CONNIE MARSHALL v. ARVEL WISE, JR.
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 22, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001404-MR
CONNIE MARSHALL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ANN O’MALLEY SHAKE, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 03-CI-007666
v.
ARVEL WISE, JR.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: BARBER, JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGES.1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
On July 9, 2003, Connie Marshall
filed suit against her landlord, Arvel Wise, Jr., in the Small
Claims Division of Jefferson District Court.
Marshall claimed
that Wise had violated the housing code and had been guilty of
trespass, and she sought to recover damages in the sum of
$1,500.00.
Marshall later amended her complaint to increase the
amount of damages claimed to $10,359.00.
1
Because the damages
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580
claimed exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the district
court, the case was transferred to Jefferson Circuit Court.
The
amended complaint also added a count claiming illegal eviction.
On July 9, 2004, Marshall and Wise entered into an
oral agreement to settle the case.
In substance, the agreement
provided that the parties would not pursue litigation against
one another regarding “the fact situation as identified in the
previous pleadings in this case.”
At a hearing held on that
date, the parties acknowledged in open court that a settlement
of all matters had been reached.
Counsel for Wise was to draft
a written agreed order to be signed by the parties and submitted
to the circuit court.
For some reason not apparent from the
record, the order was not timely prepared.
When the agreed
order was finally presented to Marshall, she refused to sign it.2
On August 24, 2004, Marshall filed a pro se “Motion
for Judgment Against the Defendant.”
The motion conceded that
“[o]n July 9, 2004, the Plaintiff and the Defendant’s Attorney
entered an oral agreement in this court.”
According to
Marshall, however, by failing to timely prepare a written agreed
order, Wise had breached the parties’ oral agreement, and she
was entitled to judgment upon her original complaint.
2
Wise
According to Wise, Marshall was mailed a copy of the written settlement
agreement for her signature on September 1, 2004, and again on November 19,
2004.
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responded that the parties had a valid settlement agreement and
sought its enforcement.
Following an evidentiary hearing, on June 3, 2005, the
circuit court determined that the parties had a valid and
enforceable settlement agreement providing that each party would
not pursue litigation against the other on the matters at issue
in this action.
On appeal, Marshall contends that the circuit court
erroneously determined that the parties had a valid oral
agreement to settle this litigation because Wise breached the
agreement when he failed to timely draft a written agreed order
memorializing their agreement.
A settlement agreement, like any other contract, is
governed by contract law.3
“[U]nder contract law, an oral
contract is ordinarily no less binding than one reduced to
writing.”4
“When parties have agreed on the essential terms of a
settlement, and all that remains is to memorialize the agreement
in writing, the parties are bound by the terms of the oral
agreement.”5
“It is elementary that a contract may not be
rescinded unless the non-performance, misrepresentation or
3
Frear v. P.T.A. Industries, Inc., 103 S.W.3d 99, 105 (Ky. 2003).
4
Id.
5
Re/Max International, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 271 F.3d 633, 646 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting that the validity of the oral settlement agreement is not
affected by the fact that it has not yet been documented in writing).
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breach is substantial or material.
Generally, courts do not
favor rescission, which will not be permitted. . . .
The court
does not look lightly at rescission, and rescission will not be
permitted for a slight or inconsequential breach.”6
Marshall concedes that the parties entered into an
oral agreement to settle the litigation on July 9, 2004.
The
issue before us, then, is whether Wise’s delay in preparing a
written agreed order was a material breach of the contract so as
to excuse performance by Marshall.
Simply put, the provision that counsel for Wise would
prepare an agreed order was not a material term of the parties’
agreement.
The intent of the agreement was to settle litigation
between the parties, and any agreement concerning who would
prepare the written order or when it would be prepared was
collateral to this essential purpose.
As there was no material
breach by Wise, Marshall remains bound by the oral agreement.
Consequently, the circuit court properly determined that the
parties had a valid oral agreement, and did not err in requiring
its enforcement.
The judgment is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
6
Fay E. Sams Money Purchase Pension Plan v. Jansen, 3 S.W.3d 753, 757 (Ky.
App. 1999), citing Evergreen Land Co, v. Gatti, 554 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Ky. App.
1977).
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BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Connie Marshall, pro se
Louisville, Kentucky
Stephen T. Porter
Louisville, Kentucky
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