DAVID RAY BUCK v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-002172-MR
DAVID RAY BUCK
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MONROE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE EDDIE C. LOVELACE, JUDGE
INDICTMENT NO. 05-CR-00013
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES. 1
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
David Ray Buck appeals from a judgment
of conviction entered by the Monroe Circuit Court.
After a jury
trial, Buck was convicted of carrying a concealed deadly weapon;
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree,
methamphetamine; tampering with physical evidence; criminal
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine; trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree, methamphetamine and
hindering prosecution in the second degree.
On appeal, Buck
argues that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth when it failed
1
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and Lewis G. Paisley and sitting as
Special Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section
110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
to produce a witness statement; that the trial court erred when
it denied his motion for a directed verdict regarding the
trafficking charge; that the Commonwealth engaged in
prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument; that the
evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for criminal
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and that double
jeopardy precluded his conviction for both possession of
methamphetamine and trafficking in methamphetamine.
Finding
that double jeopardy precluded Buck from being convicted of both
trafficking and possession, we affirm in part, reverse in part
and remand.
On January 22, 2005, Kentucky State Trooper Robert
Maxwell contacted Eddie Murphy, a detective with the
Commonwealth Attorney’s Office for the 40th judicial district.
Trooper Maxwell stated that Clint Rowe, an escaped drug dealer,
was hiding at the home of David Ray Buck in Monroe County.
Detective Murphy met with Trooper Maxwell and numerous other law
enforcement agents and proceeded to Buck’s home.
When the
officers arrived at Buck’s residence, they found Buck in his
vehicle driving along his driveway in an attempt to leave.
Following behind Buck was a red pickup truck driven by Ricky
Turner.
Clint Rowe was a passenger in Turner’s truck.
As the
police arrived, Rowe fled, but Trooper Maxwell apprehended Rowe
sometime later.
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Upon seeing the police, Buck returned to his house.
Detective Murphy frisked Buck and found a set of brass knuckles
on his person.
The detective then arrested Buck for carrying a
concealed deadly weapon.
Detective Murphy and the other
officers also noticed a strong chemical odor, often associated
with the manufacturing of methamphetamine, emanating from a
small trailer beside Buck’s house.
Because of the cold weather,
Buck asked if he could wait inside his house.
The detective
agreed and asked Buck for permission to search his car and his
home.
Buck consented.
Later, when Buck thought no one was
looking, he threw a large Ziploc ® bag behind a wood pile.
Detective Murphy retrieved the bag, which contained about one
ounce of white powder.
The detective field-tested the substance
which indicated the presence of methamphetamine.
Afterward, the
detective did a thorough search of Buck’s person and found an
empty baggie, several twist ties and $4,235.00 in cash.
In the
search of Buck’s home, the police found two blender bowls
containing a white substance.
During the search of the
remainder of Buck’s property, the police found a white Dodge
pickup truck, which contained all the necessary equipment to
manufacture methamphetamine.
The police charged Buck, Rowe and Turner with various
offenses.
On February 23, 2005, a Monroe County Grand Jury
indicted Buck and charged him with carrying a concealed deadly
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weapon; hindering prosecution or apprehension in the second
degree; manufacturing methamphetamine; trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree, methamphetamine;
criminal conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine; tampering
with physical evidence; possession of a controlled substance in
the first degree, methamphetamine; and possession of drug
paraphernalia.
On July 22, 2005, Buck proceeded to trial, and
the jury convicted him of carrying a concealed deadly weapon;
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree,
methamphetamine; tampering with physical evidence; criminal
conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine; trafficking in a
controlled substance in the first degree, methamphetamine and
hindering prosecution in the second degree.
Since there were
irregularities with the jury sentencing process, the trial
court, after considering a pre-sentence investigative report,
sentenced Buck to a total of fifteen years in prison.
Alleging
numerous errors, Buck seeks review from this Court.
COMMONWEALTH’S FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE KENTUCKY RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
To better understand Buck’s appellate arguments, we
must briefly revisit the facts.
Two days before trial, the
Commonwealth entered into an agreement with Ricky Turner to
secure Turner’s testimony against Buck.
In exchange for his
testimony, the Commonwealth granted Turner immunity and
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dismissed all charges against Turner except for a hindering
prosecution charge.
The prosecutor contacted Buck’s trial
attorney and informed him that Turner would be testifying for
the Commonwealth.
However, the prosecutor did not produce a
written or taped witness statement of Turner as required by
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 7.26.
Two days later at the trial, when the prosecutor
called Turner to the stand, Buck’s attorney objected and argued
that Turner should be excluded from testifying since the
Commonwealth had failed to comply with RCr 7.26.
The prosecutor
explained that he had not had time to comply with the rule, and
he produced Turner’s witness statement for Buck’s attorney to
examine if he so wished.
The trial court decided that Turner
could testify but offered Buck and his attorney an opportunity
to examine Turner’s statement before Turner testified.
Buck
accepted the trial court’s offer, and he and his trial counsel
briefly left the courtroom and examined Turner’s statement.
After Buck had examined Turner’s statement, Turner
proceeded to testify.
Upon direct examination, Turner stated
that he had observed Clint Rowe manufacture methamphetamine
inside the small trailer located on Buck’s property.
He further
testified that he observed Buck in close proximity to Rowe when
Rowe manufactured methamphetamine.
According to Turner, Rowe
manufactured two or three batches of methamphetamine at Buck’s
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residence.
Upon cross-examination, Turner relayed that he had
observed Rowe manufacture methamphetamine at Buck’s residence
even though Buck was absent.
Turner also testified that Buck
did not manufacture methamphetamine, did not participate in the
manufacturing of methamphetamine and did not use
methamphetamine.
On appeal, Buck points out that, according to RCr 7.26
and Jencks v. U.S., 353 U.S. 657, 77 S. Ct. 1007, 1 L. Ed. 2d
1103 (1956), a criminal defendant has the right to examine
witness statements at least forty-eight hours prior to trial.
According to Buck, such an examination gives a criminal
defendant the opportunity to discovery possible inconsistencies
between the prior statement and the latter testimony.
In
addition, relying on Beaty v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 196 (Ky.
2003), Buck argues that if the Commonwealth violates RCr 7.26,
such a violation will constitute reversible error if some
prejudice to the defendant resulted from the Commonwealth’s
failure to comply with the rule.
According to Buck, a criminal
defendant suffers prejudice if the error resulted in denying the
defendant access to information which, if he had received in a
timely manner, would have enabled him to contradict the witness,
impeach the witness or establish some other fact that might
have, within reason, altered the verdict.
Commonwealth, 805 S.W.2d 144 (Ky. 1991).
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Hicks v.
In his brief, Buck avers that Turner’s testimony
contained exculpatory evidence, i.e., that Buck neither made nor
used methamphetamine, and he insists that the Commonwealth’s
failure to comply with RCr 7.26 hindered his ability to fully
explore this exculpatory evidence and prejudiced him.
The relevant portion of RCr 7.26 reads:
Except for good cause shown, not later than
forty-eight (48) hours prior to trial, the
attorney for the Commonwealth shall produce
all statements of any witness in the form of
a document or recording in its possession
which relates to the subject matter of the
witness’s testimony and which (a) has been
signed or initialed by the witness or (b) is
or purports to be a substantially verbatim
statement made by the witness. Such
statement shall be made available for
examination and use by the defendant.
This rule is often referred to as the “forty-eight hour rule.”
When we review a trial court’s decision to deny a criminal
defendant’s motion to preclude testimony based on the
Commonwealth’s violation of the forty-eight hour rule, we will
not disturb the trial court’s decision absent an abuse of
discretion.
Beaty v. Commonwealth, supra at 202.
Additionally,
even if the Commonwealth has violated RCr 7.26, such a violation
is not grounds for automatic reversal.
31 S.W.3d 897, 905 (Ky. 2000).
Gosser v. Commonwealth,
In order to gain reversal, the
criminal defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the
Commonwealth’s tardiness.
Beaty v. Commonwealth, supra.
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If the
defendant fails to show such prejudice, then we will deem the
Commonwealth’s violation to be harmless error.
Gosser v.
Commonwealth, supra.
In the present case, Buck claims that the
Commonwealth’s tardiness prevented him from fully exploring the
exculpatory statements made by Turner during cross-examination.
However, Buck does not explain how he was prevented from
exploring this exculpatory evidence, and does not explain how he
was prejudiced.
Before Turner testified, Buck and his trial
counsel reviewed Turner’s statement, and, during Turner’s
testimony, Buck raised no further objections.
On appeal, Buck
has failed to show that he was prejudiced by the Commonwealth’s
violation of RCr 7.26; thus, we find that the Commonwealth’s
violation was nothing more than harmless error.
Given that the
error was harmless, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Buck’s motion in limine to exclude Turner’s
testimony.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING TRAFFICKING
After the close of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief,
Buck moved for a directed verdict regarding the charge of
trafficking in methamphetamine.
The trial court denied the
motion, and, according to Buck, it noted that there was not a
tremendous amount of evidence to support the charge.
However,
the trial court noted that there was evidence of a baggie, twist
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ties, a large sum of money, and evidence of two sets of scales.
Buck avers that one set of scales was found on Turner and the
other set was found on Rowe.
According to Buck, this is
evidence of complicity to traffic, not evidence of trafficking
itself.
Since Buck was charged with trafficking, not complicity
to traffic, he argues that the trial court could not rely on the
scales in denying his motion for directed verdict since such
evidence was irrelevant to the trafficking charge.
While Buck expresses his assignment of error in terms
of relevancy, in actuality, he is questioning the sufficiency of
the evidence.
In a criminal trial, when a trial court considers
a motion for directed verdict, the trial court must draw from
the evidence all fair and reasonable inferences in favor of the
Commonwealth.
1991).
Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.
The trial court may not direct a verdict in the
defendant’s favor if the evidence is sufficient to induce a
reasonable juror to believe that the defendant is guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.
Id.
Furthermore, the trial court must
assume that the evidence presented by the Commonwealth is true,
although it must reserve the questions of credibility and weight
for the jury.
Id.
When we review the denial of a directed
verdict, we must consider whether, given the evidence as a
whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt.
Id.
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A review of the record reveals that on January 22,
2005, Buck possessed large amounts of cash; he was unemployed;
he possessed a baggie and several twist ties; he possessed a
Ziploc ® bag that contained a quantity of methamphetamine; he
was armed with brass knuckles; he gave shelter to Rowe and
allowed Rowe to manufacture methamphetamine on his property; and
he attempted to flee upon learning that the police were en route
to his home.
Given the evidence as a whole, the jury acted
reasonably when it convicted Buck of trafficking in
methamphetamine.
Id.
The trial court did not err when it
denied Buck’s motion for directed verdict.
Furthermore, even if
the evidence regarding the two sets of scales was irrelevant as
Buck claims, it is well settled that a lower court’s decision
will be upheld if it reached the correct conclusion for the
wrong reason.
Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Ky.
1998).
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
During the penalty phase of Buck’s trial, the
prosecutor, in his closing argument, asked the jury to sentence
Buck to at least twenty years in prison.
The prosecutor stated,
“And I again leave that in your good hands because, as I say,
you’re the conscious of this community and what you say will not
stop here today, but just take these and consider what was done
in this case, consider what we’re dealing with here.”
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According
to Buck, this statement is prohibited by King v. Commonwealth,
253 Ky. 775, 70 S.W.2d 667 (Ky. 1934) because, by using the
“conscious of the community” language, the prosecutor asked the
jury to make a sentence recommendation, not based on the
evidence, but based on the need to send a message to other
future criminals.
Buck did not object to this language so he
argues that the prosecutor’s statement to the jury constituted a
manifest injustice that rose to the level of palpable error.
Palpable error is an irregularity that affects the
substantial rights of a party and will result in manifest
injustice to the party if not addressed by an appellate court.
Schoenbachler v. Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830, 837 (Ky. 2003).
In other words, after considering the whole case, if the
appellate court does not believe that there is a substantial
possibility that the result would have been any different then
the irregularity will be held non-prejudicial.
Id.
Since we
believe that there was no substantial possibility that the
result of Buck’s trial would have been different absent the
prosecutor’s remarks, we hold this irregularity to be nonprejudicial and decline to address the merits of Buck’s
assignment of error.
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SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE REGARDING CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY TO
MANUFACTURE METHAMPHETAMINE
According to Buck, the Commonwealth dismissed any
charges against Turner that involved methamphetamine, so Buck
argues that the Commonwealth could not use Turner to establish a
criminal conspiracy.
In addition, Buck points out that Rowe did
not testify; therefore, Buck argues that there was no direct
proof of a conspiracy between Buck and Rowe.
Based on this,
Buck reasons that the Commonwealth did not present sufficient
evidence to support the criminal conspiracy charge.
In the alternative, Buck calls to our attention the
fact that Detective Murphy testified that Buck possessed all the
necessary chemicals, save one, to manufacture methamphetamine.
Also, Buck points out that most of the equipment used to
manufacture methamphetamine was found in a white Dodge pickup
truck that Rowe had been driving, so Buck concludes that he did
not possess all the necessary equipment to manufacture
methamphetamine, even though all the equipment was found on his
property.
Buck concludes that the Commonwealth failed to
produce sufficient evidence to support the underlying charge of
manufacturing methamphetamine.
Without sufficient evidence to
support the underlying charge, Buck argues that he could not
have been convicted of criminal conspiracy.
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As we stated earlier, when we review the denial of a
directed verdict, we must consider whether, given the evidence
as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a jury to find
guilt.
Commonwealth v. Benham, supra.
KRS 506.040 sets forth the elements of criminal
conspiracy.
According to the commentary to KRS 506.040, to
prove criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must show that a
person intended to combine or agree with one or more persons to
commit an unlawful act and that one of the conspirators
performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial
agreement.
In addition, the Commonwealth may establish the
existence of a criminal conspiracy based upon the actions and
conduct of the conspirators, or based upon facts and
circumstances which, when considered separately, are not
sufficient to establish a conspiracy, but when connected and
examined as a whole are sufficient to establish a criminal
conspiracy.
Chapman v. Commonwealth, 294 Ky. 631, 172 S.W.2d
228, 231 (Ky. 1943).
According to Turner’s testimony, Buck had allowed Rowe
to use the trailer beside Buck’s house to manufacture
methamphetamine, and Turner testified that he observed Buck in
close proximity to Rowe while Rowe manufactured methamphetamine.
In addition, Turner relayed that Rowe had manufactured two or
three batches of methamphetamine at Buck’s residence.
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From this
evidence, the jury could easily infer that, by sheltering Rowe
and allowing him to manufacture methamphetamine on his property,
Buck had intentionally entered into an agreement with Rowe to
commit an unlawful act, the manufacturing of methamphetamine;
thus, the evidence supports the first element of criminal
conspiracy.
Regarding the second element of criminal
conspiracy, the jury could easily infer that one of the
conspirators, Rowe, performed an overt act, the manufacturing of
methamphetamine, in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement.
Considering the evidence as a whole, the jury acted reasonably
when it convicted Buck of criminal conspiracy to manufacture
methamphetamine.
See Commonwealth v. Benham, supra.
In the alternative, Buck insists that the evidence
could not support the underlying charge of manufacturing
methamphetamine because he did not possess all the chemicals or
all the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine.
However, this argument is not well taken for two reasons.
First, Buck was charged and convicted of criminal conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine.
The Commonwealth had to prove the
elements of criminal conspiracy, not the elements of the
underlying charge, manufacturing methamphetamine.
Second,
Detective Murphy testified unequivocally that he had found all
the equipment necessary to manufacture methamphetamine on Buck’s
property.
Since the equipment was on Buck’s property, he was in
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constructive possession of it, thus, satisfying the requirements
set forth in Kotila v. Commonwealth, 114 S.W.3d 226 (Ky. 2003).
DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROHIBITS THE POSSESSION CONVICTION AND THE
TRAFFICKING COVICTION SINCE BOTH WERE BASED ON THE SAME EVIDENCE
Buck argues that the possession conviction and the
trafficking conviction were based on the same evidence, the fact
that a bag of methamphetamine was found at his residence.
Thus,
Buck concludes that possession was a lesser included offense of
trafficking since “it cannot be said that each requires an
element that the other does not.”
So, relying on Blockburger v.
U.S., 284 U.S. 299, 52 S. Ct. 180, 76 L. Ed. 306 (1932), Buck
argues that double jeopardy prohibited the jury from convicting
him of both possession and trafficking.
According to Commonwealth v. Burge, Ky., 947 S.W.2d
805, 811 (1996), when addressing questions concerning double
jeopardy, we rely upon the analysis found in Blockburger v.
U.S., supra.
Double jeopardy does not prohibit the Commonwealth
from charging an accused with two crimes arising out of the same
course of conduct as long as each statute requires proof of an
additional element which the other does not.
The elements of trafficking in a controlled substance
in the first degree, methamphetamine are set forth in KRS
218A.1412.
The relevant portion of the statute reads, “A person
is guilty of trafficking in a controlled substance in the first
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degree when he knowingly and unlawfully traffics in . . . a
controlled substance that contains any quantity of
methamphetamine[.]”
On the other hand, the elements for
possession of a controlled substance in the first degree,
methamphetamine are set forth in KRS 218A.1415.
The relevant
portion of that statute reads, “A person is guilty of possession
of a controlled substance in the first degree when he knowingly
and unlawfully possess . . . a controlled substance that
contains any quantity of methamphetamine[.]”
Comparing these
two statutes, one can easily see that the trafficking statute
encompasses all the elements of the possession statute.
While the Commonwealth may contend that the
trafficking charge and the possession charge did not arise out
of the same course of conduct, the record simply does not
support that contention.
As we stated previously, the evidence
was sufficient to support the trafficking charge, and, by
extension, was sufficient to support the possession charge.
However, possession does not require proof of an additional
element that is not found in trafficking.
Thus, we agree with
Buck that possession was merely a lesser included offense of
trafficking.
By allowing the possession charge to stand, the
trial court violated the holding of Blockburger v. U.S., supra.
Since double jeopardy prohibited Buck from being convicted of
both trafficking and possession, we reverse that part of the
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judgment of conviction regarding possession and remand this case
to the trial court for re-sentencing.
The remainder of the
judgment of conviction is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Ken Garrett
Glasgow, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel J. Floyd, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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