THOMAS CONLEY v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 3, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001897-MR
THOMAS CONLEY
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM PENDLETON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ROBERT MCGINNIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CR-00020
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.
ABRAMSON AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM,1 SENIOR
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Thomas Conley has appealed his June 16, 2005,
conviction following a jury trial in Pendleton Circuit Court for
Possession of a Firearm (Handgun) by a Convicted Felon (KRS
527.040) and for Resisting Arrest (KRS 520.090).
He argues that
the circuit court should have directed a verdict in his favor on
both charges because the Commonwealth failed to establish
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
sufficient proof to support a conviction on either charge.
disagree.
We
Therefore, we affirm.
On January 2, 2005, Kentucky State Police Troopers
Wendell Higginbotham and Scott Lengle went to Conley’s residence
to serve an arrest warrant on him for leaving the scene of an
accident in Bracken County the previous day.
When Trooper
Lengle knocked on the door, Conley opened it, but attempted to
go back inside once he found out he was going to be arrested.
Conley, who has been paralyzed from the waist down since 1981,
uses a wheelchair for mobility and was in the wheelchair when he
answered the door that day.
Trooper Lengle grabbed Conley’s
wrist to place him in handcuffs, and a struggle ensued.
Conley
fell out of the wheelchair onto the porch, taking the officers
with him, and held his hands underneath his stomach, refusing to
allow the officers to handcuff him or further subdue him.
Both
officers noted Conley’s surprising strength and that they were
unable to pry his hands apart.
When he refused to respond to
their official presence, verbal commands, or soft hand and knee
checks, the officers sprayed him twice with OC, a pepper spraylike solution.
Trooper Lengle eventually had to use flex cuffs
to restrain Conley.
Once the officers had successfully restrained him,
Trooper Higginbotham rinsed Conley’s face with a wet cloth.
They also called the local EMS to treat minor scratches on
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Conley’s wrists.
While Trooper Higginbotham was cleaning
Conley’s face, Trooper Lengle searched the immediate area and
discovered a loaded .22 caliber handgun under a cushion of
Conley’s wheelchair.
After removing the ammunition clip as well
as the bullet in the chamber, Trooper Lengle placed the gun on
the porch.
The officers then transported Conley to the Bracken
County Courthouse for transportation to the Mason County
Detention Center.
The Pendleton County grand jury indicted Conley on two
charges; namely, Resisting Arrest and Possession of a Handgun by
a Convicted Felon.2
16, 2005.
The matter proceeded to a jury trial on June
The Commonwealth introduced the testimony of Troopers
Higginbotham and Lengle, while Conley testified on his own
behalf and also called his mother, Wanda Conley, to testify.
Wanda testified that she had visited her son the prior afternoon
to partake in their traditional New Year’s Day dinner.
She
owned the handgun the officers found, which she brought to
Conley’s residence to scare away stray dogs.
According to her
testimony, she removed the handgun from her purse while Conley
was sleeping on the couch, and placed it on the seat of his
wheelchair.
She then heard a truck approaching as well as
children’s voices.
She decided to hide the handgun under the
seat of the wheelchair so that the children would not find it.
2
Conley had been convicted on a felony drug charge in 1997.
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When she left at 4:00 that afternoon, she forgot to retrieve the
handgun from under the wheelchair cushion.
She returned the
next afternoon to get the handgun, but by that time Conley had
already been arrested.
Conley testified that he did not know
that his mother had brought the handgun to his residence or that
she had placed it under the cushion of his wheelchair.
He
testified that in past discussions, he had told his mother that
he did not need to have any guns in his home as they would have
caused too much trouble based upon his status as a convicted
felon.
He also testified that when the officers told him he was
being arrested, he panicked and did not know what to do.
He
claimed that the officers stomped on his head and used a whole
can of mace on him.
Following deliberations, the jury convicted Conley on
both counts charged in the indictment, and later sentenced him
to five years on the handgun possession conviction and fined him
$500 on the resisting arrest conviction.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, Conley argues that there was insufficient
proof to support his conviction, and that the circuit court
should have directed a verdict in his favor on both charges.
In
its brief, the Commonwealth points out that Conley’s argument
was not preserved for review as the record does not contain the
motion for a directed verdict his counsel apparently made at the
conclusion of the Commonwealth’s case.
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For this reason, it
posits, there is no way to determine what objections Conley
might have offered or what elements of the offenses he was
claiming were supported by insufficient proof.
The Commonwealth
also offers a second preservation argument, in that Conley
failed to object to the giving of instructions on a particular
issue.
Despite the lack of preservation, the Commonwealth
nevertheless maintains that it submitted sufficient proof to
allow the matter to go to the jury and to support the ultimate
convictions.
We agree with the Commonwealth that Conley’s arguments
are unpreserved.
A close examination of the videotaped record
of the trial reveals a lapse of about one minute following the
close of the Commonwealth’s case, which resumes during a
conversation regarding jury instructions.
The record does not
reflect any motion for a directed verdict, which could have been
argued during the lapse.
While we note that counsel for Conley
made a renewed motion for a directed verdict at the close of his
case, which the circuit court denied, there is no record of the
original motion or the grounds upon which it was based.
As the
Commonwealth points out, “[i]t is the duty of the appellant to
see that the record is complete on appeal.”
Roberts v. Fayette
County Bd. of Educ., 173 S.W.3d 918, 923 (Ky.App. 2005).
Conley
did not attempt to locate the missing portion of the videotape
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or submit a narrative statement to create a record of the
directed verdict motion.
Because the issues Conley raises are unpreserved, we
much review this matter under the palpable error rule of RCr
10.26, which provides:
A palpable error which affects the
substantial rights of a party may be
considered by the court on motion for a new
trial or by an appellate court on appeal,
even though insufficiently raised or
preserved for review, and appropriate relief
may be granted upon a determination that
manifest injustice has resulted from the
error.
The palpable error rule “is not a substitute for the requirement
that a litigant must contemporaneously object to preserve an
error for review. . . .
In determining whether an error is
palpable, ‘an appellate court must consider whether on the whole
case there is a substantial possibility that the result would
have been any different.’”
895 (Ky. 2002).
Commonwealth v. Pace, 82 S.W.3d 894,
In the present matter, we must determine
whether the trial court would have entered a directed verdict in
favor of Conley, had one been requested.
In Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Ky.
1991), the Supreme Court restated the test for a directed
verdict as follows:
On motion for directed verdict, the trial
court must draw all fair and reasonable
inferences from the evidence in favor of the
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Commonwealth. If the evidence is sufficient
to induce a reasonable juror to believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
is guilty, a directed verdict should not be
given. For the purpose of ruling on the
motion, the trial court must assume that the
evidence for the Commonwealth is true, but
reserving to the jury questions as to the
credibility and weight to be given to such
testimony.
The test of a directed verdict on appellate review is “if under
the evidence as a whole, it would be clearly unreasonable for a
jury to find guilt, only then the defendant is entitled to a
directed verdict of acquittal.”
to state:
Id.
The Benham court went on
“[T]here must be evidence of substance, and the trial
court is expressly authorized to direct a verdict for the
defendant if the prosecution produces no more than a mere
scintilla of evidence.”
Id. at 187-88.
POSSESSION OF A HANDGUN BY A CONVICTED FELON
Conley asserts that the Commonwealth submitted
insufficient proof to establish that he knowingly possessed the
handgun recovered by Trooper Lengle, and merely established that
it was found buried under the cushion of his wheelchair after
his arrest.
He relies upon his mother’s testimony that the
handgun belonged to her deceased husband, and that she brought
the gun to his residence and hid it without his knowledge, but
forgot to take it home with her.
We disagree with Conley’s
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argument, and hold that under either the palpable error rule or
the Benham standard, the circuit court’s ruling must stand.
Under the Kentucky Penal Code, the crime for
possessing a firearm by a convicted felon is defined as:
(1) A person is guilty of possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon when he
possesses, manufactures, or transports a
firearm when he has been convicted of a
felony, as defined by the laws of the
jurisdiction in which he was convicted[.]
While the parties stipulated that he was a convicted felon,
Conley disputes that he was in possession of a handgun.
In
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 90 S.W.3d 39, 42-43 (Ky. 2003), the
Supreme Court recently addressed the possession element of KRS
527.040(1):
Possession may be proven through either
actual possession or constructive
possession. United States v. Kitchen, 57
F.3d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1995)(discussing a
federal statute that makes it unlawful for a
felon to possess a firearm). “Constructive
possession exists when a person does not
have actual possession but instead knowingly
has the power and intention at a given time
to exercise dominion and control of an
object, either directly or through others.”
Id., quoting United States v. Garrett, 903
F.2d 1105, 1110 (7th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 905, 111 S.Ct. 272, 112
L.Ed.2d 227 (1990). . . . “Constructive
possession can be established by a showing
that the firearm was seized at the
defendant’s residence.” United States v.
Boykin, 986 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir.
1993)(discussing the same federal statute
discussed in Kitchen), cert. denied, 510
-8-
U.S. 888, 114 S.Ct. 241, 126 L.Ed.2d 195
(1993).
In a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
agree that the Commonwealth produced sufficient evidence to
support a finding that Conley constructively possessed the
handgun.
Conley was the sole resident of the trailer and its
only occupant when the officers came to serve the arrest
warrant.
Conley was also in the wheelchair when he answered
Trooper Lengle’s knock and when the struggle began.
Immediately
following the struggle, Trooper Lengle found the handgun under
the cushion of Conley’s wheelchair.
There can be no doubt that
this evidence could induce a reasonable juror to find Conley
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
As such, we can perceive no
manifest injustice in the circuit court’s decision to allow the
matter to go to the jury.
RESISTING ARREST
Conley asserts that the Commonwealth failed to
establish that he used any physical force or violence against
Troopers Higginbotham or Lengle.
Rather, he passively resisted
the officers’ actions by lying on the porch with his hands under
his stomach and did not make any physical acts towards the
officers.
For this reason, he argues that there was
insufficient proof to support the resisting arrest charge.
The
Commonwealth counters this argument, arguing that Conley exerted
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force against the officers when he began to struggle and then
locked his hands together to prevent them from placing him in
handcuffs.
The offense of resisting arrest is defined by KRS
520.090 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of resisting arrest
when he intentionally prevents or attempts
to prevent a peace officer, recognized to be
acting under color of his official
authority, from effecting an arrest of the
actor or another by:
(a) Using or threatening to use
physical force or violence against the
peace officer or another; or
(b) Using any other means creating a
substantial risk of causing physical
injury to the peace officer or another.
The Commentary to the rule provides that the offense “includes
only forcible resistance and excludes other forms of
nonsubmission to authority. . . .
Criminal sanctions are,
therefore, needed only when interference with arrest poses a
direct threat to the safety of the officer[.]”
Conley does not cite to any case law supporting his
argument that his resistance was merely passive, while the
Commonwealth cites to opinions from several other jurisdictions
upholding convictions in similar situations.
The Massachusetts
version of the resisting arrest statute, M.G.L.A. 267 § 32B, is
very similar to Kentucky’s version:
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(a) A person
arrest if he
to prevent a
color of his
effecting an
by:
commits the crime of resisting
knowingly prevents or attempts
police officer acting under
official authority, from
arrest of the actor or another,
(1) using or threatening to use
physical force against the police
officer or officers; or
(2) using any other means which creates
a substantial risk of causing bodily
injury to such police officer or
another[.]
In Commonwealth v. Maylott, 65 Mass.App.Ct. 466, 841 N.E.2d 717
(2006), the Massachusetts court upheld the defendant’s
conviction when he stiffened his arm as officers tried to arrest
him and refused to comply with their attempts to handcuff him.
The court held that he “was actively uncooperative in his
behavior as he opposed the arresting officers’ attempts to
handcuff him. . . .
[I]t took the effort of two officers to
consummate the arrest, and they were able to do so only after
pushing the defendant against the wall, thus gaining a physical
advantage over him.”
Id. at 469.
Such behavior, the court
held, “represents an active, physical refusal to submit to the
authority of the arresting officers, and opposition to their
efforts to effect the arrest. . . .
[T]he circumstances also
presented a substantial risk of injury to them.”
Id. at 469-70.
The Massachusetts court referred to two other cases also
upholding resisting arrest convictions in situations where the
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defendant stiffened his arms or body to prevent being handcuffed
or placed into a police cruiser.
Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433
Mass. 135, 741 N.E.2d 25 (2001); Commonwealth v. Katykhin, 59
Mass.App.Ct. 216, 794 N.E.2d 1291 (2003).
In the present case, we find the decisions of the
Massachusetts courts to be persuasive.
Conley’s actions
represented his physical refusal to submit to the officers’
authority.
His attempt to go back into his residence led to a
scuffle during which all three men fell to the floor of the
porch.
Despite his disability, his tremendous upper body
strength permitted him to prevent two officers from successfully
handcuffing him, and it was not until the second application of
OC spray was completed that the officers were even able to place
the flex cuffs on him.
Throughout the course of the incident,
the officers were in danger of harm as they attempted to subdue
Conley and arrest him.
The circuit court did not commit any error, palpable
or otherwise, in denying Conley’s motion for directed verdict on
the resisting arrest charge and allowing it to be submitted to
the jury.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Pendleton Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
J. Brandon Pigg
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Michael L. Harned
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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