EVELYN KAY SELF v. DAVID SELF
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002131-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-002180-MR
EVELYN KAY SELF
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOSEPH W. O'REILLY, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-501928
DAVID SELF
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
This appeal and accompanying cross-appeal
are taken from a judgment of dissolution of marriage entered by
the Jefferson Circuit Court on November 5, 2004.
The judgment
divided the marital property of Evelyn Kay (“Kay”) Self and
David Self.
Both parties contest the court’s division of the
marital assets.
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
The petition for dissolution of the marriage was filed
on May 3, 2003.
Kay and David had been married for twenty-five
years and had raised one child, who is emancipated.
Kay has
been employed for approximately twenty years as an insurance
underwriter for Kentucky Farm Bureau Insurance Company.
David
worked at Brown-Forman until 1985 when he retired and began
running his own business, David Self Lawn Care Company.
They
each have an annual income of approximately $40,000.00.
The
primary assets of the marriage consisted of two tracts of real
estate (the marital residence in Jefferson County and two acres
in Spencer County where the couple were planning to build a
home), retirement accounts, life insurance policies, bank
accounts, personal property, and David’s lawn care business and
equipment.
The action was tried on August 26, 2004.
The trial
court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
decree of dissolution on November 5, 2004.
to reconsider to which David responded.
Kay filed a motion
The motion was denied
on December 14, 2004, and this appeal followed.
In reviewing issues in an action for dissolution of
marriage, we must defer to the considerable discretion of the
trial court unless it has committed clear error or has abused
that discretion.
An appellate court “cannot disturb the
findings of a trial court in a case involving dissolution of
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marriage unless those findings are clearly erroneous.”
Cochran
v. Cochran, 746 S.W.2d 568, 569-70 (1988).
Marital property must be distributed in
accord with KRS 403.190. Pursuant to this
provision, the court must assign each spouse
their non-marital property and then divide
the couple’s marital property in “just
proportions,” without regard to marital
misconduct and in light of the following
factors: each spouse’s contribution to the
acquisition of the marital assets, including
homemaking duties; the value of each
spouse’s non-marital property; the duration
of the marriage and the economic
circumstances of each spouse at the time of
distribution. KRS 403.190(1)(a)-(d). The
standard of review is whether the trial
court abused its discretion.
Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Ky.App. 1994)(internal
citations omitted).
The first issue raised in Kay’s direct appeal concerns
two redemption checks in the amounts of $18,388.37 and $7,345.14
that were withdrawn from the parties’ joint mutual fund accounts
at Prudential Financial on June 5, 2003, approximately one month
after the filing of the Petition for Dissolution.
No
explanation was provided as to why Kay consented to the
withdrawal of these assets or why she allowed David to retain
them.
The court found that Kay had agreed to withdraw the
money and had signed the necessary documents, but “she has never
been in control of the removed funds.”
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This finding accurately
corresponded to Kay’s testimony at trial.
However, no further
mention of these funds was made in the court order.
Kay now argues that the trial court erred in failing
to account for these redemption checks in its final division of
the marital property.
She contends that it was unjust to allow
David to retain marital property totalling $25,733.00 without
some offset having been made for it in the court’s allocation of
the other assets.
David contends that the issue of the redemption checks
has not been preserved for our review because Kay failed to list
it in her prehearing statement as required under Kentucky Rules
of Civil Procedure (CR) 76.03(8).
He also argues that the
amount of the redemption checks that he retained was offset by
the fact that he made all mortgage payments on the marital
properties in Jefferson and Spencer counties during the period
of the parties’ separation.
Including taxes and insurance, his
payments amounted to $28,178.00.
Our review of the appellate record confirms David’s
contention that Kay’s prehearing statement made no specific
reference to the Prudential Financial redemption checks.
CR 76.03(4)(h) provides that within twenty days of
filing a notice of appeal, an appellant must file a prehearing
statement setting out a “brief statement of the facts and issues
proposed to be raised on appeal, including jurisdictional
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challenges[.]”
CR 76.03(8) provides in mandatory language as
follows:
a party shall be limited on appeal to issues
in the prehearing statement except that when
good cause is shown the appellate court may
permit additional issues to be submitted
upon timely motion. (Emphasis added.)
In Sallee v. Sallee, 142 S.W.3d 697, 698 (Ky.App. 2004), this
Court recognized the binding nature of that rule by refusing to
consider an appellant’s argument regarding the award of
maintenance when it had not been cited among the many issues
listed in the prehearing statement.
Kay argues that the issue of the redemption checks is
properly before this Court as having comprised a part of the
distribution of the marital estate designated to be examined on
appeal.
She contends that we cannot determine whether the trial
court made an equitable distribution without considering all
assets of the estate.
Therefore, she asks that we recognize
that she has substantially complied with the rules of appellate
procedure as set forth in Ready v. Jamieson, 705 S.W.2d 479, 481
(Ky. 1986).
We agree that the issue of the redemption checks was
sufficiently preserved because they are an essential element of
her primary argument that the settlement as a whole was
inequitable.
It is distinguishable from Sallee, in which the
maintenance issue raised on appeal was wholly unrelated to the
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issues listed in the prehearing statement.
In her pre-hearing
statement, she properly listed the allegedly inequitable nature
of the distribution of which these checks form an integral part.
David has argued that if we review this claim on the
merits, we must recognize that he paid considerable sums to
cover the mortgages and other expenses of the two marital
properties after the separation.
We note that the court
acknowledged that David paid these expenses, tracing them to and
offsetting them against funds that David withdrew from two
personal bank accounts at PNC and at BB&T.
After weighing the
equities on this issue, the court concluded as follows:
While Respondent [David] has been paying the
mortgage on both pieces of property, he has
also had the enjoyment of both pieces of
property. Respondent has been living in the
marital home and using the Spencer County
property to store equipment from his
business. Further, Respondent has been
paying the mortgages out of a bank account
that contains the parties’ former marital
funds that Petitioner no longer has access
to. Therefore, Respondent shall not receive
a credit for the money expended on mortgages
during the parties’ separation. (Emphasis
added.)
No mention was made of the two checks from the Prudential
Financial mutual fund.
We must determine whether the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing David to retain the $25,733.00 in marital
assets withdrawn from the Prudential Financial mutual fund
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accounts.
There is no presumption -- or requirement -- that
marital property be equally divided in a dissolution of marriage
action.
Russell v. Russell, 878 S.W.2d 24, 25 (Ky.App. 1994).
After considering the statutory factors enumerated in Kentucky
Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190, the trial court properly divided
the marital assets in roughly equal proportions between David
and Kay.
It appears, however, that the court overlooked the
Prudential redemption checks in its overall disposition of the
marital property.
Accordingly, we vacate and remand only that
portion of the judgment relating to the omission of these two
checks withdrawn on June 5, 2003, from Prudential Financial in
order for the court to make an equitable distribution of these
assets.
Kay’s next argument concerns the two bank accounts
held in David’s name only that were discussed by the court in
connection with his payment of the mortgages.
One was an
account at BB&T Bank containing $25,871.17 as of July 31, 2003.
The second was at PNC Bank and held $9,842.09.
David testified
that he closed the PNC account when Kay filed for divorce so
that she would not have any access to the funds.
He then opened
the BB&T account, which he proceeded to use for business and
personal purposes after the date of the separation.
Kay argues that these accounts contained the retained
earnings of the business and were a marital asset subject to
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division.
She contends that the value of the accounts should
have been added to the value of $75,000.00 that the court
assigned to the business.
In her view, the court simply
overlooked these assets when dividing the estate.
We disagree.
As cited above from the actual judgment, the court carefully and
deliberately offset the assets in these accounts against David’s
payment of the mortgages and the other expenses of the Jefferson
and Spencer County properties.
We find no abuse of discretion.
Kay next argues that the court failed to recognize the
cash value of two whole-life insurance policies owned by David.
As of July 31, 2003, the first policy had a cash value of
$14,122.49, and the second a cash value of $26,832.90.
one policy.
Kay had
The policies were indisputably marital assets.
David testified that he had borrowed $31,732.87 against the
policies in order to finance a building that the parties were
constructing on the Spencer County land.
Because of this loan,
the cash value of the policies has been reduced to $9,222.52.
The court found that David:
did not present any documentation showing
the money was taken out of the life
insurance or that it was used for the
construction of the building [in Spencer
County]. The loan payments on both of those
policies are currently covered by the cash
surrender payments he would be receiving.
The court awarded the parties their respective insurance
policies.
Kay’s insurance policy is now worth $6,388.00.
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Kay has argued that it was unfair to assign each party
his/her own life insurance policies because the cash value of
hers was only $6,388.00.
As already noted, there is no
requirement that marital property be divided in exactly equal
proportions.
While David has been assigned his two policies
with a much higher cash value, they are encumbered with
$30,000.00 in debt.
The trial court did not abuse its
discretion in its allocation of the insurance policies.
On cross-appeal, David argues that the court committed
clear error by failing to accept his testimony about the
policies.
He contends that he had used the loans against his
life insurance policies in order to make improvements to the
property in Spencer County.
Although the court ordered the
property to be sold, it refused to order the re-payment of
David’s life insurance loans from the proceeds of the sale.
He
challenges the court’s finding that he failed to present any
proof that the money was used for the Spencer County property,
relying on the documentary evidence of the loans and his own
testimony.
David argues that the evidence was uncontradicted
that he had used the money to improve the Spencer County
property and that, therefore, the court clearly erred in not
allowing him to re-capture these amounts.
The trial court is not required to accept testimony
that it finds unconvincing simply because it is uncontradicted.
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Assessing the credibility of witnesses is one of the principal
functions and prerogatives of a trial court.
“Findings of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.”
CR 52.01.
We find no abuse
of discretion on this issue.
Kay next complains that the court awarded David
business equipment having a net value of $42,883.00 without
reimbursing Kay for her marital interest.
Prior to the trial
and with the agreement of counsel for both parties, the court
appointed an appraiser, Mark Joyce, to assess the personal
property of both parties.
the business property.
Joyce assigned a value of $61,883 to
The property included in his appraisal
consisted of two pickup trucks; a dump truck; and smaller items
such as lawn mowers, leaf blowers, and office equipment.
Kay
arrived at her figure of $42,883.00 by subtracting $19,000.00 of
debt owed on one of the pickup trucks from Joyce’s total of
$61,883.00.
By order of the court, a separate appraisal of the
business was conducted by Crowe Chizek and Company (Crowe
Chizek).
However, Crowe Chizek did not perform a formal
“business valuation” because the parties refused to pay the
$7,000.00 fee.
Instead, Crowe Chizek provided a “range of
estimates of the possible fair market value of a 100 percent
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interest” in the company.
The range of estimates ran from
$60,000.00 to $90,000.00.
The Crowe Chizek report detailed the
assets of the company as including “cash, accounts receivable, a
small inventory of lawn care supplies, and mowing and
transportation equipment.”
Finding that the most fair and equitable valuation of
the business was the middle of the range provided by Crowe
Chizek, the court determined the value of the company to be
$75,000.00.
David was ordered to pay Kay a cash amount equal to
one-half the value of the company ($37,500.00) at a rate of
$7,500.00 per year over a period of five years.
David was
awarded all of the equipment associated with the business -including the automobiles.
He was also ordered to assume all
related debt.
Kay argues that the $42,883.00 assessed by Joyce was
an amount to be considered in addition to the values provided by
Crowe Chizek.
She contends that the court erred in not awarding
her one-half of that amount as well.
We disagree.
The Crowe
Chizek valuation incorporated in some detail the equipment of
the business.
The order of the court allowed David to retain
the tangible assets of the business while ordering him to pay
Kay her share of its value in cash.
discretion.
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There was no abuse of
On cross-appeal, David has also challenged the court’s
reliance on the Crowe Chizek report on the ground that it merely
provided the values of an average business similar to his
business.
He complains that it failed to assign its true value
based on an accurate, actual appraisal.
He contends that the
court should have ordered a proper business valuation, or, as he
requested at the hearing, that the business be sold and the
proceeds divided equally.
We may not disturb a court’s valuation in a divorce
action unless it is clearly contrary to the weight of the
evidence.
Underwood v. Underwood, 836 S.W.2d 439, 444 (Ky.App.
1992), overruled in part on other grounds by Neidlinger v.
Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513, 523 (Ky. 2001).
David relies on
Robinson v. Robinson, 569 S.W.2d 178 (Ky.App. 1978), in which
the court observed that the testimony of owners concerning the
value of their real property was an insufficient basis upon
which to render judgment -- absent a showing that owners were
properly qualified to testify as to valuation.
He argues that
the Crowe Chizek report was insufficient evidence upon which the
court based its decision -- even though Chizek was not one of
the owners as in Robinson.
He contends that the “court should
not have accepted the ‘estimate’ as evidence merely to penalize
the parties for not obtaining an actual business valuation.”
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We cannot agree that the court was attempting to
penalize the parties.
Either party was free to provide other
evidence of the value of the business.
In the ten months
between the completion of the report and the beginning of the
trial, David raised no objection to the Crowe Chizek report.
The court was presented with the Crowe Chizek report along with
David’s testimony that the business should be sold.
Although
the report was not a formal valuation, its content provided
sufficient evidence for the court to support its determination
as to the disposition of the business.
In conclusion, we affirm the findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and decree of dissolution of marriage of the
Jefferson Circuit Court except as to the disposition of the two
redemption checks in the amounts of $18,388.37 and $7,345.14
withdrawn by the parties from their Prudential Financial mutual
fund accounts on June 5, 2003.
We vacate and remand for entry
of an order as to that one issue.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
Joseph V. Mobley
Jennifer L. Hulse
Louisville, Kentucky
Jason R. Segeleon
Kevin C. Burke
Louisville, Kentucky
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