is made. Upon such motion, the
court may not consider the credibility of
evidence or the weight it should be given,
this being a function reserved for the trier
of fact. The trial court must favor the
party against whom the motion is made,
complete with all inferences reasonably
drawn from the evidence. The trial court
then must determine whether the evidence
favorable to the party against whom the
motion is made is of such substance that a
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verdict rendered thereon would be “palpably
or flagrantly” against the evidence so as
“to indicate that it was reached as result
of passion or prejudice.” In such a case, a
directed verdict should be given.
Otherwise, the motion should be denied.
Gibbs v. Wickersham, 133 S.W.3d 494, 495-496
(Ky.App. 2004) (citations omitted).
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES DOCTRINE
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 71.060(2) states in
part that the jailer may discharge a deputy “at any time with
cause.”
Additionally, KRS 441.055(1) requires that the
Corrections Cabinet promulgate minimum standards for jails.
Pursuant to that directive, 501 KAR 3:020 requires that the
jailer develop and maintain a manual of policy and procedure,
including a personnel policy.
As a consequence, by statute and
regulation, upon termination deputy jailers are entitled to
procedural rights.
Said v. Lackey, 731 S.W.2d 7 (Ky.App. 1987).
In compliance with the statutes and regulations, the
Lincoln County Regional Jail has an employee manual that
provides that if the employee is dissatisfied with the personnel
action taken, the employee must immediately submit a written
grievance to the jailer.
Within five days, the jailer shall
either confer with the employee about the grievance or, “at his
sole discretion, assemble an employee grievance review board
consisting of himself and two of the highest ranking jail staff
members available to confer with the employee....” Thereafter,
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the jailer has five days to notify the employee of the final
determination.
After the Lincoln County Jail Employee Grievance
Procedure is exhausted, the manual provides for further review.
The “employee shall then have the right to pursue his/her
grievance through the County’s established grievance procedure;
if such a grievance procedure exists.
Only after all
administrative procedures are exhausted shall the employee
proceed by way of civil action in a court of law.”
At the time she was hired, Mullins signed a document
entitled “Lincoln County Regional Jail-Acknowledgment formEmployee Misconduct” which states that she is aware she is
responsible for reading and understanding the jail’s policy and
procedure manual.
Despite her acknowledgement of the grievance
procedure, Mullins did not pursue her internal remedies.
Thus,
as the trial court held, the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
precludes her from now seeking relief on her wrongful
termination claim.
We agree.
As a general rule, a party is required to exhaust
available administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
relief.
Exhaustion is generally required as a matter
of preventing premature interference with
agency processes, so that the agency may:
(1) function efficiently and have an
opportunity to correct its own errors; (2)
afford the parties and the courts the
benefit of its experience and expertise
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without the threat of litigious
interruption; and (3) compile a record which
is adequate for judicial review.
Popplewell’s Alligator Dock No. 1, Inc. v.
Revenue Cabinet, 133 S.W.3d 456, 471 (Ky.
2004), quoting 2 AM.JUR.2D Administrative
Law § 505 (1994).
In this case, a similar rationale compels the application of the
doctrine.
The employee manual sets forth specific steps to be
taken to initiate the grievance procedure and ultimately
entitled Mullins to the county grievance procedure.
Had Mullins
pursued her internal remedies, the dispute may have been
resolved allowing the county to deal with its own personnel
matter without interference by the judiciary.
Additionally,
Mullins agreed to the terms and conditions of her employment
when she acknowledged she had read the contents of the manual.
To allow her to “sidestep these procedures would undermine the
internal grievance procedure that the parties had agreed to and
encourage other litigants to ignore the available procedure as
well.”
See Neiman v. Yale University, 851 A.2d 1165, 1172
(Conn. 2004).
Mullins contends that she was not required to pursue
her internal remedies because the procedure was not accessible.
Contrary to that contention, is the signed acknowledgement that
she understood she was responsible for reading and understanding
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the manual.
Although a copy was available to her at the jail
and at the fiscal court both during and after her employment,
Mullins did not read the manual.
Moreover, there are no facts
that suggest that Gooch or any county personnel prevented
Mullins from reviewing the manual.
Although Gooch failed to
respond to Mullins’s post-termination request for copies of the
manual, he was not obligated to insure that Mullins actually
knew the procedures or had a copy in her physical possession.
It was Mullins’s responsibility to be aware of her rights and to
follow the proper procedures.
Mullins claims that even had she been aware of the
procedure, her complaint would not have been favorably resolved;
she claims, therefore, that her remedy was to pursue a court
action.
An exception to the exhaustion of remedies doctrine
exists when the pursuit of those remedies would have been
futile.
Popplewell’s, supra.
Merely because Mullins predicts
that the outcome would not have changed had she pursued the
internal grievance procedure, however, is insufficient to
demonstrate the futility of the process itself.
Although the
resolution of the employee’s initial grievance is largely
discretionary with the jailer, it is an initial step in the
process of affording meaningful review that ultimately concludes
with a review in accordance with the county grievance procedure.
Mullins’s futility argument is not sufficient for this court to
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ignore the long-standing principle of the exhaustion of remedies
doctrine.
DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS
Mullins was not a terminable-at-will employee and had
a property interest in her continued employment.
Said, supra.
A full evidentiary hearing, however, is not required prior to
termination and due process requires only that the employee
receive notice and an opportunity to respond.
Cleveland Board
of Education v.Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84
L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
The pre-termination “hearing” is an
“initial check against mistaken decisions-essentially, a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the charges against the employee are true and support the
proposed action.”
Id. at 470 U.S. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. at 1495.
Prior to her termination Mullins was afforded two
opportunities to discuss the accusations with Gooch and given
written notice of the reasons for her termination.
Through the
grievance procedure, further due process was available.
There
was no denial of due process.
ABUSE OF PROCESS
After Gooch confronted Mullins regarding the missing
bond money, he pursued criminal charges against her and the case
was eventually presented to the grand jury, which did not return
an indictment.
Mullins contends that Gooch’s pursuit was an
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abuse of the criminal process, and she relies on a statement
made by Gooch at the second pre-termination meeting that if she
did not return the bond money he would seek criminal charges.
Abuse of process is a tort designed to compensate a
plaintiff for an injury incurred as a result of the irregular or
wrongful employment of a judicial proceeding and requires more
than a showing that the legal proceeding was unsuccessful.
It
must be established that there was: (1) an ulterior purpose; (2)
a willful act in the use of the process not proper in the
regular conduct of the proceeding; and (3) an injury to the
plaintiff.
Mullins v. Richards, 705 S.W.2d 951 (Ky.App. 1986).
Even if the defendant has an ulterior purpose in securing an
indictment, unless there is also an attempt to actually use that
indictment for a purpose outside the criminal proceeding, there
is no abuse of process.
Id. at 952.
There is no evidence that Gooch attempted to use the
criminal proceeding for a purpose other than to seek criminal
punishment, including restitution, for Mullins’s alleged theft
of the bond money.
The motion for a directed verdict was,
therefore, proper.
INVASION OF PRIVACY
In McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times
Company, 623 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1981), the court adopted the
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Restatement (Second) of Torts (1976) Section 652A which states
that:
One who invades the right of privacy of
another is subject to liability for the
resulting harm to the interests of the
other. (2) The right of privacy is invaded
by (a) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another...; or (b)
appropriation of the other’s name or
likeness...; or (c) unreasonable publicity
given to the other’s private life...; or
publicity that unreasonably places the other
in a false light before the public. Id. at
887.
The action protects the rights of a person to be left alone and
free from unwarranted interference by the public about matters
not of public concern.
1951).
Voneye v. Turner, 240 S.W.2d 588 (Ky.
It is not an unlimited right, however, and is subject to
the customs of the time and place and it is determined by the
norm of the “ordinary man”.
Id. at 591.
Mullins was a public employee who, as described in the
employee manual, was subject to random drug testing.
On June 3,
2002, she took a urine drug screen and the positive results were
returned by the Jefferson County Health Department with a note
attached listing the prescription drugs Mullins was taking at
the time of the test.
Mullins physician then supplied a
statement that she had been prescribed opiate therapy and
benzodiazepines.
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Despite her consent to drug testing, Mullins contends
that Gooch requested her medical information without her
knowledge or consent.
Assuming her version is accurate, if
there was any invasion of her privacy, it was the medical
personnel who gave the information to Gooch who committed the
tort.
Merely making a request is not an intrusion upon the
seclusion of another sufficient to sustain the cause of action.
The trial court properly granted a directed verdict.
EVIDENTIARY ISSUES
Mullins cites four instances where the trial court
either erroneously excluded evidence or admitted evidence.
She
claims that is was error to exclude evidence that she offered to
take a lie detector test and that she requested 30 days of the
video tape produced at the jail but received only four days.
She also maintains that the specific medications she was
prescribed should have been excluded as well as the report of
Dr. Robert Granager, a defense witness.
Even if we were to find
error in any of the evidentiary rulings, because we find that
the directed verdict was proper, our decision would not change;
further consideration is, therefore, unnecessary.
The trial
court properly granted a directed verdict on all the claims
alleged.
OFFICIAL AND INDIVIDUAL IMMUNITY
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Since we have found that Mullins failed to establish
facts sufficient to support her claims against Gooch, the
resolution of the immunity issues, either as applied in Gooch’s
official capacity or in his individual capacity, is not
required.
The judgment of the Lincoln Circuit Court is affirmed.
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE, CONCURS.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Bradley S. Guthrie
Harrodsburg, Kentucky
John T. Pruitt
Heidi Schultz Powers
Travis, Pruitt, Powers & Yeast
Somerset, Kentucky
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