MARY KEARNEY v. CITY OF SIMPSONVILLE
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RENDERED:
JULY 14, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-002052-MR
MARY KEARNEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CHARLES HICKMAN, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-CI-00286
v.
CITY OF SIMPSONVILLE
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND MINTON, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MINTON, JUDGE:
The question before us in this appeal is whether
the elected mayor and city commissioners of the City of
Simpsonville (“the City”) are employees of the City for purposes
of meeting the minimum number of employees required for an
employer to fall within the coverage of the Kentucky Civil
Rights Act (“the KCRA”).
We hold that they are employees and
that the KCRA applies.
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by
assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the
Kentucky Constitution and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
The facts germane to this appeal are simple and
uncontradicted.
Kearney was employed as the Parks and
Recreation Director for the City from August 2002 until her
termination in February 2005.
Kearney then sued the City
claiming that her discharge violated the KCRA’s prohibition on
gender discrimination.
The City moved to dismiss Kearney’s
complaint contending that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction
because the City was not an employer, as that term is used in
the KCRA, because it did not have eight employees.2
The City
supported its motion with an affidavit of its City Clerk, Debra
Batliner, asserting that the City had only seven employees.
Kearney attached to her response an affidavit from her husband
and a purported letter from a former City administrator.
Kearney contended that the City’s duly-elected mayor and
commissioners should be counted as City employees, which raised
the employee count above the jurisdictional minimum.
The trial
court apparently disagreed with Kearney’s position because it
issued an order, which reads in its entirety as follows:
Motion having been made and the Court
having been sufficiently advised,
2
KRS 344.030(2) defines an employer, in relevant part, as “a person
who has eight (8) or more employees within the state in each of
twenty (20) or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding
calendar year[.]” It is uncontested that the City is, for purposes
of the KCRA, a person as the term “person” is defined to include
“the state, any of its political or civil subdivisions or agencies.”
KRS 344.010(1).
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff’s
Complaint be dismissed with prejudice for
lack of jurisdiction over the Defendant.
So ordered this 6th day of Sept., 2005.
Dissatisfied, Kearney filed this appeal.
The question of whether Kearney actually was
improperly discharged due to her gender is not before us.
And
Kearney does not take issue with the City’s representation that
it has only seven employees apart from its mayor and city
commissioners.
So the only issue in this appeal is whether the
mayor and city commissioners should be counted as employees for
purposes of reaching the threshold number of employees required
for the City to be an employer covered by the KCRA.
This issue
is apparently one of first impression in Kentucky.
Before we address the merits of Kearney’s argument,
however, we must identify the precise procedural nature of the
issue before us.
In the case at hand, the City’s claim that it
does not meet the statutory definition of employer is, in
reality, a claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction over
it for purposes of the KCRA.
Thus, though the trial court’s
terse order did not specifically state the grounds for
dismissing Kearny’s complaint, we believe that the trial court
relied upon Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 12.02(b),
which requires a court to dismiss any claims against a defendant
over whom the trial court lacks jurisdiction.
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Since this appeal
involves no questions of fact but only the proper legal
interpretation of a statute, we owe the trial court’s decision
no deference.3
Indeed, our main objective is to interpret the
KCRA according to its plain language and to effectuate the
General Assembly’s legislative intent.4
We begin our analysis by noting that the term
“employee” is defined in the KCRA with language that offers
little guidance.
Under the KCRA, an employee is “an individual
employed by an employer[.]”5
Because that definition is of no
assistance to resolving the question before us, we must turn to
the federal law for guidance.
We are permitted to do this
because the KCRA was modeled after federal law.
In fact, the
courts of the Commonwealth often look to federal law for
guidance on interpreting the KCRA.6
Under federal law, elected
local officials are clearly not employees because 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(f) explicitly says that “the term ‘employee’ shall not
include any person elected to public office in any State or
political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters
3
Cabinet for Families and Children v. Cummings, 163 S.W.3d 425, 430
(Ky. 2005).
4
Id.
5
KRS 344.030(5).
6
Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003). See
also KRS 344.020(1)(a) (holding that one of the purposes underlying
the KCRA is to provide for execution within Kentucky of the policies
embodied in the various federal civil rights acts.).
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thereof . . . .”
Likewise, the Fair Labor Standards Act
expressly provides that elected local officials are not to be
considered employees.7
But the General Assembly chose not to use similar
language in the KCRA to exempt local elected officials from
being considered employees.
This omission is rendered even more
striking by the fact that the KCRA is expressly modeled after
federal civil rights law and contains similar language and
exclusions from coverage.
We have previously observed that the
KCRA is “virtually identical” to the Federal Civil Rights Act.8
It is a fundamental, “primary rule of statutory construction
that the enumeration of particular things excludes the idea of
something else not mentioned.”9
So, by virtue of the fact that
the General Assembly chose not to exclude elected local
officials from being employees under the KCRA while otherwise
closely tracking the federal statutes, we must conclude that the
General Assembly did not intend for such elected officials to be
excluded from coverage as “employees.”
Furthermore, it is clear that, generally, elected
officials in Kentucky are not considered “employers” for
7
See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C)(ii)(I).
8
Stewart v. University of Louisville, 65 S.W.3d 536, 539 (Ky.App.
2001).
9
Smith v. Wedding, 303 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Ky. 1957).
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purposes of the KCRA.10
Thus, if we adopt the City’s position,
local elected officials are placed in a legislative limbo where
they are neither employers nor employees.
Such a construction
is illogical since one who earns a salary from a municipality
must logically be working as an employer or an employee.
Finally, we acknowledge that the KCRA is to be
interpreted broadly in order best to achieve its antidiscriminatory goals.11
Were we to adopt the City’s position,
then the alleged wrong suffered by Kearney would be outside the
bounds of the KCRA, through no fault of Kearney’s.
So we
believe that finding local elected officials to be employees
under the KCRA helps best to further the KCRA’s overriding
purpose.
Having concluded that the City’s elected officials are
“employees” for purposes of the KCRA, we hold that the trial
court erred by finding that the City did not have enough
employees to fall within the ambit of the KCRA.
We reverse the
Shelby Circuit Court’s order dismissing this action and remand
this matter for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
10
Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1997);
Conner v. Patton, 133 S.W.3d 491 (Ky.App. 2004).
11
KRS 446.080(1) (“[a]ll statutes of this state shall be liberally
construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the
intent of the legislature[.]”).
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Samuel G. Hayward
Louisville, Kentucky
Stanley W. Whetzel, Jr.
Ruth Ann Cox Pence
Louisville, Kentucky
Philip C. Kimball
Louisville, Kentucky
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