TAURUS JERMAINE SIMMONS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001978-MR
TAURUS JERMAINE SIMMONS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JOHN R. GRISE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CR-00314
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, JUDGE; ROSENBLUM,1 SENIOR JUDGE; MILLER,2 SPECIAL
JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Tarus Jermaine Simmons appeals from an
order of the Warren Circuit Court denying his motion for post
conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42.
Simmons pled guilty to
two indictments (Case No. 00-CR-00829 and Case No. 01-CR-00314)
under a single plea agreement.
Later, upon the recantation of
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
the victim, the charges in Case No. 00-CR-00829 were dismissed
and the sentence vacated.
Simmons contends that this entitles
him to release from the plea agreement to pursue a trial in Case
No. 01-CR-00314.
For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On December 13, 2000, in Case No. 00-CR-00829, Simmons
was indicted for first-degree sodomy, a Class B felony, KRS3
510.070, and for first-degree persistent felony offender.
532.080.
KRS
The indictment alleged that Simmons had engaged in
deviate sexual intercourse with the adult male victim by
forcible compulsion.
While still under indictment on the 2000 charges, and
prior to trial thereon, on March 16, 2001, in Case No. 01-CR00314, Simmons was indicted on two counts of first-degree
trafficking in a controlled substance, first offense, a Class C
felony, KRS 218A.1412; tampering with physical evidence, a Class
D felony, KRS 524.100; and first-degree persistent felony
offender, KRS 532.080.
The indictment stated that Simmons had
sold crack cocaine to a confidential informant and possessed
crack cocaine with intent to traffic, and had tampered with
evidence in connection therewith.
On August 7, 2001, Simmons and the Commonwealth
entered into a plea agreement jointly resolving both the 2000
case and the 2001 case.
3
Pursuant to the agreement Simmons pled
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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guilty to the amended charge of first-degree attempted sodomy
(which reduced the charge from a Class B felony to a Class C
felony, see KRS 506.010) and to second-degree PFO in the 2000
case; and to two counts of first-degree trafficking in a
controlled substance (first-offense) and second-degree PFO in
the 2001 case.
The tampering charge in the 2000 case was
dismissed as part of the agreement.
The agreement provided for
a 14 year sentence in each case, to run concurrently, for a
total of 14 years to serve.
Simmons was subsequently sentenced
pursuant to the plea agreement.
Following entry of judgment on the plea agreement, the
complaining witness in the 2000 sodomy case recanted his
allegation.
On December 8, 2003, the circuit court entered an
order dismissing the 2000 case against Simmons.
On March 11, 2004, Simmons filed, pro se, a motion for
post-conviction relief pursuant to RCr 11.42, arguing that he
was entitled to have the conviction and sentence in the 2001
case vacated because of the dismissed charges in the 2000 case
and because his motive for entering the plea agreement was
motivated by his fear of a possible 20 year to life sentence on
the first-degree sodomy/PFO I charges in the 2000 case.
The
Department of Public Advocacy (DPA) was subsequently appointed
to represent Simmons.
On May 13, 2004, the DPA filed a
supplement to Simmons’ original RCr 11.42 motion and also
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claimed that, in the alternative, Simmons was entitled to relief
pursuant to CR4 60.02(e) and (f).
On May 3, 2005, the circuit court entered an order
denying Simmons’ motions for post-conviction relief.
Simmons
subsequently filed a Motion for Relief pursuant to CR 59.05 and
CR 52.02 addressing the circuit court’s reliance upon Simmons
being eligible for first-degree PFO status in its May 3, 2005,
order.
The circuit court subsequently issued an order denying
the motion.
This appeal followed.
Before us, Simmons contends that the circuit court
erred by failing to determine that his guilty plea was not
voluntarily and intelligently entered.
He alleges failure of
counsel to adequately investigate and discover that the
allegations in the sodomy case were false.
In his brief,
Simmons states these grounds for relief as follows:
The Appellant’s willingness to accept a plea
agreement for 14 years on the two
trafficking offenses, enhanced by seconddegree PFO, was the direct result of the
more serious sodomy charge he also faced.
Had the sex offense been removed from this
scenario, the Appellant would not have
accepted the 14-year plea agreement. As
noted, the sex offense charge was
subsequently dismissed in a separate post
conviction action. Appellant asserts but
for this deficiency in counsel’s failure to
properly investigate this claim, he would
not have been placed in the scenario of
pleading guilty for fourteen years to the
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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drug and PFO counts to escape the
possibility of greater punishment for the
sex offense. But for counsel’s deficient
performance in failing to investigate the
alleged sodomy charge, Appellant states that
there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have pled guilty to the drug/PFO
indictment herein, and insisted on going to
trial, rather than plead as he did in this
case.
Moreover, the trial court clearly erred in
evaluating counsel’s performance in terms of
Appellant’s eligibility as a First Degree
PFO, when defense counsel acknowledged Mr.
Simmons was only eligible for PFO Second
Degree. In a word, the Commonwealth’s
witness and the Appellant, through sworn
testimony, directly contradict the material
finding. The court erred additionally when
it essentially held that this distinction
made no difference. Parole eligibility is
an integral part of punishment, regardless
of any uncertainty as to when, if ever,
parole will be granted. Rodriguez v. U.S.
parole Commission, 594 F.2d 170, 176 (7th
Cir. 1979).
In short, Taurus Simmons was induced into a
guilty plea package deal due to the sodomy
charge and not the trafficking and tampering
charges. Had counsel only returned Mr.
Simmons’ father’s phone calls, he would have
learned that Mr. English’s father was
willing to provide counsel with evidence
English had changed his story about the
sodomy. This would have been a person, not
a relative of Appellant, whom counsel could
have used in demonstrating Mr. Simmons had
been wrongly accused of this sodomy
allegation.
Here, Taurus Simmons made it clear, he was
willing to go to trial on the Trafficking,
Tampering and PFO counts of Indictment 01CR-00314 rather than accept the
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Commonwealth’s offer of 14 years, had the
sodomy charge not been a factor.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), the
United States Supreme Court set forth the standard governing
review of claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Under
this standard, a party asserting such a claim is required to
show: (1) that the trial counsel's performance was deficient in
that it fell outside the range of professionally competent
assistance; and (2) that the deficiency was prejudicial because
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome would have
been different but for counsel's performance.
This standard was
adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Gall v. Commonwealth,
702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985).
This test is modified in cases involving a defendant
who enters a guilty plea.
In such instances, the second prong
of the Strickland test includes the requirement that a defendant
demonstrate that but for the alleged errors of counsel, there is
a reasonable probability that the defendant would not have
entered a guilty plea, but rather would have insisted on
proceeding to trial.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985);
Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.App. 1986).
A reviewing court must entertain a strong presumption that
counsel's challenged conduct falls within the range of
reasonable professional assistance.
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Strickland, supra at 688-
89.
The defendant bears the burden of overcoming this strong
presumption by identifying specific acts or omissions that he
alleges constitute a constitutionally deficient performance. Id.
at 689-90.
The relevant inquiry is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.
Id. at 694.
Upon removal of the 2000 indictment from the scenario
as suggested by Simmons, the appellant was nevertheless facing
two-counts of first-degree trafficking in a controlled
substance, first offense, Class C felonies, tampering with
physical evidence, a Class D felony, and a PFO I charge.
Under
the sentencing rules, because of the PFO I charge, for
sentencing purposes, the trafficking charges and the tampering
charge would each carry the sentence for a Class B felony, 10 to
20 years, see KRS 532.080(6)(b), which sentences could be run
consecutively up to a maximum aggregate sentence of 20 years.
See KRS 532.110(1)(c).
Thus Simmons faced three felonies with a
total sentencing range of 10 to 60 years, capped at 20 because
of the aggregate sentencing rules.
Perhaps more importantly, however, because of the PFO
I charge, Simmons faced serving a minimum term of 10 years
before being eligible for parole.
See KRS 532.080(6)(b).
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While Simmons argues that his motive for the plea was
to avoid a 20 to life sentence on the Class B sodomy charge, see
KRS 532.080(6)(a), when that charge is removed from the scenario
it is obvious that Simmons nevertheless did well with his plea
bargain.
First, he avoided the maximum 20 year sentence, which,
taking into consideration consecutive sentencing, was a
significant risk.
If convicted of all three felonies, the
minimum sentence on each would have been 10 years.
If just one
of the three was run consecutively with the other two a 20 year
sentence would have resulted.
Instead, Simmons pled for a
sentence that was at less than the midrange, 14 years, between
the minimum and maximum sentences (10 to 20).
In addition, he
avoided the PFO I conviction, which removed the stringent
requirement that he serve a minimum of ten years prior to parole
eligibility.
Instead, pursuant to the general 20% rule, he will
be eligible for parole after serving only 2.8 years, a
significant benefit.
As noted by the appellant himself in his
brief, parole eligibility is of great consideration in a plea
agreement.
Thus, with the sodomy charge removed from the
scenario, Simmons faced a decision on whether to accept a
sentence of 14 years with parole eligibility in 2.8 years, or
risk a maximum sentence of 20 years with a 10 year minimum prior
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to parole eligibility.
If the evidence against him was strong,
then he made a good decision.
However, there is little, if anything, in the record
permitting us to assess the strength of the case against him.
From the many letters he sent to the trial court contained in
the record, it appears that Simmons has essentially admitted his
guilt.
He points to no evidence which would lead us to believe
that he would not have been convicted of the three felonies for
which he was charged.
Simmons raises the argument to the effect that he was
not really eligible for PFO I and that the significance of his
plea bargain should be analyzed under the presumption that he
was not.
In support of this he cites us to trial counsel’s and
his own testimony at the evidentiary hearing.
However, the
indictment specifically identified the two prior felonies
supporting the PFO I charge, and Simmons has offered us no
reason why these prior convictions would not qualify him as a
PFO I for purposes of the 2001 charges.
If Simmons’ claim is
true, he has failed to explain a basis for the claim.
We
accordingly reject this argument.
Simmons also alleges that he is entitled to relief
under CR 60.02(e)&(f).
For reasons similar to those stated
above, we reject this argument.
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For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Warren
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Joseph Ray Myers
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Perry T. Ryan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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