THOMAS G. WHITE, DERIVATIVELY ON BEHALF OF VENCOR, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, AND VENTAS, INC., FORMERLY VENCOR, INC. v. W. BRUCE LUNSFORD; E. EARL REED, III; MICHAEL R. BARR; THOMAS T. LADT; JILL L. FORCE; JAMES H. GILLENWARTER, JR; R. GENE SMITH; WALTER F. BERAN; ULYSSES L. BRIDGEMAN; ELAINE L. CHAO; DONNA R. ECTON; GREG D. HUDSON; AND WILLIAM H. LOMICA
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 29, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001775-MR
THOMAS G. WHITE, DERIVATIVELY ON
BEHALF OF VENCOR, INC., A DELAWARE
CORPORATION, AND VENTAS, INC.,
FORMERLY VENCOR, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JUDITH E. MCDONALD-BURKMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CI-003669
W. BRUCE LUNSFORD; E. EARL REED, III;
MICHAEL R. BARR; THOMAS T. LADT; JILL
L. FORCE; JAMES H. GILLENWARTER, JR;
R. GENE SMITH; WALTER F. BERAN;
ULYSSES L. BRIDGEMAN; ELAINE L. CHAO;
DONNA R. ECTON; GREG D. HUDSON; AND
WILLIAM H. LOMICA
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
On behalf of Ventas, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, Thomas G. White appeals from an order of the
Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing this shareholder derivative
action.
We have reviewed the substantive requirements of
Delaware law along with the arguments of counsel.
We agree that
the complaint fell short of the threshold requirement that there
be a specific showing of impropriety on the part of the
defendants.
Under the relevant law, White bore the burden to
demonstrate particularized facts that the defendants were
tainted by self interest or that they failed to exercise sound
business judgment in conducting the affairs of the corporation.
Absent such particularity, relevant principles of corporate law
justify dismissal of a complaint.
We conclude that the court
did not err in dismissing the complaint.
Ventas is a publicly traded real estate investment
trust headquartered in Louisville.
Prior to a corporate
reorganization in 1998, the company was known as Vencor, Inc.
It operated a national network of integrated healthcare
facilities located on real estate that it owned and managed.
A Wisconsin resident and Ventas shareholder, Thomas
White, filed suit in Jefferson Circuit Court in 1998 against ten
members of the companys board of directors and three of its nondirector officers.
days.)
(He filed an amended complaint within a few
In the name of the interests of the corporation, White
alleged that the defendants had violated their fiduciary duties
to the company from February 10, 1997, through October 21, 1997.
During that period, White alleged that the companys officers
conspired to inflate the value of the corporations stock and
that they then dumped substantial portions of their holdings.
He alleged that the directors were complicit in making false or
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misleading statements about the companys operations and its
anticipated performance.
He also charged that they failed to
properly oversee the management of the company, a dereliction
that resulted in grave financial harm to Ventas.
In August 1998, the defendants filed a motion to
dismiss the action.
They relied on a substantive requirement of
Delaware’s corporate law known as the “demand rule.”
Under the
demand rule, a stockholder can file a derivative action only
after he has first made a demand upon the corporation’s board of
directors to take action in light of his allegation and it has
refused to do so.
He may be relieved or excused of making a
pre-lawsuit demand on the directors only if he can demonstrate
that the making of such a demand would be futile because the
directors are clearly incapable of making an impartial decision
regarding litigation.
(Del.1991).
Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200
When the action is based on the inability of the
directors to act, the stockholder’s complaint must state with
particularity why a demand on the directors to assert a claim
would have been futile.
Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040
(Del.2004).
In their motion to dismiss, the defendants contended
that prior to filing the derivative action, White failed to make
a demand of the company to pursue the alleged claims involving
corporate affairs or that he failed to properly plead in his
complaint that such a demand would have been futile.
alleged that both omissions were fatal.
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They
Before the court could
consider the motion of the defendant, the proceedings were
stayed for various reasons over a prolonged period of time.
At
long last, on July 26, 2005, an order was entered dismissing the
action.
Twenty-two days after this dismissal, White filed two
post-judgment motions.
Procedurally, he sought permission of
the court to file motions out of time based on an inadvertent
mistake of counsel.
Substantively, he sought to have the
judgment set aside in order that he might file a second amended
complaint “more concisely setting forth the facts.”
On August
24, 2005, the trial court summarily denied White’s post-judgment
motions.
This appeal followed.
White raises two alternative issues for our
consideration on appeal.
He first argues that the trial court
erred in concluding that the complaint was deficient; namely,
that it failed to charge that a demand on the company’s board of
directors would have been futile.
In the alternative, White
contends that the trial court erred by refusing to permit him to
file a second amended complaint.
We disagree with both of his
arguments.
The parties agree that Delaware law governs the
substantive issues on appeal and that the demand rule is
dispositive.
White acknowledged his failure to demand that the
company’s board of directors take action against the alleged
wrongful conduct.
Accordingly, he bore the burden to
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demonstrate in detail (i.e., with “factual particularity”) that
any demand on the corporation would have been futile.
Delaware’s stringent requirement for factual
particularity is based on streamlining and expediting discovery.
It is intended to prevent a stockholder from causing a
corporation “to expend money and resources in discovery and
trial in the stockholder’s quixotic pursuit of a purported
corporate claim based solely on conclusions, opinion or
speculation.”
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del.2000).
The requirement for factual specificity means that a complaint
must be dismissed -- regardless of the strength of the claim as
alleged on its merits -- if that specificity as to underlying
facts has not been established.
In cases where a complaining shareholder alleges that
a demand upon a company’s board of directors would have been
futile, Delaware courts have established two separate (yet
overlapping) lines of inquiry.
If the shareholder’s complaint
challenges a specific event or transaction approved by a board
of directors, Delaware courts apply a two-prong test set forth
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805
(Del.1984) (the Aronson test).
If no specific action undertaken
by the board is challenged, however, Delaware courts apply a
single-step inquiry set forth in Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927
(Del.1993) (the Rales test).
White’s complaint implicates both
tests.
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White alleged numerous facts in his complaint, which
the trial court accepted as true in ruling on the motion to
dismiss.
He claimed that company executives made overly
positive and optimistic statements to market analysts and others
during a February 1997 conference call.
He believed that these
statements affected Wall Street’s quarterly earnings projections
for the company, causing brokerage firms to reiterate their
“buy” or “strong buy” recommendations for the stock.
He also
criticized the corporation’s annual report to shareholders
(issued in March 1997) for failing to caution against the
sector’s possibly harmful exposure to proposed Medicare reforms
being considered by Congress at that time.
White alleged that management once again misled
analysts following the release of its first quarter earnings
results in April 1997.
He claimed that the favorable, forward-
looking statements affected the corporation’s stock price,
driving it upward to the benefit of its executives and
directors.
Despite a clear need to warn its stockholders, White
believed that management continued to downplay the potential
impact of reduced federal healthcare spending, emphasizing
instead only robust growth projections.
White alleged that executives misled analysts and
stockholders in press releases filed in May 1997 concerning the
corporation’s acquisition of Transitional Hospital Corporation
for $639 million dollars.
He charged that management’s
excessively optimistic predictions concerning this asset
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continued through early July, causing analysts to reiterate or
to enhance their ratings of the stock that resulted in a boost
to share prices.
White claimed that the company’s officers and
directors sold more than 118,600 shares of stock at an average
price of $42.55 per share at or near this time.
One brokerage
firm actually had a $51.00 per share price tag on the stock.
At the end of July 1997, the corporation announced its
second quarter earnings results, which matched analysts’
expectations.
According to White, management continued to make
rosy, forward-looking projections and to minimize the risks
associated with changing federal budget demands.
On September
5, 1997, R. Gene Smith, a member of the board of directors, sold
16,876 shares of stock.
According to White, the corporation routinely and
repeatedly made positive representations about operating trends
and growth opportunities at industry conferences, in press
releases, and in conference calls.
On September 18, 1997, he
alleged that Jill L. Force, a senior vice-president and the
company’s general counsel, sold 39% of her holdings.
At the
same time, Earl Reed, the company’s chief financial officer,
sold 28% of his holdings.
On October 22, 1997, the company revised its fourth
quarter guidance.
Its announcement indicated that earnings per
share would fall considerably short of analysts’ expectations.
The predicted shortfall was attributed by the company to the
negative impact of federal budget changes related to Medicare
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reimbursement.
The company’s stock price plunged 28% during the
trading day, and analysts quickly began to lose confidence in
the company’s growth prospects.
White alleged that throughout the entire period at
issue, the company’s officers and directors knew that the
corporation was being grossly mismanaged and that federal budget
changes would inevitably have a severely negative impact on the
company’s growth and earnings.
Nevertheless, the officers and
directors continued to mislead the market analysts and the
investing public about the company’s performance and prospects.
He also claimed that the company had paid too much when it
purchased Transitional Hospital Corporation.
He believed that
it had over-compensated W. Bruce Lunsford, the company’s chief
executive officer; W. Earl Reed, the chief financial officer;
and Michael R. Barr, the chief operating officer.
He contended
that company insiders sold $9.5 million in stock at artificially
inflated prices.
Finally, he charged that the managers and
directors exposed the company to a multi-million dollar federal
securities class action and that they otherwise damaged the
company’s finances and reputation.
For purposes of our discussion, the numerous
allegations contained in White’s complaint can be grouped into
the following three categories:
1. The disclosure counts: the false,
irrationally optimistic, and misleading
forward-looking statements about the
financial condition, good management, and
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growth opportunities of the company (subject
to the Rales test);
2. The waste counts: the cost of acquiring
Transitional Hospital Corporation and the
excessive compensation packages of the three
top executives (subject to the Aronson test);
3. The insider-trading counts: insider
trading and the proceeds realized from that
trading (subject to the Rales test).
Only the waste counts appear to challenge specific and direct
board action; i.e., board approval for the acquisition of
Transitional Hospital Corporation and approval for the
compensation packages offered to three executives.
In analyzing the charges contained in the complaint,
we apply the Delaware court’s two-part Aronson test to determine
whether White has asserted particularized facts sufficient to
demonstrate why a demand upon the board would have been futile
as to the waste counts.
Since the disclosure counts and
insider-trading counts do not challenge specific or direct
action undertaken by the board as a whole, they will be analyzed
under the Rales test.
We shall examine the categories
individually, beginning our discussion with the waste counts.
The Waste Counts (The Aronson Test)
In order to avoid dismissal under the demand rule,
Aronson requires that a plaintiff’s allegations raise a
reasonable doubt by satisfying either of two criteria:
(1) that
a majority of the directors were not disinterested and
independent and (2) that the challenged transaction was not the
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result of a valid exercise of sound business judgment.
473 A.2d at 814.
Aronson,
To assess the requisite disinterestedness and
independence of directors, we consider whether the plaintiff has
pleaded particularized facts that demonstrate that the directors
were motivated by personal interest, domination, or control.
If
so, their personal interests would have prevented them from
objectively evaluating a demand -- if made -- that the board
pursue the best interests of the corporation.
Brehm, supra.
To
assess whether the transaction was undertaken as part of the
board’s exercise of its business judgment, we consider whether
the directors were proper persons to conduct litigation on
behalf of the corporation.
White named ten of the company’s directors as
defendants in the derivative action.
Of these, six (Beran,
Bridgeman, Chao, Ecton, Hudson, and Lomica) were neither
officers nor employees of the company.
White alleged no
particularized facts to suggest that any of these “outside
directors” would have been unable to act independently or
disinterestedly if he had he demanded action of them.
Instead,
White relied on the second Aronson test by claiming that the
challenged transactions (i.e., the excessive executive
compensation packages and the huge consideration paid by Ventas
to acquire Transitional Hospital Corporation) -- constituted
corporate waste and that they were not the product of a valid
exercise of the board’s business judgment.
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Corporate directors enjoy substantial deference in
exercising their business judgment on behalf of a corporation.
Delaware law presumes that a corporation’s directors make
business decisions on an informed basis, in good faith, and in
the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest
of the company.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
This presumption of
regularity is commonly referred to as the “business judgment
rule.”
Under the business judgment rule, directors exercise
very broad discretion in making decisions relating to executive
compensation.
See Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
The standard for
determining corporate waste is also rigorous and requires proof
that directors irrationally squandered or gave away corporate
assets.
Id.
The waste counts of White’s complaint essentially
consisted of conclusory allegations.
He was quite clear in
articulating his personal disagreement with the board’s judgment
as to the value of retaining top executives and of acquiring
Transitional Hospital Corporation.
However, he did not allege
that the board failed to review and to consider available and
relevant information concerning either decision.
He did not
allege an absence of adequate or substantial consideration
inuring to Ventas in exchange for the corporate assets paid to
compensate the executives and for the asset represented by the
acquisition of Transitional Hospital Corporation.
On balance,
the allegations were insufficient to overcome the presumption of
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regularity or to raise a reasonable doubt that the directors
validly exercised sound business judgment with respect to both
issues.
The Disclosure Counts and the Insider-Trading Counts
(The Rales Test)
We shall next address the disclosure counts and the
insider-trading counts of White’s complaint.
In these counts,
White did not complain of any specific transaction or enterprise
undertaken by the board as a whole.
Nor did he allege that the
board members had an affirmative duty to act in a particular
manner and that they disregarded that duty.
Rather, he claimed
in general terms that the board was complicit in the challenged
conduct and that it was lax in its management of the affairs of
the company.
Under these circumstances, the allegations of the
complaint are analyzed under the Rales standard.
Under Rales, supra, a court essentially applies the
first prong of the Aronson test to determine whether the
complaint asserted particularized facts sufficient to create “a
reasonable doubt that . . . the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business
judgment in responding to a stockholder’s a demand for action.”
634 A.2d at 934.
Under this inquiry, the court then asks
whether any of the directors was rendered “interested” by the
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conduct at issue and, if so, whether the disinterested
(impartial) directors were nonetheless capable of acting
independently from those interested (partial) directors.
director is considered “interested” if he or she:
Id.
(1) received
A
from the challenged conduct or transaction a personal financial
benefit that was not equally shared by the other stockholders;
(2) might have suffered “a materially detrimental impact” from
the proposed legal action; or (3) was “incapable, due to
domination and control, of objectively evaluating a demand, if
made, that the board assert the corporation’s claims.”
Rales
634 A.2d at 936.
Pursuant to subsection (1) of the Rales test, White’s
complaint does not contain factual allegations sufficiently
particularized to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the
Ventas board of directors could have -- or would have -properly exercised its independent, disinterested business
judgment in responding to a demand for action if he had posed
such a demand prior to filing suit.
White did not allege that
the outside directors, who comprised a majority of the board,
received any personal benefit (in the sense of self-dealing)
from any of the challenged transactions so as to render those
directors incapable of properly responding to the concerns of a
shareholder.
Additionally, pursuant to subsection (2) of the Rales
standard, White did not sufficiently plead that any of the
outside directors would have been unwilling to act on behalf of
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the company because they would have been subject to “a
substantial likelihood” of liability stemming from legal action.
The complaint’s bare and unsubstantiated allegation
that the outside directors participated in the challenged
conduct falls far short of meeting the strict pleading
requirement.
In Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d
1049, 1055 (Del.Ch. 1996), the Delaware court observed that:
the simple expedient of naming a majority of
otherwise disinterested and well-motivated
directors as defendants and charging them
with laxity or conspiracy etc., will not
itself satisfy the standards for permitting
a shareholder to be excused from demand.
Finally, pursuant to subsection (3) of the Rales rule,
we note that White did allege that the outside directors were so
motivated by improper influences as to be arguably dominated by
-- or beholden to -- Lundsford, Reed, and Barr (the company’s
chief executive officer, chief financial officer, and chief
operating officer, respectively).
However, that bare allegation
was insufficient to meet the strict requirement of
particularity.
The Delaware courts have consistently held that
an unsupported, conclusory allegation of “domination” does not
excuse demand.
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
Instead, the
plaintiff must allege specific facts that would demonstrate that
the challenged directors were controlled by the offending
directors through personal or other relationships.
failed to make such a demonstration.
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Id.
White
In addition to falling short of demonstrating bias or
self-interest, While also failed to allege facts sufficient to
cast doubt as to whether the Ventas board of directors court
have properly exercised its independent, disinterested business
judgment in responding to a shareholder demand for action.
The
trial court did not err by concluding that these counts of the
complaint were also subject to dismissal under the strict
requirements of Delaware’s demand rule.
Although he believes that the court erred in
dismissing his complaint for insufficiency, White nonetheless
argues in the alternative that the trial court erred by failing
to permit him leave to amend.
We observe that White’s post-
judgment motion for relief was filed out of time.
Regardless of
this procedural shortcoming, we would still decline to reverse
the court’s refusal to permit the second amendment of his
complaint.
Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (CR) 15.01 provides
that a plaintiff may file one amended complaint prior to the
filing of a responsive pleading but that “[o]therwise a party
may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written
consent of the adverse party. . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
Although leave to amend shall be freely given when justice so
requires, that decision remains within the sound discretion of
the trial court.
Lambert v. Franklin Real Estate Co., Ky.App.,
37 S.W.3d 770 (2000).
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We shall recapitulate the sequence of procedural
events in this case:
July 1998 -- White filed the complaint
(followed within a few days by a first
amended complaint);
January 2000 -- the appellees filed a
motion to dismiss;
July 26, 2005 -- the court dismissed
the complaint;
22 days later, White filed two postjudgment motions, including a motion to file
the second amended complaint;
August 24, 2005 -- the court denied the
motions.
In their motion to dismiss in January 2000, the
appellees cited unmistakably fatal flaws in White’s complaint
and relied on an established and well developed body of law.
More than five years then elapsed until July 26, 2005, when the
trial court dismissed White’s complaint.
During that
considerable interval, White did nothing to attempt to remedy or
to supplement the deficiencies of which he had been made aware.
We cannot conclude that justice required the court to permit
White to file an amended complaint more than seven years after
the original complaint had been filed.
The trial court did not
abuse its discretion by refusing to grant White’s motion.
We affirm the order of the Jefferson Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
P. Stephen Gordinier
Louisville, Kentucky
David Tachau
John David Dyche
Louisville, Kentucky
Jeffrey R. Krinsk
Mark L. Knutson
San Diego, California
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLEES:
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
David Tachau
Louisville, Kentucky
Mark L. Knutson
San Diego, California
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