GOLDBERG & SIMPSON, P.S.C.; STEVEN A. GOODMAN; AND WAYNE F. WILSON v. PHILIP J. GOODMAN AND JULIE GOODMAN
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001273-MR
GOLDBERG & SIMPSON, P.S.C.;
STEVEN A. GOODMAN;
AND WAYNE F. WILSON
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE PAMELA R. GOODWINE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 05-CI-01229
v.
PHILIP J. GOODMAN AND
JULIE GOODMAN
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER AND MINTON, JUDGES; KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE.1
BARBER, JUDGE:
This appeal arose from the Fayette Circuit
Court’s dismissal of a third-party complaint filed by
Appellants, Goldberg & Simpson, P.S.C.; Steven A. Goodman
(Steven); and Wayne F. Wilson (Wilson).
The third-party
complaint was against Appellee, Julie Goodman (Julie), and
claimed she was liable to the Appellants due to her alleged
1
Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
professional failings to her husband, who is an Appellee, Philip
J. Goodman (Philip).
in this opinion.
The alleged failures are discussed later
We first examine the facts which gave rise to
this current appeal.
Steven and Philip are brothers.
and a partner of Goldberg & Simpson.
Steven is an attorney
Their parents, Lawrence I.
Goodman (Lawrence) and Leah Elkowitz Goodman (Leah), are
deceased.
Leah passed away in 1977 and her estate was probated
thereafter.
(Evelyn).2
Lawrence remarried in 1981 to Evelyn Kossoff
The couple remained together until Lawrence’s death
on February 20, 2004.
Through Lawrence’s will and revocable
living trust, Evelyn was to receive nearly all of his estate.
Also, Steven and Philip were each to receive the contents of
specific safe deposit boxes.
Lawrence’s will and revocable
living trust were prepared by Wilson while employed at Goldberg
& Simpson.
Philip disagreed with the distributions and filed a
complaint March 16, 2005, against Appellants alleging liability
for several reasons.
In essence, Philip claims that in 1982,
his father, Lawrence, orally agreed to leave him one-half of his
entire estate with the exception of his marital home.
This
agreement was made in exchange for Philip not pursuing legal
action related to alleged wrongdoings committed by Lawrence and
2
Lawrence’s widow, Evelyn K. Goodman, is not a party to either suit.
also the Executrix of Lawrence’s estate.
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She is
Steven during the settlement of Leah’s estate.
Philip argues
that Steven convinced their father not to honor the alleged oral
agreement.
Goldberg & Simpson and Wilson were named in relation
to the preparation of the estate planning documents at issue.
In an effort to shield themselves from potential
liability, Appellants filed a third-party complaint against
Julie on April 8, 2005.
Philip and Julie were married at the
time of the alleged oral agreement between Philip and Lawrence.
Coincidentally, Julie is an attorney.3
Appellants stated that
Julie provided legal advice to Philip about claims he could
assert against his father’s estate.
They also asserted that
Julie failed to advise Philip to get a written agreement to
leave property by will from his father and to file a timely
claim against his father’s estate.
Appellant claimed Julie’s
failures and negligence were the direct and proximate results of
Philip’s damages.
Shortly thereafter, Julie filed a motion to dismiss
the third-party complaint.
Following a hearing and briefing by
both sides, the circuit court dismissed the third-party
complaint against Julie on May 16, 2005.
It is this dismissal
order that Appellants appeal.
Julie filed her motion to dismiss under CR 12.02(f).
A dismissal pursuant to CR 12.02(f) for failure to state a claim
3
Julie has been licensed to practice law in the Commonwealth since 1980.
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is proper only if it appears the pleading party could not prove
any set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him
to relief.
Wood v. Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, Division of
American Home Products, 82 S.W.3d 849, 851 (Ky. 2002), (citing
Pari-Mutuel Clerks’ Union v. Ky. Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801,
803 (Ky. 1977)).
In determining whether a complaint should be
dismissed, the issue is a matter of law.
Grand Communities,
Ltd. v. Stepner, 170 S.W.3d 411, 417 (Ky.App. 2004), (citing
James v. Wilson, 95 S.W.3d 875, 884 (Ky.App. 2002)).
Thus, our
review is de novo.
We must presume that all the factual allegations in
the complaint are true and draw any reasonable inference in
favor of the non-movant.
Commonwealth, ex rel., Chandler v.
Anthem Insurance Companies, Inc., 8 S.W.3d 48, 51 (Ky.App.
1999).
The issue is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately
prevail, but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence
to support the claims.
Id.
Following a review of Appellants’ third-party
complaint, it is clear that all of their claims are based on
Julie’s status as an attorney.4
In essence, Appellants contend
4
The following paragraphs from Appellant’s 19 paragraph third-party
complaint are particularly supportive:
6. The Third-Party Plaintiffs allege, upon information and belief,
that the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, provided legal advice to the
Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman, concerning the estates of his mother and
father.
8. The Third-Party Plaintiffs state, upon information and belief, that
the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, as Plaintiff’s wife and in her
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that if Julie had given proper legal advice and performed the
appropriate legal acts, then Philip would have suffered no
damages.
capacity as giving legal advice to Plaintiff, was aware of Plaintiff’s claim
against the estate.
9. The Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs state, upon information and
belief, that the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, failed to advise the
Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman, that an agreement to leave property by will
must be in writing, and, therefore, if the allegations by Plaintiff, Philip
J. Goodman, concerning oral representations by Lawrence I. Goodman are true
(which the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs deny), then the Third-Party
Defendant, Julie Goodman, failed to advise the Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman,
that a written contract was required in order to enforce those alleged oral
representations or failed to procure such a written agreement.
13. As a direct and proximate result of the failure of the Third-Party
Defendant, Julie Goodman, to advise the Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman, of the
requirement for a written contract to will property or to procure such a
written agreement, the Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman, did not obtain an
enforceable contract from Lawrence I. Goodman, to leave said Plaintiff,
Philip J. Goodman, one-half of the estate of Lawrence I. Goodman, by will, if
the allegations concerning the oral representations of Lawrence I. Goodman in
the Complaint are true (which the Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs deny).
14. As a direct and proximate result of this failure on behalf of the
Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, the damages which Philip J. Goodman
claims as a consequence of his Complaint, if any, are the direct and
proximate result of the failure of the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman,
to advise the Plaintiff to obtain a written contract with respect to the
alleged oral representations or to procure such a written agreement.
15. Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs further allege that the Third
Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, has continued to advise Plaintiff, in
conjunction with other counsel, concerning Plaintiff’s claims against the
estate of Lawrence I. Goodman.
16. The Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs state, upon information and
belief, that the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, failed to advise the
Plaintiff, Philip J. Goodman, concerning timely filing of a claim against the
estate of Lawrence I. Goodman or failed to obtain a timely claim against the
estate of Lawrence I. Goodman.
17. The Third-Party Plaintiffs also allege, upon information and
belief, that Third-Party Defendant failed to advise Plaintiff concerning
statutes of limitation which could prevent even a valid claim from being
enforceable, against the estate of any other parties.
18. As a direct and proximate result of this failure and negligence by
the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, the damages which Plaintiff claims
as a consequence of his Complaint, if any, are the direct and proximate
result of the failure and negligence of the Third-Party Defendant, Julie
Goodman.
19. As a consequence of these failures and negligence on the part of
the Third-Party Defendant, Julie Goodman, the Defendants/Third-Party
Plaintiffs are entitled to indemnity and/or contribution for any and all
damages which Plaintiff may recover from the Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiffs.
(Emphasis added.)
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The relationship of attorney-client is a contractual
one, either expressed or implied by the conduct of the parties.
Daugherty v. Runner, 581 S.W.2d 12, 16 (Ky.App. 1979).
In other
words, the attorney-client relationship can arise not only by
contract, but also from the conduct of the parties.
Winchester, 941 S.W.2d 466, 468 (Ky. 1997).
Lovell v.
Courts have found
that the relationship is created as a result of the client’s
reasonable belief or expectation that the lawyer is undertaking
the representation.
Id.
is personal in nature.
Also, an attorney-client relationship
American Continental Insurance Co. v.
Weber & Rose, P.S.C., 997 S.W.2d 12, 13 (Ky.App. 1998), (citing
Automobile Club Insurance Co. v. Lainhart, 609 S.W.2d 692
(Ky.App. 1980)).
The personal nature permits a legal
malpractice action to accrue only to the attorney’s client.
Id.
at 14.
An attorney is not ordinarily liable to third persons
for his acts committed in representing a client.
157 S.W.2d 284, 285 (Ky. 1941).
Rose v. Davis,
It is only where his acts are
fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to third persons
that he is liable.
Id. at 284-285.
Similarly, an attorney may
be liable for damages caused by his negligence to a person
intended to be benefited by his performance irrespective of any
lack of privity.
Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 334 (Ky.App.
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1978), (citing Donald v. Garry, 97 Cal.Rptr. 191 (Cal.Ct.App.
1971)).
We must determine whether an attorney-client
relationship existed between Philip and Julie.
Philip is not
asserting that Julie was his attorney during any period of time
at issue.
Furthermore, Philip had counsel of record for issues
related to each of his parent’s estates.
Ray Larson represented
Philip in issues relating to the execution of Leah’s estate and
Jack Cunningham was Philip’s attorney in relation to the
execution of Lawrence’s estate according to the record.
However, before we make our determination there is another issue
that must be resolved.
We are presented with a unique situation in that it is
not an alleged client claiming an attorney-client relationship
was established, rather a third party is making this assertion.
As a result, we must determine whether a third party has
standing to establish the existence of such an attorney-client
relationship on someone else’s behalf.
We are unable to find
precedent to support such a situation in our Commonwealth.
We
believe allowing third parties to assert the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between two people is
inappropriate.
This is true particularly when both the
individuals in the alleged relationship deny the same.
The only
person who has standing to claim an attorney-client relationship
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existed is Philip and he has chosen not to do so at this time.
Therefore, we do not believe Julie and Philip established an
attorney-client relationship.
However, if we assume that Philip and Julie did form
an attorney-client relationship, third parties are only allowed
to sue an attorney retained by another if the attorney’s acts
are fraudulent or tortious and result in injury to the third
person or if the attorney’s negligence damaged the third person
intended to be benefited by the attorney’s performance.
Appellants made no claim that Julie’s acts with Philip were
either fraudulent or tortious.
They only assert that Julie was
negligent in performing her attorney duties for Philip.
An attorney is liable to a third person for her
negligence only if that person was intended to be benefited by
her performance.
Hill, supra, 561 S.W.2d at 334.
In other
words, the attorney must owe a duty to the third person.5
question of duty presents an issue of law.
The
Murphy v. Second
Street Corporation, 48 S.W.3d 571, 573-574 (Ky.App. 2001).
Again, our review shall be de novo.
Even when viewed in light most favorable to
Appellants, none of Julie’s acts for Philip were ever intended
5
In order to meet the burden of proof in a negligence action, one must
establish: (1) a duty on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of that
duty; and (3) consequent injury. Murphy v. Second Street Corporation, 48
S.W.3d 571, 573 (Ky.App. 2001), (citing Mullins v. Commonwealth Life
Insurance Co., 839 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Ky. 1992)).
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to benefit the Appellants in any way.
The only person intended
to benefit from Julie’s alleged acts would have been Philip.
With no duty owed to Appellants, we cannot find that Appellants
could have a valid claim against Julie even presuming she acted
as Philip’s attorney.
Thus, Appellants failed to state a claim
upon which judgment could be granted.
See CR 12.02(f).
While our reasoning differs somewhat from the circuit
court, the end result is the same.
Therefore, we affirm the
circuit court’s dismissal of Appellant’s third-party complaint
pursuant to CR 12.02(f).
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
J. Robert Lyons, Jr.
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, JULIE
GOODMAN:
Katherine K. Yunker
Lexington, Kentucky
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE, PHILLIP G.
GOODMAN:
Theodore E. Cowen
Lexington, Kentucky
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