MITCHELL CHILDERS v. ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS; HON. SHEILA C. LOWTHER, CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED: MAY 12, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001959-WC
MITCHELL CHILDERS
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-00-90263
v.
ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS;
HON. SHEILA C. LOWTHER, CHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Mitchell Childers petitions this Court to review
an opinion of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board)
entered August 19, 2005, affirming the Chief Administrative Law
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes 21.580.
Judge’s (CALJ’s) decision to deny Childers’ motion to reopen his
claim.
We vacate and remand.
On February 2, 2000, Childers sustained a work-related
injury while employed with Adelphia Communications.
Childers
underwent an anterior cervical discectomy with fusion and
eventually returned to his previous position earning the same
wage.
The parties subsequently executed a settlement agreement
which was approved by order of the CALJ entered March 20, 2001.
As consideration for this settlement Childers received a lump
sum payment in the amount of $37,527.07.
On February 17, 2005, Childers filed a motion to
reopen his claim.
Therein, Childers contended the claim should
be reopened based upon a change in his disability or worsening
of impairment.
Childers also argued that the settlement
agreement should be set aside based upon mutual mistake or
constructive fraud.
Childers further argued he did not
specifically waive his right to reopen the claim in the
settlement agreement.
By a two–page order entered March 18,
2005, the CALJ determined that Childers had waived his right to
reopen and denied the motion.
The CALJ did not address
Childers’ arguments that the settlement agreement should be set
aside based upon mutual mistake or constructive fraud.
Unsatisfied with the CALJ’s decision, Childers sought review
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with the Board.
The Board affirmed the decision of the CALJ,
thus precipitating our review.
Childers raises the following contentions of error:
1) the CALJ erred by determining the settlement agreement
constituted a valid waiver of his right to reopen, 2) the CALJ
erred by denying his motion to reopen based upon a change in
disability or worsening of condition, and 3) the settlement
agreement should be set aside because of mutual mistake or
constructive fraud.
We will address Childers’ claims seritum.
Upon his first claim, Childers relies upon Huff
Contracting v. Sark, 12 S.W.3d 704 (Ky.App. 2000) for his
assertion that “the lack of specific monetary consideration”
rendered the waiver of his right to reopen void.
The parties’
settlement agreement provides, in relevant part, as follows:
Claimant herein agrees to accept an
additional lump sum of $37,527.07 in
consideration for a full and final waiver of
any and all rights to compensation for
future medical expenses that may result from
the work-related injuries that are the
subject of this claim. All parties to this
agreement understand that a dismissal with
prejudice means a full and final waiver of:
past and future income benefits; future
medical expenses; any past medical expenses
that are outstanding; past and future
vocational benefits; past and future
rehabilitation benefits; all other
compensation benefits; and, including but to
limited to, a full and final waiver of any
right to reopen this claim for any reason
whatsoever. (Emphasis added).
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Childers asserts that the $37,527.07 he received under
the settlement agreement was consideration solely for the waiver
of future medical benefits.
Thus, he claims that no
consideration was given for his waiver of past and future
vocational benefits, past and future rehabilitation benefits or
the right to reopen his claim.
The CALJ concluded that the
$37,527.07 represented consideration for the waiver of all
rights in conjunction with this claim.
Under Huff, this Court held that consideration must be
present for a valid waiver of a claimant’s right(s).
Id.
Here,
the settlement agreement specifically provided that Childers
“agrees to accept an additional lump sum of $37,527.07 in
consideration for a full and final waiver of any and all rights
. . . to reopen this claim for any reason whatsoever.”
Accordingly, we believe the language of the parties’ agreement
clearly provides that a portion of the money paid thereunder was
in consideration for the waiver of Childers’ right to reopen his
claim.
Thus, the settlement agreement validly waived Childers’
right to reopen his claim.
We shall now address Childers’ second and third claims
collectively.
Childers asserts the settlement agreement was
based upon a five (5%) percent impairment rating when the record
reveals the actual impairment rating was ten (10%) percent.
As
the agreement erroneously reflects an impairment rating of five
-4-
(5%) percent, Childers contends the settlement agreement should
be set aside based upon mutual mistake or constructive fraud.
From a review of the record, it is clear that Childers
raised the issues of mutual mistake and constructive fraud
before the CALJ.
It is equally clear that the CALJ did not
address these issues in its order.
We believe the CALJ is
required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law upon
all contested issues.
334 (Ky. 1985).
See Eaton Axle Corp. v. Nally, 688 S.W.2d
We further believe it is reversible error for
the CALJ not to make the required findings of fact and
conclusions of law upon such contested issues.
See id.
We do
not express an opinion regarding the validity of Childers’
claims of mutual mistake or constructive fraud.
We merely
conclude these issues should have been addressed and ruled upon
by the CALJ.
We, thus, vacate and remand this cause to the CALJ for
the limited purpose of making findings of fact and conclusions
of law upon whether the settlement agreement should be set aside
based upon mutual mistake and/or constructive fraud.
If the
CALJ determines the settlement agreement should be set aside
upon one or both grounds, the CALJ should then reach Childers’
remaining issues of whether he established a prima facie case to
warrant reopening and an increase in benefits.
As such, we do
not reach appellant’s remaining contentions upon these issues.
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For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is vacated and this cause is remanded for
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Thomas G. Polites
WILSON, POLITES & MCQUEEN
Lexington, Kentucky
Jo Alice Van Nagell
Lori V. Daniel
CLARK & WARD, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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