MUNOZ BROTHERS, INC. v. VIDAL ESCOBAR; WILLSTAFF WORLDWIDE STAFFING; HON. ANDREW MANNO, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 17, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001375-WC
MUNOZ BROTHERS, INC.
v.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NOS. WC-03-01413 & WC-03-94378
VIDAL ESCOBAR; WILLSTAFF WORLDWIDE
STAFFING; HON. ANDREW MANNO,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM AND McANULTY, JUDGES; PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BUCKINGHAM, JUDGE:
Munoz Brothers, Inc., petitions for our
review of an opinion by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board)
affirming an opinion and award by an administrative law judge
(ALJ) in favor of an injured worker, Vidal Escobar.
1
Munoz
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
Brothers contends that the apportionment of benefits payable to
Escobar between it and Willstaff Worldwide Staffing was
erroneous.
We affirm.
At the time of the hearing before the ALJ, Escobar was
40 years old, had no formal education, and was not fluent in
English.
He came to the United States from El Salvador in 1989.
In El Salvador, he had worked on a farm.
Escobar worked for Willstaff, a temporary employment
agency, from October 2001 until he was injured in January 2002.
On January 16, 2002, Escobar was struck by a 55-pound bag of
laundry while working in a hospital under the employ of
Willstaff.
The bag had flown out of a laundry chute and struck
Escobar in the back while he was bending over to pick up dirty
laundry.
Escobar claimed he immediately experienced pain in his
hip, back, and leg.
X-rays were taken at the hospital, and
Escobar did not return to work until the next day.
However, he
could not continue to work when he returned because the pain was
so intense.
He sought additional medical treatment and later
returned to work briefly doing light cleaning.
In January 2003, Escobar went to work for Munoz
Brothers doing clean-up work at Rupp Arena in Lexington.
On
January 29, 2003, he suffered another injury to his low back.
He testified that he was lifting an aluminum table that weighed
approximately 55 pounds when he felt a strong pain in his back
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and hip.
He received medical treatment for this injury, but
when he attempted to go back to work, Munoz Brothers had no work
for him.
His employment ended sometime in February 2003.
Escobar filed claims in connection with the separate
back injuries.
The ALJ considered the testimony of Dr. Tony
Perez, Dr. Thomas Menke, Dr. Gregory T. Snider, and Dr. Robert
B. Nickerson.
Dr. Nickerson had performed his evaluation at the
University of Kentucky after the ALJ had ordered a university
evaluation pursuant to KRS2 342.315.
The ALJ found that the parties did not offer
sufficient evidence to overcome the presumptive weight afforded
the opinions of Dr. Nickerson.
See KRS 342.315(2).
Therefore,
the ALJ adopted the 12% impairment rating of Dr. Nickerson.
As
Dr. Nickerson had concluded that an 8% rating was attributable
to the January 2002 injury and a 4% rating attributable to the
January 2003 injury, the ALJ adopted the finding of Dr.
Nickerson as an accurate reflection of the appropriate
apportionment between the two injuries.
Next, the ALJ found that Escobar did not retain the
physical capacity to return to the type of work performed at the
time of the January 2002 injury or the 2003 injury.
However,
the ALJ found that Escobar did retain the physical capacity to
return to the work he performed at the time of his first injury.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
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Then, there being no evidence that Escobar had returned to work
after either injury at equal to or greater wages, the ALJ
determined that the three-multiplier provision in KRS
342.730(1)(c) did not apply.
Munoz Brothers appealed to the
Board, which affirmed the ALJ.
This petition for review
followed.
Pursuant to Campbell v. Sextet Mining Co., 912 S.W.2d
25 (Ky. 1995), and Fleming v. Windchy, 953 S.W.2d 604 (Ky.
1997), Escobar received a permanent partial disability award of
8% against Willstaff and a total disability award against Munoz
Brothers with an offset for the 8% permanent partial disability
award.
Thus, Escobar recovered the sum of $13.63 per week
against Willstaff, commencing August 5, 2002, and continuing
thereafter for a period not to exceed 425 weeks.
Against Munoz
Brothers, Escobar recovered the sum of $150 per week commencing
November 2, 2003, and continuing for so long as he remains
totally disabled.
Munoz Brothers’ argument in its petition for review is
that the ALJ erred by not enhancing the award against Willstaff
by the three multiplier.
Specifically, Munoz Brothers argues
that the ALJ erred when he determined that Escobar retained the
physical capacity to return to his work in the hospital laundry
room following the first injury and thus failed to apply the
three-multiplier provision in the statute.
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“The function of further review of the [Board] in the
Court of Appeals is to correct the Board only where the . . .
Court perceives the Board has overlooked or misconstrued
controlling statutes or precedent, or committed an error in
assessing the evidence so flagrant as to cause gross injustice.”
Western Baptist Hosp. v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky.
1992).
“[T]he ALJ, as fact-finder, has the authority to believe
part of the evidence and disbelieve other parts, even when it
came from the witness or the same adversary party’s total
proof.”
Roberts v. Estep, 845 S.W.2d 544, 547 (Ky. 1993).
“When one of two reasonable inferences may be drawn from the
evidence, the finders of fact may choose.”
Jackson v. General
Refractories Co., 581 S.W.2d 10, 11 (Ky. 1979).
As the Board noted, Munoz Brothers had the burden of
proving the application of the three-multiplier to the
impairment rating assessed for Escobar’s injury with Willstaff.
Since Munoz Brothers was unsuccessful, the question on appeal is
whether the evidence is so overwhelming as to compel a finding
in its favor.
See Paramount Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695
S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985).
Munoz Brothers argues that the evidence compels a
finding that Escobar did not have the physical capacity to
return to his work in the hospital laundry after his first
injury and, therefore, that the three-multiplier provision of
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the statute should apply to the award against Willstaff.
Such a
finding would change the percentage of the total award for which
Willstaff would be responsible from roughly 8% to roughly 24%,
thus increasing the amount of the offset from the award against
Munoz Brothers by roughly 16%.
As the Board noted, the standard for the application
of the three-multiplier is whether the claimant lacked the
physical capacity to return to the same type of work he
performed at the time of injury.
142 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Ky. 2004).
See Ford Motor Co. v. Forman,
The issue of the claimant’s
physical capacity and the application of the three-multiplier is
based on both lay and medical evidence in the record.
Carte v.
Loretto Motherhouse Infirmary, 19 S.W.3d 122, 126 (Ky.App.
2000).
The Board analyzed the evidence as follows:
As indicated above, there was simply a
dearth of evidence concerning Escobar’s job
duties with either Willstaff or Munoz
Brothers. He was never fully questioned
concerning the component parts of the jobs
he performed. Though Escobar testified he
could no longer work at Saint Joseph
Hospital, that testimony, standing alone,
compels no particular result.
We agree with the Board’s conclusion that it stated as follows:
The ALJ was left with medical testimony
which indicated Escobar had indeed been
released to return to work after that
injury. Faced with this evidence, we
believe the ALJ did not err in his
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determination that the three multiplier did
not apply. The evidence falls short of
compelling a finding that Escobar was unable
to return to his former employment with
Willstaff after the first injury . . . We
cannot say the ALJ’s decision was so wholly
unreasonable that it must be reversed as a
matter of law.
The Board’s opinion is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
James R. Carpenter
Lexington, Kentucky
Steven D. Goodrum
Lexington, Kentucky
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