JEFFREY CASTILE v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED: JUNE 9, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001081-MR
JEFFREY CASTILE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE CRAIG Z. CLYMER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00198
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
DYCHE AND GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM, SENIOR JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
Jeffrey Castile has appealed from the
McCracken Circuit Court’s May 18, 2005, Final Judgment and order
denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to Third Degree
Sexual Abuse.
We affirm.
On June 11, 2003, the McCracken County grand jury
indicted Castile on one count of First Degree Sexual Abuse,2 a
Class D Felony, for subjecting a child under the age of 12 to
1
Senior Judge David C. Buckingham, sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
2
KRS 510.110.
sexual contact during the winter and spring of 2003.
The victim
was A.L., the three-year-old daughter of H.L., whom Castile had
married in May 2003.
Jeff and H.L. separated in June and were
eventually divorced in early 2004.3
For the majority of the
case, Castile was represented by private counsel, Emily Ward
Roark, and by Florida attorney Charles D. Jamieson, who
apparently specializes in sexual abuse cases.4
The case was
assigned to Judge Craig Z. Clymer.
Following extensive litigation, Castile and the
Commonwealth reached an agreement in August 2004 that he would
plead guilty to an amended count of sexual misconduct, with a
recommended sentence of sixty days and no contact with the
victim.
Judge R. Jeffery Hines signed the judgment accepting
the guilty plea on August 27, in place of the absent Judge
Clymer.
On September 3, Judge Clymer entered an order rejecting
the plea agreement, indicating that the court would only accept
a plea that included the requirements that Castile complete a
two-year sex offender program and register as a sex offender.
3
This Court shall take judicial notice of the record in Quertermous v.
Loveless, Livingston Circuit Court No. 04-CI-00016, addressing the custody of
A.L. The Livingston Circuit Court’s order awarding sole custody of A.L. to
her natural father is currently under submission before this panel (appeal
No. 2005-CA-001276-ME). That appeal has been placed in abeyance pending
resolution of this criminal appeal, as the two cases appear to be
inextricably entwined.
4
Attorney Jamieson also represented H.L. in the custody case.
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Castile opted not to enter into a plea, and a new trial date was
set for March 16, 2005.
The morning before trial, the circuit court conducted
an extensive hearing on several pending motions in limine.
After receiving an unfavorable ruling regarding the testimony of
a defense expert, Castile’s counsel recommended that plea
negotiations should resume.
Following a lunch break, attorney
Roark discussed the matter with Castile and with the Assistant
Commonwealth’s Attorney, and Castile then requested input from
attorney Jamieson, who at that time was obtaining avowal
testimony from the defense expert witness.
Shortly before 4:00
that afternoon, an agreement was reached, and Castile moved to
enter a guilty plea to an amended charge of Third Degree Sexual
Abuse, with a recommended sentence of thirty days in jail, to be
served on weekends, that he have no contact with the victim, and
that he must register as a sex offender.
The circuit court
conducted a Boykin5 colloquy, during which Castile admitted to
having committed the offense, and the plea was accepted.
An
Order and Judgment memorializing the guilty plea was entered
March 16, 2005, which scheduled a sentencing hearing for May.
On April 13, 2005, the Livingston Circuit Court
entered its ruling in the custody case, having reserved its
ruling until Castile’s criminal case had been decided.
5
The
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
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court found that a change in circumstances had taken place, in
that H.L. had married and continued to have a relationship with
Castile, who had sexually abused A.L.
The court then awarded
sole custody to A.L.’s natural father, and H.L. was only granted
supervised visitation.
Back in the criminal case, attorney Roark moved to
withdraw as counsel on May 12, 2005, the day before the
sentencing hearing, which was granted the following day when
attorney Lisa DeRenard entered an appearance.
Through new
counsel, Castile moved the circuit court to withdraw his guilty
plea and set aside the order and judgment.
He argued that the
plea was entered based upon his former attorney’s representation
that he would have to register as a sex offender for five years
rather than ten, and that he had less than ten minutes to
discuss and accept the plea agreement.
that his plea was involuntary.
Accordingly, he asserted
He requested a hearing on the
motion, which was held that day.
During the hearing, Castile introduced testimony from
his former counsel.
Attorney Roark testified that the
settlement discussions lasted several hours, beginning shortly
after lunch and culminating with the entry of the plea around
4:00.
While she testified that she never told Castile that he
had ten minutes to make a decision, she stated that she might
have told him that the judge needed to go home and that he
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needed to decide that afternoon as the trial was scheduled for
the next morning.
However, the offer was discussed for more
than ten minutes.
Regarding the period of time he would have to
register as a sex offender, attorney Roark testified that she
mistakenly told Castile that he would only have to register for
five years.
However, she produced a letter from her to Castile
dated September 2, 2004, in which she addressed the registration
requirement, informing him that he would “merely have to give
your address and phone number of where you are living for the
next ten years to the State Police and will be in their sexual
offender database during that period.”
(Emphasis added.)
On
the evening of March 15th, she determined that the period of
registration was ten years, and contacted Castile by cell phone
the next day.
Castile indicated that he already knew that he
had to register for ten years.
She mailed a letter to Castile
on March 21st discussing the registration period in Kentucky and
whether he would have to register in Tennessee, where he was a
resident.
Castile testified next.
He stated that he did not
remember the contents of the September 2004 letter, with
everything going on during the plea discussions, and he
clarified that he was given ten minutes to make a decision
toward the end of the negotiations.
He testified that he would
not have taken the plea if he had known he would have to
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register for ten years in Kentucky.
On cross-examination, he
admitted that H.L. stayed with him every so often at his
residence in Tennessee until the custody hearing neared, when
they were told they should not be seen together.
H.L. moved in with her grandmother.
At that point,
He also agreed that he was
an intelligent person, and did not have any mental deficiencies.
The Commonwealth also presented the circuit court with a copy of
the recently entered order from the custody case awarding sole
custody of A.L. to her natural father.
At the conclusion of the testimony, the circuit court
allowed the parties to argue their respective sides through
counsel.
Castile stated that he had been given erroneous
information by his attorney and felt pressured by time
limitations to decide whether to accept the plea agreement.
The
Commonwealth, on the other hand, maintained that the only reason
Castile was attempting to withdraw his guilty plea was due to
the adverse custody ruling, in which H.L. lost custody of her
daughter.
Regarding the named reasons, the Commonwealth pointed
out that Castile failed to establish that he had been pressured
to do anything, but merely testified that his time had been
limited, and that Castile knew that he had to register as a sex
offender for ten years at the time he entered the plea based
upon his attorney’s letter and telephone conversation shortly
after the plea was entered.
Furthermore, it took two months for
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Castile raise any concerns over the length of the sex offender
registration period.
The circuit court made several findings on the record
before denying Castile’s motion.
Specifically, the circuit
court found that any uncertainty as to the period of
registration would not render an otherwise knowing, intelligent,
and voluntary plea invalid, and that the real reason behind the
motion was the loss of custody by H.L.
The circuit court went
on to sentence Castile pursuant to the Commonwealth’s
recommendation and the final judgment and sentence, along with
the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, was
entered May 18, 2005.
This appeal followed.
Castile raises two issues on appeal, namely, whether
the trial court erred in denying his motion to withdraw the
guilty plea and whether the custody ruling was relevant in
determining whether his guilty plea was valid.
The Commonwealth
responds to each of these arguments in its brief, asserting that
the circuit court did not commit any error or abuse its
discretion.
Our standard of review in the matter is two-fold.
First, we must determine whether the circuit court’s
determination that Castile’s plea was voluntary is supported by
the record under a clearly erroneous standard.
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In Lynch v.
Commonwealth,6 this Court held that it “is not to act de novo in
determining the question of voluntariness.
Rather it is to
review the record before it to ascertain whether the court below
acted erroneously in denying that appellant’s pleas were made
involuntarily.”
More recently, the Supreme Court of Kentucky in
Rodriguez v. Commonwealth stated, “[o]ur case law is clear that
the discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea exists
only after a determination has been made that the plea was
voluntary.
If the plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw
must be granted.”7
Second, if the plea was voluntary, we must
determine whether the circuit court abused its discretion in
denying Castile’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea.8
We shall first address Castile’s second argument
regarding the circuit court’s review of the custody order
concerning H.L.’s daughter.
Castile argues that the order was
not relevant under KRE 401 to the determination as to whether
his attorney provided him with incorrect information or whether
his plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
The
Commonwealth contends that the information in the custody order
was in fact relevant, as it went to Castile’s and H.L.’s
6
610 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Ky.App. 1980).
7
87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002).
8
Anderson v. Commonwealth, 507 S.W.2d 187, 188 (Ky. 1974); Hurt v.
Commonwealth, 333 S.W.2d 951, 953 (Ky. 1960).
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credibility as well as to his motive for wanting to withdraw his
plea.
KRE 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence
having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or
less probable than it would be without the evidence.”
We agree
with the Commonwealth that the custody order was relevant, in
particular to the motive behind the motion to withdraw the
guilty plea.
The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in
considering the custody order.
We shall next address the heart of this case, which is
whether the circuit court properly denied Castile’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
He claims that his plea was invalid
based upon a totality of the circumstances, including that his
attorney provided incorrect information about the reporting
requirement and that he was only given a brief time to decide
whether to enter a plea.
The Commonwealth counters with the
argument that Castile had been thoroughly apprised of his rights
and that he did not satisfy the high burden of proving that his
plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently or voluntarily.
RCr 8.08 provides that “[a] defendant may plead not
guilty, guilty or guilty but mentally ill.
The court may refuse
to accept a plea of guilty or guilty but mentally ill, and shall
not accept the plea without first determining that the plea is
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made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge.”
Pursuant to RCr 8.10, “[a]t any time before judgment
the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but mentally
ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.”
In Bronk v. Commonwealth,9 the Supreme Court of
Kentucky addressed the validity of a guilty plea:
A guilty plea is valid only when it is
entered intelligently and voluntarily.[]
Thus, RCr 8.08 requires a trial court, at
the time of the guilty plea, to determine
“that the plea is made voluntarily with
understanding of the nature of the charge,”
[] to fulfill “the dual purpose of having a
judicial determination that the guilty plea
is made voluntarily and understandably and
providing an appropriate court record
demonstrating those important facts.”[]
Under RCr 8.10, trial courts have discretion
to permit a defendant to withdraw his or her
guilty plea before final judgment and
proceed to trial.[] In cases where the
defendant disputes his or her voluntariness,
a proper exercise of this discretion
requires trial courts to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding
the guilty plea[] and juxtapose the
presumption of voluntariness inherent in a
proper plea colloquy with a Strickland v.
Washington[, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984),] inquiry into the
performance of counsel:
A showing that counsel’s assistance was
ineffective in enabling a defendant to
intelligently weigh his legal
alternatives in deciding to plead
guilty has two components: (1) that
counsel made errors so serious that
counsel’s performance fell outside the
9
58 S.W.3d 482, 486-87 (Ky. 2001).
(Footnotes omitted.)
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wide range of professionally competent
assistance; and (2) that the deficient
performance so seriously affected the
outcome of the plea process that, but
for the errors of counsel, there is a
reasonable probability that the
defendant would not have pleaded
guilty, but would have insisted on
going to trial.[]
Regarding the totality of the circumstances surrounding the
plea, a trial court must consider “the accused’s demeanor,
background and experience, and whether the record reveals that
the plea was voluntarily made. . . .
The trial court is in the
best position to determine if there was any reluctance,
misunderstanding, involuntariness, or incompetence to plead
guilty.”10
In the present case, there is an abundance of evidence
to support the circuit court’s finding that Castile’s plea was a
valid one.
He is an intelligent person who understood the
charge against him and the ramifications of entering the plea,
and his expressed reasons supporting his claim of
involuntariness were called into question by his own former
attorney.
Regardless of what his attorney told him at the time
of the plea regarding the registration period, Castile had
previously received the correct information and indicated to his
attorney that he knew that the registration period was for ten
years in Kentucky.
10
Furthermore, he never testified that he felt
Centers v. Commonwealth, 799 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Ky.App. 1990).
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any pressure to make his decision, and the record shows that he
had several hours to make his decision.
Therefore, the circuit
court did not commit any error in finding that Castile’s plea
was entered voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly.
We also agree with the Commonwealth that the circuit
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Castile’s motion,
once it determined that the plea was valid.
It was appropriate
for the circuit court to consider that the actual motive behind
the motion was H.L.’s loss of custody of her daughter, and was
in essence an attempt to reopen this case to allow her to regain
custody.
Based upon the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the plea, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the
circuit court’s ruling.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Lisa A. DeRenard
Benton, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Tami Allen Stetler
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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