CHARLES W. BIGGS v. SANDRA BERNICE BIGGS AND HON. MALENDA HAYNES
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RENDERED:
AUGUST 4, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-001244-MR
CHARLES W. BIGGS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CARTER FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KRISTI HOGG GOSSETT, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00097
SANDRA BERNICE BIGGS AND
HON. MALENDA HAYNES
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from a judgment in a
domestic case dividing the parties’ property and debt, and
awarding maintenance and attorney fees to appellee.
Upon review
of the record, we affirm the judgment in all respects except for
the award of the bedroom suite and bedding to Sandra.
1
We
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
reverse the family court’s award of the bedroom suite and
bedding and remand for such property to be awarded to Charles.
Charles and Sandra Biggs were married in April of 2000
and, at the time of the marriage, Charles was 54 years of age
and Sandra was 55.
Charles petitioned for dissolution of
marriage in 2004.
At the time of the divorce, Charles was
retired from AK Steel and was receiving $1,122 per month in
pension benefits.
He was also employed by his son at Tri State
Auto Mart earning $3,000 a month.
Additionally, Charles
receives $833 month for properties sold under land contract.
The family court found Charles’ gross monthly income to be
$4,950, and his monthly expenses to be $4,193.
At the time of the marriage, Sandra was working two
days a week at a hospital.
Due to work injuries, Sandra retired
from her job in September of 2000 and receives a total of $858
per month in social security disability benefits and retirement
income from her previous employer.
of income.
This is Sandra’s sole source
Since the date of the marriage, Sandra has also been
diagnosed to be suffering from dementia.
The court found
Sandra’s monthly expenses to be $1,345.
In the court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and judgment entered on February 9, 2005, the family court
awarded Sandra $14,082 for her interest in the marital residence
valued at $276,000 with a mortgage of $193,651.
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Sandra was also
awarded $25,000 for her interest in certain golf course property
valued at $100,000 with no mortgage.
As for personal property,
Sandra was awarded a 1995 Chrysler vehicle, a curio, the
parties’ bedroom suite and bed linens.
Charles was ordered to
pay $8,801 in credit card debt, $3,000 in attorney fees for
Sandra, and $350 a month in maintenance for a period of 3 years.
Charles thereafter filed a motion to alter or amend the
judgment.
On May 18, 2005, the court entered an order modifying
the February 9, 2005 judgment, reducing the amount of Sandra’s
interest in the marital residence to $11,004.
This appeal by
Charles followed.
At the outset we note that no appellee brief was filed
by Sandra in this case.
Accordingly, pursuant to CR
76.12(8)(c)(i), this Court must accept Charles’ statement of the
facts and issues as correct.
(Ky.App. 1986).
Whicker v. Whicker, 711 S.W.2d 857
However, where the appellant’s statement of
facts conflicts with the findings of fact by the trial court,
this Court may accept the appellant’s statement of facts only if
it adjudges the trial court’s findings to be clearly erroneous.
Id.
Charles’ first argument is that the family court erred
in awarding Sandra a marital interest in the golf course
property.
The property was purchased by Charles in 1996 along
with his then wife, Christine.
When Charles and Christine
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divorced, the property remained in both of their names.
After
Charles and Sandra were married, Charles purchased Christine’s
interest in the property for $56,000.
The title to the property
was then put in Charles’ and Sandra’s names.
After this
purchase, the bank required the golf course loan to be rolled
over into a mortgage on the marital residence.
The family court
valued the property at $100,000 (with no indebtedness since the
loan was rolled over into a loan on the marital residence) and
found that the one-half interest in the property purchased after
the marriage was marital since this one-half interest was
purchased with marital funds.
Accordingly, the court awarded
Sandra $25,000 for her interest in the property.
Charles argues that Sandra was not entitled to an
interest in the property because she did nothing to improve the
property or increase its value during their marriage.
argument is without merit.
This
Pursuant to KRS 403.190(3), all
property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before
a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital property
unless it was acquired by one of the methods in KRS 403.190(2).
Charles does not deny that marital funds were used to purchase
Christine’s one-half interest in the property after he and
Sandra were married.
Hence, Sandra has an interest in the
property by virtue of the fact that a one-half interest in the
property was purchased during the marriage with marital funds,
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not because of anything she did to increase the value of the
property pursuant to KRS 403.190(2)(e).
In the alternative, Charles argues that even if Sandra
had a marital interest in the property, it is inequitable for
Sandra to receive the full $25,000 for her interest because
Charles is essentially still paying the loan on the golf course
property since it was rolled over into the mortgage on the
marital residence.
We disagree.
In computing Sandra’s interest
in the marital residence, all the debt on that property
(including the amount rolled over from the golf course loan) was
subtracted to determine the amount of equity in the marital
residence.
Hence, this debt was considered in reducing her
interest in that property.
To allow Charles to subtract this
debt in determining the equity in both properties would amount
to double-dipping relative to the debt on Charles’ part.
Next, Charles argues that the court erred in allowing
Sandra to have the bedroom suite and the bedding.
Charles
maintains that Sandra admitted that this personalty was
purchased prior to the marriage, so he was entitled to retain
this property as his nonmarital property under KRS 403.190(2).
The court did not make a specific finding as to the marital or
nonmarital nature of this property.
The court merely stated,
“In light of the relative circumstances of the parties the court
finds that these items should be awarded to Respondent.”
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Sandra
testified that Charles would say that these items were purchased
before the marriage, but that she and Charles both picked out
the items.
A receipt in the record in Charles’ name shows that
he purchased the bedroom suite on January 23, 2000, several
months before the marriage.
Hence, under KRS 403.190(2), the
trial court erred in awarding Sandra this property.
Accordingly, we reverse the award of the bedroom suite and
bedding to Sandra and remand for said property to be awarded to
Charles.
Charles also argues that the court erred in assigning
him all of the $8,801 in credit card debt.
There is no
statutory presumption regarding the marital or nonmarital nature
of debt incurred during the marriage.
52 S.W.3d 513, 522 (Ky. 2001).
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger,
Debt incurred during the
marriage is to be assigned on the basis of such factors as
receipt of benefits and extent of participation, whether the
debt was incurred to purchase marital property, whether the debt
was necessary for support of the family, and the economic
circumstances of the parties and their respective abilities to
assume the indebtedness.
Id. at 523.
Charles alleges that Sandra made charges without
Charles’ knowledge and used the credit cards for inappropriate
uses such as paying bills for her children.
The trial court
specifically found that the evidence revealed that in 2002, the
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parties toured the United States in their RV and often used
credit cards to pay their gas, meals, and other expenses.
The
court then ruled that due to the disparity in the parties’
incomes, Charles should be solely responsible for all of the
credit card debt.
The court also added the credit card payment
to Charles’ monthly expenses, and subtracted the payment from
Sandra’s monthly expenses in determining the parties’ respective
reasonable monthly expenses in the case.
Since the trial
court’s findings of fact on this issue were supported by
substantial evidence, they are not clearly erroneous and are
binding on this Court.
1980).
Ghali v. Ghali, 596 S.W.2d 31 (Ky.App.
Thus, the family court did not err in assigning all of
the credit card debt to Charles.
The next issue before us is that of maintenance.
Charles contends that the family court erred in awarding Sandra
$350 a month for 3 years.
Specifically, Charles contends that
the trial court failed to consider his net income rather than
his gross income, failed to consider the full amount of his
claimed monthly expenses, and failed to consider his assigned
credit card debt.
In reviewing the award of maintenance, we see that the
court adopted its findings of fact regarding Charles’ expenses
from its earlier order on July 15, 2004, on temporary
maintenance.
The court rejected Charles’ claim of $4,943 in
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expenses, finding that his reasonable expenses should not
include groceries for his sister and his sister’s son and
daughter, and thus reduced his reasonable expenses to $3,993.
We cannot say that finding was clearly erroneous.
Contrary to
Charles’ assertion that the court did not consider Charles’
assigned credit card debt, we also see in the February 9, 2005
judgment that the court specifically added $200 a month to
Charles’ expenses for the assignment of the parties’ credit card
debt (bringing the total to $4,193), and subtracted that amount
from Sandra’s expenses.
As to the claim that the court only considered his
gross income and not his after-tax net income in awarding
maintenance, we agree that in looking at the parties’ financial
resources pursuant to KRS 403.200(2), the court should consider
the parties’ net income, not gross income.
107 S.W.3d 222, 226 (Ky. 2003).
Powell v. Powell,
While the court did initially
look at Charles’ gross income in its award of maintenance, the
court ultimately found that Charles would have “approximately
$757 net remaining at the end of the month,” although it is
unclear if the court considered Charles’ tax liabilities in
arriving at this figure.
In our view, even if the court erred
in not considering Charles’ after-tax income in awarding
maintenance, the error was harmless because the award of
maintenance was nonetheless proper given:
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the disparity of the
parties’ financial resources (KRS 403.200(2)(a) and (f)); the
standard of living established during the marriage (KRS
403.200(2)(c)); Sandra’s age (KRS 403.200(2)(e)); Sandra’s
failing mental health and inability to work (KRS 403.200(2)(e));
and the fact that Charles is still able to work (KRS
403.200(2)(f)).
At the time of the divorce, Sandra was 59 years
old, on disability and had been diagnosed with dementia.
As
found by the family court, the parties enjoyed a comfortable
standard of living during the marriage, living in a nice home
and taking frequent trips.
Even if Charles did not have the
full $757 in net income left at the end of the month, he is in a
much better financial position than Sandra, who has $858 in
monthly income and $1,345 in reasonable monthly expenses.
Awarding maintenance is a matter within the discretion of the
trial court.
1977).
Browning v. Browning, 551 S.W.2d 823 (Ky.App.
We cannot say that the family court abused its
discretion in its award of maintenance in this case.
Charles’ remaining argument is that the family court
erred in awarding Sandra $3,000 in attorney fees.
An allowance
of attorney fees is authorized under KRS 403.220 when there is
an imbalance in the financial resources of the parties.
v. Lampton, 721 S.W.2d 736 (Ky.App. 1986).
Lampton
The allocation of
attorney fees in a domestic case is entirely within the
discretion of the trial court.
Underwood v. Underwood, 836
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S.W.2d 439 (Ky.App. 1992), overruled on other grounds,
Neidlinger v. Neidlinger, 52 S.W.3d 513 (Ky. 2001).
Given the
aforementioned disparity in the parties’ incomes and financial
resources, we believe the court’s award of attorney fees was
justified.
For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the
Carter Circuit Court, Family Court Division is affirmed in part
and reversed in part, and the matter remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEES
Phillip Bruce Leslie
Greenup, Kentucky
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