J.D. v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY SERVICES, AND A.D., the minor child
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002342-ME
AND
NO. 2005-CA-002612-ME
J.D.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEALS FROM JEFFERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KEVIN L. GARVEY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-AD-500197
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
CABINET FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES, AND
A.D., the minor child
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment and
orders of the Jefferson Family Court by a natural mother whose
parental rights in her child were terminated in an action filed
by the Cabinet for Health and Family Services (Cabinet).
We
affirm.
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
J.D., the natural mother of A.D., has struggled with
substance abuse and criminal problems since before A.D.’s birth.
She refused to take advantage of the treatment programs offered.
Further, while felony charges were pending in a prior case, J.D.
was arrested for shoplifting.
Ultimately, she was incarcerated.
Given J.D.’s complete lack of progress with her
reunification plan objectives, the Cabinet sought the
involuntary termination of her parental rights.
The court
agreed that the Cabinet had established the statutory
requirements under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 625.090, and
it entered an order terminating J.D.’s parental rights.2
appealed from this order.
J.D.
While this appeal was pending, J.D.’s
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 60.02 motion to vacate the
judgment was denied.
J.D. also appealed from this order, and
the two appeals have been combined for our review.
A.D. was born on April 14, 2004.
Her parents are
J.D., her natural mother, and J.S., her natural father.
birth, A.D. tested positive for marijuana.
involved with J.D. at that time.
At her
The Cabinet became
Rather than remove the child,
the Cabinet directed J.D. to seek drug treatment through the
Jefferson Alcohol and Drug Abuse Center (JADAC).
an assessment with JADAC on June 29, 2004.
2
J.D. completed
Because no beds were
The termination order also terminated the rights of A.D.’s father, J.S.
J.S. has made no response to this appeal, nor has he challenged the
termination of his parental rights.
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available for in-patient treatment, JADAC scheduled J.D. for
space in the Women’s Intensive Outpatient Program (WIOP).
was scheduled to begin the program on July 5, 2004.
she failed to show up.
J.D.
However,
JADAC then offered her a second space in
WIOP, scheduling her to begin on July 27, 2004.
Again, J.D.
failed to appear.
In fact, J.D. was arrested on that day for
shoplifting diapers.
At the time of her arrest, she was under
the influence of crack cocaine.
At the time of this offense,
J.D. had 13 counts of possession of a forged instrument pending
against her.
On August 4, 2004, J.D. entered a guilty plea to
all 13 counts.
Under the terms of the plea agreement, J.D.
faced two years in prison on each count, to be served
concurrently.
She was sentenced on August 7, 2004.
On August 2, 2004, shortly after J.D.’s shoplifting
arrest and prior to her plea on the felony counts, the Cabinet
paid her a home visit. When the Cabinet asked J.D. to take a
drug screen, she informed them she would test positive for
marijuana.
In fact, the test came back negative for marijuana
but positive for cocaine.
The facts set out above formed the basis for an
abuse/neglect petition that was filed by the Cabinet in the
Jefferson Family Court on August 5, 2004.
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A temporary removal
hearing was held a week later.
At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court placed A.D. in the temporary custody of the
Cabinet.
Following removal, it was recommended that J.D. comply
with the recommendations of the JADAC, complete the WIOP and any
recommended aftercare, and exercise visitation provided she met
the case plan objectives and remained clean and sober.
On November 18, 2004, J.D. appeared in court for an
evidentiary hearing on the abuse/neglect allegations.
At that
time, she stipulated to the facts set out above and in the
abuse/neglect petition.
J.D. stipulated that A.D. was born
testing positive for marijuana as a result of J.D.’s drug
dependency and that A.D. was a victim of neglect as set forth in
the Cabinet’s petition.
On November 11, 2004, J.D. was granted shock
probation.
At the time of her release, J.D. did not attempt to
visit A.D., nor did she contact the Cabinet to check on A.D.’s
status.
As a result of the choices she made following her
release, J.D.’s probation was revoked.
In an order entered on
January 13, 2005, the court revoking her probation found that,
notwithstanding the needs of her child, J.D. had violated the
terms of her probation.
Subsequent to the revocation of her probation, J.D.
appeared before the Jefferson Family Court for a disposition
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hearing in the abuse/neglect case.
in the care of the Cabinet.
At that time A.D. was placed
By causing herself to be placed in
custody yet again, J.D. had placed herself in a position where
she could not obtain the services necessary to continue working
toward reunification.
As a result of her past history and her
present status, on May 24, 2005, the Cabinet filed a petition to
involuntarily terminate J.D.’s parental rights.
A termination hearing was held September 27, 2005.
At
the hearing, the Cabinet introduced J.D.’s criminal record, as
well as the dependency/neglect/abuse action previously filed in
this case.
offered.
In addition, the Cabinet testified to the services
On cross-examination, J.D. admitted to the factual
basis underlying the dependency/neglect/abuse action.
She also
admitted that she had been offered substance abuse help through
JADAC on two separate occasions, yet had neglected to take
advantage of either.
Further, J.D. admitted to the choices she
had made that led to her current incarceration.
Finally, she
admitted that by causing herself to be placed in custody yet
again, she had placed herself in a position that precluded the
substance abuse treatment she needed.
On October 13, 2005, the court entered findings of
fact and conclusions of law in the termination action.
In its
findings, the court set out the facts surrounding J.D.’s
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substance abuse problems, her decisions not to take advantage of
the WIOP offered through the JADAC, her criminal lifestyle
choices which resulted in her present incarceration, and her
inability when not in custody to obtain employment and to
establish a stable home.
The court, which had denied J.D.’s
motion for a continuance, was aware that a hearing was scheduled
for October in another court to address J.D.’s continued
incarceration.
In its separate conclusions, the court found the
elements set out in KRS 625.090 had been met.
Based on its
findings of fact and conclusions of law, the court then entered
an order terminating the parental rights of J.D. and J.S.
J.D.
appealed the court’s decision.
While this appeal was pending, J.D. was released from
custody.
Based on her release, J.D. filed a CR 60.02 motion.
In an order entered November 12, 2005, the court denied the
motion.
In entering its order, the court set forth two grounds
for its denial.
First, the court concluded that based on KRS
625.110, a CR 60.02 motion is not available in a termination
action.
Second, to the extent the motion was available, the
court concluded it offered no new evidence warranting relief.
The court noted that, in its initial judgment, it had already
taken into consideration the possibility that J.D. would be
released.
J.D. also appealed from this order.
-6-
Kentucky law has long recognized that “[t]he trial
court has broad discretion in determining whether the child fits
within the abused or neglected category and whether the abuse or
neglect warrants termination.”
R.C.R. v. Commonwealth, Cabinet
for Human Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky.App. 1999), citing
Department of Human Resources v. Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672, 675
(Ky.App. 1977).
This case was tried before the court without a jury.
As such, the trial court heard the evidence and entered its
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
On review, such
“[f]indings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.”
See
CR 52.01.
In addition, in reviewing findings of fact by the
trial court, “the test is not whether we would have decided it
differently, but whether the findings of the trial judge were
clearly erroneous or that he abused his discretion.”
Cherry, 634 S.W.2d 423, 425 (Ky. 1982).
Cherry v.
Thus, a court’s
findings cannot be disturbed unless there is no substantial
evidence in the record to support them.
38.
R.C.R., 988 S.W.2d at
See also M.P.S. v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 979 S.W.2d
-7-
114, 116 (Ky.App. 1998).
This court in R.C.R. went on to state
that:
Clear and convincing proof does not
necessarily mean uncontradicted proof. It
is sufficient if there is proof of a
probative and substantial nature carrying
the weight of evidence sufficient to
convince ordinarily prudent-minded people.
Id. at 38-9, quoting Rowland v. Holt, 253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5,
9 (1934).
The grounds for the involuntary termination of
parental rights are set out in KRS 625.090.
As noted by this
court in Cabinet for Families and Children v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d
172, 175-76 (Ky.App. 2004),
Before a circuit court may terminate
such rights, it must find--by clear and
convincing evidence--(1) that the child is
an "abused or neglected child, as defined by
KRS 600.020(1)" and (2) that termination
would be in the child's best interest. KRS
625.090(1). After that threshold is met,
the court must find the existence of one of
the numerous grounds recited in KRS
625.090(1) (including abandonment,
infliction of serious physical injury or
emotional harm, sexual abuse, or neglect in
providing access to basic survival needs) in
order to terminate parental rights.
The statute sets forth two parts that must be satisfied before
termination can be considered:
The Circuit Court may involuntarily
terminate all parental rights of a parent of
a named child, if the Circuit Court finds
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from the pleadings and by clear and
convincing evidence that:
(a) 1. The child has been adjudged to
be an abused or neglected child, as defined
in KRS 600.020(1), by a court of competent
jurisdiction;
2. The child is found to be an
abused or neglected child, as defined in KRS
600.020(1), by the Circuit Court in this
proceeding; or
3. The parent has been convicted
of a criminal charge relating to the
physical or sexual abuse or neglect of any
child and that physical or sexual abuse,
neglect, or emotional injury to the child
named in the present termination action is
likely to occur if the parental rights are
not terminated; and
(b) Termination would be in the best
interest of the child. (Emphasis added.)
See KRS 625.090(1).
If the threshold requirements are met, the
court must then find by clear and convincing evidence that one
or more of the grounds listed in section two are present before
termination can be ordered.
The grounds found by the court to
be applicable to J.D. include:
(a) That the parent has abandoned the
child for a period of not less than ninety
(90) days;
(e) That the parent, for a period of
not less than six (6) months, has
continuously or repeatedly failed or refused
to provide or has been substantially
incapable of providing essential parental
care and protection for the child and that
there is no reasonable expectation of
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improvement in parental care and protection,
considering the age of the child;
(g) That the parent, for reasons other
than poverty alone, has continuously or
repeatedly failed to provide or is incapable
of providing essential food, clothing,
shelter, medical care, or education
reasonably necessary and available for the
child's well-being and that there is no
reasonable expectation of significant
improvement in the parent's conduct in the
immediately foreseeable future, considering
the age of the child.
See KRS 625.090 (2).
J.D. first argues that the court erred in finding A.D.
was abused or neglected.
In support of her argument, J.D.
points out that the testimony of A.D.’s foster mother and the
testimony of the caseworker for the Cabinet did not provide
evidence in support of this finding.
In making this argument,
J.D. ignores evidence presented to the trial court unfavorable
to her position.
In particular, J.D. ignores the facts
underlying the records of the abuse/neglect action filed in this
case.
Likewise, she ignores the fact that she admitted to all
of these facts on cross-examination during the termination
hearing.
Based on the record, the court found the evidence
supported findings under KRS 625.090(1)(a) and (b).
The first
part is satisfied by the fact that A.D. was found to be abused
or neglected in a prior proceeding.
-10-
This alone is sufficient to
satisfy the statutory requirement.
Further, the second part,
that A.D. is found to be abused or neglected in this proceeding,
is supported by evidence of J.D.’s substance abuse, her failure
to take advantage of treatment programs on two occasions, and
her criminal lifestyle choices that led to her continued
incarceration.
The definition of an abused or neglected child is
contained in KRS 600.020(1).
J.D.’s incapacity due to substance
abuse falls within KRS 600.020(1)(c); her criminal lifestyle
choices and repeated incarceration falls within abandonment as
set out in KRS 600.020(1)(g); and her past history and continued
failure to provide adequate care, supervision, food, clothing,
shelter, and education, falls within KRS 600.020(1)(h).
Each of
these findings is supported by substantial evidence in the
record.
Thus, any argument that the court erred in this regard
is without merit.
In order to terminate parental rights, the court must
first reach a threshold finding under KRS 625.090(1).
The first
part, that A.D. is, or has been found to be, abused or neglected
satisfies KRS 625.090(1)(a).
The second part of the threshold
finding, that termination would be in A.D.’s best interests has
not been challenged by J.D. on appeal.
625.090(1)(b).
This then satisfies KRS
Once the threshold requirements are met, we must
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turn to the additional requirement that one or more of the
statutory grounds set out in KRS 625.090(2) are present.
In this regard, J.D. argues the court erred in
concluding she had abandoned A.D.
J.D. suggests the court made
this determination based solely on her incarceration.
Further,
she suggests she did all she could to meet the Cabinet’s
reunification plan while in custody.
In support of this
argument, J.D. points out that she took advantage of the
programs available to her while in custody.
Specifically, J.D.
notes she attended Alcohol Anonymous meetings.
As J.D. principally focuses on abandonment, we will
begin our analysis there.
findings of the court.
J.D.’s argument ignores the actual
While it is true that this court in J.H.
v. Cabinet for Human Resources, 704 S.W.2d 661, 663 (Ky.App.
1985), concluded that “incarceration alone can never be
construed as a abandonment as a matter of law[,]” the court in
the case sub judice did not base its finding of abandonment
solely on J.D.’s incarceration.
Rather, it merely considered
her criminal lifestyle choices as one of several factors in
reaching a determination on abandonment.
As noted by the court
in J.H., “absence, voluntary or court-imposed, may be a factor
to consider in determining whether the [child has] been
neglected[.]”
Id.
This position was reiterated by Kentucky’s
highest court in Cabinet for Human Resources v. Rogeski, 909
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S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1995).
In that case the court stated that
incarceration for an isolated criminal offense may not alone
justify the termination of parental rights, but it is a factor
to be considered.
114.
Id. at 661.
See also M.P.S., 979 S.W.2d at
Under these circumstances, we cannot say the court erred
in considering J.D.’s history of criminal choices and the
resulting incarceration as a factor in making its decision.
Further, we note that J.D.’s argument once again
ignores the evidence as a whole.
While she can point to the
fact that she took part in the programs available while
incarcerated, she ignores the complete lack of effort on her
part when programs were offered while she was not in custody.
Further, J.D. conceded on cross-examination that, through her
choices and actions, she placed herself in a position that
precluded her from participating in substance abuse programs.
Given these facts, we must determine whether the court erred in
finding the existence of one or more of the statutory factors
set out in KRS 625.090(2).
The court, after considering the evidence before it,
reached conclusions as to the existence of three of the
statutory factors listed in KRS 625.090(2).
In its findings,
the court set out the facts surrounding J.D.’s substance abuse
problems, her decisions not to take advantage of the WIOP
offered through the JADAC, her criminal lifestyle choices which
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resulted in her history of incarceration, and her inability when
not in custody to obtain employment and establish a stable home.
As these findings were supported by substantial evidence, we
cannot say the court was clearly erroneous.
Further, the
findings support the court’s conclusions under KRS 625.090(2).
As only one of the statutory factors is necessary, the existence
of three more than supports the court’s decision to terminate
J.D.’s parental rights.
The final issue raised by J.D. concerns the court’s
decision to deny her motion seeking to continue the termination
hearing.
J.D. filed her motion on August 30, 2005, seeking to
continue the hearing scheduled for September 27.
As the basis
for her motion, J.D. noted that she was scheduled for a hearing
in circuit court on October 26 concerning her continued
incarceration.
The court denied the motion on September 6,
2005.
The decision to grant a continuance lies solely within
the discretion of the trial court.
Snodgrass v. Commonwealth,
814, S.W.2d 579, 581 (Ky. 1991), overruled in part on other
grounds by Lawson v. Commonwealth, 53 S.W.3d 534 (Ky. 2001).
See also Williams v. Commonwealth, 644 S.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Ky.
1982).
The court in Snodgrass noted that “[w]hether a
continuance is appropriate in a particular case depends upon the
unique facts and circumstances of the case.”
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Id.
One of the
factors the court is to consider is whether denying the
continuance will lead to identifiable prejudice.”
Id.
In this
case, J.D.’s motion was based solely on the fact that her
continued custody would be reviewed before the circuit court on
October 26.
The possibility of J.D.’s continued custody was
before the court during the termination hearing.
Further, it
was only one of several factors the court considered in reaching
its decision.
A decision to deny a continuance is reviewed for abuse
of discretion.
1970).
See Wells v. Salyer, 452 S.W.2d 392, 395-96 (Ky.
See also Williams, 644 S.W.2d at 337.
In this case,
J.D. has failed to show any identifiable prejudice followed from
the court’s denial of her motion.
In light of the fact that the
court took into account the possibility of her release, and the
fact that it was only one of several factors upon which the
court based its decision, we conclude that the court did not
abuse its discretion in this regard.
As to J.D.’s appeal of the termination of her parental
rights, we find no error.
The court correctly applied the
statutory factors set out in KRS 625.090.
A review of the
record demonstrates that substantial evidence exists to support
the court’s conclusion that A.D. had been found previously, and
was currently found, to be abused or neglected as defined in KRS
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600.020.
Likewise, the court did not err in finding A.D. was
abandoned.
As to J.D.’s appeal of the denial of her motion under
CR 60.02, we note that the court set forth two grounds to
support its decision.
First, the court questioned whether, in
light of KRS 625.110, CR 60.02 even applied to termination
actions under KRS 625.090.
Assuming that CR 60.02 did apply,
the court rejected J.D.’s contention that her release provided a
basis to set aside the judgment under CR 60.02.
The court noted
that it had considered the possibility of her release in its
original order.
While J.D. timely appealed the order denying
her CR 60.02 relief, she has made no arguments to this court
concerning the court’s decision.
In light of these
circumstances, we conclude the appeal was waived.
The judgment and orders of the Jefferson Family Court
are affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
John H. Helmers, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, CABINET
FOR HEALTH AND FAMILY
SERVICES:
G. Thomas Mercer
Louisville, Kentucky
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