TINA M. WEST v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001941-MR
TINA M. WEST
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE STEPHEN A. HAYDEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00135
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
REVERSING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR, JUDGE; ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE; 1 MILLER, SPECIAL
JUDGE. 2
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
Tina West brings this appeal from a
conditional guilty plea entered in Henderson Circuit Court
pursuant to RCr 3 8.09.
West contends that the arresting officer
1
Senior Judge Paul W. Rosenblum, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
Retired Judge John D. Miller, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
3
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
did not have reasonable suspicion to conduct a “Terry stop,” 4
thus the seizure of drug-related evidence incident thereto was
inadmissible.
For the reasons stated below, we reverse.
There is no substantial dispute as to the facts.
On
February 22, 2005, Detective Matt Conley was conducting
surveillance at the Target Store in Owensboro, Daviess County,
Kentucky.
He was watching for the purchase of products
containing ingredients commonly used in the manufacture of
methamphetamine; e.g., lithium batteries and cold medicine
containing pseudoephedrine (such as Sudafed).
Detective Conley
had been a narcotics detective for just over a year and had
performed similar surveillance duty during that period of time.
On the date aforesaid, West entered the store, went
directly to the cold medicine aisle and selected two boxes of
Sudafed. 5
Detective Conley testified that West appeared to be
extremely nervous and persisted in looking at security cameras.
Based upon her purchase of the Sudafed and her demeanor,
Detective Conley suspected that she may be involved in the
manufacture of methamphetamine.
after she departed the store.
As a result, he followed her
He sought to determine if she
went to any other stores to make additional purchases.
However,
West did not visit other stores, but, rather, commenced her
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889
(1968).
5
Store policy limits the purchase of Sudafed to two boxes.
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journey to Henderson County, more than twenty miles away.
Detective Conley followed.
Approximately one-half hour later, West pulled into
the driveway at her son’s residence near the intersection of
Kentucky Highway 136 and U.S. 41 South in Henderson County.
Detective Conley pulled into the driveway behind her, thereby
blocking her vehicle. Detective Conley’s vehicle was unmarked
and without emergency lights.
West got out of her vehicle.
Detective Conley exited his, approached her, and identified
himself as a police officer.
It appears that another other
officer at some point arrived at the scene.
Detective Conley asked West for her driver’s license,
and she responded that she did not have one.
Detective Conley
also questioned her about her purchase of the Sudafed at the
Target Store in Owensboro.
West admitted to other purchases but
denied that she had bought Sudafed.
Detective Conley asked her
for consent to search the automobile.
She refused.
Detective Conley ran West’s name through a computer
system and determined that there were two outstanding warrants
for her arrest.
Based upon the outstanding warrants Detective
Conley placed West under arrest, and searched her vehicle as a
search incident thereto.
The search yielded a set of scales with white residue,
ten boxes of Sudafed, two baggies of white powder which field-
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tested positive for methamphetamine, and a baggie containing a
coffee filter with white residue which appeared to have been
used in manufacturing methamphetamine.
Detective Conley
transported West to the police station in Henderson.
Appellant
made incriminating statements.
As a result of the evidence gathered in connection
with the stop, the Henderson County Grand Jury indicted West for
Unlawful Distribution of a Methamphetamine Precursor, KRS 6
218A.1438; First-Degree Possession of a Controlled Substance,
KRS 218A.1515; and Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, KRS
218A.500.
On May 13, 2005, West filed a motion to suppress the
fruits of the February 22 police stop.
Following a hearing, the
circuit court entered an order denying the motion.
West subsequently entered the conditional guilty plea,
reserving the right to challenge the denial of her motion to
suppress.
Under the plea agreement she received a total of two
and one-half years to serve.
September 8, 2005.
Final judgment was entered on
This appeal followed.
An appellate court's standard of review of the trial
court's decision on a motion to suppress requires that we first
determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by substantial evidence.
6
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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If they are, then they are
conclusive.
RCr 9.78.
Based upon those findings of fact, we
must then conduct a de novo review of the trial court's
application of the law.
Commonwealth v. Neal, 84 S.W.3d 920,
923 (Ky.App. 2002).
West does not challenge the findings of the circuit
court concerning the events surrounding the stop; and, in any
event, the circuit court’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence.
Because of its bearing on the remainder of our review,
we first consider the Commonwealth’s argument that Detective
Conley’s encounter with West at her son’s residence was not a
Terry stop but, rather, was a consensual encounter not requiring
reasonable suspicion.
There are three types of interaction between the
police and citizens: consensual encounters, temporary detentions
(generally referred to as Terry stops), and arrests.
Baltimore
v. Commonwealth, 119 S.W.3d 532, 537 (Ky.App. 2003).
The Fourth
Amendment, of course, “applies to all seizures of the person,
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of
traditional arrest.”
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89
S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
16-19, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1877, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
“‘[W]henever
a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom
to walk away, he has “seized” that person,’ id., at 16, 88
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S.Ct., at 1877, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the
seizure be ‘reasonable.’”
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422
U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2578, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
It
is from unreasonable searches and seizures that both the federal
and state constitutions afford protection to citizens.
The prohibition against unreasonable searches and
seizures provided by the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution applies to Terry stops as well as
arrests.
Id.
Of course, there is no such prohibition involved
in consensual encounters.
The threshold issue before us is whether West was
“seized.”
encounter.
If not, then the incident was merely a consensual
As the United States Supreme Court noted in Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 at 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868 at 1879 n. 16, 20
L.Ed.2d 889, "not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons."
Moreover, officers
"do not violate the Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an
individual on the street or in another public place...."
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324, 75
L.Ed.2d 229 (1983).
"Only when the officer, by means of
physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained
the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure has
occurred."
Terry, supra.
In United States v. Mendenhall, 446
U.S. 544, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), the Court held
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that a person has been seized when, in view of all of the
circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person
would have believed that he was not free to leave.
100 S.Ct. at 1877.
Id. at 554,
The Mendenhall Court identified factors that
might suggest that a seizure has occurred, such as the
threatening presence of several officers, the display of a
weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person, or
the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
with the officer's request might be compelled.
Id.
Here, upon West’s arrival at her son’s home, Detective
Conley pulled in behind her, thereby blocking her egress back
onto the highway.
He then exited his vehicle, approached West,
asked her for her driver’s license, and questioned her about her
purchase of Sudafed in Owensboro.
Under these circumstances, a
reasonable person, we conclude, would not consider themselves at
liberty to leave.
Upon being questioned about the Sudafed, it
would have become apparent to West that Detective Conley had
followed her some 20 miles.
In light of police efforts in
getting to this point, it is unlikely a reasonable person would
have believed she could have simply replied she wasn’t
interested in discussing the matter and walked away.
Moreover,
the encounter occurred on private property and Detective Conley
had blocked her exit back to the public road.
factors, we conclude that there was a seizure.
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Upon these
It is suggested
by no one that the encounter was intended as an arrest premised
upon probable cause; hence, the incident was a Terry stop.
Having concluded that the stop was, in fact, a Terry
stop seizure, we now consider whether the seizure was
permissible.
In Terry the United States Supreme Court held that a
brief investigative stop, detention, and frisk for weapons do
not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the initial stop was
supported by reasonable suspicion, a far lighter standard than
probable cause.
It is now firmly established that in
circumstances giving rise to a reasonable suspicion that a crime
is in process or has been or is about to be committed, police
officers may briefly detain suspected individuals in order to
investigate, and may take reasonable steps to maintain the
status quo and to protect themselves while they do so.
Michigan
v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981);
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612
(1972); Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142 (Ky. 1999).
To
justify this lesser intrusion upon an individual's privacy
interests, the officer's suspicion must be more than a mere
hunch.
Although it need not amount to probable cause, the
suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts
which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
reasonably warrant that intrusion.”
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Terry v. Ohio, supra, at
21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. Determining whether a detention or a frisk
is reasonable thus requires “a review of the totality of the
circumstances, taking into consideration the level of police
intrusion into the private matters of citizens and balancing it
against the justification for such action.”
Baker v.
Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d at 145.
A central concern in balancing these competing
considerations in a variety of settings has been to assure that
an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy is not subject
to arbitrary invasions solely at the unfettered discretion of
officers in the field. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648,
654-655, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396-1397, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S., at 882, 95 S.Ct., at
2580.
To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a seizure
must be based on specific, objective facts indicating that
society's legitimate interests require the seizure of the
particular individual, or that the seizure must be carried out
pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on
the conduct of individual officers.
Delaware v. Prouse, supra,
at 663, 99 S.Ct., at 1401. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 558-562, 96 S.Ct. 3074, 3083-3085, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116
(1976).
Finally, “[A]an investigative stop must cease once
reasonable suspicion or probable cause dissipates,” United
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States v. Watts, 7 F.3d 122, 126 (8th Cir.1993), and the
detention must be “reasonably related in scope” to the
suspicion, U.S. v. Perez, (2006), 440 F.3d 363, 372, citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, and “cannot be excessively intrusive.”
Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, (2005), 410 F.3d 810, 836, citing
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82
L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).
With the foregoing in mind, we believe that any
suspicion Detective Conley may have had that criminal activity
was afoot based upon his observances of West at the Target store
in Owensboro had dissipated below a reasonable suspicion at the
time of the stop at her son’s residence in Henderson County some
one half-hour later.
The stop was impermissible and the
corresponding seizure unlawful.
Factors supporting reasonable suspicion to begin with
were, according to the Commonwealth, West’s actions in entering
the store and going directly to the medicine aisle; her
lingering in the aisle for some time; her looking at the
security cameras; acting “extremely” nervous; and her purchase
of two boxes of Sudafed, the store limit.
However, following West after her departure from the
premises, Detective Conley obtained information tending to
dispel his conjecture that criminal activity was afoot.
Detective Conley testified that he followed her from the
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premises for the purposes of observing whether she went to any
additional stores to purchase methamphetamine ingredients.
West’s failure to follow the predictive behavior of a
methamphetamine manufacturer by purchasing additional boxes of
Sudafed at other stores, but instead driving to a private
residence without any known connection to the manufacturing of
methamphetamine, dissipated considerably any suspicion aroused
by West’s initial conduct at the Target store.
At the time Detective Conley finally stopped West, the
time, location, and circumstances were considerably changed from
Detective Conley’s initial observations.
Detective Conley knew
at this point that his original theory that West was on a
mission to obtain Sudafed at various stores was incorrect.
Rather, his additional observations of West following her
departure from the Owensboro Target store disclosed only conduct
inconsistent with criminal activity.
In short, upon the
totality of the circumstances, at the time of the stop, there
were not articulable facts sufficient to support reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
was improper.
As such, the stop
It follows that the evidence obtained following
the stop was improperly obtained, and is inadmissible against
West.
We accordingly reverse the order of the circuit court
denying her motion to suppress the evidence.
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For the forgoing reasons the judgment of the Henderson
Circuit Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded for
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ROSENBLUM, SENIOR JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa Bridges Clare
Assistant Public Advocate
Department of Public Advocacy
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Todd D. Ferguson
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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