STELLA FAYE KEGLEY v. MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY AND ROGER BARKER
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 1, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001021-MR
STELLA FAYE KEGLEY
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM ROWAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BETH LEWIS MAZE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-90253
v.
MOREHEAD STATE UNIVERSITY
AND ROGER BARKER
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
ABRAMSON, GUIDUGLI, AND VANMETER, JUDGES.
ABRAMSON, JUDGE. Stella Faye Kegley appeals from an April 21,
2005, summary judgment of the Rowen Circuit Court dismissing her
claims for compensatory and punitive damages against Morehead
State University and Roger Barker, the University’s Director of
Human Resources.
Kegley contends that the defendants unlawfully
terminated her from her employment as a custodian in violation
of KRS 344.040, a section of the Kentucky Civil Rights Act;
retaliated against her in violation of KRS 344.280 and KRS
342.197 for having asserted her civil and workers’ compensation
rights; and caused her to suffer extreme emotional distress.
Finding insufficient grounds for all of Kegley’s contentions, we
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
This Court reviews summary judgments by considering,
as did the trial court, whether “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on
file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
CR 56.03.
Although reasonable doubts must be resolved in her favor, the
“party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion
cannot defeat it without presenting at least some affirmative
evidence showing that there is a genuine issue of material fact
for trial.”
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc.,
807 S.W.2d 476, 482 (Ky. 1991).
Construed favorably to Kegley, the record indicates
that she began working as a building services technician for the
University in 1990, and that through the years her duties
regularly included such tasks as cleaning and supplying
dormitory restrooms and unclogging commodes and showers.
On
September 10, 2002, Kegley suffered a workplace injury when she
was replacing a container of caustic cleaner on an overhead
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shelf and spilled some of the liquid on her face and in her left
eye.
She received prompt medical attention and fortunately
suffered no loss of vision, but she claims that her eyes were
rendered painfully sensitive to the chemical fumes produced by
bleach and other common cleaning agents.
The University
notified its workers’ compensation carrier of Kegley’s accident
and eventually Kegley was awarded temporary total disability
benefits for the period from October 1, 2002, to October 24,
2002.
Kegley filed a workers’ compensation claim for permanent
disability benefits in August 2003, and apparently that claim
was settled in 2004 for $5,000.00.
In the meantime, Kegley’s doctor released her to
return to work by letter dated September 27, 2002.
He noted
that her eyes remained sensitive and recommended that she avoid
working with chemicals; work in well ventilated areas; and, to
prevent accidental splashes of chemicals into her eyes, that she
wear safety goggles.
Given these restrictions and in hopes that
her unusual sensitivity would resolve, Kegley was permitted to
return to a thirty-day period of light duty work, commencing
October 7, 2002, during which she was excused from cleaning
tasks involving chemicals.
The University made it clear,
however, that at the end of that period she would be expected to
resume the full scope of her usual duties or face termination.
On October 21, 2002, Kegley walked into a janitor’s closet that
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was full of drain cleaner fumes and, despite the fact that she
was wearing safety goggles, immediately suffered a severe
reaction.
Her eyes reddened, teared, and became sore and itchy,
and her left eye swelled shut.
This incident, too, was reported
to the University’s workers’ compensation carrier.
Before the end of her thirty-day light duty period,
Kegley requested and was granted leave from her job pursuant to
the Family Medical Leave Act.
She remained away from work until
that leave was exhausted in January 2003.
In a January 20, 2003
letter, Kegley’s eye doctor informed Kegley’s supervisors that
Kegley could return to work “but she should limit her exposure
to irritant chemicals and fumes due to the sensitivity of her
corneas.
She may return to her normal duties as tolerated.”
Given this release and the exhaustion of Kegley’s leave, on
January 23, 2003, Appellee Barker notified Kegley through her
workers’ compensation attorney that the University expected her
to resume her regular duties or be deemed to have abandoned her
employment.
Kegley returned to work on January 28, 2003, and
was assigned to clean showers in one of the dorms.
Kegley
refused to use bleach to clean the showers, as was the
University’s standard practice, but instead used Triad, which
Kegley claims is a disinfectant that does not produce irritating
fumes.
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That afternoon Kegley met with Barker in his office.
Apparently he reiterated the University’s position that if she
was not able to resume her full duties her employment would be
terminated and told her that he deemed goggles adequate
protection against fumes.
He also, according to Kegley, told
her that she would need to waive any future claim against the
University for her alleged eye condition, including her as yet
unfiled workers’ compensation claim.
When Kegley refused to
sign the waiver and asked Barker “Why are you discriminating
against me?” Barker allegedly became upset and told her that she
did not understand what discrimination was.
The next day, when
Kegley again refused to use bleach to clean the showers, the
University terminated her employment.
Kegley maintains that her
discharge violated the Kentucky Civil Rights Act’s provisions
prohibiting discrimination and retaliation, as well as the
Workers’ Compensation Act’s provision prohibiting retaliation.
She also asserts an extreme emotional distress claim against the
University and Barker.
Initially, Kegley contends that even though her eye
condition prevented her from using caustic cleaning chemicals,
she could still perform all of her cleaning duties by
substituting nonirritating cleaners.
She maintains the
University discriminated against her in violation of the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, when it failed to accommodate her
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perceived disability by permitting her to make that
substitution.
KRS 344.040 provides in pertinent part that “[i]t
is an unlawful practice for an employer: (1) . . . to discharge
any individual, . . . because the person is a qualified
individual with a disability.”
As Kegley notes, under this
statute covered employers are obliged to make reasonable
accommodations to retain employees with qualifying disabilities.
Noel v. Elk Brand Manufacturing Company, 53 S.W.3d 95 (Ky.
2000).
We agree with the University, however, that Kegley is
not entitled to the protections of the Act because she is not
disabled.
As our Supreme Court recently reiterated, the Kentucky
Civil Rights Act was modeled after federal law (including
particularly, for the purposes of this case, the Americans With
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.), and our courts
interpret the Kentucky Act consistently with its federal
counterpart.
2003).
Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589 (Ky.
Under both statutes, “disability” is defined as
(a) A physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one (1) or more of the
major life activities of the individual;
(b) A record of such an impairment; or
(c) Being regarded as having such an
impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); KRS 344.010(4).
under part (a) of this definition,
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To be considered disabled
an individual must initially prove that he
or she has a physical or mental impairment.
Yet having an impairment does not alone make
one disabled for purposes of the Act. An
individual claimant must also prove that the
impairment limits a major life activity, and
this limitation must be substantial.
Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d at 592 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
Kegley concedes that even if
her eye condition could be deemed an impairment, it does not
substantially limit any of her major life activities, and thus
she is not actually disabled.
She contends, however, that she
is “disabled” for the purposes of the statute under part (c) of
the definition because the University regarded her as disabled.
To be “regarded as” disabled a plaintiff must prove
that
(1) A covered entity mistakenly believes
that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life
activities, or
(2) A covered entity mistakenly believes
that an actual, non-limiting impairment
substantially limits one or more major life
activities.
Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d at 594.
Kegley
maintains that the University mistakenly believed that her nonlimiting eye impairment substantially limited her ability to
work and thus that it regarded her as disabled.
To establish
this claim, however, Kegley must “demonstrate that [the
University] thought [she] was disabled and that [it] thought
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that [her] disability would prevent [her] from performing a
broad class of jobs,” not just the particular job at issue.
Id.
(quoting from Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 119
S. Ct. 2139, 144 L. Ed. 2d 450 (1999)).
Moreover, the United
States Supreme Court has explained that an employer does not run
afoul of the antidiscrimination laws when it “decide[s] that
physical characteristics or medical conditions that do not rise
to the level of an impairment—such as one’s height, build, or
singing voice—are preferable to others, just as it is free to
decide that some limiting, but not substantially limiting,
impairments make individuals less than ideally suited for a
job.”
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. at 490-91, 119
S.Ct. at 2150.
Accordingly, “employers [are] at liberty to
establish reasonable job standards that disqualify applicants
who [can] not meet those standards.”
Howard Baer, Inc. v.
Schave, 127 S.W.3d at 594.
We agree with the University that Kegley has failed to
offer proof that the University regarded her eye condition as a
substantial impairment that excluded her from a broad class of
jobs.
Even assuming that Kegley’s age and work experience
limited her to custodial type work, there are many such jobs
that do not require the use of harsh chemicals.
There is no
evidence that the University considered her unfit for that broad
class of jobs.
Rather, the University’s insistence that she be
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able to work with its preferred custodial chemicals was no more
than a reasonable job standard Kegley could not meet.
It was
reasonable not only because the University had a right to insist
on those cleaners it thought best, but also because, as Kegley’s
October 21, 2002, encounter with the drain opener fumes
demonstrates, occasional exposure to fumes was virtually
unavoidable in Kegley’s University position.
The University
could therefore reasonably insist that its custodial employees
not be subject to potential injury any time such an exposure
occurred.
The trial court did not err, therefore, by dismissing
Kegley’s discrimination claim.
Against this result, Kegley argues that the University
must have regarded her as disabled because it offered to
“accommodate” her condition by providing her with goggles, as
though it were attempting to comply with the disability
statutes.
As the United States District Court for the Western
District of Kentucky has noted, however, the fact that an
employer offers to accommodate one of its employees “does not
necessarily mean [the employer] regarded her as having a
substantially limiting impairment.”
Summers v. Middleton and
Reutlinger, P.S.C., 214 F. Supp. 2d 751, 754 (W.D.Ky. 2002).
Otherwise, as the Court noted, employers would be unnecessarily
inhibited from inquiring about employees’ conditions and from
attempting to relieve their situations.
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We are not persuaded
that the proffer of goggles in this case would permit a rational
juror to find that the University regarded Kegley as disabled.
Kegley next contends that the University dismissed her
in retaliation for complaining about what she believed was its
disability discrimination and for her refusal to waive her
workers’ compensation rights.
She bases these claims on her
January 28, 2003, meeting with Barker when he allegedly sought
her waiver, and she responded by accusing him of discrimination.
A jury could find, she insists, that it was either her refusal
to waive her workers’ compensation rights or her accusation that
prompted the University to dismiss her the next day.
As Kegley correctly notes KRS 342.197 and KRS 344.280
prohibit, respectively, retaliation “for filing and pursuing” a
lawful claim for Workers’ Compensation benefits, or for
“oppos[ing] a practice declared unlawful by” the Civil Rights
Act.
To establish a claim for retaliation under either statute
Kegley must first show that
(1) she engaged in a protected activity,
(2) she was disadvantaged by an act of her
employer, and
(3) there was a causal connection between
the activity engaged in and the [defendant]
employer’s act.
Kentucky Department of Corrections v. McCullough, 123 S.W.3d
130, 134 (Ky. 2003) (civil rights).
See also First Property
Management v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d 185 (Ky. 1993) (workers’
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compensation).
To establish a causal connection, the claimant
must prove, either directly or indirectly, that the protected
activity “was a substantial and motivating factor but for which
the employee would not have been discharged.”
First Property
Management v. Zarebidaki, 867 S.W.2d at 188 (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
As the United States Supreme
Court has noted, moreover, “[e]mployers need not suspend
previously planned [actions] upon discovering that a Title VII
suit has been filed, and their proceeding along lines previously
contemplated, though not yet definitively determined, is no
evidence whatever of causality.”
Clark County School District
v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 272, 121 S. Ct. 1508, 1511, 149 L. Ed.
2d 509 (2001).
Here, even assuming that Kegley has offered proof of
protected acts under both statutes during her January 28, 2003
meeting with Barker, she has failed to offer proof that her
discharge resulted from those acts.
The University had decided
long before that meeting (in October 2002, prior to Kegley’s
leave of absence) to discharge Kegley if she was unable to
resume her duties without restriction.
Kegley has offered no
evidence that the University ever deviated from that position,
so her eventual termination under those very circumstances is
“no evidence whatever” that her discharge resulted from her
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alleged refusal to waive her workers’ compensation claim or her
alleged protest against disability discrimination.
Finally, Kegley contends that by discharging her, the
University inflicted severe emotional distress.
As she notes,
“[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is
subject to liability for such emotional distress.”
Stringer v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 151 S.W.3d 781, 788 (Ky. 2004) (quoting
from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1)).
To be entitled
to recovery, a claimant must establish each of the following
elements:
1) the wrongdoer’s conduct must be
intentional or reckless;
2) the conduct must be outrageous and
intolerable in that it offends against the
generally accepted standards of decency and
morality;
3) there must be a causal connection between
the wrongdoer’s conduct and the emotional
distress; and
4) the emotional distress must be severe.
Id. at 788 (citation omitted).
Kegley has not proffered sufficient evidence to meet
this burden.
Although we do not doubt that Kegley found the
loss of her job distressing, as we have explained, her
termination was not wrongful and so cannot be deemed either
outrageous or intolerable.
Kegley, moreover, has offered no
proof of emotional distress beyond that ordinarily associated
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with the loss of a job.
Even the distress inflicted in the case
of a wrongful termination has been found insufficient to sustain
an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Id.;
Bednarek v. Local Union, 780 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. App. 1989).
The
trial court did not err, therefore, by dismissing Kegley’s
severe emotional distress claim.
In sum, the University neither discriminated against
Kegley, who is not disabled, nor retaliated against her for
pursuing workers’ compensation benefits or for asserting her
right to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner.
Instead, it
lawfully discharged her when she could no longer safely perform
all of her duties.
Although Kegley’s accident was unfortunate,
the University’s eventual termination decision was not
unreasonable and certainly did not amount to an outrageous
infliction of emotional distress.
Accordingly, we affirm the
April 21, 2005, summary judgment of the Rowan Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Andrew J. Ruzicho
Lexington, Kentucky
Kevin G. Henry
Andrew DeSimone
Sturgill, Turner, Barker &
Moloney, PLLC
Lexington, Kentucky
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