DAVID L. WARDLE v. LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN COUNTY GOVERNMENT
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 29, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001296-MR
DAVID L. WARDLE
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-01741
LEXINGTON-FAYETTE URBAN
COUNTY GOVERNMENT
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND POTTER, SENIOR
JUDGES.1
POTTER, SENIOR JUDGE:
David L. Wardle appeals from an order of
the Fayette Circuit Court granting summary judgment to
Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government (LFUCG) in a lawsuit
initiated by Wardle in connection with a drug test he was
required to take, following a work-related automobile accident,
1
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and John Woods Potter sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
in contravention of LFUCG’s employee handbook.
For the reasons
stated below, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The LFUCG Employee Handbook specifies that “[a]ny
employee involved in a single vehicle accident with property
damages of $2,500.00 or more must immediately notify his or her
supervisor and undergo a drug and alcohol test within two hours
of the incident, but no later than eight hours after the
incident.”
In April 1999, Wardle was an employee of LFUCG.
Wardle was employed as a carpenter in the Division of Building
Maintenance and Construction.
On April 28, 1999, Wardle backed
into a concrete pillar while driving an LFUCG-owned vehicle
during work hours.
The incident caused damage to the vehicle.
Wardle subsequently reported the accident to his supervisor, Ben
Turpin.
Turpin notified his superior, Carolyn Smith, of the
incident, who directed Turpin to have Wardle tested for drugs
and alcohol.
Wardle was subsequently tested at an Urgent
Treatment Center.
According to Wardle, either on the day of the
accident or the following day, LFUCG became aware that the
amount of damages caused in the vehicle accident was less than
$2,500.00; LFUCG, however, alleges that it did not become aware
of the damages estimates until after it had received the drug
test results.
As further discussed below, this factual dispute
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was finally determined in the federal litigation adversely to
Wardle, and, pursuant to the principles of res judicata, we
assume that LFUCG did not become aware of the property damage
estimates until after it received the results of the drug test.
On May 4, 1999, the Urgent Treatment Center notified
LFUCG that Wardle had tested positive for drugs.
In response to
the test results, LFUCG ordered Wardle to submit to a mandatory
substance abuse evaluation and suspended him for thirty days.
Immediately after Wardle began to serve the suspension, however,
because the damage to the vehicle fell below the $2,500.00
threshold required to trigger a drug test, LFUCG rescinded the
suspension, all record of his positive test was removed from his
personnel file, and Wardle was reinstated with back pay.
On July 30, 1999, Wardle filed an action in United
States District Court alleging various causes of action in
connection with LFUCG’s decision to require him to take a drug
test following the April 28, 1999, accident.
In his complaint,
Wardle alleged that the testing violated his Fourth and Fifth
Amendment rights as applied to the state by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
He also alleged violations of corresponding
provisions of the Kentucky Constitution, and he asserted state
law claims for breach of contract; breach of implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; and fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.
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On July 21, 2000, the District Court entered an
Opinion & Order granting LFUCG summary judgment on those claims
over which it had original jurisdiction, and dismissing Wardle’s
state law claims without prejudice.
On September 5, 2002, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals rendered an unpublished opinion affirming the District
Court’s decision.
Cir. 2002).
See Wardle v. LFUCG, 45 Fed.Appx. 505 (6th
The Sixth Circuit noted that Wardle had not claimed
that LFUCG had known about the property damage estimates prior
to obtaining his drug test results until his post-judgment
motion to vacate.
This was held by the Sixth Circuit to be
untimely, and binds us, pursuant to the principles of res
judicata, to the factual determination that LFUCG did not know
the results of Wardle’s drug test until after it received the
property damage estimates to the vehicle.
On March 24, 2003,
the United States Supreme Court entered an order denying
certiorari.
See Wardle v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government, 538 U.S. 923, 123 S.Ct. 1582, 155 L.Ed.2d 314
(2003).
On April 22, 2003, Wardle filed a Complaint in Fayette
Circuit Court asserting state law claims substantially
paralleling the state law claims asserted in his Federal
complaint.
In addition, Wardle asserted a Retaliation/Whistle
Blower claim not previously raised in the Federal complaint.
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On
March 15, 2005, an order was entered granting LFUCG summary
judgment on all claims asserted by Wardle.
On May 23, 2005, an
order was entered denying Wardle’s motion to alter, amend, or
vacate.
This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Before us, Wardle contends that the circuit court
erroneously granted summary judgment to LFUCG.
Upon application
of the principles of res judicata, as previously discussed, the
operative facts are not in dispute.
Thus, our task is to
determine whether LFUCG was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
In Count I of his Fayette Circuit Court complaint,
Wardle asserted a State law constitutional claim under Section
10 of the Kentucky Constitution, which provides for protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures parallel to the
protections contained in the Fourth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
In Count II of his Complaint Wardle asserted a
State law constitutional law claim asserting that LFUCG had
failed to follow the written procedures in its Employee
Handbook, which we construe to be a due process argument
implicating Section 2, the Kentucky Constitution’s parallel
section to the Fifth Amendment due process clause.
In Count III
of his complaint Wardle asserts a State constitutional claim
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alleging a taking of his property interest in his governmental
employment, which we construe as an alleged violation of
Kentucky Constitution Section 13, which is parallel to the
takings clause contained in the Fifth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution.
In his Complaint in Federal District Court, Wardle
raised these same issues.
While not ruling upon the State
Constitutional Claims, the District Court held that LFUCG was
entitled to summary judgment upon the parallel Federal
Constitutional Claims.
This determination was upheld on appeal
to the Sixth Circuit, and certiorari was denied by the United
States Supreme Court.
In the present Complaint, Wardle makes the same
factual arguments he made in his Federal Complaint, except for
his impermissible attempt to change the timing of LFUCG’s
knowledge of the property damage.
In the present case, however,
Wardle’s claims are limited to violations of the aforementioned
provisions of the Kentucky Constitution.
It has been
consistently held that the Kentucky Constitutional provisions
upon which Wardle relies provide no greater protection than
their respective Federal counterpart contained in the United
States Constitution.
See, e.g., LaFollette v. Commonwealth, 915
S.W.2d 747, 748 (Ky. 1996) (Kentucky State Constitution
"provides no greater protection than does the federal Fourth
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Amendment”).
Therefore to prevail here Wardle would have to
have the factual issues underlying his State claim decided
differently than they were decided in his Federal action.
Based upon the Federal Court’s disposition of the
parallel federal constitutional claims in the federal lawsuit,
and because the Kentucky Constitution’s counterparts to the
federal provisions provide no greater protections than the
parallel federal provisions, we conclude that the doctrine
of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion as it is sometimes
called,2 bars relitigation of the issues underlying Wardle’s
constitutional claims in the present action.
In order for issue preclusion to be used as a bar to
further litigation, certain elements must be present, Yeoman v.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Health Policy Board, 983 S.W.2d 459,
465 (Ky. 1998):
First, the issue in the second case must be the same
as the issue in the first case.
Here, because of the doctrine
of res judicata, the factual issues in the present case are the
same as those presented in the federal case.
The only
difference is that the operative provisions in this case are
contained in the State Constitution instead of the Federal
2
“When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment,
the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties,
whether on the same or a different claim.” Restatement (Second) of Judgments
§27 (1982).
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Constitution.
Again, however, the State provisions provide only
the same level of protection afforded by the Federal
Constitution.
Second, the issue must have been actually litigated.
The constitutional issues were litigated in the Federal
proceeding, and ultimately summary judgment was granted to LFUCG
on all claims as raised under the federal constitution.
Third, even if an issue was actually litigated in a
prior action, issue preclusion will not bar subsequent
litigation unless the issue was actually decided in that action.
This is similar to the previous requirement.
The federal
constitutional claims were actually decided against Wardle.
Fourth, for issue preclusion to operate as a bar, the
decision on the issue in the prior action must have been
necessary to the court's judgment.
The District Court’s
determination that the federal constitution did not support the
causes of action asserted by Wardle was necessary to its award
of summary judgment to LFUCG.
In summary, we conclude that the State constitutional
claims asserted by Wardle in the present action are barred by
collateral estoppel.
Wardle argues that although he did not prevail in the
federal action he will prevail here because he will try his case
differently and present evidence that was not presented in the
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Federal action.
Such an argument does not avoid the reach of
the doctrine of issue preclusion.3
swallow the rule.
Indeed such an exception would
Rare is the litigant who doesn’t believe he
would do better given a second bite at the apple.
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY ISSUES
In his complaint, Wardle asserted the common law tort
claims of invasion of privacy; breach of covenant of good faith
and fair dealing; intentional infliction of emotional distress;
and fraud/misrepresentation.
breach of contract.
Wardle also asserted a claim of
We agree with the circuit court that LFUCG
is entitled to summary judgment on each of these counts pursuant
to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
LFUCG is an urban county government.
“Pursuant to KRS
67A.060(1) [an] urban county government retains the immunities
of county government.
It is, like a county government, an arm
of the state entitled to the protective cloak of sovereign
immunity.”
Hempel v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Government,
641 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ky.App. 1982).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity extends to actions
sounding in both tort and contract.
University of Louisville v.
Martin, 574 S.W.2d 676, 677 (Ky.App. 1978) (citing All-American
Movers v. Kentucky Ex Rel. Hancock, 552 S.W.2d 679 (Ky.App.
1977) and Foley Construction Co. v. Ward, 375 S.W.2d 392 (Ky.
3
Restatement (Second) of Judgments §28 (1982).
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1964)).
As such, pursuant to sovereign immunity, the circuit
court properly granted LFUCG summary judgment on Wardle’s common
law tort claims of invasion of privacy; breach of covenant of
good faith and fair dealing; intentional infliction of emotional
distress; and fraud/misrepresentation; and on his claim of
breach of contract.
RETALIATION/WHISTLE BLOWER CLAIM
Wardle further contends that the circuit court
erroneously granted summary judgment to LFUCG on his
Retaliation/Whistle Blower claim.
Count IX of Wardle’s
complaint alleged that “the Defendant retaliated against
Plaintiff by conspiring to and/or in fact actually retaliating
against and discriminating against Plaintiff after Plaintiff
opposed the LFUCG’s unlawful drug testing policies and
procedures, as well as increased retaliatory actions after
Plaintiff filed his Federal complaint.”
While the complaint did
not so state, the parties now agree that this count is brought
pursuant to the Kentucky Whistle Blower Act, KRS 61.101, et seq.
KRS 61.103(2) provides that “employees alleging a
violation of [the Whistle Blower Act] may bring a civil action
for appropriate injunctive relief or punitive damages, or both,
within ninety (90) days after the occurrence of the alleged
violation.”
(Emphasis added).
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Here, the alleged Whistle Blower Act violation
occurred in the aftermath of the April 1999 automobile accident
and subsequent drug test.
Wardle did not file his State Law
Whistle Blower action until April 22, 2003, over four years
after the original events.
Thus, unless the statute of
limitations was tolled during the pendancy of the Federal
proceedings, Wardle’s Whistle Blower action was filed well
outside of the applicable limitations period.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) provides as follows:
Except as provided in subsections (b) and
(c) or as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute, in any civil action of
which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other
claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction
that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental
jurisdiction shall include claims that
involve the joinder or intervention of
additional parties.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(d) provides as follows:
The period of limitations for any claim
asserted under subsection (a), and for any
other claim in the same action that is
voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or
after the dismissal of the claim under
subsection (a), shall be tolled while the
claim is pending and for a period of 30 days
after it is dismissed unless State law
provides for a longer tolling period.
(Emphasis added).
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We construe 28 U.S.C. § 1367 as providing for the
tolling of a state statute of limitations on a claim only if the
claim is brought as part of the Federal case.
Here, Wardle did
not bring a Whistle Blower count in his Federal case.
As such,
this claim is not entitled to the benefit of the tolling
provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(d).
It follows that at the
time Wardle brought his claim in Fayette Circuit Court, his
Whistle Blower claim was barred by the 90-day statute of
limitations contained in KRS 61.103(2).
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
James M. Morris
Sharon K. Morris
Lexington, Kentucky
Robert L. Roark
Beth Bowell
Lexington, Kentucky
Tracy Jones
Lexington-Fayette Urban County
Government Department of Law
Lexington, Kentucky
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