COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY v. ABDAL-AZEEZ JALAL HAKIM
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RENDERED: JUNE 30, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001064-MR
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BATH CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CR-00039
v.
ABDAL-AZEEZ JALAL HAKIM
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BARBER, KNOPF, AND MINTON, JUDGES.
BARBER, JUDGE:
Appellant, the Commonwealth of Kentucky, appeals
the Bath Circuit Court’s grant of shock probation to the
Appellee, Abdal-Azeez Jalal Hakim.
We affirm.
Hakim entered a guilty plea to charges of DUI fourth
offense, driving while license suspended for DUI, third offense,
and theft of motor vehicle plates.
He was sentenced to three
years imprisonment on January 12, 2004.
On February 25, 2004,
Hakim made a motion for shock probation or work release.
The
court granted the motion placing restrictions on Hakim including
avoiding committing another offense, avoid persons of disrepute,
undergo treatment, and maintain employment.
On June 18, 2004, Hakim was arrested for DUI.
The
Commonwealth moved to revoke his shock probation on September 2,
2004.
The circuit court revoked probation and reinstated
Hakim’s three year sentence.
On February 23, 2005, Hakim filed
a motion for shock probation which was denied.
Hakim filed a
motion for reconsideration of that denial on April 6, 2005.
Hakim asserted that he had been found not guilty of the charges
brought against him, which were the reason his shock probation
had been revoked.
Hakim provided the court with proof that he
had been found not guilty at trial of the charges stemming from
the June 18, 2004 arrest.
The Commonwealth objected to the
motion, claiming that time had expired for the motion to be
heard, pursuant to KRS 439.265(1).
Hakim asserted that CR 60.02
permitted the court to reconsider its order, and to reinstate
the earlier grant of shock probation.
On April 22, 2005, the
circuit court reinstated the shock probation.
The circuit court, in a separate order, stated that it
had retained jurisdiction over the matter under KRS 439.265, and
for this reason, the order was timely.
KRS 439.265 permits a
defendant up to 180 days after sentencing to file a motion for
shock probation.
KRS 439.265(1).
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The court must then consider
the motion within sixty days of its filing, and make a ruling
within ten days of that consideration.
KRS 439.265(2).
The trial court’s Supplemental Order of April 28,
2005, stated:
This Court is reconsidering the original
motion filed on February 22, 2005, which is
still within the sixty (60) day period for
the Court’s consideration, and the ten (10)
days beyond that, as it was always the
Court’s intention to entertain a motion for
shock, once the trial in the Montgomery
County action had been concluded.
Sister states have held that a reconsideration of a
ruling on a motion for shock probation must be made within time
limits equal to those applicable to the original motion.
State
ex rel. Corrigan v. White, 378 N.E.2d 743 (Oh.App. 1976).
The Commonwealth alleges that the circuit court
overstepped its jurisdiction in granting Hakim shock probation.
The Commonwealth claims that the law requires the court to use
the date of the original sentencing, January 12, 2004, as the
sentencing date.
The Commonwealth further argues that the court
lost jurisdiction over the matter 180 days after that date.
After revocation of an initial probation, the
defendant may file a new motion for shock probation, which can
properly be reviewed by the court.
102 S.W.3d 918, 925 (Ky. 2003).
Stallworth v. Commonwealth,
Time for review on such a
motion will run after the statutory limits have expired.
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The
trial court’s ruling was within the applicable time limits
provided by law.
Hakim argues that the Commonwealth did not preserve
this issue for appeal.
The Commonwealth contends the issue is
preserved by virtue of the filing of a notice of appeal.
As the
Appellee correctly notes, filing of a notice of appeal does not
preserve the issue for appellate review.
A party is required to
make an objection specific enough to show both the circuit court
and the reviewing court the matter being objected to.
Commonwealth, 473 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1971).
Bell v.
A party may not
properly raise an issue on appeal unless the trial court was
timely notified of the objection, and had opportunity to review
and rule thereon.
1989).
West v. Commonwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600 (Ky.
As the Commonwealth notes in its Reply brief, however,
the issue was briefly raised before the trial court on June 2,
2005.
Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that
review is appropriate.
Hakim argues that CR 60.02 permitted the trial court
to review the denial of the motion for shock probation.
Hakim
asserts that being found not guilty of the charges which
resulted in the revocation of shock probation was a change in
circumstances sufficient to bring the case within the ambit of
CR 60.02.
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As stated in previous opinions of this Court, the
purpose of CR 60.02 is to allow the trial court a method to
correct errors in judgments upon a showing of “facts or grounds,
not appearing on the face of the record and not available by
appeal or otherwise, which were discovered after rendition of
judgment without fault of the party seeking relief.”
Harris v.
Commonwealth, 296 S.W.2d 700, 701 (Ky. 1956); see also Gross v.
Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Ky. 1983) and Commonwealth v.
Gross, 936 S.W.2d 85, 88 (Ky. 1996).
CR 60.02 permitted the
trial court to entertain Hakim’s motion, whether or not the
motion was made within the time limits provided by the shock
probation statute.
The unusual circumstances presented in this
case, i.e. a defendant whose probation was revoked for an
offense he was acquitted on; permit the trial court to review
and rule on the motion at its discretion.
The Commonwealth’s
assertion on appeal, that probation was revoked for reasons
other than Hakim’s arrest, is not supported by the record, or by
the pleadings filed by the Commonwealth in opposition to the
grant of shock probation.
Therefore, that contention is without
merit.
The standard of review on appeal of the grant or
denial of a motion for CR 60.02 relief is whether the trial
court abused its discretion.
358, 361 (Ky. 1996).
Brown v. Commonwealth, 932 S.W.2d
The Commonwealth has shown no abuse of
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discretion by the trial court.
For this reason, the ruling is
affirmed.
KNOPF, JUDGE, CONCURS.
MINTON, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General of Kentucky
Samuel N. Potter
Frankfort, Kentucky
Robert E. Prather
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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