CRITTENDEN BUILDERS SUPPLY CO. v. GRANT COUNTY CONCRETE CO., INC.
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001675-DG
CRITTENDEN BUILDERS SUPPLY CO.
v.
APPELLANT
ON DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
FROM GRANT CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIE REINHARDT WARD, SPECIAL JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-XX-00003
GRANT COUNTY CONCRETE CO., INC.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: TAYLOR AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
MILLER, SPECIAL JUDGE:
This matter is before us upon an order
granting discretionary review dated October 17, 2005.
Rules of Civil Procedure 76.20.
Kentucky
We are reviewing a decision of
the Grant Circuit Court which affirmed an appeal from the Grant
District Court, Small Claims Division.
1
Retired Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
As an initial matter, we suggest that discretionary
review was improvidently granted.2
The granting of discretionary
review in a case of this nature is outside the underlying
purpose of the Small Claims Division.
We sit far removed from a
decision of a court that was not bound to compile a
sophisticated record supporting its decision.
However, since
discretionary review has been granted, we address the issues
presented on the merits, and affirm.
The Small Claims Division entered judgment against
appellant “Crittenden Builders Supply Co.” adjudging it liable
for the price of a shipment of concrete delivered by appellee
Grant County Concrete Co., Inc. (Grant County Concrete).
For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
On May 21, 2002, Crittenden Lumber & Building Supply,
LLC (Crittenden Lumber) placed an order with Grant County
Concrete for approximately 11-1/2 yards of concrete.
Grant
County Concrete delivered the material on the same day it was
ordered.
The concrete was used for improvement upon the
business premises then owned and occupied by Crittenden Lumber.
Grant County Concrete contemporaneously invoiced Crittenden
Lumber.
Crittenden Lumber never paid.
2
Cf. Campbell v. Crager, 167 S.W.3d 669 (Ky.App. 2005), wherein discretionary
review of a decision of the Small Claims Division was appropriately granted.
We recognized that a default judgment was an appropriate device in small
claims proceedings.
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At some point following the delivery, Crittenden
Lumber went out of business.
On December 19, 2002, Frances
Henry, LLC d/b/a Crittenden Builders Supply Company (Crittenden
Builders Supply) was organized.
It subsequently acquired some
of Crittenden Lumber’s assets, including its inventory and the
improved premises, and commenced operations of a similar nature
upon the same premises.
On January 21, 2005, Grant County Concrete filed a
Small Claims Complaint against Crittenden Builders Supply.
brief trial was held on March 8, 2005.
A
At trial, Grant County
Concrete proved the May 21, 2002, delivery, and Crittenden
Builders Supply defended on the basis that the purchase was made
by a different company (Crittenden Lumber), and that it had not
even been organized at the time of the delivery.
The trial
court entered judgment in favor of Grant County Concrete in the
amount of $1,443.59 upon the basis that Crittenden Builders
Supply obtained a benefit from the concrete delivery, i.e., the
improvement to the premises.
On July 6, 2005, the circuit court
affirmed upon the same reasoning.
We affirm, though upon
different reasoning.
The circuit court order stated, in relevant part, as
follows:
Appellant argues on appeal that it is not
the proper party to be before the Court on
this claim because it was not the legal
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entity with which the Plaintiff/Appellee
contracted in May of 2002. However, a
review of the record and the evidence before
the trial court is sufficient for the trial
court to find that, based on the purchase by
the Defendant/Appellant of the substantial
assets of Crittenden Builders Supply, that
Crittenden Builders Supply, Inc. has
acquired an equitable benefit from the Grant
County Concrete delivery of its product in
2002. Accordingly:
IT IS ORDERED that the Judgment of the Grant
County District Court is affirmed.
Before us, the appellant contends that the trial court
erred by ruling in favor of Grant County Concrete.
Grant County
Concrete argues that the judgment should stand because
Crittenden Builders Supply Company is merely a continuation of
Crittenden Lumber Co.3
It is generally accepted in Kentucky that a
corporation which acquires the assets of another corporation
does not thereby necessarily assume responsibility for payment
of the debts or liabilities of the corporation which it has
acquired.
American Railway Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky.
3
In its reply brief, Crittenden Builders Supply contends that Grant County
Concrete has not preserved this issue for review because it was not presented
to the small claims court. The trial transcript is a little over three
pages, neither side was represented by counsel, and legal arguments, as such,
were not presented by either party. Further, Crittenden Builders similarly
raised arguments in its circuit court appeal, and its appeal to this Court,
which were not specifically presented to the small claims court. Moreover,
Grant County Concrete did raise this argument to the circuit court. In light
of all these factors, we will consider the argument as sufficiently
preserved. Similarly, the appellant objects to our consideration of certain
public records obtained by the appellee from the office of the Kentucky
Secretary of State and attached as an appendix to its brief. As the
information contained in these documents is within the scope of judicial
notice, see Kentucky Rules of Evidence 201, we have considered the corporate
documents in our review.
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636, 228 S.W. 433 (1920).
The sale of corporate assets is
generally a bona fide transaction, and the selling corporation
receives money to pay its debts or property that may be
subjected to the payment of its debts and liabilities.
The
purchasing corporation will not, in the absence of a contract
obligation or fraud, be held responsible for the debts or
liabilities of the selling corporation.
S.W. at 437.
American Railway, 228
Exceptions to the general rule that a purchaser,
in the absence of a contract obligation, cannot be held
responsible for the debts and liabilities of the selling
corporation, are:
(1) where the purchaser expressly or
impliedly agrees to assume such debts or
other liabilities;
(2) where the transaction amounts to a
consolidation or merger of the seller and
purchaser;
(3) where the purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation of the selling
corporation; or
(4) where the transaction is entered into
fraudulently in order to escape liability
for such debts. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 437; Pearson ex rel. Trent v. National Feeding Systems,
Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2002)
Based upon the ownership, management, and control of
Crittenden Lumber vis-à-vis Crittenden Builders Supply,4 as
4
For example, Crittenden Lumber was organized by Val Andrews, Inc. and
Stoneridge Development, Inc. V. Ruth Klette was an officer and director of
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reflected in the record, we believe that exception three
applies, and, though for a different reason, conclude that the
trial court properly held the appellant liable for the May 21,
2002 concrete delivery.
We are persuaded that Crittenden
Builders Supply is, in substance, merely a continuation of
Crittenden Lumber Co., and that exception three to the general
rule as stated in American Railways, as set forth above, applies
so as to bind Crittenden Builders Supply for the May 21, 2002,
concrete delivery.
The appellants contend that there is insufficient
evidence to establish that the “continuing business” exception
applies in this case.
We disagree.
This is nothing more than a
simple suit for debt.
Consistent with the purpose in
establishing the Small Claims Division, see KRS 24A.220, the
case was tried without counsel.
In such cases, the Small Claims
Division does not engage in legal niceties nor sophisticated
findings.
It effectively has no record other than perhaps a
“form” complaint and sometimes a response of sorts.
The Court
simply considers the complaint and sundry information provided
by the parties and renders a decision based upon equity and fair
dealing.
It is essentially an oral proceeding.
That is
Val Andrews, Inc. Crittenden Builders Supply was organized by V. Ruth
Klette. Thus, among other reasons, there is a direct link, through V. Ruth
Klette, between Crittenden Lumber and Crittenden Builders Supply.
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precisely what occurred in the case at hand.
No attorneys were
involved until an appeal was taken to the circuit court.
While we do not necessarily agree with the Small
Claims Division that Crittenden Builders Supply Company should
pay for the concrete simply because it is using same, that is an
important factor in rendering an opinion based upon equity and
justice.
At the appeal level there is sufficient documentation
to demonstrate that the ownership, management, and control of
the corporations are quite the same.
We find the case of Pearson ex rel. Trent v. National
Feeding Systems, Inc., 90 S.W.3d 46 (Ky. 2002), a case injected
by the lawyers and used to convince this court to grant
discretionary review, not dispositive.
However, if one should
insist upon its applicability, we believe that the situation at
hand clearly falls within the “continuing business” exception as
set out therein.
Actually, the Pearson decision addressed the
question of whether a purchaser of corporate assets at a
bankruptcy sale would be liable for the torts (products
liability) of the seller.5
In order to resolve this question,
the Court looked to the ancient principle that a purchaser of
corporate assets is not ordinarily liable for the debts of the
5
In modern vernacular the question is whether a corporation that “purchases
the assets” (in contrast to merger and consolidation, which is controlled by
statute, see Kentucky Revised Statutes 273.291) of another corporation can be
said to have “purchased the former’s torts.”
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seller.
In so doing the Court simply viewed the tort claims as
a debt.
That has little to do with the issues before us.
For the foregoing reasons the Judgment of the Grant
Circuit Court is affirmed.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, DISSENTS.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert A. Winter
Ft. Mitchell, Kentucky
John Brent Threlkeld
Williamstown, Kentucky
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