MYRON ADDISON SPEARS, JR. v. DORIS ANNEMARIE SPEARS (NOW GOODIN)
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RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001626-MR
MYRON ADDISON SPEARS, JR.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HARDIN FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA ADDINGTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 92-CI-01168
v.
DORIS ANNEMARIE SPEARS (NOW GOODIN)
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) AFFIRMING
(2) DENYING MOTION FOR SPECIAL LEAVE TO BE GRANTED ORAL ARGUMENT
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND MINTON, JUDGES, HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, Myron Addison Spears, Jr. (Myron),
and Appellee, Doris Annemarie Spears (Doris), were divorced by
the Hardin Circuit Court pursuant to a decree entered November
17, 1992.
The decree incorporated the parties’ Separation
Agreement in its entirety.2
The Separation Agreement contained a
1
Senior Judge Joseph R. Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
2
The parties’ Separation Agreement was entered into October 30, 1992.
clause which determined Doris’ interest in Myron’s military
retirement pay.
It is this clause which has led to a continuous
battle between the parties.
before our court.
The current appeal is the third
Due to the number of prior appeals, we first
examine the relevant procedural history in this matter.
Appellant’s pending motion to be allowed an oral argument is
denied.
In 1997, Myron retired from the army and a dispute
arose over Doris’ interest in his military pension.
Following a
hearing, the Domestic Relations Commissioner (DRC) recommended
in her Commissioner’s Report that Doris’ interest in Myron’s
military pension should be determined by applying a conversion
factor.
The conversion factor was not contained in the parties’
Separation Agreement.
The circuit court subsequently adopted
the DRC’s recommendations in their entirety on October 17, 2000.
It was this adoption which was the basis of Myron’s first
appeal.3
We approved the use of the conversion factor by the
circuit court, but remanded due to a mathematical error.4
On January 14, 2003, Doris filed a motion to hold
Myron in contempt for his alleged failure to pay her the awarded
military retirement benefits.
During the course of these
3
Myron’s first appeal was 2000-CA-002678-MR.
March 1, 2002.
4
Unpublished opinion rendered
Myron sought discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court, but was
denied.
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proceedings, Myron moved to have the October 2000 order vacated
pursuant to Ky. CR 60.02(a),(b),(c), and (d).5
Following a
hearing, the circuit court denied Myron’s Ky. CR 60.02(a) motion
per order entered August 26, 2003.
Myron subsequently withdrew
his motion to reopen pursuant to Ky. CR 60.02(b),(c), and (d) on
September 30, 2003.
However, he filed a third motion March 12,
2004, seeking relief from judgment pursuant to Ky. CR 60.02(e)
arguing that the October 2000 order was void.
Specifically,
Myron argued that the circuit court misinterpreted federal law
which caused the court to act beyond its jurisdiction.
circuit court overruled Myron’s motion.
The
Myron again appealed.6
We affirmed the circuit court in an unpublished
opinion rendered November 12, 2004.7
We concluded that Myron’s
alleged errors would, at most, have given rise to a voidable
judgment, rather than a void judgment.
Voidable judgments are
not subject to collateral attack under Ky. CR 60.02.
We also
stated that Myron’s appeal was close to being frivolous pursuant
to Ky. CR 73.02(4), but allowed him leeway due to his status as
5
Myron’s first motion was based on Ky. CR 60.02 (b),(c), and (d) and filed
May 30, 2003. He was represented by counsel at that time. Myron’s second
motion was based on Ky. CR 60.02(a) and filed July 3, 2003. This motion was
pro se.
6
Myron was pro se during his second appeal.
number 2004-CA-000644-MR.
7
His second appeal was case
Myron again sought discretionary review by the Kentucky Supreme Court, but
was denied on October 12, 2005.
-3-
a pro se appellant.
We now turn our attention to Myron’s
current appeal.
Myron filed another Ky. CR 60.02(e) motion on May 10,
2005, alleging that the October 2000 order was void because the
circuit court failed to adhere to KRS 403.180, the statute
governing separation agreements.
The circuit court overruled
Myron’s motion on July 5, 2005, holding that it was barred due
to res judicata.
It is from this order that Myron has appealed.
For litigation to proceed in an orderly manner and
finally settle the rights of the parties, it is necessary for
parties to timely assert the rights they claim to a court with
power to grant the relief sought.
Williamson v. Commonwealth,
767 S.W.2d 323, 325-326 (Ky. 1989).
The doctrine of res judicata is that an existing final
judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion,
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of causes of
action and of facts or issues thereby litigated, as to the
parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.
v. Commonwealth, 983 S.W.2d 459, 464 (Ky. 1998).
Yeoman
Res judicata
may be used to preclude entire claims that were brought or
should have been brought in a prior action.
City of Covington
v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen’s and Firefighters’
Retirement Fund of the City of Covington, 903 S.W.2d 517, 521
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(Ky. 1995).
Also, res judicata is applicable not only to the
issues disposed of in the first action, but to every point which
properly belonged to the subject of the litigation in the first
action and which in the exercise of reasonable diligence might
have been brought forward at that time.
Egbert v. Curtis, 695
S.W.2d 123, 124 (Ky.App. 1985).
Following a review of the record, we agree with the
circuit court that this matter is barred due to the doctrine of
res judicata.
Myron has been fighting to have the October 2000
court order modified for nearly six years.
upheld this order.
Repeatedly, we have
He is again before us requesting this order
not be enforced.
Myron’s second appeal was based on the denial of his
Ky. CR 60.02(e) motion arguing that the October 2000 order was
void.
We acknowledge that Myron advances different arguments as
to why the order was void.
The second appeal argued the circuit
court lost its jurisdiction because it misinterpreted federal
law.
In his current appeal, Myron is arguing that the order was
void because the circuit court failed to comply with KRS
403.180.
We believe the issue of whether the October 2000 order
was void was fully litigated at the conclusion of Myron’s appeal
related to his first Ky. CR 60.02(e) motion.
Myron should have
raised all arguments related to whether the October 2000 order
-5-
was void in his first Ky. CR 60.02(e) motion and subsequent
appeal.
Myron has presented no reason explaining why he was
unable to make his KRS 403.180 arguments at that time.
Kentucky
Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 does not give Myron a third appeal
simply because he thought of another argument to support his
position with the benefit of hindsight.
There needs to be finality in the legal process for
all parties involved.
Fortunately, individuals are not entitled
to unlimited appeals.
It has been nearly six years since the
original order at issue was entered.
It is time for this issue
to be laid to rest once and for all.
We believe Myron’s current
appeal is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
We hope this
opinion provides a final resolution to this issue for all
parties involved with this matter.
In our opinion for Myron’s second appeal, we advised
the circuit court not to tolerate further proceedings it
determines were undertaken for the purpose of delay or
harassment.
again.
We wish to remind the circuit court of this advice
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Hardin Circuit
Court.
ALL CONCUR.
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ENTERED:
June 30, 2006___
/s/ David A. Barber_____________
JUDGE
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Myron Addison Spears, Jr.
Pro Se
Elizabethtown, Kentucky
Christina M. Tobin
Louisville, Kentucky
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