VICTOR KEISKER v. KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
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RENDERED: MARCH 10, 2006; 2:00
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
P.M.
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000995-MR
VICTOR KEISKER
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE WILLIAM L. GRAHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CI-00613
KENTUCKY RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: MINTON AND VANMETER, JUDGES; MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE.1
MILLER, SENIOR JUDGE:
Out-of-state retiree Victor Keisker
appeals from an order of the Franklin Circuit Court upholding
the Kentucky Retirement Systems’ calculation of the amount of
monthly out-of-pocket health insurance premium reimbursement he
is entitled to under KRS2 61.702 and KAR3 1:290, and upholding
1
Senior Judge John D. Miller sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
Kentucky Revised Statute 21.580.
2
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
Kentucky Administrative Regulations.
the Retirement Systems’ request for recoupment of premium
reimbursement overpayments made by the agency to Keisker.
For
the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Victor Keisker is a retired Louisville police officer
who currently lives in Lynn Haven, Florida.
Keisker had 20
years of service at the time of his 1992 retirement.
He retired
under the County Employees Retirement System (CERS) Hazardous
Duty plan.
As a benefit of his CERS retirement status, Keisker
is entitled to receive health insurance covering himself and his
spouse.
After retiring from his job as a police officer,
Keisker moved to Florida and began working for the Florida
Department of Environmental Protection.
As a benefit of his
employment with the State of Florida, Keisker began receiving
health insurance coverage for himself and his spouse; however,
the State of Florida did not pay the full premium, and Keisker
was required to pay a portion of the premium out of his own
pocket.
As a CERS retiree residing out of state, Keisker was
eligible to apply for reimbursement of amounts he paid toward
his Florida health care plan through the Retirement Systems’
medical insurance reimbursement plan (MIRP).
The rules
concerning participation in the MIRP and eligibility for premium
reimbursement are set forth in KRS 61.702 and 105 KAR 1:290.
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Central to this appeal is the MIRP formula provision contained
in 105 KAR 1:290 Section 2(2), which provides that reimbursement
entitlements must be reduced by any amount contributed by an
employer toward the recipient's medical insurance premium.
Prior to 2002, it appears that the agency reimbursed
Keisker for his total out-of-pocket premium under the MIRP
formula.
Beginning in 2002, however, Keisker did not receive
full reimbursement of his out-of-pocket costs under the agency’s
reimbursement formula.
Instead, Keisker received reimbursement
of an amount equal to the difference between the agency’s
monthly premium allowance for a couple health insurance plan and
the amount paid by the State of Florida.
For example, in 2002
the total premium for Keisker’s Florida insurance for himself
and his wife was $583.96.
Of this amount, the State of Florida
paid $450.34, resulting in an out-of-pocket expense to Keisker
of $133.62 per month.
The monthly premium allowance in 2002 for
a couple plan was $522.92 per month.
Pursuant to the Retirement
Systems’ MIRP formula as set forth in 105 KAR 1:290 Section
2(2), Keisker was reimbursed $72.58 per month, which was based
upon the premium allowance for a couple plan ($522.92) less the
Florida contribution ($450.34).
This resulted in a net out-of-
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pocket expense to Keisker of $61.04 per month ($133.62 $72.58), or $732.48 per year.4
On March 20, 2003, Steven L. Mackey, Medical Insurance
Ombudsman of the Retirement Systems, wrote Keisker a letter
informing him that the agency had over-reimbursed him by a total
of $232.48 for the period of June 2002 through September 2002.5
After receiving the March 20, 2003, Mackey letter, Keisker
objected to the agency regarding its request for reimbursement,
and further objected to the agency’s failure to pay his full
out-of-pocket costs for his Florida health care insurance.
Keisker contended that, pursuant to KRS 61.702, he was entitled
to 100% reimbursement of his out-of-pocket costs up to the
amount of the monthly premium allowance for a couple health care
plan.
On June 4, 2003, a final administrative decision
letter was issued by Jennifer A. Jones, Legal Counsel for
Retirement Systems, reiterating that Keisker had been overreimbursed for the period of June through September 2002, and
4
In 2003 the total premium for Keisker’s Florida insurance was $659.87 per
month, of which the State of Florida paid $508.00. This resulted in Keisker
having to pay $150.98 per month out-of-pocket. The Retirement Systems’
premium allowance for a couple plan in 2003 was $545.76 per month, and
pursuant to the Systems’ formula for reimbursement, it reimbursed Keisker
$36.88 per month ($545.76 - $508.88). As a result, Keisker’s unreimbursed
out-of-pocket expense in 2003 was $114.10 per month, or a total of $1,369.20
for 2003.
5
The over-reimbursement resulted from Keisker having been reimbursed based
upon the reimbursement rate for the family plan rate rather than the retiree
and spouse (couple) rate. The letter requested reimbursement of the
overpayment pursuant to 105 KAR 1:290 Section 7(1).
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reaffirming the agency’s interpretation of the relevant statutes
and regulations which set forth the reimbursement rate for of
out-of-pocket health care premiums.
Keisker subsequently
appealed the administrative decision letter pursuant to KRS
61.645 and KRS Chapter 13B.
The matter was referred to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Paul F. Fauri.
The parties set forth stipulations, briefed the legal
issues, and submitted the matter to the ALJ upon the record.
No evidentiary hearing was held.
On January 6, 2004, the ALJ
issued his report and recommended order.
The ALJ upheld the
Retirement Systems’ interpretation of KRS 61.702 and
promulgation of 105 KAR 1:290 and its claim to reimbursement.6
Keisker timely filed exceptions to the ALJ’s Report
and Recommended Order.
On April 6, 2004, the Administrative
Appeals Committee of the Board of Trustees of Kentucky
Retirement Systems issued a Final Order adopting the ALJ’s
recommended order as the final order of the Agency.
Keisker
subsequently appealed to the Franklin Circuit Court.
On April 13, 2005, the Franklin Circuit Court entered
an order upholding the Retirement Systems’ interpretation of KRS
61.702 and 105 KAR 1:290, and the agency’s claim of entitlement
to reimbursement from Keisker.
This appeal followed.
6
The ALJ, citing KRS 13A.140, noted that he was without authority to
adjudicate the regulation as invalid.
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Before us, Keisker contends that KRS 61.702 requires
that he be reimbursed for the full amount of his out-of-pocket
health care premiums up to the monthly premium allowance for a
couples plan; that the Retirement Systems’ reimbursement formula
and 105 KAR 1:290 contravene KRS 61.702; that the Retirement
Systems’ “purported goal of equalizing benefits is ultra vires”;
that the Retirement Systems’ formula violates the constitutional
freedom of interstate travel and migration; and that the formula
is unconstitutional because it is arbitrary and capricious.
The principal issues in this appeal concern the proper
interpretation of KRS 61.702 and whether the Retirement Systems’
promulgation of 105 KAR 1:290 comports with KRS 61.702.
The
interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for the court.
White v. McAllister, Ky. 443 S.W.2d 541 (KY. 1969).
We review
questions of law arising out of administrative proceedings de
novo. Camera Center, Inc. v. Revenue Cabinet, 34 S.W.3d 39, 41
(Ky. 2000); Revenue Cabinet v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 838
S.W.2d 406, 408 (Ky.App. 1992).
The fundamental rule in the interpretation and
construction of a statute is that the court should "ascertain
and give effect to the intention of the Legislature and that
intention must be determined from the language of the statute
itself if possible."
Moore v. Alsmiller, 289 Ky. 682, 686-87,
160 S.W.2d 10, 12 (1942).
Generally a statute is open to
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construction only if the language that is used is ambiguous and
requires interpretation.
If the language is clear and
unambiguous and if applying the plain meaning of the words would
not lead to an absurd result, further interpretation is
unwarranted. Overnite Transportation v. Gaddis, 793 S.W.2d 129,
131 (Ky.App. 1990).
However, when a statute is ambiguous and
its meaning uncertain, the legislative intent should be
ascertained by considering the whole statute and the purpose
intended to be accomplished.
Department of Motor
Transportation. v. City Bus Co., Ky., 252 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky.
1952).
In construing the statute, the court must consider the
policy and the purpose of the statute, the reason and the spirit
of the statute, and the mischief intended to be remedied. Barker
v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 515, 516-17 (KY.App. 2000).
The
court's interpretation of the statute should produce a practical
and reasonable result.
Walker v. Kentucky Department of
Education, 981 S.W.2d 128, 130 (Ky.App. 1998).
Statutes should
not be interpreted so as to bring about absurd or unreasonable
results."
Estes v. Commonwealth, 952 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Ky.
1997).
Our task is to determine whether KRS 61.702 authorizes
the promulgation of 105 KAR 1:290 Section 2(2),7 which provides
that “[t]he monthly reimbursement rate shall be reduced by the
7
Keisker does not allege that any of the other provisions of 105 KAR 1:290
are inconsistent with KRS 61.702.
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amount contributed by an employer or agency toward the
recipient's medical insurance premium.”
With the
foregoing principles of statutory construction in mind, we now
review the text of the statute.
KRS 61.702 provides, in
relevant part, as follows:
(1) (a) The board of trustees of Kentucky
Retirement Systems shall arrange by
appropriate contract or on a self-insured
basis to provide a group hospital and
medical insurance plan for present and
future recipients of a retirement allowance
from the Kentucky Employees Retirement
System, County Employees Retirement System,
and State Police Retirement System . . . .
(b) The board may authorize present and
future recipients of a retirement allowance
from any of the three (3) retirement systems
to be included in the state employees' group
for hospital and medical insurance and shall
provide benefits for recipients equal to
those provided to state employees having the
same Medicare hospital and medical insurance
eligibility status . . . .
. . . .
(c) For recipients of a retirement allowance
who are not eligible for the same level of
hospital and medical benefits as recipients
living in Kentucky having the same Medicare
hospital and medical insurance eligibility
status, the board shall provide a medical
insurance reimbursement plan as described in
subsection (7) of this section. (Emphasis
added).
. . . .
(3) (a) The premium required to provide
hospital and medical benefits under this
section shall be paid:
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. . . .
5. In full from the Kentucky Retirement
Systems insurance fund for all
recipients of a retirement allowance
from any of the three (3) retirement
systems where such recipient is a
retired former member of one (1) or
more of the three (3) retirement
systems (not a beneficiary or dependent
child receiving benefits) and had two
hundred and forty (240) months or more
of service upon retirement.
. . . .
(7) The board shall promulgate an
administrative regulation to establish a
medical insurance reimbursement plan to
provide reimbursement for hospital and
medical insurance premiums of recipients of
a retirement allowance who are not eligible
for the same level of hospital and medical
benefits as recipients living in Kentucky
and having the same Medicare hospital and
medical insurance eligibility status. An
eligible recipient shall file proof of
payment for hospital and medical insurance
at the retirement office. Reimbursement to
eligible recipients shall be made on a
quarterly basis. The recipient shall be
eligible for reimbursement of substantiated
medical insurance premiums for an amount not
to exceed the total monthly premium
determined under subsection (3) of this
section. The plan shall not be made
available if all recipients are eligible for
the same coverage as recipients living in
Kentucky. (Emphasis added).
KRS 61.702 (1)(a) and (b) provide that the Retirement
Systems must provide similarly situated retirees covered under
the Kentucky Employees Retirement System, the County Retirement
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System, and the State Police Retirement System with health
insurance equal to the health insurance benefits provided to
current state employees.
Accordingly, Keisker, along with other
similarly situated retirees, is entitled to the same health
insurance benefit as current state employees – no more, no less.
We believe the legislature intended that the term “benefit”
refer to the monetary monthly premium allowance as opposed to
any other measure of benefits.
For example, the monthly premium
allowance for 2002 for a couple plan was $522.92 per month.
KRS 61.702(c) recognizes that some retirees will
choose to move out-of-state following their retirement.
This
subsection of the statute provides that if an out-of-state
retiree is, for some reason, “not eligible” to obtain the “same
level” of health insurance as his Kentucky counterpart, then he
is entitled to an amount of reimbursement as defined in
subsection 7 of KRS 61.702.
As relevant to this case, the crucial provision of
subsection 7 is the sentence “[t]he recipient shall be eligible
for reimbursement of substantiated medical insurance premiums
for an amount not to exceed the total monthly premium determined
under subsection (3) of this section.”
We construe the
reference to “the total monthly premium determined under
subsection (3) of this section” as referring to the monthly
premium allowance described above (for example, $522.92 per
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month in 2002), and establishing the monetary insurance benefit
level to which a retiree is entitled.
We believe that the legislature anticipated that in
most situations, out-of-state retirees will obtain insurance
from other sources, and will accordingly be reimbursed a monthly
premium allowance in an amount up to, but not to exceed, the
monthly premium allowance allotted for a similarly situated instate retiree (for example, $522.92 per month in 2002).8
We
further believe, however, that the legislature intended that if
an employee had insurance coverage through an out-of-state
employer, such as the State of Florida, any premiums paid by the
employer would be deducted from the monthly premium allowance.
Because the overall statutory scheme seeks to place all retirees
on the same monetary benefit footing, we construe the “not to
exceed” clause of the subsection as mandating that the amount
paid by a retiree’s employer be deducted from the monthly
premium allowance.
This places in-state retirees, out-of-state
retirees on a Kentucky insurance plan, out-of-state retirees
with private insurance, and out-of-state retirees with employer
funded insurance on the same footing
In summary, we construe the text of KRS 61.702 as
providing for a deduction of insurance premiums paid by a thirdparty employer from the monthly premium allowance.
8
This
If the retiree had to pay more than the monthly premium allowance, he would
have to pay those costs out of his own pocket.
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construction ensures that an out-of-state retiree does not
receive a greater allotment for insurance coverage than his
Kentucky counterpart (or his out-of-state counterpart who
participates in the Kentucky insurance system),9 which we believe
comports with the legislative intent of the statute.
It follows
that 105 KAR 1:290 Section 2(2) is consistent with KRS 61.702.
“A regulation is valid unless it exceeds statutory authority or
is repugnant to the underlying statutory scheme.”
Jewish Hosp.,
Inc. v. Baptist Health Care System, Inc., 902 S.W.2d 844, 848
(Ky.App. 1995).
Such is not the case here; thus, the regulation
is valid.
Keisker argues, however, that if the agency’s
interpretation of the statute is correct, as we have determined
that it is, then KRS 61.702 is unconstitutional as a violation
of his constitutional freedom of interstate travel and
migration, and violative of Section 2 of the Kentucky
Constitution because it is arbitrary and capricious.
However,
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 24.03 provides that
“when the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly
affecting the public interest is drawn into question in any
action, the movant shall serve a copy of the pleading, motion or
9
Under Keisker’s interpretation, again using 2002 as an example, he would
have received a total monthly reimbursement allowance of $583.86 (the total
cost of his Florida insurance) as compared to a $522.92 allowance for
Kentucky retirees. We are persuaded that the legislature did not intend this
result.
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other paper first raising the challenge upon the AttorneyGeneral.”
Brashars v. Commonwealth, 25 S.W.3d 58 (Ky. 2000).10
Keisker has failed to cite us to his preservation of this issue
by compliance with CR 24.03, and our review of the record fails
to disclose such notification.
In any event, we assign no merit
to Keisker’s constitutional arguments.
In summary, the statute is valid, the regulation
promulgated by the agency is consistent with the statute, and
the agency properly applied the formula described by 105 KAR
1:290, Section 2(2) to Keisker’s circumstances.
Based upon this
conclusion, it follows that the agency has properly calculated
the reimbursement to which Keisker is entitled, and Keisker is
liable to the agency for repayment of the over-reimbursements
applicable to the months of June through September 2002.
For the foregoing reasons the judgment of the Franklin
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
David Leightty
Louisville, Kentucky
Brown Sharp II
Frankfort, Kentucky
10
Our Supreme Court may wish to reexamine this rule. It appears superfluous
to require such notification when the Commonwealth is already a party to the
proceedings. It further appears antithetical to judicial economy.
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