ANTHONY GRAGSTON v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: July 7, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002137-MR
ANTHONY GRAGSTON
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00469
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE1 AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
After having entered a conditional plea of
guilty, Anthony Dewayne Gragston brings this appeal from a Final
Judgment and Sentence of the Fayette Circuit Court, which
convicted him of possession of marijuana2 and evading or fleeing
police.3
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly overruled the motion to suppress evidence seized by
1
Judge R. W. Dyche concurred in this opinion prior to his retirement
effective June 17, 2006.
2
KRS (Kentucky Revised Statute) 218A.1422
3
KRS 520.100
the police at the time of the arrest.
After our review of the
record and pertinent law, we affirm.
Gragston disputes whether the officers had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify the warrantless
stop, seizure, and subsequent arrest in this case.
The United
States Supreme Court has ruled that unprovoked flight -- under
certain circumstances -- may constitute sufficient suspicion.
See, Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 199, 120 S.Ct. 673 (2000).
Kentucky case law mirrors the holding in Wardlow.
See,
Commonwealth v. Banks, 68 S.W.3d 347 (Ky. 2001).
On February 19, 2005, the night of the arrest,
Gragston was observed approaching the passenger-side window of a
parked vehicle on Breckenridge Street in Lexington, Kentucky.
The vehicle had its brake lights on, and it appeared that the
motor was running.
Officer Curtsinger and Detective Sparks were
patrolling the neighborhood (known as a high-crime area) in
order to monitor criminal activity -- particularly street-level,
drug-related crimes.
The two officers were travelling on
Breckenridge Street when they noticed Gragston near the vehicle,
which was stopped on the road.
When Gragston saw the marked police cruiser
approaching the vicinity, he began to walk in the opposite
direction at an alleged “fast pace”.
Upon observing Gragston’s
conduct, the officers decided to investigate the matter further
-2-
in order to determine if criminal activity were afoot.
Officer
Curtsinger testified that although Gragston’s actions were
consistent with drug dealing behavior, the officers merely
sought to ask some questions at that juncture.
As the officers
entered a nearby parking lot, Gragston began to run before any
verbal exchange could occur.
The officers then exited their
vehicle, and a foot pursuit ensued.
Gragston was observed
tossing his jacket and reaching for his pockets.
The officers
repeatedly identified themselves as police and asked Gragston to
halt.
Gragston subsequently “gave up” and was subdued.
After the chase, the officers discovered a bag
containing marijuana along the path of Gragston’s flight.
Accordingly, Gragston was charged with trafficking in a
controlled substance within 1000 yards of a school and with
fleeing or evading police.
The former charge was later amended
to possession of marijuana.
Claiming that there was no basis for the initial
investigatory stop, Gragston filed a motion on May 26, 2005,
asking the court to suppress the evidence seized as a result of
the encounter.
On June 17, 2005, the trial court denied the
motion to suppress on the grounds that the officers possessed
the requisite suspicion to stop Gragston initially.
On August
5, 2005, Gragston entered a conditional plea of guilty to the
amended charge of possession of marijuana and to fleeing or
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evading police.
count.
He was sentenced to twelve months on each
This appeal followed.
The proper standard of appellate review on a
suppression issue is found in Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d
920, 923 (Ky.App. 2002):
An appellate court’s standard of review
of the trial court’s decision on a motion to
suppress requires that we first determine
whether the trial court’s findings of fact
are supported by substantial evidence. If
they are, then they are conclusive.
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr)
9.78. Based on those findings, we must then
conduct a de novo review of the trial
court’s application of the law to those
facts to determine whether its decision is
correct as a matter of law. (Citations
omitted.)
The findings of fact with respect to the chase are undisputed.
The factual findings by the trial court are well-supported by
the testimony of the officers as well as by physical evidence
collected at the scene.
Additionally, Gragston does not dispute
his running from the scene upon observing the police enter the
parking lot.
Pursuant to RCr4 9.78, the factual findings are
conclusive in this matter.
We next consider whether the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts of this case; i.e., whether the
court correctly determined that the officers had reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify an investigative stop of
4
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
-4-
Gragston.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d
889 (1968).
Terry holds that under appropriate circumstances
and in an appropriate manner, a police officer may approach a
person to investigate the possible occurrence of criminal
activity -- even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest.
Id.
The lesser standard of reasonable suspicion is a
sufficient basis for such an inquiry.
Kentucky law holds that a
police officer may approach a person, identify himself as a
police officer, and ask a few questions without even implicating
the Fourth Amendment.
Fletcher v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.3d at
559 (Ky.App. 2005); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20
L.Ed. 889 (1968).
There are three types of interactions between citizens
and police officers:
consensual encounters, temporary
detentions, and arrests.
Baltimore v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d
532, 537 (Ky.App. 2003).
Consensual encounters do not implicate
the Fourth Amendment -- unlike and as distinguished from
temporary detentions and arrests.
Id.
Terry stops generally
fall into the category of temporary detentions.
Initially, the
police officers sought to engage in a consensual encounter with
Gragston in order to ask a few questions.
When he took flight
and attempted to elude the police, Gragston wholly changed the
dynamics of the encounter and triggered the justification for a
Terry stop.
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The police officers were conducting surveillance for
drug-related activity.
Officer Curtsinger testified that
Gragston’s actions (e.g., approaching a parked car in the middle
of a street) were consistent with drug dealing behavior.
Although Gragston’s mere presence at this location would not
suffice for a Terry stop, other additional factors taken in the
aggregate justified the stop:
Gragston’s immediate flight from
the scene upon seeing the police; the reputation of Breckenridge
Street for being a high-crime area with a high frequency of drug
activity; Gragston’s behavior in tossing his jacket and reaching
for his trousers as being consistent with drug-related activity.
United States v. Cortez held that the totality of the
circumstances must be assessed in determining whether an officer
has a reason to initiate an investigative stop.
United States
v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 419, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).
Common sense and experience come into play when
evaluating whether the “totality of the circumstances” permits
questioning and subsequent seizure of a suspicious person.
Cortez recites as follows:
The process does not deal with hard
certainties, but with probabilities. Long
before the law of probabilities was
articulated as such, practical people
formulated certain common sense conclusions
about human behavior; jurors as fact finders
are permitted to do the same—and so are law
enforcement officers. Finally, the evidence
thus collected must be seen and weighed not
-6-
in terms of library analysis by scholars,
but as understood by those versed in the
field of law enforcement. (Emphasis added.)
Cortez, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.Ct. at 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621
(1981).
In the case before us, the police officers properly
drew reasonable inferences with respect to Gragston’s unprovoked
flight.
The officers had just pulled into a parking lot when
Gragston ran away before any hint of a stop or seizure could
occur.
Relevant to this case, the United States Supreme Court
discusses the nuances of seizure as follows:
The word “seizure” readily bears the
meaning of a laying on of hands or
application of physical force to restrain
movement, even when it is ultimately
unsuccessful. It does not remotely apply,
however, to the prospect of a policeman
yelling “Stop, in the name of law!” at a
fleeing form that continues to flee. That
is no seizure.
California v. Hodari, 449 U.S. at 626, 111 S.Ct. at 1550 (1991).
Gragston instantly created reasonable suspicion for a
Terry stop upon taking flight.
In Wardlow, supra, the Court
addressed a strikingly similar situation and held:
It was not merely respondent’s presence
in an area of heavy narcotics trafficking
that aroused the officer’s suspicion, but
his unprovoked flight upon noticing the
police. Headlong flight—wherever it occurs—
is the consummate act of evasion: It is not
necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it
is certainly suggestive of such. (Emphases
added.)
-7-
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 124, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (2000).
Wardlow
continues:
Unprovoked flight is simply not a mere
refusal to cooperate. Flight, by its very
nature, is not ‘going about one’s business’;
in fact, it is just the opposite. Allowing
officers confronted with such flight to stop
the fugitive and investigate further is
quite consistent with the individual’s right
to go about his business or to stay put and
remain silent in the face of police
questioning.
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 676 (2000).
that Wardlow is dispositive of this case.
We conclude
The police officers
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to pursue, to seize, and
subsequently to arrest Gragston upon his unprovoked flight.
evidence seized in the course of his arrest was, therefore,
admissible.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Kristin Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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The
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