HARRY W. HUPP v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY, REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002249-MR
HARRY W. HUPP
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE F. KENNETH CONLIFFE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-006020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY,
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Harry W. Hupp has appealed from the September
29, 2005, memorandum and order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
which denied his motion for a writ of prohibition.
Having
concluded that the circuit court did not err by denying the
motion, we affirm.
This case arose from a decision to retry Hupp in the
Jefferson District Court on criminal charges of assault in the
1
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
fourth degree,2 terroristic threatening in the third degree,3 and
attempting to intimidate a participant in a legal process.4
These charges originated from an incident occurring on October
2, 2004, when Hupp allegedly choked and threatened his live-in
girlfriend.
The previous trial had been terminated by the
granting of a mistrial when, during cross-examination of the
victim, Hupp’s counsel questioned the victim about her having
sex in an automobile parked in a restaurant parking lot the
night before the October 2nd incident.
Hupp claimed that his
cross-examination of the victim was proper impeachment of her
credibility because she had lied under oath at a previous family
court hearing regarding the incident in the parking lot.
The district court, in sustaining the Commonwealth’s
objection and its request for a mistrial, stated:
I don’t believe that I was unclear in my
ruling previously. There was an objection
made when you attempted to elicit, attempted
to discuss in the opening statement about
her having sex with another man in a parking
lot. I indicated at that time that I
believed that it would be all right to
discuss that she was with someone else, but
not what they were expressly engaging in,
because, I thought the prejudicial effect
outweighed any probative value regarding
that.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.030.
3
KRS 508.080.
4
KRS 524.040 and KRS 506.010.
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Hupp sought a writ of prohibition in the Jefferson Circuit Court
on the basis that any retrial would violate the prohibition
against double jeopardy because there was no manifest necessity
for the district court to declare a mistrial.
denied the motion on September 29, 2005.
The circuit court
This appeal followed.5
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
and Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution specifically provide
that no person shall be tried twice for the same offense.6
However, the principle of double jeopardy does not prevent a
retrial if the previous proceedings were terminated because
“[t]he trial court, in exercise of its discretion, [found] that
the termination [was] manifestly necessary.”7
Manifest necessity
has been described as an “‘urgent or real necessity’” [citation
omitted].8
A finding of manifest necessity is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court.9
A grant of mistrial will only be
5
On December 19, 2005, a panel of this Court granted Hupp’s motion for
immediate relief and stayed his retrial pending the outcome of this appeal.
6
Commonwealth v. Scott, 12 S.W.3d 682, 684 (Ky. 2000) (citing Tinsley v.
Jackson, 771 S.W.2d 331 (Ky. 1989); and Leibson v. Taylor, 721 S.W.2d 690,
693 (Ky. 1987) (overruled on other grounds, Shaffer v. Morgan, 815 S.W.2d
402, 404 (Ky. 1991))).
7
KRS 505.030(4)(b); Grimes v. McAnulty, 957 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. 1997);
Nichols v. Commonwealth, 657 S.W.2d 932, 933 (Ky. 1983).
8
Miller v. Commonwealth, 925 S.W.2d 449, 453 (Ky. 1996) (overruled on other
grounds, Garrett v. Commonwealth, 48 S.W.3d 6 (Ky. 2001)).
9
Grimes, 957 S.W.2d at 225.
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overturned if the ruling by the trial court was clearly
erroneous or constituted an abuse of discretion.10
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in limiting the questioning of the victim regarding
her sexual activity in the parking lot on October 1.
A trial
judge has broad discretion in establishing the proper boundaries
on cross-examination.11
While Kentucky Rules of Evidence section
611 permits a witness to be cross-examined on any matter
relevant to any issue in the case, the trial judge is still
allowed discretion to limit cross-examination.
Such limitation
is permitted when necessary to further the search for truth,
avoid waste of time, or protect witnesses against unfair and
unnecessary attack.12
In general, the role of cross-examination is to permit
the defendant an opportunity to impeach a particular witness as
to credibility.
A defendant cannot be denied the opportunity to
impeach a witness for bias, or from presenting facts from which
the jury could draw inferences regarding the credibility of the
10
Tinsley, 771 S.W.2d at 332.
11
Commonwealth v. Maddox, 955 S.W.2d 718, 720-21 (Ky. 1997). See also Moore
v. Commonwealth, 771 S.W.2d 34 (Ky. 1988) (overruled on other grounds,
McGuire v. Commonwealth, 885 S.W.2d 931 (Ky. 1994)).
12
DeRossett v. Commonwealth, 867 S.W.2d 195, 1998 (Ky. 1993) (citing Lawson
The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook § 3.20(II) (3d ed. 1993)).
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witness.13
“The right to confrontation guarantees an opportunity
for effective cross-examination, but not cross-examination in
whatever way and to whatever extent the defense might wish”
[citation omitted].14
Placing limitations on cross-examination
does not unduly infringe on the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution, which is “only implicated if the
excluded cross-examination concerns a matter giving the witness
reason to testify falsely during the trial at hand[.]”15
The
Confrontation Clause does not limit the discretion of the trial
judge in imposing limits on cross-examination if there is a
problem regarding confusion or relevancy.
Our examination of this case is greatly hindered by
the pitiful quality of the recordings of the district court
trial.
Because we are unable to hear any of the bench
conferences and since the appellant has not filed a narrative
statement16 concerning the discussion of whether a mistrial was
manifestly necessary, we assume that the district court
adequately explained that it would limit questioning of the
victim to the fact that she was with another man, but “not what
they were expressly engaging in.”
Hupp has failed to articulate
13
Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674
(1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974).
14
Epperson v. Commonwealth, 809 S.W.2d 835, 842-43 (Ky. 1991).
15
Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196, 206 (Ky. 2003).
16
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 75.13.
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how such a limitation so impaired his examination of the victim
that he was denied a fair trial.
We cannot conclude that the
district court’s ruling in limiting Hupp’s impeachment of the
victim’s credibility on cross-examination by prohibiting his
questioning of her about her having sex in the automobile was an
abuse of discretion.
There existed other means of impeaching
the victim’s credibility than by expressly violating the trial
court’s ruling, such as simply asking the victim if she had
previously perjured herself while under oath in the family court
hearing.
Because the district court had addressed the matter
during defense counsel’s opening statement, we cannot conclude
that it abused its discretion in limiting Hupp’s questioning of
the victim, or in finding a manifest necessity to grant a
mistrial when counsel failed to abide by that ruling.
The writ
of prohibition Hupp sought from the circuit court is an
extraordinary remedy which will be granted only in exceptional
circumstances.17
Whether to grant a writ of prohibition rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court.18
Accordingly,
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hupp’s
petition for a writ of prohibition based on its determination
17
James v. Shadoan, 58 S.W.3d 884, 885 (Ky. 2001).
18
Commonwealth v. Ryan, 5 S.W.3d 113, 115 (Ky. 1999).
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that the district court acted within its sound judicial
discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
WINE, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT:
David A. Lambertus
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
David A. Sexton
Special Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEE:
David A. Sexton
Special Asst. Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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