KENNETH W. CLAWSON AND BOBBIE CLAWSON; ROBERT ADAMS AND CONNIE ADAMS; MARTY BAKER AND PATTI BAKER; LEE HESTER AND ALISON HESTER; RON ISAACS AND JUDY ISAACS; VERN MCGLONE AND TERESA MCGLONE; CHUCK STRUNK AND MARY ANN STRUNK; KENNETH NELSON AND LUCIE NELSON; AND DON HALEY v. CONGLETON LANE, LLC AND THE RICHMOND CITY COMMISSION
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 3, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001511-MR
KENNETH W. CLAWSON AND BOBBIE CLAWSON;
ROBERT ADAMS AND CONNIE ADAMS; MARTY BAKER
AND PATTI BAKER; LEE HESTER AND ALISON
HESTER; RON ISAACS AND JUDY ISAACS;
VERN MCGLONE AND TERESA MCGLONE; CHUCK
STRUNK AND MARY ANN STRUNK; KENNETH
NELSON AND LUCIE NELSON; AND DON HALEY
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01257
CONGLETON LANE, LLC AND THE
RICHMOND CITY COMMISSION
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE:
Kenneth Clawson and his wife, Bobbie, along
with several of their neighbors (all collectively referred to as
“Clawson” for ready reference), appeal from a decision of the
Madison Circuit Court affirming a zoning change as approved by
the Richmond City Commission.
Clawson claims that the findings
of the circuit court were inadequate and thus arbitrary under
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 100.211 and 100.213 as to
whether there was substantial evidence in the record and whether
due process was afforded to the parties.
After our review of
the record and pertinent authorities, we affirm the trial court.
The property at issue is located on the west side of
Interstate 75 approximately 100 feet northwest of the
intersection of Old Town Branch Road and Pioneer Drive in
Madison County.
It consists of 207 acres.
In May 2003, owners
of the tract of land requested a zoning change from agricultural
to single-family residential.
In June 2004, the land was sold
to Congleton Lane, LLC (Congleton), who was substituted as
Defendant/Appellee.
Congleton intends to develop the farmland
into a subdivision with 464 lots (minimum 9500 square feet) for
affordable housing.
The Clawson appellants own the surrounding
properties, which are zoned agricultural.
Located on those
portions of land that are already developed are residences
valued at from $200,000 to more than $500,000.
The proposed zoning change was first discussed on
May 13, 2003, at a Planning Commission public work session.
The
next discussion occurred at a Planning Commission public hearing
that was advertised pursuant to statutory requirements by
posting signs and sending notice by certified mail to the
surrounding landowners.
This session was a trial-type hearing
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attended by counsel for both supporters and opponents of the
zoning change.
On June 10, 2003, the proposed change went before the
Richmond City Commission.
The Planning Commission considered
the matter again at two public work sessions on July 8, 2003,
and on August 12, 2003.
On August 27, 2003, the Planning
Commission discussed the change at yet another public hearing.
All of those meetings concluded with approval of the change.
On
October 28, 2003, the matter was discussed by the Richmond City
Commission, and the Ordinance was read for the first time.
The
Ordinance was read for the second time and received final
approval unanimously from the Richmond City Commission on
November 11, 2003.
Clawson then appealed to the Madison Circuit Court,
charging that the Commission’s actions were arbitrary.
After
examining the evidence presented and its relationship to
Richmond’s comprehensive plan, the circuit court issued an order
providing as follows:
“The zone change agrees with parts of the
Comprehensive Plan but may disagree with others.”
Affirming Change of Zone at 2.)
(Order
The court then carefully
examined the evidence to determine whether the area had
undergone changes that would justify deviating from the
comprehensive plan.
After reviewing testimony concerning growth
and development in the county and a moratorium on multi-family
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homes, the court concluded:
“Therefore, it is clear that the
City based the zone change on the evidence presented to them.
No part of their decision was arbitrary in nature.”
Id. at 3.
On appeal, the parties raise the following issues:
1)
whether all of the findings required by KRS 100.213(1)(b) were
made; 2) if all the required findings were made, whether there
were basic evidentiary findings of fact to support the
conclusions required by the statutes; 3) whether the findings of
fact were supported by substantial evidence in the record; and
4) whether the basic elements of due process were afforded to
the parties.
These issues were addressed by the Supreme Court of
Kentucky in the classic zoning case of American Beauty Homes
Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning
Comm’n., 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964).
Explaining that zoning
decisions are administrative in nature, the Supreme Court
emphasized that:
[t]here is an inherent right of appeal from
orders of administrative agencies where
constitutional rights are involved, and
section (2) of the Constitution prohibits
the exercise of arbitrary power.
The Court set forth three criteria for ferreting out
arbitrariness:
“(1) action in excess of granted powers, (2)
lack of procedural due process, and (3) lack of substantial
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evidentiary support....”
Id. at 456.
The Court summarized its
reasoning as follows:
In the final analysis all of these issues
may be reduced to the ultimate question of
whether the action taken by the
administrative agency was arbitrary. As a
general rule the yardstick of fairness is
sufficiently broad to measure the validity
of administrative action.
Id. at 457.
(Emphasis added.)
Utilizing that yardstick, we shall examine the
statutes underlying the administrative process.
The pertinent
excerpt of KRS 100.211 sets forth the requirement that:
The planning commission shall then hold at
least one (1) public hearing after notice. .
. and make findings of fact and a
recommendation of approval or disapproval of
the proposed map amendment to the various
legislative bodies or fiscal courts
involved. The findings of fact and
recommendation shall include a summary of
the evidence.
KRS 100.213 sets requirements concerning zoning
changes as they relate to the comprehensive plan.
It provides:
Before any map amendment is granted, the
planning commission or the legislative body
or fiscal court must find that the map
amendment is in agreement with the adopted
comprehensive plan, or, in the absence of
such a finding that . . . there have been
major changes of an economic, physical, or
social nature within the area involved which
were not anticipated in the adopted
comprehensive plan and which have
substantially altered the basic character of
such an area.
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The primary concern of KRS 100.211 is due process.
In
Hilltop Basic Res. v. County of Boone, 180 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Ky.
2005), a recent zoning decision, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
once again defined due process in the administrative context:
The fundamental requirement of procedural
due process is simply that all affected
parties be given “the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)...Procedural due
process in the administrative or legislative
setting has been widely understood to
encompass “a hearing, the taking and
weighing of evidence if such is offered, a
finding of fact based upon a consideration
of the evidence, the making of an order
supported by substantial evidence, and,
where the party’s constitutional rights are
involved, a judicial review of the
administrative action.”
Id., quoting Morris v. City of Catlettsburg, 437 S.W.2d 753, 755
(Ky. 1969).
The eight public meetings held prior to the
approval of the ordinance were properly noticed, considerably
more hearings than were required to satisfy the statutory
mandate of “at least one” public meeting.
Clawson next attacks the evidence as lacking the
necessary specificity to satisfy procedural due process.
He
relies on Caller v. Ison, 508 S.W.2d 776, 777 (Ky. 1974), which
held that:
...the requirements of the proceeding
conducted, in order to meet constitutional
due process must include a hearing, the
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taking and weighing of offered evidence, a
finding of fact based upon a consideration
of the evidence, and conclusions supported
by substantial evidence.
As the findings were nothing more than a
restatement of the legal requirements, they
were not specific enough to permit a
meaningful review by the court.
(Citations omitted.)
Caller, however, is highly distinguishable
since it did not address any evidence at all.
The circuit court
in Caller found there were not even enough facts presented for
an initial “meaningful review.”
Id.
At the oral argument of this case, counsel for Clawson
vehemently argued that the Commission’s findings were wholly
inadequate.
He was correct only in part.
While the findings
were certainly neither abundant not numerous, they were not so
sparse or “bare bones” in nature to compel us to set them aside
as insufficient.
The disputed property had been recently annexed by
Richmond and zoned “agricultural” as a transitional
classification pending development.
The evidence clearly
established that the proposed map amendment conformed to
Richmond’s comprehensive plan.
In addition, the commissioners specifically found that
the disputed area was no longer suitable for strictly
agricultural use and that it was suitable for relatively dense
single-family housing.
The commissioners also noted that the
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area had undergone economic, physical, or social changes that
had altered the farmland.
No specific finding was recited that
the economic, physical, or social changes had not been
anticipated in the adopted comprehensive plan.
However, the
omission of such a finding assumes less significance since the
property had only recently been annexed.
As we review the
findings of the Commission, we conclude that the proposed zone
classification was appropriate, that the findings were adequate,
that the evidence supported the findings, and that the decision
was not arbitrary.
In its review of the Commission’s action, the trial
court recited in its order that it reviewed transcripts from the
public hearings and considered the evidence presented concerning
new road construction and utilities -- as well as a moratorium
on multi-family housing.
KRS 100.213 directs that evidence be examined by the
planning commission, legislative body, or fiscal court.
After
considering the evidence, findings must be made:
that the map amendment is in agreement with
the adopted comprehensive plan, or in the
absence of such a finding that . . .there
have been major changes of an economic,
physical, or social nature within the area
involved.
Evidence was presented showing that a new road was constructed
giving access to the property in question.
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Ample evidence
indicated an increasing need for single-family housing in the
rapidly growing areas of Madison County.
In 1997, Richmond instituted a moratorium on multifamily homes in order to encourage growth of single-family
residences.
The record shows extensive discussion of Madison
County’s need for sufficient housing.
Testimony indicated that
the property at issue is one of the few -- if not the only -appropriate areas for construction of medium-income homes in the
county.
Madison County is experiencing extraordinary growth,
adding approximately 100 people per month to its population
base.
An additional 800 to 1200 families are anticipated in the
community in the wake of the federal order to destroy the nerve
gas that is stored at the county’s Bluegrass Army Depot.
The record also shows the Commission considered
evidence offered by opponents of the change concerning traffic,
water flow, and deed restrictions.
Although the proposed zoning
change generally complies with Richmond’s comprehensive plan,
the Madison Circuit Court found that it deviated in part because
the surrounding developed properties consist of much larger lots
than those involved in the plan for new housing construction.
However, based on the totality of the evidence examined by the
Commission, the court found that the area had experienced
changes sufficiently consistent with the guidelines of KRS
100.213 to justify the zoning change.
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Both the Commission and the Madison Circuit Court were
presented with sufficient evidence to show the zoning change is
in agreement in major part with the comprehensive plan in
providing affordable housing for a growing community.
Based on
adequate but not ample evidence, findings recited that the
growth has been more than sufficient to justify the proposed
zoning change insofar as it deviates from the comprehensive
plan.
Thus, the change complies with KRS 100.211 and 100.213.
Although more detailed and more specific findings might have
avoided recourse by the appellants to this appeal, we cannot
agree that they have succeeded in demonstrating a violation of
due process.
We affirm the judgment of the Madison Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES:
David L. Bohannon
Richmond, Kentucky
Roger M. Oliver
Berea, Kentucky
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