DEBRA GILBERT v. PRIME, INC.; MICHAEL M. BALDANZA; AND NATIONWIDE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002338-MR
DEBRA GILBERT
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-003761
PRIME, INC.; MICHAEL M.
BALDANZA; AND NATIONWIDE MUTUAL
INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Debra Gilbert has appealed from two orders of
the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on July 26, 2005, which
granted summary judgment to Prime, Inc. and Michael M. Baldanza,
and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company.
Having concluded that
the trial court correctly determined that Gilbert failed to
timely file her complaint against Prime and Baldanza, and
Nationwide, we affirm.
1
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
On May 22, 2000, at approximately 7:00 a.m., Nicole
Schindler, Gilbert’s daughter, was driving Gilbert’s vehicle2 on
Interstate 65 in Louisville, Kentucky, when the vehicle was
crushed by a tractor trailer owned by Prime and operated by
Baldanza3 which overturned in a curve on the interstate.
was not involved in the accident.
Gilbert
Prime and Baldanza quickly
admitted fault and determined that liability was not at issue.
On May 22, 2000, Nationwide, which insured Gilbert’s
vehicle, was advised of the collision and assigned Pat Duvall as
the adjuster to handle Gilbert’s property damage claim.
Nationwide also assigned Carrie Goff as the adjuster responsible
for investigation of subrogation potential if property damage
due to the collision was paid to Gilbert under her collision
coverage with Nationwide.
The next day, Gilbert notified Duvall
that Baldanza was at fault and that she wanted to have Prime’s
insurer handle payment of her vehicle damage.
On May 24, 2000,
Terry Banta, an adjuster for Reliance Insurance Company, Prime’s
insurer, advised Duvall that he was arranging an inspection of
Gilbert’s vehicle.
A few days later on May 30, 2000, Banta
notified Duvall that Prime had accepted full liability for
Gilbert’s vehicle damage; that Prime would provide Gilbert a
2
Gilbert’s vehicle was a 1994 Nissan Altima.
3
Baldanza had worked for Prime since March 3, 2000, and had only been working
a few weeks at the time of the accident.
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rental vehicle; and that Prime had set up a date to inspect
Gilbert’s vehicle.
After Banta’s inspection of the vehicle, Prime made an
offer to Gilbert on June 1, 2000, to settle Gilbert’s property
damage claim with Prime and Baldanza for the sum of $8,420.64.
Records from Banta’s file indicate that on June 8, 2000, it was
noted that someone would be handling Gilbert’s property claim on
her behalf and they would be in contact with Banta.
At the
center of the dispute in this case is whether Gilbert ever
accepted this offer.
Gilbert argues that Banta led her to
believe that the settlement of her property damage claim would
be finalized after Schindler’s claims were settled.
On April
26, 2002, less than one month before the statute of limitations
would expire, Banta received a letter from Gilbert’s current
counsel stating that he would be representing Gilbert regarding
her claim for damages arising out of the May 22, 2000, accident.
However, the letter made no reference to the alleged statement
by Banta to settle Gilbert’s claim at a later date, nor did it
refer to any pending offer or any agreement reached by Banta and
Gilbert regarding settlement matters.
To the contrary, the
letter requested that an offer of settlement be made on
Gilbert’s property damage claim.
On May 21, 2002, Schindler timely filed a complaint
against Prime, Baldanza, and Nationwide seeking compensation for
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her injuries and damages arising out of the May 22, 2000, motor
vehicle accident.
were taken.
Depositions of both Schindler and Baldanza
Subsequently, a mediation4 regarding this claim was
held on November 14, 2003, resulting in Prime and Baldanza
making an offer to Schindler, which she did not immediately
accept.
However, on December 2, 2003, Schindler accepted the
settlement offer made during the prior mediation and she signed
a Release and Settlement Agreement on January 13, 2004.
During the course of Schindler’s mediation, Gilbert
demanded payment of $8,420.64, as originally offered by Prime,
stating that she had agreed to accept this amount in settlement
of her claim and had agreed to defer payment until Schindler’s
personal injury claim was resolved.
Payment was refused by
Prime and Baldanza, as they claimed the two-year statute of
limitations had run on Gilbert’s property claim, pursuant to KRS5
413.125.
After this response from Prime and Baldanza, Gilbert
contacted Nationwide and requested that it reopen the collision
claim which she had initially opened after the May 22, 2000,
accident.
Nationwide refused to reopen the collision claim
arguing that it had closed its file eight days after the
accident when Banta called and advised that Prime and Baldanza
had accepted liability for the damage to Gilbert’s car and had
4
Retired Judge Michael O. McDonald acted as mediator.
5
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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placed Gilbert in a rental car.
Further, Nationwide explained
that because Gilbert did not reopen her property damage claim
within two years of the date of the accident, she forfeited her
rights under the policy to proceed with the claim under her
collision coverage.
On July 29, 2004, Gilbert filed a motion to
intervene in the action previously filed by Schindler against
Prime, Baldanza, and Nationwide seeking damages for her crushed
vehicle.
In this motion, Gilbert moved the trial court to allow
her to file a verified intervening complaint against Prime and
Baldanza seeking to enforce the June 1, 2000, settlement under
two theories of recovery: (1) estoppel; and (2) contract.
She
also sought to enforce payment from Nationwide of her property
damage claim under the collision coverage of her policy.
On
September 3, 2004, more than four years after the accident,
Gilbert was granted leave to file an intervening complaint
against Prime, Baldanza, and Nationwide.
In her complaint, Gilbert alleged that Banta advised
her that her property damage claim would be paid at the time
settlement was reached on Schindler’s bodily injury claim.
Neither Banta, nor Reliance, was made a party to Gilbert’s
action through the intervening complaint.
At no place in her
intervening complaint did Gilbert allege that Banta’s statement
constituted an offer, nor did she allege that she ever accepted
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any offer made by Banta.
Rather, she merely claimed that a
statement had been made by Banta that her claim would be settled
at a later date.
Gilbert claimed that she did not file her suit
against Prime and Baldanza at the time Schindler filed her suit
because of statements made by Reliance employees causing her
not to “take any further steps in furtherance of her property
damage claim until the mediation date of her daughter’s bodily
injury claim.”
However, it is important to note that the
mediation in Schindler’s case occurred over one year after the
statute of limitations on Gilbert’s property damages had
expired.
In discovery, Gilbert deposed Banta and John Ryan, a
Prime employee, Goff, Duval, and another Nationwide employee,
Charles Goode.
Gilbert’s deposition was not taken by Prime,
Baldanza, or Nationwide.
In Banta’s deposition, he denied
telling Gilbert that her property damage claim would be settled
when Schindler’s bodily injury claim was settled.
Banta
testified that he made an offer in the amount $8,420.64 to
Gilbert regarding her property damage on or about June 1, 2000,
approximately ten days after the accident occurred.
He went on
to state that Gilbert rejected the offer and never made a
counter-offer.
Further, Banta pointed out that the settlement
offer was made several years before Schindler’s bodily injury
action was filed, years before her claims were settled, and
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years before any of the parties even knew that Schindler’s
claims would be settled.
Banta went on to testify that there
was no reason not to pay the settlement at the time the offer
was made if Gilbert had in fact accepted it.
A “Claims File
Activity Sheet” in Banta’s file indicated that on June 8, 2000,
Gilbert rejected the offer and indicated that Gilbert advised
Banta that an attorney would be calling him to handle her
property damage claim.
On November 19, 2004, Prime and Baldanza filed a
motion for summary judgment based on the two-year statute of
limitations, i.e., May 22, 2002.
Upon submitting its answer,
Nationwide also filed a summary judgment motion on December 7,
2004, seeking dismissal of Gilbert’s property damage collision
claim.
Nationwide relied upon the following portions of its
policy with Gilbert:
1.
We have the right of subrogation under
the:
a)
Physical Damage[:]
C.
Coverages in this policy.
This means that after paying a loss to
you or others under this policy, we
will have the insured’s right to sue
for or otherwise recover such loss from
anyone else who may be liable. Also,
we may require reimbursement from the
insured out of any settlement or
judgment that duplicates our payments.
These provisions will be applied in
accordance with state law. Any insured
-7-
will sign such papers, and do whatever
else is necessary, to transfer these
rights to us, and will do nothing to
prejudice them.
In her response to the summary judgment motions,
Gilbert argued that the alleged statement by Banta that he would
settle her claim at a later date tolled the statute of
limitations for her property damage claim.
Gilbert filed an
affidavit to her sur-reply to the motions for summary judgment,
wherein she swore that Banta made an offer of settlement for
$8,420.64 on June 1, 2000.
She stated, “I accepted the offer.”
She did not state in the affidavit when she accepted the offer.
However, a reference to her response to Prime’s motion for
summary judgment is revealing.
She stated in her response that
she accepted the offer on November 14, 2003, at the Schindler
mediation with Prime.
Further, Gilbert claimed in her brief
that accepting the offer more than three years after the offer
was made was within a reasonable time period, despite the
admitted expiration of the statute of limitations during that
period.
Following submission of the summary judgment motions,
the trial court reviewed the parties’ memoranda, and following
oral argument by counsel, the trial court on July 26, 2005,
granted, in one order and opinion, summary judgment in favor of
Prime and Baldanza, and, in a separate order and opinion,
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summary judgment in favor of Nationwide.
Gilbert then filed a
timely motion to alter, amend, or vacate the orders on August 5,
2005.
By separate orders entered by the trial court on October
12, 2005, the trial court denied Gilbert’s motions to alter,
amend, or vacate the summary judgments against her.
This appeal
followed.
Gilbert raises two issues before this Court.
First,
she contends that there existed a genuine issue of material fact
as to whether or not there was a settlement of her property
damage claim, and thus summary judgment was not appropriate.
Gilbert argues that the facts concerning whether or not there
was a settlement are in dispute.
It is Gilbert’s position that
Banta made a settlement proposal and that she accepted the offer
with the understanding that she would be paid when Schindler’s
bodily injury claim was settled.
Prime and Baldanza argue before this Court that
Gilbert has abandoned all of her unsuccessful estoppel and
tolling claims as well as her claims regarding the
reasonableness of her alleged acceptance of the offer three and
one-half years after it was made.
They contend that she now
seeks reversal from this Court, representing the case to this
Court as a simple contract case based on whether or not there
was acceptance on June 1, 2000.
Prime and Baldanza argue that
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Gilbert should not be allowed to change the facts that she used
as basis for objecting to summary judgment.
Under Kentucky law, it is well-settled that “[t]he
standard of review on appeal of a summary judgment is whether
the trial court correctly found that there were no genuine
issues as to any material fact and that the moving party was
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”6
CR 56.03 provides
that summary judgment may be rendered “[i]f the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and
admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
Summary
judgment is improper unless “it would be impossible for the
respondent to produce evidence at the trial warranting a
judgment in his favor and against the movant” [citation
omitted].7
“The inquiry should be whether, from the evidence of
record, facts exist which would make it possible for the nonmoving party to prevail.
In the analysis, the focus should be
on what is of record rather than what might be presented at
6
Scifres v. Kraft, 916 S.W.2d 779, 781 (Ky. 1996)
7
Steelevest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476, 483 (Ky.
1991).
-10-
trial.”8
The term “impossible” is to be applied in a “practical
sense, not in an absolute sense.”9
Prime, Baldanza, and Nationwide, as the moving
parties, each had the burden of proving entitlement to summary
judgment,10 which included establishing that there was no genuine
issue as to any material fact, and that each had the right to
summary judgment with “such clarity that there is no room left
for controversy[.]”11
The trial court must view the record in a
light most favorable to Gilbert, the party opposing the motions,
and all doubts are to be resolved in her favor.12
If there is a
genuine issue as to any material fact, the trial court should
not render a summary judgment, regardless of its belief as to
the opposing party’s chance of success at trial.13
If the burden
shifts to the party opposing summary judgment, he or she “cannot
defeat it without presenting at lease some affirmative evidence
showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact for
8
Welch v. American Publishing Co. of Kentucky, 3 S.W.3d 724, 730 (Ky. 1999).
See also Paintsville Hospital Co. v. Rose, 683 S.W.2d 255, 256 (Ky.
1985)(noting that summary judgment is proper only where the movant shows that
the adverse party cannot prevail under any circumstances).
9
Perkins v. Hausladen, 828 S.W.2d 652, 654 (Ky. 1992).
10
Christie v. First American Bank, 908 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky.App. 1995).
11
Williams v. City of Hillview, 831 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Ky. 1992).
12
Dossett v. New York Mining & Manufacturing Co., 451 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Ky.
1970); Puckett v. Elsner, 303 S.W.2d 250, 251 (Ky. 1957).
13
Puckett, 303 S.W.2d at 251.
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trial[,]”14 but, “[t]he threshold [ ] is quite low[.]”15
The
evidence presented by the moving party in support of its summary
judgment “must be of such nature that no genuine issue of fact
remains to be resolved.”16
Otherwise, summary judgment is
improper even when the party opposing summary judgment presents
no contradicting evidence.17
“When faced with a motion for summary judgment, the
role of the trial [court] is not to decide issues of fact, but
instead [it] must determine whether a real issue exists”
[citation omitted].18
“Because summary judgments involve no fact
finding, this Court will review the circuit court’s decision de
novo[,]”19 since it “involves only legal questions and the
existence of any disputed material issues of fact[.]”20
In the case before us, the trial court assumed for the
purposes of summary judgment proceedings that Banta had made
assurances that Gilbert’s claim would be settled at a later
date, but it properly held pursuant to Kentucky law that under
14
Steelevest, 807 S.W.2d at 482.
15
Commonwealth, Transportation Cabinet, Dept. of Highways v. R.J. Corman
Railroad Co./Memphis Line, 116 S.W.3d 488, 498 (Ky. 2003).
16
Carter v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 731 S.W.2d 12, 14 (Ky.App. 1987).
17
Id.
18
R.J. Corman Railroad Co., 116 S.W.3d at 497.
19
3D Enterprises v. Metro Sewer District, 174 S.W.3d 440, 445 (Ky. 2005).
20
Lewis v. B & R Corp., 56 S.W.3d 432, 436 (Ky.App. 2001).
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the facts and circumstances of this case reliance on the
adjustor’s statement would not toll the running of the statute
of limitations for filing her property damage claim.
The trial
court assumed for purposes of the summary judgment motions that
Gilbert accepted the offer on November 14, 2003, since that was
the date that she argued in her brief.
The trial court focused on this Court’s Opinion in
Brown v. Noland Co.,21 to determine whether Gilbert was permitted
to accept an offer which had been made three and one-half years
prior to her claimed acceptance on November 14, 2003.
The trial
court noted that Gilbert was represented by two attorneys,
neither of whom ever indicated prior to the summary judgment
proceeding that there was an offer pending by Banta, much less
any settlement agreement to be made at some unknown time during
the future.
The trial court noted that Gilbert was required to
exercise reasonable diligence to protect her cause of action and
further that there was no evidence that Prime or Baldanza did
anything to cause Gilbert to delay filing suit.
The trial court
ruled that Gilbert’s failure to file her property damage claim
was not reasonable or justified under either theory posed by her
and entered summary judgment in favor of Prime and Baldanza.
It was not until after entry of the summary judgments
against her that Gilbert claimed for the first time that she had
21
403 S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1966).
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not accepted the offer on November 14, 2003, as she had so
strenuously argued in the prior pleadings.
Instead, she argued
for the first time that she had accepted the offer on June 1,
2000, the same day the offer was made.
No explanatory affidavit
or clarification was offered by Gilbert as to the change in the
meaning of her sworn statement “I accepted the offer” in her
prior affidavit.
This change came merely from counsel’s
argument.
Upon review of the findings of the trial court, we
conclude that it did not abuse its discretion in granting
summary judgment to Prime and Baldanza, as each had met the
burden of proof.
Even construing all facts in a light most
favorable to Gilbert, we do not conclude that she met her low
burden of proof that there was any fact in dispute as to whether
Prime and Baldanza were not entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
In reviewing the trial record in its entirety, it is clear
that Gilbert claimed that she accepted the Prime and Baldanza
offer on November 14, 2003, the date of Schindler’s mediation.
The first time that she made a claim of acceptance on June 1,
2003, was in her brief filed on August 5, 2005, to support of
her motion to alter, amend, or vacate the summary judgments.
Thus, for the reasons set out in the trial court’s order, we
hold that summary judgment in favor of Prime and Baldanza was
proper.
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Gilbert next argues that summary judgment in favor of
Nationwide was improper.
Gilbert argues that in reading her
Nationwide policy there was no way she could have known that the
statute of limitations on her claim expired after two years.
She acknowledges that Nationwide can shorten the statute of
limitations, but she claims that it failed to clearly do so in
the contract.22
Nationwide argues that whether the statute of
limitations is two years, or 15 years, the point is that under
the policy, Gilbert was to do nothing to prejudice Nationwide’s
right to sue or otherwise recover from anyone else who may be
liable for property damage to Gilbert’s vehicle.
Nationwide
argues in its brief as follows:
In the present case, if Nationwide were to
pay [Gilbert’s] collision claim, it would
clearly not be able to subrogate against
Prime, Inc. and/or its driver [Baldanza] to
recover payments made. Prime [ ]/Baldanza
would raise the same statute of limitations
defense on Nationwide’s subrogation claim as
they raised in [Gilbert’s] direct claim
against them for property damage.
[Gilbert] did not timely file her property
damage claim against the tortfeasors [ ].
Even if [Gilbert] had thirty years to sue
Nationwide, she can not cure her breach of
the contract provision requiring that she do
nothing to jeopardize Nationwide’s
subrogation rights. . . .
The trial court agreed with Nationwide, and in its
order granting Nationwide summary judgment stated as follows:
22
See Elkins v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co., 844 S.W.2d 423 (Ky.App.
1992).
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Regardless of whether the Court finds a
two year statute of limitations or a fifteen
year statute of limitations (for a contract
dispute), the bottom line reveals that
Gilbert failed to file suit against the
tort-feasor within the two year statute of
limitations under KRS 413.125. She is
barred from seeking redress therefrom.
Gilbert has a duty to avoid prejudice to the
subrogation rights of Nationwide . . . .
Nationwide cannot recoup its loss from
the tort-feasor due to Gilbert’s failure to
timely file suit thereon. Remedial System
v. New Hampshire Fire Insurance Co.,
Ky.App., 13 S.W.2d 1005 (1929) supports
Nationwide’s position. There simply are no
genuine issues of material fact and
Nationwide is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Nationwide[’s] motion for
Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED.
We conclude that the reasoning of the trial court in
granting Nationwide’s motion for summary judgment is sound and
based upon the law of this Commonwealth.
There is no dispute
that Gilbert’s actions clearly prejudiced and prevented
Nationwide from recovering from a subrogation claim against
Prime and Baldanza and this was clearly a violation of the
contract between Gilbert and Nationwide.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Jefferson
Circuit Court’s orders granting summary judgment to Prime and
Baldanza, and Nationwide.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE, CONCURS IN PART, DISSENTS IN
PART, AND FILES SEPARATE OPINION.
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MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE, CONCURRING IN PART AND
DISSENTING IN PART:
I concur in the dismissal of Debra
Gilbert’s claims against Prime, Inc., and Michael M. Baldanza as
being barred by limitations.
I am not, however, of the opinion that her claim
against Nationwide Insurance Company should be dismissed.
Gilbert has breached no contract.
was an executory contract.
Her agreement with Nationwide
She performed her side of the
contract when she timely paid her premiums.
Nationwide performs
their side when loss occurs.
It is true that she may lose her rights under the
contract by operation of law, i.e., waiver or estoppel.
She may
also, of course, lose her rights by release of the tortfeasor,
which she did not do.
She cannot, however, lose her rights under the
contract by allowing the statute of limitations to run against
her subrogee, which has no rights until payment is made.
It would be a strange state of affairs if an insured
under a collision contract of insurance were bound to settle
with his insurer in time to permit the insurer to prosecute a
subrogation claim against the tortfeasor within the time
prescribed for limitations of a tort action.
Finally, subrogation claims are creatures of equity,
whereas limitations traditionally apply to actions at law.
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My
notion is that whether a subrogation claim can be prosecuted
should be governed by laches, and not by limitation periods
prescribed by law.
BRIEFS AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES PRIME,
INC. AND BALDANZA:
Charles E. Theiler, II
Louisville, Kentucky
F. Larkin Fore
Sara M. Fore
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES
PRIME, INC. AND BALDANZA:
F. Larkin Fore
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE NATIONWIDE:
Gregory L. Smith
Louisville, Kentucky
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