D.C.O. v. J.A.O.
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 3, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
C ommonwealth O f K entucky
C ourt O f A ppeals
NO. 2005-CA-001238-ME
D.C.O.1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LESLIE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE GENE CLARK, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00095
v.
J.A.O.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND KNOPF, JUDGES.
KNOPF, JUDGE:
D.C.O. appeals from an order of the Leslie
Circuit Court which restricted J.A.O.’s visitation with his
children, but allowed him limited and supervised visitation.
D.C.O. contends that the trial court erred by excluding a
videotaped interview with the younger child, and by denying her
1
In the interest of the parties' privacy, and in accordance with
this Court's policy, the parents and children shall be referred
to only by their initials.
motion to terminate J.A.O.’s visitation entirely.
After
reviewing the record, we find no reversible error or manifest
abuse of discretion.
Hence, we affirm.
D.C.O. and J.A.O. were married in 1996 and separated
in April 2004.
Two children were born of the marriage, A.B.O.
(born December 1, 1997) and S.J.O. (born April 14, 2001).
Following filing of the petition for dissolution of marriage,
the trial court granted the parties joint custody of the
children, with J.A.O. designated as the residential custodian.
During the pendency of the dissolution proceedings, D.C.O.
alleged that J.A.O. had physically and sexually abused the
children.
After conducting a hearing, the trial court found
insufficient evidence to warrant removal of the children from
J.A.O.’s home, but nonetheless concluded that it was in the best
interest of the children to designate D.C.O. as their custodian.
In its decree of dissolution entered on November 1, 2004, the
trial court awarded sole custody of the children to D.C.O., and
granted parenting-time to J.A.O. according to the schedule
adopted in the circuit.
On March 23, 2005, D.C.O. filed a motion to terminate
J.A.O.’s visitation with the children.
D.C.O. made new
allegations that the children had been physically and sexually
abused by J.A.O. and by J.A.O.’s mother and sister.
After
filing of that motion, the trial court entered an order allowing
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J.A.O. limited and supervised visitation pending further
proceedings.
A hearing was held on April 18, 2005, at which
D.C.O. presented testimony from case workers with the Cabinet
for Health and Family Services and the Kentucky River Community
Care Program.
Officers with the Kentucky State Police also
testified concerning their investigation of the allegations.
J.A.O., his mother and his sister each testified, denying that
they had abused the children in any way.
During the hearing, D.C.O. sought to introduce
videotapes of forensic interviews with the children which were
conducted by the case workers during the investigation.
After
reviewing the first five minutes of the interview with the
younger child, S.J.O. (who was then four-years old), the trial
court determined that the child was unable to adequately recount
and recall events and therefore was not qualified to testify.
However, the trial court found that the older child was
competent to testify and allowed her videotaped interview to be
introduced.
On May 19, 2005, the trial court entered its findings
of fact, conclusions of law and an order restricting J.A.O.’s
visitation.
The trial court found that the allegations of
physical and sexual abuse involving both children were
consistent and credible.
The court further found that the
conduct by J.A.O. and his family had seriously endangered the
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children.
Consequently, the court ordered that J.A.O.’s
visitation with the children be restricted to one two-hour visit
weekly, conducted under the direct supervision of the Cabinet
for Health and Family Services.
D.C.O. now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred
by excluding the videotaped interview of S.J.O., and by allowing
J.A.O. restricted visitation rather than terminating his
visitation with the children entirely.
J.A.O. has not filed a
responsive brief in this appeal.
Turning to the first issue, D.C.O. specifically
contends that the trial court should have reviewed the entire
videotape interview of S.J.O. prior to making a decision on her
competency to testify.
KRE 601(b) sets out the qualifications of competency
as a witness as follows:
Minimal qualifications.
A person is
disqualified to testify as a witness if the
trial court determines that he:
(1) Lacked the capacity to perceive
accurately the matters about which he
proposes to testify;
(2) Lacks the capacity to recollect
facts;
(3) Lacks the capacity to express
himself so as to be understood, either
directly or through an interpreter; or
(4) Lacks the capacity to understand
the obligation of a witness to tell the
truth.
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Pursuant to KRE 601, a witness is competent to
testify if she is able to perceive accurately that about which
she is to testify, can recall the facts, can express herself
intelligibly, and can understand the need to tell the truth.
The competency bar is low with a child's competency depending on
her level of development and upon the subject matter at hand.2
It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to
determine whether a witness is competent to testify.3
The trial
judge is in the unique position to observe witnesses and to
determine their competency.4
Generally, the qualification of child witnesses is
done in a testimonial context.
In this case, however, the
children’s videotaped interviews were not made under oath nor
were the children subject to cross-examination.
Nonetheless, no
objection was made to the introduction of the tapes on this
ground.5
Furthermore, the trial court and the parties apparently
consented to introduction of videotapes in lieu of their live
2
Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 525 (Ky. 2002);
Jarvis v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. 1998).
3
Bart v. Commonwealth, 951 S.W.2d 576, 579 (Ky. 1997).
4
Id. See also Kotas v. Commonwealth, 565 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Ky.
1978).
5
J.A.O. objected to introduction of the videotapes based on
authentication and hearsay grounds. The trial court overruled
these objections and J.A.O. did not appeal from these rulings.
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testimony.
Therefore, the witness-qualification rules were
applicable in this case.
Given the procedural posture of this case, we agree
with D.C.O. that it would have been better practice for the
trial court to have reviewed the entirety of S.J.O.’s videotaped
interview prior to making a ruling on the child’s competency to
testify.
However, we find that D.C.O. suffered no prejudice as
a result of the trial court’s failure to do so.
The trial court
specifically found that the allegations of abuse involving both
children were substantiated based upon all of the evidence
presented at the hearing.
Moreover, this issue goes to the central matter raised
in D.C.O.’s appeal: her contention that the trial court should
have terminated J.A.O.’s visitation entirely based upon the
abuse allegations and the children’s expressed fear of their
father.
Clearly, the evidence and the trial court’s findings
would have supported such a decision.
Nevertheless, matters
involving visitation rights are held to be peculiarly within the
discretion of the trial court, and a trial court's
determinations as to visitation will only be reversed if they
constitute a manifest abuse of discretion or were clearly
erroneous in light of the facts and circumstances of the case.6
6
Drury v. Drury, 32 S.W.3d 521, 525 (Ky.App. 2000).
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The allegations of abuse presented in this case are
serious and disturbing and the trial court found them to be
credible.
To protect the children, the trial court properly
restricted J.A.O.’s visitation.
However, given the history of
this case and the ambiguous nature of some of the allegations,
the court allowed J.A.O. very limited and supervised visitation
with the children.
The trial court also has continuing
jurisdiction to modify visitation as the facts and circumstances
warrant, and we have confidence in the trial court’s ability to
do so.7
Consequently, we find that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion by allowing J.A.O. limited and supervised
visitation with the children.
Accordingly, the May 19, 2005, order of the Leslie
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
No brief for appellee.
Alison C. Wells
Barret, Haynes, May, Carter &
Davidson, P.S.C.
Hazard, Kentucky
7
Indeed, after considering additional evidence, the trial court
entered an order holding all visitation in abeyance pending the
outcome of this appeal.
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