LARRY WAYNE WEATHERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 8, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001608-MR
LARRY WAYNE WEATHERS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM WASHINGTON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DOUGHLAS M. GEORGE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00069
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON AND WINE, JUDGES; MILLER,1 SPECIAL JUDGE.
WINE, JUDGE:
Larry Wayne Weathers, Appellant, was indicted in
Washington Circuit Court on a two count indictment of theft by
unlawful taking over three hundred dollars ($300) pursuant to
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 514.030 and as a persistent
felony offender in the first degree pursuant to KRS 532.080(3).
The Appellant signed a guilty plea that was filed with the
Washington Circuit Court May 24, 2005.
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Subsequently on May 27,
Retired Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution.
2005, the Appellant filed a motion to withdraw his plea.
This
motion was supplemented with additional grounds on June 9, 2005.
The trial court denied, without a hearing, the Appellant’s
attempt to withdraw the guilty plea.
The record on appeal does
not contain a transcript of the guilty plea colloquy, but does
contain the signed plea agreement.
A final judgment and
sentence was entered in Washington Circuit Court on July 8,
2005.
This appeal follows.
We now affirm.
Following his arraignment, the Appellant filed several
pro se motions, including a motion to dismiss and a motion
suppress for failure to properly secure a warrant.
Included in
the motion to dismiss, filed November 9, 2004, were allegations
that the citation failed to charge a felony offense and that the
arresting officer was not credible.
A second motion to dismiss
was filed on December 4, 2004, alleging defects in the
indictment.
These are the same grounds raised by the Appellant
in the appeal before this Court.
The Appellant decided to serve as his own counsel and so
announced during his arraignment on December 9, 2004.
However,
on January 6, 2005, the court did appoint the Hon. Shelby Horn
of the local public defender’s office to represent the
Appellant.
All pretrial motions were passed to March 10, 2005.
The Appellant continued to file detailed motions on his own
behalf including challenges to the citation.
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The Appellant was
provided a copy of all discovery including a copy of the grand
jury transcript.
A hearing was held on April 7, 2005, and all
said motions were denied.
On May 6, 2005, the Appellant filed yet a third motion
to dismiss again raising irregularities in the citation and
challenging the arresting officer’s credibility.
On the day of trial, the Appellant pled guilty to
theft by unlawful taking over $300.
A PFO I enhancement was
dismissed in exchange for the plea.
Immediately thereafter on May 27, 2005, the Appellant
moved to withdraw his plea, again citing the same allegations
contained in the motions to dismiss as well as this appeal.
RCr 8.10 provides that “[a]t any time before judgment
the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally
ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”
However, the word “may” in RCr 8.10 does not give a trial judge
unfettered discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea
without affording the defendant a hearing on the motion.
Our
case law is clear that the discretion to deny a motion to
withdraw a guilty plea exists only after a determination has
been made that the plea was voluntary.
Rodriguez v.
Commonwealth, 87 S.W. 3d 8 (Ky. 2002).
If the plea was
involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must be granted.
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Haight
v. Commonwealth, 760 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ky. 1988); Allen v. Walter,
534 S.W.2d 453, 455 (Ky. 1976).
Appellant asserted in his RCr 8.10 motion that his
plea was involuntary because it was the product of ineffective
assistance of counsel.
In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100
S. Ct. 1708, 64 L. Ed. 2d 333 (1980), it was held that “[a]
guilty plea is open to attack on the ground that counsel did not
provide the defendant with ‘reasonably competent advice.’”
Id.
at 344, 100 S. Ct. at 1716, citing McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759, 770-71, 90 S. Ct. 1441, 1448-49, 25 L. Ed. 2d 763
(1970).
The line running through these cases is that the
voluntariness of a guilty plea “can be determined only by
considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1469,
25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970).
In Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58 S.W.3d
482, 486 (Ky. 2001), the Kentucky Supreme Court referred to this
as the “totality of the circumstances surrounding the guilty
plea.”
Generally, an evaluation of the circumstances supporting
or refuting claims of ineffective assistance of counsel requires
an inquiry into what transpired between attorney and client that
led to the entry of the plea, i.e., an evidentiary hearing.
While the trial court did not conduct an evidentiary
hearing under the circumstances of this case, one was not
necessary.
From the pleadings filed by the Appellant pro se, it
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is readily apparent he is very articulate.
Further, there is a
written plea agreement and waiver of rights included in the
record.
The Appellant did not designate that the plea colloquy
be made part of this record.
It has long been held that when
the complete record is not before the appellate court, that
Court must assume that the omitted record supports the decision
of the trial court.
Commonwealth v. Thompson, 697 S.W.2d 143,
145 (Ky. 1985), citing Commonwealth, Dept. of Highways v.
Richardson, 424 S.W.2d 601 (Ky. 1968).
Even in the absence of
an oral plea colloquy or transcript, the signed plea sheet alone
is sufficient to show a voluntary plea.
Crawford, 789 S.W.2d 779 (Ky. 1990).
Commonwealth v.
There are no cited cases
requiring a judge to read from the bench a defendant’s rights to
a defendant who has already waived those rights.
Id.
In
determining the validity of a guilty plea in a criminal case,
the plea must represent a voluntary and intelligent choice among
the alternative course of action open to the defendant.
Centers
v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky. App. 1990), citing North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162
(1970).
See also Sparks v. Commonwealth, 721 S.W.2d 726 (Ky.
App. 1986).
The available record demonstrates that Appellant made
a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his rights
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guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution and Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution.
The record on appeal reveals absolutely no error or abuse by the
trial court.
For all of the above-stated reasons, we affirm.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Larry Wayne Weathers, pro se
LaGrange, KY
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Gregory C. Fuchs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, KY
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