LISA HICKS; TAMMY MAYES; AND JILL ABRAMS v. MICHAEL F. EUBANKS, EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF MARY F. HENDRICKS, DECEASED; AND JEREMY WAYNE HENDRICKS
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RENDERED:
NOVEMBER 17, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-001009-MR
LISA HICKS; TAMMY MAYES;
AND JILL ABRAMS
v.
APPELLANTS
APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JULIA HYLTON ADAMS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-00999
MICHAEL F. EUBANKS, EXECUTOR
OF THE ESTATE OF MARY F.
HENDRICKS, DECEASED; AND
JEREMY WAYNE HENDRICKS
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: GUIDUGLI, JUDGES; BUCKINGHAM AND HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
JUDGES.1
GUIDUGLI, JUDGE:
This appeal arises from a will contest case
filed in the Madison Circuit Court contesting the Last Will and
Testament executed by Mary Hendricks on March 15, 2001, leaving
virtually all of her estate to her only grandson, Jeremy Wayne
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Senior Judges David C. Buckingham and Joseph R. Huddleston, sitting as
Special Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section
110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
Hendricks.
Appellants, Lisa Hicks, Tammy Mayes, and Jill Abrams,
who are the granddaughters and heirs of Mary, contend that the
trial court incorrectly granted a directed verdict in favor of
the Appellees, Jeremy and the executor of Mary’s estate, Michael
Eubanks.
Because the trial court properly entered a directed
verdict for the Appellees, we affirm.
On November 27, 1991, Mary executed a will naming her
husband, Arnold Hendricks, as the primary beneficiary.
The will
also contained a provision stating that should her husband
predecease her, or should they die simultaneously or under such
circumstances as to render it impracticable to determine which
survived the other due, or due to a common disaster within
thirty days of each other, her estate was to be split equally
among her four grandchildren, Lisa, Tammy, Jill, and Jeremy.
All four are the children of Mary’s son, Wayne Hendricks.
Lisa,
Tammy and Jill’s mother, Barbara, passed away when they were
young.
Wayne later married Jan Hendricks, who is Jeremy’s
mother.
On July 16, 2000, Mary’s husband, Arnold, died.
As a
result, Mr. Eubanks was hired as an attorney to represent Mary
as the Executor of her husband’s estate.
On November 20, 2000,
Mary went to Mr. Eubank’s office to discuss her husband’s
estate.
During this meeting, Mary also expressed her desire to
change her will and to leave her entire estate to her grandson,
Jeremy.
However, Mary did not change her will at this time.
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A couple of months later, Mary was admitted to the
Pattie A. Clay Hospital to have her leg amputated.
On January
22, 2001, Mary was transferred to the Madison Manor Nursing
Home.
From this time until the date of her death, Mary was
either a patient at the Madison Manor Nursing Home or the Pattie
A. Clay Hospital.
On February 27, 2001, Mr. Eubanks received a phone
call from Jan Hendricks asking him to visit Mary at the Madison
Manor Nursing Home to discuss her husband’s estate and her will.
Mr. Eubanks met with Mary on that same day, and he made notes on
Mary’s previous will to reflect what Mary intended to change.
Neither Jan nor Jeremy was present during this discussion
between Mary and Mr. Eubanks.
After meeting with Mary, Mr. Eubanks prepared a new
will.
On March 15, 2001, Mr. Eubanks took the new will to Mary
at the Madison Manor Nursing Home for execution.
The execution
was witnessed by Lora House and Gladys Fugate, who worked in Mr.
Eubank’s office.
The will was also witnessed by Jeff Rager, who
was another attorney in Mr. Eubank’s office.
The will left the
sum of $25.00 to each granddaughter, and the remainder of the
estate was left to Jeremy.
Again, neither Jan nor Jeremy was
present during the execution of Mary’s will.
Mary died testate in Madison County on June 2, 2001.
Her March 15, 2001, will was admitted to probate on June 14,
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2001, and Mr. Eubanks was appointed the Executor of Mary’s
estate.
On September 28, 2001, the three granddaughters filed
suit contesting the validity of the March 15, 2001, will.
The
granddaughters contended that Mary did not have the requisite
testamentary capacity to execute the March 15, 2001, will, and
that the will was the result of undue influence exerted by
Jeremy’s mother, Jan.
On August 6, 2003, the Madison Circuit Court granted
the Appellees’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of
testamentary capacity.
before a jury.
The issue of undue influence was tried
However, at the conclusion of all the testimony,
the Madison Circuit Court granted a directed verdict in favor of
the Appellees on April 15, 2005.
On appeal, the Appellants contend that the trial court
incorrectly granted a directed verdict in favor of the Appellees
regarding the issue of undue influence.
Claiming that there was
sufficient evidence to show that Mary was unduly influenced by
Jeremy’s mother, Jan, to change her will, the Appellants contend
that the trial court’s granting of the Appellees’ motion for
directed verdict was improper.
When reviewing a motion for directed verdict, a trial
court must consider the evidence in the strongest possible light
in favor of the party opposing the motion.
700 S.W. 2d 415, 416 (Ky.App. 1985).
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Taylor v. Kennedy,
Furthermore, “a trial
judge cannot enter a directed verdict unless there is a complete
absence of proof on a material issue or if no disputed issues of
fact exist upon which reasonable minds could differ.”
v. Klapheke, 967 S.W.2d 16, 18-19 (Ky. 1998).
Bierman
“On appeal the
appellate court considers the evidence in the same light[,]”
Sutton v. Combs, 419 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Ky. 1967), and it may not
disturb a trial court’s decision on a motion for directed
verdict unless that decision is clearly erroneous.
Bierman, 967
S.W.2d at 18.
The focus of the Appellants’ argument is that Jeremy’s
mother, Jan, unduly influenced Mary to change her will and to
essentially disinherit the Appellants.
Although the Appellants
do not contend that Jeremy unduly influenced Mary, “undue
influence which invalidates the entire will may be that of any
one or more of the beneficiaries or a third person.”
Schloemer, 409 S.W.2d 809, 812 (Ky. 1966).
Raymond v.
Contending that Jan
unduly influenced Mary to change her will, the Appellants allege
that Jan made disparaging remarks about the Appellants in order
to manipulate Mary.
Specifically, the Appellants allege that
Jan told Mary that Tammy had taken her pain pills, that Tammy
was not coming to visit her when she really was, and that she
told Mary that the granddaughters were always fighting.
Thus,
the Appellants contend that the alleged remarks that Jan made
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about the Appellants to Mary unduly influenced Mary to change
her will and exclude the Appellants.
As stated in Bye v. Mattingly, 975 S.W.2d 451, 457
(Ky. 1998), “[u]ndue influence is a level of persuasion which
destroys the testator’s free will and replaces it with the
desires of the influencer.”
In determining whether the testator
was unduly influenced, the court must first examine whether the
influence was inappropriate.
Id.
Furthermore, the court must
examine whether the testator was exercising her own judgment
when she executed the will.
Id.
Therefore,
[t]o determine whether a will reflects the
wishes of the testator, the court must
examine the indicia or badges of undue
influence. Such badges include a physically
weak and mentally impaired testator, a will
which is unnatural in its provisions, a
recently developed and comparatively short
period of close relationship between the
testator and principal beneficiary,
participation by the principal beneficiary
in the preparation of the will, possession
of the will by the principal beneficiary
after it was reduced to writing, efforts by
the principal beneficiary to restrict
contacts between the testator and the
natural objects of his bounty, and absolute
control of the testator’s business. Blecher
v. Somerville, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 620 (1967);
Golladay v. Golladay, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 904,
906 (1995).
Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457.
When applying these badges, or tests,
to the March 15, 2001, will, it is clear that the trial court
correctly determined that there was not sufficient evidence to
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show that undue influence played a role in Mary’s disposition of
her estate.
First, it is clear that while Mary may have been
physically weak due to her leg amputation, there was not
sufficient evidence presented to show that she was mentally
weak.
Additionally, the record was also clear that Jan did not
have absolute control of Mary’s business affairs, because Mary’s
sister, Beulah, continually helped Mary with paying her bills
and writing her checks.
Although Jan and Mary may have
experienced a “difficult” relationship, the trial court judge
correctly determined that the relationship was not a “recently
developed and comparatively short period of close relationship.”
Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457.
As noted by the trial judge, there was
some relationship between Mary and Jan because of Jeremy.
Furthermore, there was evidence presented that when Mary’s
husband, Arnold, had open heart surgery in Louisville in the
summer of 2000, Jan was present with Mary for the entire week.
Thus, a relationship did exist between Mary and Jan and it
continued to exist until Mary’s death.
Additionally, no evidence was presented to show that
Jan participated in the preparation of Mary’s will.
Although
the Appellants point out that Jan called Mr. Eubanks to come to
the Madison Manor Nursing home to talk to Mary about her will in
February of 2001, Jan was not present when Mr. Eubanks and Mary
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reviewed her old will and discussed making the revisions.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that Jan was present when Mary
executed her will on March 15, 2001.
Accordingly, Jan did not
participate in the preparation of Mary’s will.
Furthermore, Jan
did not have possession of the will, nor do the Appellants
contend that she did.
The next test is whether the will was unnatural in its
provisions.
The issue of unnatural disposition is “only to be
used as an indicia of a jury question rather than an issue to be
determined by the trial judge alone.”
S.W.2d 580, 582 (1970).
Bennett v. Bennett, 455
However, it is a factual issue which
can be satisfactorily explained by the proponents of the will.
Id.
Thus, the burden of proof is on the proponents of the will
to explain the disposition.
929 (1968).
Gibson v. Gipson, 426 S.W.2d 927,
Based on the evidence that Mary’s grandson, Jeremy,
regularly cared for and visited Mary and that they had a long
and loving relationship, there was sufficient evidence to show
that the will was not unnatural in its provisions.
The only questionable test of undue influence
presented was whether Jan prevented the Appellants from having
contact with Mary.
While there was evidence presented that the
Appellants were restricted at times from seeing Mary, there was
sufficient evidence presented to show that it was Mary, and not
Jan, who requested that the Appellants not be admitted to her
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room.
Specifically, there was documentation that Mary made a
request to the staff at the Madison Manor Nursing Home that she
would rather the Appellants not visit, “because they are always
making trouble.”
Additionally, there were nurses’ notes
presented on days when Mary was considered oriented and
communicative, in which she expressed outside of Jan’s presence
a desire not to have the Appellants visit.
Accordingly, there
was not sufficient evidence presented to show that Jan prevented
the Appellants from having contact with Mary.
Based on the analysis of the tests of undue influence,
the Appellants failed to show that Jan influenced Mary in such a
way as to prevent her from exercising her own judgment when she
executed her will on March 15, 2001.
Additionally, the
Appellants did not present adequate evidence to show that Jan
influenced Mary by threats or coercion, or that any influence
made by Jan was inappropriate.
Bye, 975 S.W.2d at 457.
Because
“it is not sufficient for the contestant to show that there was
opportunity to exercise undue influence or that there was a
possibility that it was exercised,” the Appellants did not meet
their burden of proof.
Stutiville’s Ex’rs v. Wheeler, 187 Ky.
361, 219 S.W. 411, 416 (1920).
Accordingly, we conclude that
there was not sufficient evidence on which reasonable persons
could disagree concerning whether undue influence played a role
in Mary’s disposition of her estate.
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The Appellants further contend that the directed
verdict was improper because “when slight evidence of the
exercise of undue influence and the lack of mental capacity is
coupled with evidence of an unequal or unnatural disposition, it
is enough to take the case to the jury.”
S.W.2d 927, 928 (Ky. 1968).
Gibson v. Gipson, 426
However, because the issue of mental
incapacity was already decided at the summary judgment stage and
is not being contested in this appeal, there was insufficient
evidence to take the case to the jury.
Additionally, the Appellants contend that the trial
court erred in basing its ruling on the lucid interval doctrine
because it applies to mental incapacity, which was not at issue
in this case.
However, after reviewing the trial judge’s oral
ruling, it is clear that she was not basing her ruling on this
doctrine and was simply using it as an example.
Accordingly, we
conclude that the directed verdict was appropriate.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
the Madison Circuit Court.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANTS:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
Walter G. Ecton, Jr.
Richmond, Kentucky
James T. Gilbert
Richmond, Kentucky
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