JOHN BIANCHI, D.M.D. BIANCHI REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; and LEWIS BIANCHI in his capacity REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP v. CITY OF HARLAN, a Fourth Class City; AND CONVENTION COMMISSION, an agency of the City of Harlan
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 3, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2005-CA-001019-MR
AND
2005-CA-001020-MR
JOHN BIANCHI, D.M.D.
and wife, SANDY BIANCHI;
BIANCHI REAL ESTATE
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP; and
LEWIS BIANCHI in his capacity
as General Partner, BIANCHI
REAL ESTATE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
v.
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NOS. 01-CI-00061 & 01-CI-00144
CITY OF HARLAN, a Fourth Class City;
and CITY OF HARLAN TOURIST
AND CONVENTION COMMISSION,
an agency of the City of Harlan
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART AND REVERSING IN PART
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HENRY, JUDGE; PAISLEY, SENIOR
PAISLEY, SENIOR JUDGE:
This appeal revolves around two
condemnation actions filed by the City of Harlan and the City of
Harlan Tourist and Convention Commission (hereinafter these
1
Senior Judge Lewis G. Paisley sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
parties will be referred to collectively as “City of Harlan” or
“city”) against John Bianchi; Sandy Bianchi, his wife; Bianchi
Real Estate Limited Partnership and Lewis Bianchi, John
Bianchi’s son, as a general partner in the Bianchi Real Estate
Limited Partnership (hereinafter these parties will be referred
to collectively as the “Bianchis”).
In these condemnation
actions, the city sought to take certain properties owned by the
Bianchis.
This controversy started in early 2001 when the City
of Harlan decided to build a civic center and water park (the
civic center project).
So, seeking land on which to build the
civic center project, the City of Harlan, in February 2001,
filed a condemnation action in Harlan Circuit Court against the
Bianchis seeking to take some of their property.
This property
was located at 204-206 South Main Street in Harlan, Kentucky.
The Bianchis leased out this property, and, at the time of the
condemnation action, it was used as a pet shop (the pet shop
property).
Then in March 2001, the City of Harlan filed another
condemnation suit against the Bianchis.
In the second action,
the city sought to take more of the Bianchis’ property.
The
property that was the subject of the second action was located
at 200-202 South Main Street and at 208 South Main Street on the
corner of West Clover Street and South Main Street.
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The
Bianchis used this property as a parking lot (the parking lot
property).
According to the Bianchis, the parking lot property
provided parking to the pet shop and to various other businesses
in downtown Harlan such as:
the New Townsite Restaurant located
at 124 South Main Street, the Styles and Stuff Beauty Salon and
apartments located at 126-128 South Main Street and the Shirt
Shack print shop located at 130 South Main Street.
These
businesses were all located across the street from the parking
lot property on the north side of Clover Street; thus, they were
not adjacent to any of the condemned property.
Moreover, each
of these businesses leased its premises from the Bianchis.
In addition, the Bianchis insisted that the parking
lot property also provided parking to the Harlan Funeral Home, a
funeral home owned and operated by the Bianchis.
The funeral
home was located at 208-209 South Cumberland Avenue and had its
own parking lot on the far west side of the funeral home that
fronted upon South Cumberland Avenue.
The back of the funeral
home was immediately west and adjacent to the parking lot
property.
Moreover, the Bianchis claimed that the parking lot
property provided parking to both Zion’s Rentals located at 109
West Clover Street and the Black Motor Apartments located at 201
South Cumberland Avenue.
These properties were located
immediately west and adjacent to the condemnation properties as
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well.
Zion’s Rentals leased its premise from the Bianchis, and
the record revealed that the Bianchis owned the Black Motor
Apartments.
Although the condemnation petitions were properly
served upon the Bianchis, they did not file an answer contesting
the city’s right to condemn their property.
However, in May
2001, the Bianchis did file a motion to consolidate the two
actions.
Also, in this motion, they asked the trial court to
apply the “unity rule”.
The unity rule permits two or more
tracts of land to be considered as one tract for the purpose of
valuation in a condemnation action if the tracts are contiguous
or in close proximity and they have a single owner and are used
for a single purpose.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Department of
Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. Crafton-Duncan, Inc., 668
S.W.2d 62, 64 (Ky. App. 1984).
In the Bianchis’ motion, they
argued that the trial court should apply the unity rule to the
parking lot property and the pet shop property since these
tracts had a single owner and were used for a single purpose.
In addition, the Bianchis argued that the unity rule should also
be applied to the business properties on the north side of
Clover Street and to the funeral home property, the Zion’s
Rentals property and the Black Motor Apartments property.
According to the Bianchis, all of these properties were used
along with the condemnation properties for a single purpose.
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Thus, they should all be considered as one parcel of land for
the purposes of condemnation.
In June 2001, the trial court
consolidated the two condemnation actions.
And, in January
2002, the trial court held that the unity rule would be applied
to the parking lot property and the pet shop property, but the
court declined to apply the unity rule to the Bianchis’ other
properties.
On April 11, 2003, over two years after the
condemnation actions had been initiated, the Bianchis moved the
trial court for permission to file a late answer in order to
contest the city’s right to condemn.
In their motion, the
Bianchis alleged that the city had significantly scaled back the
civic center project and could have obtained land elsewhere.
On
April 22, 2003, the trial court denied the Bianchis’ motion and
entered an interlocutory order and judgment authorizing the city
to take possession of the parking lot property and the pet shop
property and authorizing payment for the taking.
Afterwards,
both the city and the Bianchis filed exceptions from the
valuation part of the judgment prompting the need for a trial.
In May 2003, the Bianchis sought permission to file a
counterclaim against the city.
In June 2003, the trial court
granted permission, and the Bianchis subsequently filed a
counterclaim for inverse condemnation.
According to the Supreme
Court of Kentucky, “inverse condemnation” refers to a lawsuit
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filed against a governmental entity to recover the fair market
value of property that the government has taken by its
activities instead of taking the property through an eminent
domain proceeding.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources
and Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Stearns Coal and Lumber
Co., 678 S.W.2d 378, 381 (Ky. 1984).
In their counterclaim, the
Bianchis alleged that when the city took the pet shop property
and the parking lot property, it also took and utilized all of
the adjoining tracts of land, specifically: 124 South Main (the
New Townsite Restaurant); 126-128 South Main Street (the Styles
and Stuff Beauty Salon and apartments); 130 South Main Street
(the Shirt Shack print shop); 208-209 South Cumberland Avenue
(the Harlan Funeral Home and its adjacent parking lot); 109 West
Clover Street (Zion’s Rentals) and 201 South Cumberland Avenue
(the Black Motor Apartments).
According to the Bianchis, they
owned the previously mentioned properties and these properties
“were being utilized and in conjunction in unity and concert of
purpose with the property taken by the [city].”
The Bianchis
requested the trial court to award them the difference in fair
market value of the previously mentioned properties immediately
before the city took the condemnation properties and immediately
after the city took the condemnation properties.
Prior to trial, the trial court ordered the
condemnation action and the Bianchis’ inverse condemnation
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counterclaim to be tried separately although both were to be
heard by the same jury.
Pursuant to that ruling, the
condemnation action proceeded to trial on February 15, 2005.
On
February 18th, the jury entered its verdict and found that the
difference in value of the parking lot and pet shop properties
immediately before and immediately after the taking was
$120,000.00.
About a month later, the inverse condemnation
counterclaim proceeded to trial on March 15, 2005.
At the
beginning of the second trial, the trial court dismissed the
following properties from the Bianchis’ counterclaim: 124 South
Main (the New Townsite Restaurant); 126-128 South Main Street
(the Styles and Stuff Beauty Salon and apartments); 130 South
Main Street (the Shirt Shack print shop).
The trial court
dismissed these properties because they were not contiguous with
the parking lot and pet shop properties.
As a result, the jury
only heard evidence regarding the funeral home and its parking
lot, Zion’s Rentals and the Black Motor Apartments.
Furthermore, the trial court did not apply the unity rule to the
remaining inverse condemnation properties.
On March 17th, the
jury entered its second verdict and found that the difference in
value of the inverse condemnation properties immediately before
and immediately after the city took the parking lot and pet shop
properties was $43,640.00.
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On March 29, 2005, the trial court entered a judgment
in the present case and awarded the Bianchis $120,000.00 for the
parking lot and pet shop properties and awarded the Bianchis
$43,640.00 for the remaining inverse condemnation properties.
The Bianchis immediately filed an appeal from the judgment, and
the City of Harlan filed a cross-appeal.
THE BIANCHIS’ APPEAL
The Unity Rule
In their appellate brief, the Bianchis vigorously
insist that the trial court erred as a matter of law when it did
not apply the unity rule to the inverse condemnation properties2
vis à vis the original condemnation properties.3
According to
the Bianchis, the parking lot property provided parking to all
of the inverse condemnation properties; thus, the Bianchis
contend that the condemnation properties and the inverse
condemnation properties were used for a single purpose.
Thus,
they argue that the trial court should have applied the unity
rule so the jury could consider both the condemnation properties
and the inverse condemnation properties as one parcel in
2
The New Townsite Restaurant, the Styles and Stuff Beauty Salon and
apartments and the Shirt Shack print shop (all on the north side of Clover
Street) and the Harlan Funeral Home and its adjacent parking lot, Zion’s
Rentals and the Black Motor Apartments (all on the south side of Clover
Street adjacent to the condemnation properties.
3
The parking lot property and the pet shop property.
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determining the value of the Bianchis’ property immediately
before and immediately after the taking.
As previously stated, the unity rule “permits two or
more parcels of land to be deemed one tract for the purpose of a
condemnation when they are contiguous or in near proximity and
are united in use and ownership.”
Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Transportation, Bureau of Highways v. CraftonDuncan, Inc., supra.
In the present case, there is no serious
dispute that all the properties in question were owned by the
Bianchis, either by John Bianchi or by the Bianchi Real Estate
Limited Partnership.
However, despite the Bianchis strenuous
insistence to the contrary, the Bianchis’ various properties
were not used for a single purpose.
For example, the various
properties in the inverse condemnation action were used as a
funeral home, as parking lot for said funeral home, as a retail
rental business, as a hair salon, as a restaurant, as a print
shop and as apartments.
As for the condemnation properties, one
property was used as a pet shop, and the other property was used
to provide parking for the pet shop and for the inverse
condemnation properties.
At the trial court level and now on
appeal, the Bianchis attempt to use the parking lot property as
the glue to bind all of their properties together into a single
parcel by claiming that they were all used for a single purpose;
however, as the record clearly demonstrates, each property was
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used for a different purpose.
Since the Bianchis’ various
properties lacked a single purpose, the trial court did not err
when it refused to apply the unity rule to the inverse
condemnation properties.
In the alternative, the Bianchis insist that the trial
court violated Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 42.02 by
conducting separate trials.
According to CR 42.01, a trial
court may consolidate actions which involve a common question of
law or fact.
However, according to CR 42.02, a trial court may
order separate trials for any claim, cross-claim, counterclaim
or third-party claim if the trial court determines that
separation will be in furtherance of judicial convenience or
avoid prejudice.
Moreover, it has long been held that such a
decision is within the sound discretion of the trial court and
will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion.
Malcolm v. Poland, 126 S.W.2d 1098, 1101 (Ky. 1930).
In the
present case, the Bianchis have simply failed to show that the
trial court abused its considerable discretion when it ordered
the inverse condemnation counterclaim to be tried separately
from the original condemnation actions.
The Bianchis’ Late Answer
According to the Bianchis, the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it denied their motion to file a late answer.
The Bianchis admit that they did not file an answer since they
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did not initially desire to contest the city’s right to take the
properties.
However, on appeal, they repeat their claim that
they learned from an unnamed source that the city had scaled
back the size of civic center project.
Based on this and
relying on CR 6.02, the Bianchis insist that they demonstrated
the requisite excusable neglect to justify the need to file a
late answer.
In the Commonwealth, condemnation actions are
controlled by the Eminent Domain Act of Kentucky, KRS Chapter
416.540-990.
answers.
KRS 416.600 specifically deals with the filing of
According to that statute, the property owner has
twenty days from the date the petition was served to file an
answer.
The answer must be limited solely to the question of
the petitioner’s right to condemn. KRS 416.600.
The statute
contains no provision for the filing of a late answer.
However,
according to the pertinent part of CR 6.02,
[w]hen by statute . . . an act is required
or allowed to be done at or within a
specified time, the court for cause shown
may, at any time in its discretion . . .
upon motion made after the expiration of the
specified period permit the act to be done
where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect[.]
As a can be seen, the enlargement of time is within the
discretion of the trial court; thus, we will not reverse absent
an abuse of that discretion.
See Sims Motor Transport. Lines v.
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Foster, 293 S.W.2d 226 (Ky. 1956).
In the present case, the
Bianchis alleged, more than two years after the petitions had
been filed, that they had learned from an unnamed source that
the city had scaled back the size of the civic center project.
They insist that this constituted excusable neglect which would
justify filing a late answer to contest the city’s right to
condemn.
However, this allegation does not rise to the level of
excusable neglect since, even if true, it does not strip the
city of its right to condemn the Bianchis’ properties for public
use, especially since the city made use of all of the property
it took from the Bianchis.
We find that the Bianchis failed to
show that the trial court abused its discretion; thus, we affirm
the trial court’s denial of their request to file a late answer.
Inverse Condemnation Properties on the North Side of Clover
Street
The Bianchis argue that the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it dismissed the following properties from
their counterclaim: the New Townsite Restaurant property, the
Styles and Stuff Beauty Salon/apartments property and the Shirt
Shack print shop property.
The trial court dismissed these
properties since they were located on the north side of Clover
Street, and they were not contiguous with the condemnation
properties.
Relying on Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Highways, 413 S.W.2d 65 (Ky. 1967), the Bianchis
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argue that even if different tracts of land are physically
separated from one another they can still be considered as a
whole if they are used for a single purpose.
The Bianchis argue
that the properties on the north side of Clover Street were used
with the parking lot property for a single purpose.
We find that this allegation of error is merely a
rehashing of the Bianchis’ earlier unity rule argument; thus, we
find it unnecessary to address its merits since we previously
addressed the unity rule and, more importantly, since we reverse
that part of the trial court’s judgment as it relates to the
Bianchis’ counterclaim.
The City’s Right to Condemn
According to the Bianchis, the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it failed to dismiss the original
condemnation actions.
The Bianchis aver that the Harlan city
council voted to condemn property for use on the civic center
project but the council never specifically mentioned the
Bianchis’ properties.
Based on this allegation, the Bianchis
reason that the city had no right to condemn their properties.
Since the Bianchis did not file a timely answer
challenging the city’s right to condemn their property and since
they did not file an appeal from the interlocutory judgment
granting the city the right to enter the property, we find that
the Bianchis did not properly preserve this allegation of error
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for appellate review.
Thus, we decline to address the merits of
this argument.
THE CITY OF HARLAN’S CROSS-APPEAL
The Bianchis’ Counterclaim.
On cross-appeal, the City of Harlan argues that the
trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied the city’s
motion to dismiss the Bianchis’ counterclaim in its entirety.
The city argues that to have a taking for inverse condemnation
purposes there must be physical intrusion upon the property.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and Environmental
Protection Cabinet v. Stearns Coal and Lumber Co., supra.
The
Stearns court defined a “taking” as “entering onto private
property and devoting it to public use so as to deprive the
owner of all beneficial enjoyment.”
Id. at 381.
The city
insists that it did not intrude, physically or otherwise, upon
any of the inverse condemnation properties.
Thus, there was no
taking of these properties; thus, the trial court erred when it
failed to dismiss the Bianchis’ counterclaim.
In the present case, for the Bianchis to sustain an
action for inverse condemnation, they had to show that they
suffered an actual taking.
Spanish Cove Sanitation, Inc., v
Louisville-Jefferson County Metropolitan Sewer District, 72
S.W.3d 918, 921 (Ky. 2002).
However, a property owner does not
suffer a taking, for inverse condemnation purposes, unless he
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shows that his rights as a landowner have been completely
frustrated and he has been completely deprived of the use of his
property.
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Natural Resources and
Environmental Protection Cabinet v. Stearns Coal and Lumber Co.,
supra. at 382.
Or, in other words, a property owner suffers a
taking when he loses all the economically beneficial uses of his
property.
Bobbie Preece Facility v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
Department of Charitable Gaming, 71 S.W.3d 99, 103 (Ky. App.
2001).
In the present case, the Bianchis did not suffer an
actual taking since the city did not physically intrude upon any
of the inverse condemnation properties and since they lost none
of the economically beneficial uses of said properties.
In
fact, the record demonstrates that, after the city took the
condemnation properties, the Bianchis continued to use the
inverse condemnation properties for the same purposes as they
did prior to the taking.
Since there was no physical intrusion
and no lose of use by the Bianchis, the trial court erred as a
matter of law when it denied the city’s motion to dismiss the
Bianchis’ counterclaim for inverse condemnation.
Thus, we
reverse that part of the judgment as it relates to the Bianchis’
counterclaim and remand for dismissal.
Jury Instructions and Witness Testimony
According to the city, the jury instructions regarding
the Bianchis’ counterclaim were defective.
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In addition, the
city complains that John Bianchi, Lewis Bianchi and their expert
witness all testified to incompetent and irrelevant matters.
However, since we reverse that part of the judgment as it
relates to the Bianchis’ counterclaim and remand for dismissal
of the counterclaim, we need not address the city’s last two
allegations of error.
CONCLUSION
We affirm that part of the trial court’s judgment as
it relates to the original condemnation action.
However, we
reverse that part of the judgment as it relates to the Bianchis’
counterclaim and remand for dismissal of the counterclaim.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANTS/CROSS-APPELLEES:
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEES/CROSS-APPELLANTS:
Rodney E. Buttermore, Jr.
BUTTERMORE & BOGGS
Harlan, Kentucky
Susan C. Lawson
LAWSON & LAWSON, P.S.C.
Harlan, Kentucky
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