VINCENT INGABRAND v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
OCTOBER 6, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001678-MR
VINCENT INGABRAND
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENRY CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 98-CR-00064
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Vincent Ingabrand appeals from orders of
the Henry Circuit Court that denied his motion to vacate
judgment pursuant to RCr1 11.42.
Ingabrand claims that the
charges against him should have been dismissed under a program
of pretrial diversion.
He argues that his counsel was
ineffective for allowing him to enter a plea of guilty in light
of his lost opportunity for the dismissal that he had negotiated
and anticipated.
1
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
On November 13, 1998, Ingabrand was indicted on the
following charges:
one count of burglary in the first degree (a
class B felony); one count of wanton endangerment involving a
police officer in the first degree (a class D felony); and one
count of assault in the third degree (a class D felony).
These
charges arose from an incident in which Ingabrand forced his way
into his brother’s house, seized a rifle, and waved it in the
parking lot of a funeral home.
air.
He fired several shots into the
After his arrest, he struck one of the state police
troopers on the back of the head.
At his arraignment on December 3, 1998, Ingabrand
entered a plea of not guilty to the charges.
At a hearing on
December 10, 1998, it became apparent that some agreement had
been reached between Ingabrand’s court-appointed attorney, John
West, and the Commonwealth to send Ingabrand to an intensive,
six-month drug and alcohol rehabilitation program and to monitor
him thereafter.
The court cautioned Ingabrand:
“. . . after
the [rehabilitation] program, be sure you enter into active full
time employment.”
No mention was made at the hearing that the
charges against Ingabrand would be dismissed if he completed the
program.
Following that hearing, the circuit court entered two
orders on December 15, 1998.
The first order released him (as
of December 10) to the custody of the Henry County Community
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Corrections Corporation (HCCCC) in order for him to attend the
rehabilitation program.
The order also provided that if he left
the rehabilitation center (either voluntarily or involuntarily)
before completing the program, Ingabrand was to report
immediately to the Oldham County Jail.
If he failed to turn
himself in, a bench warrant would be issued for his arrest.
Of particular significance to this appeal is the
second order, which was captioned, “ORDER IMPLEMENTING
DEFENDANT’S PLAN OF DIVERSION OF SENTENCE.”
It consisted of a
pre-printed form, which described the Defendant as “having pled
guilty” -- although Ingabrand had not entered a guilty plea as
of that time.
His initial plea had been “not guilty,” and the
Commonwealth had not negotiated its offer based on a plea of
guilty.
The form also alluded to a “plan” that had been
submitted by the defendant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, and
the Project Manager.
The plan itself does not appear in the
record.
Under the terms of the second order, Ingabrand was
released into the custody of the HCCCC for a period of two years
under the following conditions:
to work faithfully at suitable
employment, to undergo and to complete drug rehabilitation, to
report to the project coordinator, to be subject to random
alcohol or drug testing, to enroll in GED classes, and to remain
law-abiding.
The order also included the following statement:
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It is further ordered and adjudged that if a
motion is filed for non-compliance of the
diversion plan and after a hearing is held
the Defendant’s violation is established by
reasonable evidence, the case shall be
immediately docketed for formal sentencing
pursuant to the Commonwealth’s offer to
enter a guilty plea.
Thus, by its literal language, the order presumed the prior
existence of a guilty plea or an offer of a guilty plea.
This order was signed by the court, Ingabrand, his
attorney, and a representative of the HCCCC Approval Committee.
The Commonwealth’s attorney did not sign the order, nor is there
a space on the form for his signature.
On October 7, 1999, Ingabrand appeared in court to
report that he had completed the rehabilitation program.
He was
living with his wife and was employed as a truck driver.
In
discussing the case with the Commonwealth’s attorney,
Ingabrand’s lawyer stated that he believed that the disposition
of the case would be determined not only by how well Ingabrand
did in drug treatment, but also by the need to insure that there
would not be any “further problems.”
let it go” for a period of time.
Therefore, “they should
The Commonwealth’s attorney
agreed, stating that he wished to resolve the case after the
first of the year.
He explained: “I can make some accommodation
for counts two and three [the wanton endangerment and assault
charges] but I’ve got to address the burglary [charge].”
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Several hearings were held over the course of the next
year during which the court received reports that Ingabrand was
continuing to test negative for drugs and alcohol and was in
full-time employment.
At a hearing on February 3, 2000, the Commonwealth’s
attorney informed the court that:
the original referral which you entered by
agreed order on December 15, 1998, was for
two years and frankly I didn’t pull any
punches with John [West] . . . and I assume
he’s told Vince [Ingabrand] . . . until I’m
satisfied that he’s got the cocaine problem
behind him it’s gonna be that you should
send him to the Department of Corrections.
He’s got to continue to be in a position to
help himself; I’ll work with you. My
expectation at the end of the two-year
period – if he’s clean – I’ll probably
recommend a fairly lengthy sentence but
recommend he will be placed on probation.”
An agreement on the disposition of the case was
reached on December 14, 2000 -- two years and four days from the
date of his release to the custody of HCCCC to enter the
rehabilitation program.
In exchange for a plea of guilty, the
Commonwealth offered to dismiss the burglary charge and to
recommend sentences of five years each on the charges of wanton
endangerment and assault -- to run consecutively for a total of
ten years.
The Commonwealth did not object to probation.
Ingabrand was sentenced in accordance with this plea offer on
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January 18, 2001.
He received a total sentence of ten years,
probated for five years.
Approximately two and one-half years later, on June
10, 2002, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke Ingabrand’s
probation following his indictment on new charges.
had been arrested on May 17, 2002.
Ingabrand
He was charged with
possession of a handgun by a felon, two counts of first-degree
wanton endangerment, and two counts of terroristic threatening.
He was indicted on these charges as well as the additional
charge of persistent felony offender in the second degree (PFO
II).
He entered a plea of guilty to the new charges.
The trial
court granted the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke probation and
denied him shock probation on the new charges.
He now faces a
combined sentence of fifteen years.
Pro se, Ingabrand filed a motion pursuant to RCr
11.42, arguing that his counsel had rendered ineffective
assistance.
He cites the dispositional hearing of December 14,
2000, claiming that his lawyer failed to move the trial court
for specific performance of the court’s original diversion plan.
Ingabrand claims that his original diversion plan mandated that
the charges against him were to be dismissed after he had
successfully completed the two-year diversion program.
An
additional post-conviction memorandum in support of the motion
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was filed on behalf of Ingabrand by a court-appointed attorney.
The motion was denied, and this appeal followed.
Ingabrand argues that he was subject to a courtordered diversion plan that required the dismissal of the
charges against him upon his completion of the rehabilitation
program and subsequent monitoring.
He cites KRS2 533.258(1),
which provides:
[i]f the defendant successfully completes
the provisions of the pretrial diversion
agreement, the charges against the defendant
shall be listed as ‘dismissed-diverted’ and
shall not constitute a criminal conviction.
He contends that his attorney was ineffective for failing to
raise an objection that would have resulted in a dismissal of
the charges against him and for advising him instead to plead
guilty under these circumstances.
In order to establish ineffective assistance of
counsel, the movant must satisfy a two-part test by showing: (1)
that counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) that the
deficiency resulted in actual prejudice affecting the outcome.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984).
The two-prong Strickland test also applies to
challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of
counsel.
2
See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
An appellant must show that the attorney’s
performance was deficient and that the attorney’s ineffective
performance affected the outcome of the plea process.
Id.
In other words, in order to satisfy the
‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must
show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial.
Id. at 59; Sparks v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 721 S.W.2d 726, 728
(1986).
Our review of the record and applicable law indicates
that Ingabrand was never subject to a pretrial diversion program
that required a dismissal of the charges upon successful
completion of the program’s requirements.
was not available in his case.
Such a program simply
Ingabrand’s defense counsel
could not have raised an objection or made a motion to dismiss
the charges at the time of the entry of the guilty plea because
such actions would have been groundless in light of the earlier
proceedings.
Although the program created for Ingabrand bore some
similarity to the pretrial diversion program, it was
distinguishable in several respects and did not comport with the
directives of KRS 533.250, et seq. and with RCr 8.04.
KRS 533.250 et seq., the statute which governs
pretrial diversion programs, was enacted in 1998 and became
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effective on July 15 of that year (approximately four months
prior to Ingabrand’s initial indictment).
The statute directs
each judicial circuit to develop a plan for a pretrial diversion
program and to submit it to the Supreme Court for approval on or
before December 1, 1999.
KRS 533.250(1).
In the meantime, as
of July 15, 1998, “the only other pretrial diversion programs
utilized by the Commonwealth shall be those authorized by the
Kentucky Supreme Court and providing for the pretrial diversion
of misdemeanants.”
KRS 533.262(2) (Emphasis added.)
Therefore,
Ingabrand could not lawfully have been subject to any pretrial
diversion program pre-dating the statute because the charges
against him were all felonies.
The terms of the statute provide that a pretrial
diversion program “may be utilized for a person charged with a
Class D felony offense[.]”
KRS 533.250(1)(a).
Ingabrand was
charged with one class B and two class D felonies.
Thus,
because of the class B felony, he was never eligible for a pretrial diversion program that would have allowed for dismissal.
Probation of his sentence was the best -- and actually the only
-- alternative available to him.
Additionally, the agreement also did not conform to
the directives of RCr 8.04, which requires that any pretrial
diversion agreement “must be in writing and signed by the
parties.”
RCr 8.04(1).
That rule continues:
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[p]romptly after the agreement is made, the
Attorney for the Commonwealth shall file the
agreement together with a statement that
pursuant to the agreement the prosecution is
suspended for a period specified in the
statement.
RCr 8.04(3).
Although reference was made to “an agreement” in
the language of the pre-printed order of December 15, 1998, no
agreement was ever filed.
Ingabrand implies that the order
itself constituted such an agreement.
However, the order does
not meet the formalities or requirements of the statute or of
the rule.
It was not signed by the Commonwealth, nor did it
contain the specific terms of the agreement.
We agree with the
analysis of the circuit court in its order denying Ingabrand’s
motion to vacate judgment:
While it is apparent that Defense
Counsel, Defendant, and the Court wished to
put the Defendant in some sort of drug rehab
program immediately, what is not apparent
and what does not appear from the record is
that the Commonwealth felt itself bound by
any sort of contract to dismiss charges
based upon diversion.
The record shows that on at least two occasions, the
Commonwealth’s attorney referred to the effect that Ingabrand’s
completion of the program would have on his sentencing.
Our
review of the record, in particular the hearings, indicates that
the Commonwealth and defense counsel had created an informal
agreement pursuant to which Ingabrand participated in
rehabilitation and regular monitoring by the court.
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The
Commonwealth’s ultimate recommendation as to his sentence was to
be contingent upon his performance in this program.
This
informal arrangement does not comply with the pre-trial
diversion statute or with RCr 8.04.
Clear and unequivocal agreement by the Commonwealth is
required as stated by the Supreme Court in Flynt v.
Commonwealth, 105 S.W.3d 415, 424 (Ky. 2003):
KRS 533.250 diversion cannot be
characterized as simply a sentencing
alternative--akin to a sentence of probation
or conditional discharge--which is available
for the trial court’s consideration. The
most significant distinguishing feature is
that, unlike a sentence of imprisonment,
probation, or conditional discharge,
admission into a diversion program permits a
defendant who successfully completes
diversion to avoid a felony conviction
entirely. And, we conclude that this
interruption of prosecution prior to final
disposition requires the Commonwealth's
agreement.
Ingabrand’s “diversion plan” was never represented to
him or to his attorney as entitling him to dismissal of the
charges against him.
Ingabrand attended the hearings at which
the Commonwealth made it absolutely clear that he would
ultimately be sentenced.
Ingabrand never raised any protest.
The term “diversion” was used in the second order, and defense
counsel referred to “his diversion program” at one of the
hearings.
But there was never any written, executed, or
specific agreement or promise that the charges against him would
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be dismissed at the end of the two-year period.
The
Commonwealth has correctly noted that Ingabrand only raised this
claim after his probation was revoked -– well over two years
after the entry of his guilty plea.
The performance of Ingabrand’s counsel was not
deficient in failing to raise this issue nor in allowing his
client to enter a plea of guilty.
No pre-trial diversion
agreement had been created that met the requirements of KRS
533.250, et seq., and of RCr 8.04; nor had Ingabrand been lulled
into believing that the charges would be dismissed upon his
successful completion of rehabilitation and monitoring.
He was
made fully aware that the terms of his sentencing were wholly
contingent upon his behavior and that he was being given the
benefit of a program specially tailored to accommodate him.
We affirm the orders of the Henry Circuit Court
denying Ingabrand’s motion pursuant to RCr 11.42.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Edward L. Gafford
LaGrange, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Courtney J. Hightower
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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