JOHN RONNIE OSBORNE v. EAGLE COAL COMPANY #10; DR. BALLARD WRIGHT; HON. JOHN W. THACKER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND KENTUCKY WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001844-WC
JOHN RONNIE OSBORNE
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-98-73105
v.
EAGLE COAL COMPANY #10; DR. BALLARD WRIGHT;
HON. JOHN W. THACKER, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGE; AND KENTUCKY WORKERS'
COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
TACKETT, TAYLOR, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
John Ronnie Osborne seeks review from an opinion
of the Workers’ Compensation Board (the Board) entered August 5,
2005, affirming a decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
entered April 25, 2005, denying appellant’s motion to reopen for
an increase in permanent disability and disallowing medical
expenses incurred after July 1, 2004.
We affirm.
Appellant was a coal miner for approximately nineteen
years and was employed by appellee when he was injured at work
on July 13, 1998.
Appellant filed a claim for workers’
compensation benefits for the alleged work-related injury to his
back.
By order entered in August 2000, the ALJ found that
appellant had suffered a work-related injury and assessed a 15%
total impairment rating.
The ALJ found that 7.5% was
attributable to the work-related injury and 7.5% was
attributable to a nonwork-related automobile accident that
occurred in 1988.
Thereafter, Eagle Coal Company #10 (Eagle
Coal) filed a motion to reopen to contest medical services.
A
few months thereafter, appellant filed a motion to reopen
alleging increased occupational disability.
By opinion and
order entered April 25, 2005, the ALJ denied appellant’s motion
to reopen by concluding that the injury suffered in 1998 was not
the cause of appellant’s current complaints, and thus, he
suffered no increased disability.
The ALJ sustained Eagle
Coal’s motion by concluding that medical expenses incurred after
July 1, 2004, were noncompensable.
Being unsatisfied with the
opinion, appellant sought review by the Workers’ Compensation
Board.
By opinion entered August 5, 2005, the Board affirmed
the ALJ’s decision, thus precipitating our review.
Initially, we note that our review of the Board’s
opinion is limited to correcting the Board if we perceive the
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Board has overlooked or misconstrued applicable law, or
committed error in assessing the evidence that resulted in gross
injustice.
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685
(Ky.App. 1992).
Appellant initially contends the ALJ erred by
concluding that medical expenses incurred after July 1, 2004,
were noncompensable.
Specifically, appellant believes the ALJ
erroneously relied upon the opinion of Dr. Martyn Goldman.
Appellant asserts the ALJ could not rely upon Dr. Goldman’s
opinion that appellant suffered no permanent impairment from the
work-related injury.
Appellant argues the ALJ’s opinion was
clearly contrary to the original opinion and award issued on
August 4, 2000; wherein, appellant was found to suffer a 15%
permanent impairment.
As Dr. Goldman’s opinion is contrary to
the opinion and award of August 2000, appellant contends her
opinion cannot constitute substantial evidence and that “res
adjudicata and/or law of the case” doctrine precludes reliance
upon her opinion.
We disagree.
As pointed out by the Board:
The reasonableness, necessity and workrelatedness of the contested treatment
recommended by Dr. Wright was not at issue
in the original claim decided by ALJ
Coleman. Indeed, such treatment had not
even been recommended at the time the claim
was originally decided. Thus, neither res
judicata nor collateral estoppel would apply
to the ALJ’s determination of the
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compensability of the treatment that is the
subject of Eagle Coal’s medical fee dispute.
As the precise issue of the compensability of Dr. Peter D.
Wright’s treatment was not decided in the original claim,
appellant’s argument that the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel would apply is clearly without merit.
Moreover, we observe that it is within the province of the factfinder to believe or disbelieve parts of evidence.
Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479 (Ky. 1999).
Whittaker v.
In the case at hand, it was
within the province of the ALJ to accept certain parts of Dr.
Goldman’s testimony and to reject others.
Indeed, the ALJ found
that appellant suffered a 15% permanent impairment; hence,
rejecting Dr. Goldman’s opinion that appellant suffered no
permanent impairment.
However, the ALJ found credible Dr.
Goldman’s testimony that any further medical treatment was
inappropriate and that appellant’s current symptoms were not
related to his injury sustained at work in 1998.
Upon the
whole, we are of the opinion the ALJ properly relied upon Dr.
Goldman’s testimony and that such testimony constituted
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that medical
treatment after July 1, 2004, was noncompensable.
Appellant also contends the ALJ committed reversible
error by denying his motion to reopen the claim for a worsening
of condition.
In particular, appellant argues that his “current
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level of pain would be sufficient to prevent a return to any
substantial gainful employment and award of 100% occupational
disability benefits should have been granted herein.”
Appellant argues the ALJ erred by believing that an
increase in a permanent impairment rating was necessary to
sustain a motion to reopen.
However, as found by the Board:
Thus, it is true that the ALJ below had
the discretion to award PTD benefits on
reopening in the absence of evidence of an
increase in Osborne’s permanent impairment
rating from the date of the original award
to the date of reopening. However,
notwithstanding the implications of
Osborne’s argument on appeal, there is
nothing in the ALJ’s decision on reopening
to indicate that he thought himself
constrained by the lack of such evidence.
The ALJ did not dismiss Osborne’s claim on
reopening based on his failure to prove an
increase in functional impairment. Rather,
the ALJ expressly found that Osborne “has no
increase in disability as no objective
medical evidence of worsening of condition
has been shown and the testimony of the
plaintiff as to his assessment of the
severity of his condition is essentially the
same.”
Based upon this sound reasoning by the Board, we, likewise,
reject appellant’s argument.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Leonard Stayton
Inez, Kentucky
Denise Kirk Ash
Lexington, Kentucky
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