CHARLEY'S HEADQUARTERS, INC. v. AGNES WILLIAMS; HON. HOWARD E. FRASIER, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE; AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
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RENDERED:
FEBRUARY 10, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001150-WC
CHARLEY'S HEADQUARTERS, INC.
APPELLANT
PETITION FOR REVIEW OF A DECISION
OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD
ACTION NO. WC-03-67407
v.
AGNES WILLIAMS; HON. HOWARD E.
FRASIER, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE;
AND WORKERS' COMPENSATION BOARD
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JOHNSON, KNOPF, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Charley’s Headquarters, Inc. has petitioned for
review from the May 6, 2005, opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board which affirmed the Administrative Law Judge’s
award of benefits to Agnes Williams for a work-related
cumulative trauma injury.
Having concluded that the Board did
not overlook or misconstrue controlling case law, we affirm.
Williams is a 45-year-old licensed cosmetologist.
From 1983 until 2003, she was the sole owner of Charley’s
Headquarters, a beauty salon located in Harlan, Kentucky.
Williams, in her deposition filed on July 9, 2004, stated that
her job as a cosmetologist involved cutting, curling, foiling,
shampooing, blow drying and styling hair.
She further stated
that because of the repetitive use of both hands, involving
pushing, pulling, and flexing, that beginning in 2000 she began
to notice pain, numbness, and loss of grip strength in her hands
and wrists.1
During this time, Williams contacted her workers’
compensation carrier, which paid all bills related to medical
treatment from 1999-2001.
On June 14, 2001, Williams was examined by Dr. Farook
K. Ghory at Appalachian Regional Healthcare (ARH) in Harlan,
Kentucky.
hands.
Williams complained of pain and numbness in both
Dr. Ghory diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome,
scheduled EMG studies, and prescribed medication for pain.
On
September 4, 2001, and November 1, 2001, Williams saw Dr. Fazal
H. Ahmad, also of ARH, who reviewed the EMG studies and
determined that it was positive for carpal tunnel syndrome.
Dr.
Ahmad recommended surgery following additional abnormal EMG
studies, but Williams chose not to undergo the surgery.
On November 12, 2003, Dr. Moez R. Premji, Williams’s
treating physician, diagnosed Williams with carpal tunnel
1
Williams also alleged a work-related neck injury in her application for
workers’ compensation benefits. However, Williams’s alleged neck injury is
not an issue in this appeal.
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syndrome and informed her that the injury was work-related.
Based on Dr. Premji’s findings, Williams filed her Form 101,
Application for Resolution of Injury, on February 3, 2004.
In support of her claim, Williams filed the report of
Dr. Christa U. Muckenhausen, who performed an independent
medical evaluation on March 15, 2004.
Dr. Muckenhausen
performed a physical examination of Williams and reviewed
Williams’s medical records.
She diagnosed Williams with
“bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome secondary to repetitive minitrauma on the job as a beautician . . . .”
Dr. Muckenhausen
noted that Williams’s complaints related to her work.
She
assessed Williams with a 13% whole body impairment based on the
AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, and
recommended that she lift and carry a maximum of ten pounds
infrequently, lift and carry less than ten pounds frequently,
and perform limited pushing and pulling.
In a follow-up report
dated July 8, 2004, Dr. Muckenhausen confirmed that the
development of carpal tunnel syndrome did not require “forceful
flexion of the extremities” and that Williams’s carpal tunnel
was caused by her work as a cosmetologist.2
Charley’s Headquarters submitted the medical report of
Dr. Kenneth Graulich, who conducted an independent medical
2
Charley’s Headquarters objected to the filing of this supplemental report,
but not on any grounds related to causation of Williams’s carpal tunnel
syndrome. The objections were overruled by the ALJ.
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evaluation of Williams on May 12, 2004.
Dr. Graulich performed
a physical exam of Williams and reviewed Williams’s medical
records.
He diagnosed bilateral carpal tunnel syndrome and
assessed a 19% whole body impairment based on the AMA Guides.
However, Dr. Graulich stated that he did not believe Williams’s
injuries were caused by her work as a cosmetologist, because a
cosmetologist’s work was not “the most forceful and severely
repetitive type work.”
Charley’s Headquarters also submitted the medical
report of Dr. Richard Dubou.
Based on his review of Williams’s
medical records, Dr. Dubou noted that even after Williams
stopped working in 2003, her symptoms did not improve.
Dubou stated:
The vast amount of carpal tunnel diagnoses
are not caused by work or repetitive motion
but by other factors such as association
with obesity (Kasden) and “The Journal of
Hand Surgery”, cigarette smoking, diabetes,
thyroid and amaloid, etc. Where work is a
proximal factor it is fairly obvious and is
caused by repetitive work requiring flexion
of the wrist, industrial type vibratory
tools, impact hammers or air guns or
repetitive lifting requiring flexion and
extension of the wrist. . . . Likewise,
being a hairdresser is not truly a
repetitive action such as would be found in
a factory. There are breaks between
clipping and significantly longer breaks
than clients. More to the point, if the job
were the proximate cause of a carpal tunnel
pathology, the difference between the right
hand [and] the left hand would be marked
since very few right handed people can use
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Dr.
scissors with their left hand. In Ms.
Williams’ case, the findings are only
slightly worse on the right than the left.3
The issues presented to the ALJ included causation of
the carpal tunnel syndrome, the statute of limitations for the
carpal tunnel claim, and the extent of her disability.
After
reviewing the lay and medical evidence the ALJ determined that
“based on established precedent, a worker who sustains a gradual
injury is not barred from filing a claim as long as it is filed
within two years of the date a physician informs the worker the
injury is due to the work.”
On October 4, 2004, the ALJ entered
his opinion and award relying on Dr. Muckenhausen’s diagnosis
regarding causation and Dr. Graulich’s 19% impairment rating.
He awarded permanent partial disability benefits at the rate of
$202.68 for 425 weeks from November 14, 2003, with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum on all past and unpaid compensation.
Charley’s Headquarters filed a timely petition for
reconsideration wherein it claimed the ALJ erred by relying on
Dr. Graulich’s impairment rating since it was Dr. Graulich’s
opinion that Williams’s injury was not work-related.
It also
argued that Williams had not provided sufficient expert evidence
to prove causation.
Finally, Charley’s Headquarters argued that
“[s]ubmission of bills to a self-employed person’s own workers’
3
Dr. DuBou attributed Williams’s carpal tunnel to obesity, based on his
erroneous conclusion that she was 5’5” tall and weighed 165 pounds.
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compensation insurance carrier, triggers the two year statute of
limitations.”
On November 9, 2004, the ALJ entered an order denying
the petition, with a minor recalculation of the award of
benefits.
Charley’s Headquarters appealed to the Board, which
affirmed the ALJ on May 6, 2005.
This petition for review
followed.
When reviewing one of the Board’s decisions, this
Court will only reverse the Board’s decision when it has
overlooked or misconstrued controlling law or so flagrantly
erred in evaluating the evidence that it has caused gross
injustice.4
To properly review the Board’s decision, this Court
must ultimately review the ALJ’s underlying decision.
Where the
ALJ has found in favor of the employee, who had the burden of
proof, this Court must determine whether the ALJ’s findings were
supported by substantial evidence.5
The Supreme Court of
Kentucky has defined substantial evidence as “evidence of
substance and relevant consequence having the fitness to induce
conviction in the minds of reasonable [people]” [citation
omitted].6
4
In other words, substantial evidence is, “evidence
Western Baptist Hospital v. Kelly, 827 S.W.2d 685, 687-88 (Ky. 1992).
5
Special Fund v. Francis, 708 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Ky. 1986). See also Wolf
Creek Collieries v. Crum, 673 S.W.2d 735, 736 (Ky.App. 1984).
6
Smyzer v. B. F. Goodrich Chemical Co., 474 S.W.2d 367, 369 (Ky. 1971).
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which would permit a fact-finder to reasonably find as it did.”7
And, as the fact-finder, the ALJ, not this Court and not the
Board, has sole discretion to determine the quality, character,
and substance of the evidence.8
Not only does the ALJ weigh the
evidence, but the ALJ may also choose to believe or disbelieve
any part of the evidence, regardless of its source.9
Williams’s testimony was that she had been
experiencing pain and numbness in her hands and wrists as early
as 1999, and that the problem continued to worsen.
She further
conceded that she thought the problem was work-related from the
outset, and she requested and was paid workers’ compensation
benefits from 1999 to 2001.
Williams described in detail the
physical demands of her work to which she attributed her hand
and wrist pain.
There is evidence that Williams sought
treatment beginning in 1999; however, it was not until November
2003 that she was informed by her treating physician that the
condition was work-related.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky and the Kentucky Court
of Appeals have long recognized the complexity in resolving the
beginning date for the clocking of the statute of limitations
7
Special Fund, 708 S.W.2d at 643.
8
Whittaker v. Rowland, 998 S.W.2d 479, 481 (Ky. 1999) (citing Paramount
Foods, Inc. v. Burkhardt, 695 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Ky. 1985)). See also Snawder
v. Stice, 576 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Ky.App. 1979).
9
Whittaker, supra (citing Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560 S.W.2d
15, 16 (Ky. 1977)).
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for cumulative trauma claims.
Prior to 1999, it was held that
limitations began to run on a cumulative trauma claim when the
disabling reality of the work injury became manifest.10
This
longstanding “manifestation of disability” standard was
clarified in the notable Supreme Court case of Alcan Foil
Products v. Huff.11
In Alcan Foil, the Supreme Court held that
the onset of “occupational disability” no longer has any bearing
on determining the date from which the period of limitations
begins to run or in determining an injured worker’s obligation
to give notice.
In making this determination, the Court
expressly stated as follows:
In Pendland, the worker became aware of
her injury when she experienced disabling
symptoms of pain; thus, the manifestation of
physical and occupational disability
occurred at the same time. The question
remains, therefore, whether the phrase
“manifestation of disability” refers to the
physical disability or symptoms which cause
a worker to discover that an injury has been
sustained or whether it refers to the
occupational disability due to the injury.
We conclude that it refers to the worker’s
discovery that an injury had been sustained.
We arrive at this conclusion for several
reasons: 1.) the court’s explicit statement
that the period of limitations runs from the
date of “injury;” 2.) the fact that the
definition of “injury” contained in KRS
342.0011(1) refers to any work-related
harmful change in the human organism, and
10
Randall Co./Randall Division of Textron, Inc. v. Pendland, 770 S.W.2d 687
(Ky.App. 1989).
11
2 S.W.3d 96 (Ky. 1999).
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does not consider whether the change is
occupationally disabling; and 3.) the
entitlement to workers’ compensation
benefits begins when a work-related injury
is sustained regardless of whether the
injury is occupationally disabling.12
Since Alcan, the law has been that where a worker
discovers that a physically disabling injury has been sustained,
becomes aware that the injury is caused by work, and fails to
file a claim within two years of that date, his claim will be
barred by the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court
reaffirmed its position in Special Fund v. Clark,13 holding that
the two-year statute of limitations established in KRS 342.185
begins to run in claims involving work-related cumulative trauma
when the worker discovers (1) the fact that an injury has
occurred, and (2) the fact that it was caused by work.
Additionally, we must consider the Supreme Court’s
holding in Hill v. Sextet Mining Corp.,14 which was rendered
following Alcan Foil.
In Hill, the Court assigned special
importance to the date on which a claimant first acquires
knowledge that a work-related cumulative trauma injury is
permanent.
Hill involved a cumulative trauma claim where the
injured worker held a personal belief for several years that a
cervical condition that had gradually developed over time was in
12
Alcan Foil, 2 S.W.3d at 101.
13
998 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1999).
14
65 S.W.3d 503 (Ky. 2001).
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fact work-related.
With regard to notice and limitations, the
Supreme Court stated as follows:
Implicit in the finding of a gradual
injury was a finding that no one instance of
workplace trauma, including those
specifically alleged and those of which the
employer was notified, caused an injury of
appreciable proportion. Instead, the ALJ
concluded that the harmful change that gave
rise to the claimant’s permanent disability
occurred gradually and resulted, at least to
a significant extent, from the effect of
work-related wear and tear during the course
of his coal mine employment. Medical
causation is a matter for the medical
experts and, therefore, the claimant cannot
be expected to have self-diagnosed the cause
of the harmful change to his cervical spine
as being a gradual injury versus a specific
traumatic event. He was not required to
give notice that he had sustained a workrelated gradual injury to his spine until
his was informed of that fact [citations
omitted].
It is clear that the claimant was aware
of symptoms in his cervical spine and
associated the periodic flare-up of symptoms
with his work long before being evaluated .
. . and he also sought medical treatment
after some specific incidents of cervical
trauma. Furthermore, it is clear that the
physicians who treated the claimant’s
symptoms over the years had encouraged him
that the work was too stressful.
Nonetheless, there is no indication that any
of them ever informed him of his workrelated gradual injury, i.e., that his work
was gradually causing harmful changes to his
spine that were permanent. Under those
circumstances, we are not persuaded that the
claimant was required to self-diagnose the
cause of the cervical pain that contributed
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to his inability to work after February 11,
1998, as being such an injury.15
Therefore, although Williams reported to her workers’
compensation carrier that she was experiencing pain in her hands
and wrists, there was no medical evidence of bilateral carpal
tunnel syndrome or any other work-related wrist or hand injury
at that time.
Williams was not diagnosed with carpal tunnel
syndrome and informed that the condition was caused by her work
until Dr. Premji did so in November 2003.
Therefore, there was
substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s finding that the
period of limitations began to run in November 2003, and the ALJ
was not in error in determining that the claim was timely.
Because we conclude that the Board’s well-written
opinion by Chairman Gardner correctly addresses Charley’s
Headquarters’s final arguments, we quote the pertinent parts of
its opinion and adopt it as our own:
The sum and substance of Charley’s
Headquarters arguments relates to its
challenge of the ALJ’s assessment of the
cause of Williams’ carpal tunnel syndrome.
Charley’s Headquarters is apparently
distraught that an ALJ is free to choose the
impairment rating of one physician while
rejecting the causation opinion from that
same physician, and asserts this “cherry
picking” of evidence should not be
tolerated. The crux of Charley’s
Headquarters’ argument is an attack on the
well-settled principle that an ALJ may
choose to believe part of the evidence and
15
Hill, 65 S.W.3d at 507.
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disbelieve other portions of the evidence,
whether the evidence came from the same
witness or the same party’s total proof.
Caudill v. Maloney’s Discount Stores, 560
S.W.2d 15 (Ky. 1977); Brockway v. Rockwell
International, 907 S.W.2d 166 (Ky.App.
1995).
As counsel for Charley’s Headquarters
is well aware, he made this same argument
before the Kentucky Court of Appeals in
Fairbanks Coal Co. v. Collins, 2003 WL
1227207 (Ky. App.) (rendered January 10,
2003 and designated not to be published).
In Collins as here, the ALJ chose to rely on
causation from one physician and the
impairment rating from another physician.
The court stated:
Fairbanks also is of the
opinion this Court should no
longer allow ALJ’s to ‘cherry
pick’ from the evidence.
Presumably Fairbanks is discussing
the concept that it is within the
authority of an ALJ/fact-finder to
pick and choose from the evidence,
including believing a part of a
witness’s testimony while
disregarding other parts.
Unfortunately for Fairbanks, this
principle is firmly established by
the court.16 As it related to the
issue of causation on the
psychological disorder, the ALJ
relied upon Drs. Breeding,
Muckenhausen and Jain, and, while
in assessing impairment, relied
upon the impairment rating
assessed by Dr. Shraberg. That
was her right in accordance with
Republic Steel Corp. v. Justice
and Magic Coal Co. v. Fox.
Whether we would have reached the
same conclusion is irrelevant.
16
“See Republic Steel Corp. v. Justice, Ky. 464 S.W.2d 267 (1971), and Magic
Coal Co. v. Fox, Ky., 19 S.W.3d 88 (2000).”
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However, the concept of picking
portions of the evidence is not a
fallacious as Fairbanks would want
us to believe. The determination
of causation involves a multitude
of factors, even in the realm of
medical causation. On the other
hand, the assessment of an
impairment rating, as was done by
Dr. Shraberg, is merely a function
of a medical provider analyzing
the AMA Guides. Therefore, it was
not, in our opinion, totally
unreasonable for the ALJ to rely
upon the causation testimony of
Drs. Breeding, Muckenhausen and
Jain, while at the same time
relying upon the impairment rating
assessed by Dr. Shraberg.
Here, we are satisfied Dr. Muckenhausen’s
opinion addressing causation constituted
substantial evidence and the ALJ was free to
rely on that portion of her opinion.
We also reject Charley’s Headquarters’
argument that the ALJ impermissibly shifted
the burden of proof. As can be seen from
the ALJ’s analysis, he did nothing more than
rely on medical evidence submitted by
Williams to resolve the contested issue of
work-relatedness and causation. The burden
of proof was not shifted to Charley’s
Headquarters and its argument to the
contrary is strained at best.
We further believe Charley’s
Headquarters’ argument that the ALJ went
outside the record to conclude Dr. DuBou’s
measurements of Williams’ height and weight
were incorrect is without merit. It was Dr.
DuBou’s opinion that Williams’ carpal tunnel
syndrome was not work-related and was due in
part to her obesity. He recorded Williams’
height at 5’5” and her weight at 165 pounds.
The ALJ correctly noted, on reconsideration,
that there was contrary evidence from Dr.
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Ghory contained in the record. Dr. Ghory
recorded Williams was 5’9” and weighed 149
pounds.17 Furthermore, Williams, at the
final hearing, testified she was “almost 510” and weighed “146.” The ALJ’s
observation that Williams was taller than
him was not error.
In support of its argument, Charley’s
Headquarters cites Newberg v. Price, 868
S.W.2d 841 (Ky. 1993), for the proposition
that an ALJ is not authorized to substitute
one physician’s height measurement for that
reported by another. Newberg v. Price,
supra, is inapposite. That case involved a
claim for coal workers’ pneumoconiosis
benefits and the level of benefits that are
authorized based on spirometeric testing.
Those tests require accurate height
measurements in order to accurately measure
a claimant’s pulmonary function. Here, we
are satisfied that a claimant’s own
testimony as to her height and weight
constitutes competent evidence, especially
in light of the fact that she was not crossexamined on this point. Further, her
testimony was confirmed by Dr. Ghory’s June
14, 2001 physical examination. We would
also point out Dr. DuBou did not physically
examine Williams, but only performed a
records review. We are unable to discern
the source of Dr. DuBou’s information
regarding Williams’ height and weight.
Finally, the Board is not inclined to
disregard nearly 90 years of Kentucky
jurisprudence and we summarily reject
Charley’s Headquarters’ invitation to hold
that the preponderance of evidence standard
should apply to workers’ compensation
claims.
For the foregoing reasons, the opinion of the Workers’
Compensation Board is affirmed.
17
This Court would also point out that both Dr. Muckenhausen and Dr. Graulich
examined Williams and noted her height as 5’9” and her weight at 146 pounds.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
W. Barry Lewis
Hazard, Kentucky
Sherry Brashear
Harlan, Kentucky
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