K.A.C., A MINOR CHILD v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002202-ME
K.A.C., A MINOR CHILD
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYLE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE BRUCE PETRIE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-J-00009
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: McANULTY1 AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; ROSENBLUM,2 SENIOR JUDGE.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE:
K.A.C, born April 26, 1991, appeals
from a Juvenile Status Disposition Order of the Boyle Family
Court adjudging her beyond control, in contempt of the terms and
conditions of a previously imposed Juvenile Status Offender
1
Judge William E. McAnulty, Jr. concurred in this opinion prior to his
resignation effective July 5, 2006, to accept appointment to the Kentucky
Supreme Court. Release of the opinion was delayed by administrative
handling.
2
Senior Judge John W. Rosenblum sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
Order, and committing her to the custody of the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services (Cabinet) until age 18.
For the
reasons stated below, we affirm.
On January 13, 2005, K.A.C.’s father executed a
Juvenile Complaint alleging that K.A.C. had committed the
juvenile status offense of being beyond the control of her
parents and school officials in violation of Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 630.020(2).
The complaint was filed in Boyle
Family Court on January 17, 2005.
The petition stated K.A.C.
had been having boys at her home while the father was at work;
that the father feared that the juvenile was involved in sexual
activity and drug use; that K.A.C. had been disobedient and
disrespectful to her parents; and that K.A.C. had cursed her
parents at times.
On January 17, 2005, a Juvenile Petition was filed by
Jason P. Warinner of the Danville Police Department charging
K.A.C. with felony custodial interference, see KRS 509.070,
based upon the allegation that she had enticed another juvenile
to leave her custodial parents and remain away from home.
As a
result of the custodial interference charge, K.A.C. was taken
into detention.
A hearing on the pending petitions was held on January
19, 2005.
At that time, the custodial interference charge was
dropped, and K.A.C. was released to her mother under the terms
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and conditions of a Juvenile Status Offender Order.
Pursuant to
the order, among other things, K.A.C. was not to leave home
without custodial permission; was to obey all rules of her home;
was to attend all school sessions on time, have no unexcused
absences, and have no behavior problems at school; was to
violate no law; was not to consume, use or possess any alcohol,
tobacco products, or illegal drugs; and was to submit to random
drug testing to be administered by the Cabinet.
A review
hearing was scheduled for February 23, 2005.
At the February 23, 2005, hearing K.A.C. admitted to
the beyond control allegation as contained in the Juvenile
Status Offender Complaint filed by her father.
K.A.C. waived
separate disposition; the family court probated her to the
court, and entered a new Juvenile Status Offender Order.
The
conditions contained in the new order were substantially the
same as those contained in the order entered on January 19,
2005.
On May 9, 2005, K.A.C.’s mother filed an affidavit
stating that the previous night K.A.C. had asked if she could go
out and was told that she could not.
The affidavit stated that
K.A.C. then “got horribly irate, punched holes in her bedroom
walls, [and] pulled her hair[.]”
On May 19, 2005, K.A.C.’s
father filed an affidavit stating that he was concerned about
K.A.C.’s welfare because she was staying out and sometimes
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spending the night with a seventeen-year-old boyfriend.
The
affidavit also stated that the father suspected drug use.
On
May 20, 2005, Dana Stigall, Counselor at the Bruce Hall Day
Treatment Center, the school K.A.C. was then attending, filed a
letter into the record stating that on May 10, 2005, K.A.C. had
tested positive for marijuana and benzodiazepines.
As a result of the foregoing, on May 20, 2005, the
family court entered an order directing that K.A.C. be taken
into custody for contempt of court for failure to comply with
the terms and conditions of the previously imposed Juvenile
Status Offender Order.
A contempt hearing was set for May 23,
2005.
At the conclusion of the hearing the family court
determined that K.A.C. was in contempt of court on the basis
that she had “violated most” of the terms and conditions of the
previously imposed Juvenile Status Order.
Specifically, the
family court found that K.A.C. had violated terms and conditions
of the order by staying overnight at her boyfriend’s house
without permission; by having unexcused absences from school; by
violating school rules; by using tobacco products; and by using
illegal drugs.
The court sentenced K.A.C. to 30 days of
detention - seven to serve with the balance probated.
K.A.C.
was further committed to the temporary custody of the Cabinet.
A disposition hearing was scheduled for June 22, 2005.
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In connection with the June 22, 2005, disposition
hearing the Cabinet prepared a Predispositional Investigation
Report.
At the conclusion of the disposition hearing the family
court adopted the recommendations of the Cabinet, including the
requirements that K.A.C. complete a program at Kentucky
Methodist Homes for Children and Youth in Versailles, Kentucky;
that K.A.C. submit to drug screens without question; that K.A.C.
remain drug and alcohol free; that K.A.C. respect all parental,
custodial, out of home care, and law enforcement authority at
all times; that K.A.C. maintain a “C” average or better in her
academics and have no unexcused absences when school is in
session; that her parents submit to drug screenings without
question; and that K.A.C. have no contact with the 17 year-old
juvenile she had been dating.
The family court further ordered
that K.A.C. be committed to the custody of the Cabinet until age
18.
This appeal followed.
First, K.A.C. contends that the family court erred in
permitting the introduction of drug screen test results at the
May 23, 2005, evidentiary hearing and relying upon those results
to, in part, find K.A.C. in contempt and sentence her to
detention.
Prior to the May 23, 2005, court date, Dana Stigall of
Bruce Hall Day Treatment School, the school K.A.C. was then
attending, wrote a letter to the family court, which was placed
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in the court file.
The letter advised the court that K.A.C. had
been screened on May 10, 2005, and had tested positive for
marijuana and benzodiazepine.
At the May 23, 2005, hearing,
over K.A.C.’s objection, the results of the drug screen were
introduced through Stigall.
K.A.C. contends that the drug
screen results were introduced in violation of Kentucky Rules of
Evidence (KRE) 602, KRE 701, and KRE 702, and the due process
guarantees of the 6th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Sections 2 and 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
KRE 702, which governs testimony by expert witnesses,
provides that a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education may provide opinion
testimony if scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact.
A trial court's determination as
to whether a witness is qualified to give expert testimony under
KRE 702 is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review.
Farmland Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 36 S.W.3d 368, 378 (Ky.
2000); Fugate v. Commonwealth, Ky., 993 S.W.2d 931, 935 (1999);
Murphy by Murphy v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 957 S.W.2d 297, 299
(Ky.App. 1997).
"An abuse of discretion occurs when a 'trial
judge's decision [is] arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or
unsupported by sound legal principles.'"
Farmland Mut. Ins.
Co., 36 S.W.3d at 378 (quoting Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v.
Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 581 (Ky. 2000)).
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In this case, Stigall provided testimony which
included technical matters relating to the administration and
interpretation of a drug screening test administered to K.A.C.
Based upon this test, Stigall expressed her opinion that the
testing produced a positive result for marijuana and
benzodiazepine.
Because of the technical aspects of this test,
we believe that testimony expressing an opinion concerning test
results requires some modicum of training and education in order
to comply with KRS 702.
While Stigall has a Masters Degree in
Counseling Psychology, is Certified as a Psychological
Associate, and is a Qualified Mental Health Professional, we
believe that Stigall’s admission that she has no training in
administering and interpreting the test fails to demonstrate the
requisite training and knowledge to qualify as an expert witness
with regard to the test under KRE 702.
Stigall admitted that she had no training or
certification to perform the test.
She also admitted that she
did even not know the name of the test or how the test kits were
stored.
Because Stigall failed to demonstrate a minimum level
of training and knowledge concerning the administration and
interpretation of the test, we conclude that the family court
abused its discretion by permitting the drug test results to be
introduced through Stigall.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing, however, we believe
that the admission of the drug screening was harmless error.
An error is deemed harmless if, upon consideration of the entire
case, there appears to be no likely possibility that the result
would have been different in the absence of error.
Commonwealth, 495 S.W.2d 800, 801-02 (Ky. 1972).
Scott v.
First, there
was testimony that K.A.C. had made admissions that she used
marijuana.
Further, K.A.C. was not found in contempt solely for
using and or/possessing illegal drugs.
She was also found in
contempt for leaving home without parental permission; for
unexcused absences from school; for failure to follow school
rules; and for use of tobacco.
As such, even if the drug screen
results had not been admitted, we do not believe that, upon
exclusion of this evidence, there is a substantial possibility
that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.
As such, any error in admitting the results of the drug screen
test was harmless.
Next, K.A.C. contends that the detention sentence
imposed by the family court did not constitute the least
restrictive alternative, and was thereby improper.
The
procedures for the detention of a Juvenile are addressed in KRS
630.080 and KRS 630.070.
KRS 630.080 provides as follows:
(1) In order for the court to detain a
child after the detention hearing, the
Commonwealth shall establish probable cause
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at the detention hearing that the child is a
status offender and that further detention
of the child is necessary for the protection
of the child or the community. If the
Commonwealth fails to establish probable
cause that the child is a status offender,
the complaint shall be dismissed and the
child shall be released. If the
Commonwealth establishes probable cause that
the child is a status offender, but that
further detention of the child is not
necessary for the protection of the child or
the community, the child shall be released
to the parent or person exercising custodial
control or supervision of the child. If
grounds are established that the child is a
status offender, and that further detention
is necessary, the child may be placed in a
nonsecure setting approved by the Department
of Juvenile Justice;
(2) A status offender may be securely
detained if the cabinet has initiated or
intends to initiate transfer of the youth by
competent document under the provisions of
the interstate compact pursuant to KRS
Chapter 615;
(3) A status offender who is subject to a
valid court order may be securely detained
upon a finding that the child violated the
valid court order if the court does the
following prior to ordering that detention:
(a) Affirms that the requirements for a
valid court order were met at the time
the original order finding the child to
be a status offender was issued;
(b) Makes a determination during the
detention hearing that there is
probable cause that the child violated
the valid court order; and
(c) Within seventy-two (72) hours of
the initial detention of the child,
exclusive of weekends and holidays,
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receives an oral report in court and on
the record delivered by an appropriate
public agency other than the court or a
law enforcement agency, or receives and
reviews a written report prepared by an
appropriate public agency other than
the court or a law enforcement agency
that reviews the behavior of the child
and the circumstances under which the
child was brought before the court,
determines the reasons for the child's
behavior, and determines whether all
dispositions other than secure
detention have been exhausted or are
inappropriate. If a sufficient prior
written report is included in the
child's file, that report may be used
to satisfy this requirement. The child
may be securely detained for a period
not to exceed seventy-two (72) hours
pending receipt and review of the
report by the court. The court shall
conduct a violation hearing within
twenty-four (24) hours of the receipt
of the report, exclusive of weekends
and holidays. If the report is
available at the time of the detention
hearing, the violation hearing may be
conducted at the same time as the
detention hearing. The hearing shall
be conducted in accordance with the
provisions of KRS 610.060. The
findings required by this subsection
shall be included in any order issued
by the court which results in the
secure detention of a status offender.
KRS 630.070 provides that “[n]o status offender shall be placed
in a secure juvenile detention facility or juvenile holding
facility as a means or form of punishment except following a
finding that the child has violated a valid court order.”
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KRS 630.070 and KRS 630.080 do not contain the
standard that detention be the “least restrictive alternative.”
It appears that K.A.C. may be confusing the standards relating
to a detention proceeding with the standards applicable to a
final disposition.
KRS 630.120, which addresses final
dispositions, requires application of the “least restrictive
alternative” in connection with dispositional hearings.
See KRS
630.120(4) (“The court shall affirmatively determine that all
appropriate remedies have been considered and exhausted to
assure that the least restrictive alternative method of
treatment is utilized.”)
As this standard was not applicable to
the May 23, 2005, contempt proceedings, however, this argument
is based upon an erroneous premise, and the family court did not
err by failing to apply the “least restrictive alternative”
standard in connection with its decision to enter a detention
order against K.A.C.
Next, K.A.C. contends that family court erred in
committing K.A.C. to the Cabinet for contempt since she had
already been sentenced to 30 days in detention for the same
conduct.
We construe this as an argument that the family
court’s ordering of the detention of K.A.C. and the subsequent
ordering that she be committed to the Cabinet constitutes
multiple punishment for the same conduct in violation of double
jeopardy principles.
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The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and
Section 13 of the Kentucky Constitution contain double jeopardy
provisions which, among other things, proscribe multiple
punishments for the same offense.
S.W.2d 671, 673 (Ky.App. 1998).
Commonwealth v. Ray, 982
However, K.A.C.’s argument that
this prohibition was violated by the family court’s sentencing
her to detention for contempt and committing her to the Cabinet
for contempt is based upon an erroneous premise.
On May 23,
2005, K.A.C. was sentenced to detention for contempt based upon
a finding by the family court that she had violated the
provisions of the family court’s previously imposed Juvenile
Status Offender Order.
Based upon the unsatisfactory results of
the prior disposition, however, as demonstrated by K.A.C.
continuing unacceptable conduct, a further dispositional hearing
was undertaken not for the purpose of punishing K.A.C., but,
rather, to consider the appropriate continuing disposition to
effect the rehabilitation of K.A.C.
It follows that the June
22, 2005, disposition committing K.A.C. to the Cabinet was not
punishment cumulative to the prior detention.
In addition, we
note that the June 22, 2005, disposition hearing arose out of a
juvenile status offender petition.
Such a petition is in the
nature of a civil action and, as such, does not implicate double
jeopardy principles.
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Next, K.A.C. contends that the family court erred in
committing K.A.C. to the Cabinet because commitment is not a
possible sentence for contempt.
Again, we believe that this
argument is based upon an erroneous premise.
We do not construe
the family court’s decision to commit K.A.C. to the Cabinet as
based merely upon its finding of contempt.
We, rather, construe
the disposition as having been made in light of K.A.C.’s
continuing out of control conduct, the entire record, and all of
the circumstances involved.
Again, K.A.C.’s commitment to the
Cabinet was not as punishment for K.A.C.’s violation of the
previously imposed Juvenile Status Order.
Next, K.A.C. contends that the family court erred in
committing K.A.C. to the Cabinet because commitment was not the
least restrictive alternative.
KRS 600.010(2)(c) provides “[t]he court shall show
that other less restrictive alternatives have been attempted or
are not feasible in order to insure that children are not
removed from families except when absolutely necessary[.]”
KRS
600.020(35) defines “least restrictive alternative” as follows:
"Least restrictive alternative" means,
except for purposes of KRS Chapter 645,[3]
that the program developed on the child's
behalf is no more harsh, hazardous, or
intrusive than necessary; or involves no
3
KRS Chapter 645 is concerned with the Mental Health Act of The Unified
Juvenile Code.
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restrictions on physical movements nor
requirements for residential care except as
reasonably necessary for the protection of
the child from physical injury; or
protection of the community, and is
conducted at the suitable available facility
closest to the child's place of residence[.]
A family court is obligated to make specific findings
addressing its conclusion that its deposition is the least
restrictive alternative.
459 (Ky.App. 2003).
See X.B. v. Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d
At the conclusion of the June 22, 2005,
hearing, the family court discussed in detail its rationale for
committing K.A.C. to the Cabinet and why it was the court’s
determination that this was the least restrictive alternative
and in the best interest of K.A.C.
The family court noted that
this was the next step along an escalating level of
dispositions, and that the prior dispositions had not succeeded
in resolving K.A.C.’s irresponsible conduct.
The family court
assigned blame to K.A.C., but particularly in regard to why it
considered placement with the Cabinet the least restrictive
disposition, the family court cited to the irresponsible conduct
of the parents, particularly the mother.
The family court noted
the mother’s failure to attend counseling meetings, failure to
take a drug screen, and her transporting of the seventeen-yearold boyfriend to a visitation with K.A.C. at the Kentucky
Methodist Homes for Children and Youth in Versailles, Kentucky.
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Under Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 52.01, in
an action tried without a jury, "[f]indings of fact shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the
credibility of the witnesses.
A factual finding is not clearly
erroneous if it is supported by substantial evidence.”
Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky.
1998); Uninsured Employers' Fund v. Garland, 805 S.W.2d 116, 117
(Ky. 1991).
Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken alone
or in light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative
value to induce conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.
Golightly, 976 S.W.2d at 414; Sherfey v. Sherfey, 74 S.W.3d 777,
782 (Ky.App. 2002).
An appellate court, however, reviews legal
issues de novo, see, e.g., Carroll v. Meredith, 59 S.W.3d 484,
489 (Ky.App. 2001); Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d 656 (Ky.App.
2003).
While the family court did not make specific written
findings concerning least restrictive measure issues, it did
make findings at the conclusion of the June 22, 2005, hearing
which, we believe, sufficiently complies with its obligation
under KRS 600.010(2)(c).
Moreover, those findings were
supported by substantial evidence, and hence are binding upon
our review.
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Having carefully reviewed the record, we cannot
conclude that the family court was clearly erroneous or abused
its discretion in its decision to order K.A.C.’s commitment to
the Cabinet.
Finally, K.A.C. contends that the family court’s order
of May 23, 2005, converted the proceedings into a dependency
proceeding.
This argument is based upon the entry of an order
on May 23, 2005, captioned “Order Granting Temporary Custody in
a Dependency, Neglect, Abuse Action.”
This argument was not
raised before the family court, and, accordingly the issue is
not preserved.
We accordingly review the issue pursuant to RCr
10.26.
The order upon which K.A.C. relies is a preprinted
form order which, based upon its caption, is designed to be used
in dependency, abuse and neglect cases.
In awarding temporary
custody to the Cabinet, it appears that the family court used
the wrong form.
The case at the time the order was entered was
a juvenile status offender proceeding, and while the family
court entered an order designed for a dependency, abuse and
neglect case, the order does not purport to “convert” the matter
to that type of proceeding.
We accordingly do not believe that
there was any such “conversion” of the case.
was no manifest injustice under RCr 10.26.
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In summary, there
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Boyle
Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
David W. Barr
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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