THOMAS LEO ABELL; ALICE FAYE ABELL v. ROXIE REYNOLDS
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RENDERED:
MARCH 31, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001144-MR
THOMAS LEO ABELL;
ALICE FAYE ABELL
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MARION CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE ALLAN RAY BERTRAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00082
ROXIE REYNOLDS
APPELLEE
OPINION
VACATING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Thomas Leo Abell and Alice Faye Abell
appeal from an order of the Marion Circuit Court granting
summary judgment to appellee Roxie Reynolds in a lawsuit
concerning a boundary line fence.
The Abells contend that
because their claim against Reynolds arises from the Kentucky
Boundary Line Fence Act (Fence Act), the circuit court did not
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute 21.580.
have jurisdiction over the cause of action, and that, in any
event, summary judgment was improper.
Because the circuit court
did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Abells’ Fence
Act claim, we vacate the order granting summary judgment, and
remand.
The Abells and Reynolds own adjoining property in
Marion County.
The Abell property is a farm and is used for
agricultural purposes, including the raising of livestock.
The
Abells owned their farm prior to the time Reynolds purchased the
adjoining property and constructed a residence.
Further, a
fence existed along the property line prior to the time Reynolds
purchased the adjoining property.
The Abells replaced a portion of the fence in
approximately 1990.
Prior to doing so, the Abells asked
Reynolds if she would be willing to pay half of the cost of the
fence, and she agreed.
The replacement of that fence and the
contribution by Reynolds were uneventful.
At some point in 2003, the Abells advised Reynolds of
their intention to again replace portions of the fence.
Reynolds indicated that this was agreeable to her; however, she
refused to contribute toward the cost of the replacement.
Reynolds took the position that she was not obligated to
contribute toward the replacement.
The Abells nevertheless
proceeded with the fence replacement.
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After completion of the fence replacement, by letter
dated December 9, 2003, via counsel, the Abells requested that
Reynolds pay them $565.00, one-half of the cost of the
replacement.
The letter suggested legal action if Reynolds
refused to make the demanded payment.
Reynolds, however,
persisted in refusing to contribute toward the cost of the
replacement.
On December 23, 2003, the Abells filed a Complaint in
Marion District Court, naming Roxie Reynolds as the defendant in
the action.
The complaint sought a contribution of one-half of
the cost of the earlier fence replacement.
The complaint
alleged that Reynolds was obligated for one-half of the cost of
replacement “pursuant to the Kentucky Boundary Line Fence Act,
by agreement and/or other applicable Kentucky law to pay 1/2 of
the cost of removing the old fence and constructing the new
one.”
(Emphasis added).
On February 5, 2004, Reynolds filed her Answer and
Counterclaim.
The answer denied any obligation to reimburse the
Abells for a portion of the cost of the fence replacement.
Reynolds’ counterclaim alleged causes of action based upon
trespass, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and
malicious prosecution.
Alleging that the Abells had acted with
oppression, fraud, or malice, the counterclaim also sought
punitive damages.
The counterclaim alleged damages in excess of
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$4,000.00.
Because the damages sought exceeded the
jurisdictional limits of the district court, Kentucky Revised
Statutes (KRS) 24A.120, the counterclaim also sought removal of
the action to Marion Circuit Court.
In their answer to
Reynolds’ counterclaim, the Abells objected to removal of “the
entire case” to circuit court.
On March 8, 2004, the district court entered an order
removing the case to Marion Circuit Court.
Following the taking of depositions, on September 8,
2004, Reynolds filed a motion for summary judgment on the
Abells’ claims against her.
On October 26, 2004, the circuit
court entered an order granting summary judgment.
The circuit
court determined that the Abells had not complied with the
provisions of the Fence Act prior to the replacement of the old
fence, and thus had no sustainable cause of action to seek
reimbursement under the Act.
While this may be a correct
ruling, we are of the opinion the circuit court lacked
jurisdiction to so hold.
We address the matter of circuit court jurisdiction,
which we think is dispositive of this appeal.
The Kentucky Boundary Line Fence Act consists of two
substantive statutes, KRS 256.030 and KRS 256.042.
KRS 256.045.
KRS 256.042 provides that “[t]he District Court shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions arising under this
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section or KRS 256.030.”
(Emphasis added).
Hence, jurisdiction
over claims arising under the Fence Act are vested exclusively
in the district court.
The legislature, pursuant to the constitution, has
express power to determine the original jurisdiction of circuit
and district courts.
KRS 23A.010.
Ky. Const. §§ 112(5) and 113(6).
See also
When the legislature does not specifically assign
jurisdiction of a particular matter to the district court,
jurisdiction rests in the circuit court.
72 S.W.3d 566, 577 (Ky. 2002).
Hyatt v. Commonwealth,
However, “[w]hen jurisdiction
over any matter is granted to District Court by statute, such
jurisdiction shall be deemed to be exclusive unless the statute
specifically states that the jurisdiction shall be concurrent.”
(Emphasis added).
KRS 24A.020.
As there is no provision in the Fence Act for
concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, the Marion
Circuit Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the
Abells’ Fence Act claim.
This would be so even if the Abells
sought damages in excess of the district court’s jurisdictional
limit of $4,000.00 as set by KRS 24A.120.
See, e.g., Privett v.
Clendenin, 52 S.W.3d 530 (Ky. 2001) (District courts have
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims brought under
the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, even involving sums
exceeding the district court's jurisdictional limitation) and
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Kampschaefer v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kampschaefer, 746 S.W.2d
567, 568 (Ky.App. 1988) (District courts may assert jurisdiction
over Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act action
regardless of the amount of arrearages).
Because Marion Circuit Court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction over the Abells’ Fence Act claim, its
October 26, 2004, order granting summary judgment in favor of
Roxie Reynolds must be vacated.
The Abells also contend they have common law theories
for recovery which were not addressed in the circuit court’s
October 26, 2004, order granting summary judgment.
The order,
in fact, does only refer to the Abells’ Fence Act claim.
While
the Abells contend that they pleaded common law theories for
recovery, neither their complaint nor their brief identifies
those theories with specificity.
We accordingly are unable to
undertake a meaningful review of those issues.
Moreover, we
have grave doubts as to the merit of any common law claims.
In
any event, issues concerning common law theories, if any, may be
addressed in district court upon remand.
Further, while in the
normal course of events a counterclaim which exceeds the
jurisdictional amount of district court would necessitate the
removal of the entire case (claim and counterclaim) to circuit
court, see Ky. R. Civ. P. 3.03(2)(b) and Miles v. Shauntee, 664
S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1983), because the Abells’ Fence Act claim
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is anchored in district court, we are persuaded that Reynolds’
counterclaim, in addition to the Abells’ common law claims, if
any, should be addressed alongside the Abells’ Fence Act claim
in district court.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Marion
Circuit Court is vacated, and the matter is remanded for
additional proceedings consistent with this opinion.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Scott Abell
Kirk Hoskins
Louisville, Kentucky
Robert Spragens, Jr.
Lebanon, Kentucky
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