ROBERT C. FIELDS v. SHIRLEY L. FIELDS
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RENDERED: May 5, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000958-MR
ROBERT C. FIELDS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM BOYD CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE C. DAVID HAGERMAN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00167
v.
SHIRLEY L. FIELDS
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
GUIDUGLI AND TAYLOR, JUDGES; EMBERTON, SENIOR JUDGE.1
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Robert C. Fields brings this pro se appeal from
an April 13, 2005, summary judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court
dismissing his claim for recovery of personal property as timebarred.
We affirm.
The current dispute centers around ownership of family
household furniture.
Appellant asserts ownership of the
household furniture and claims the furniture was loaned to his
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 21.580.
brother, Phil E. Fields in 1983.2
Phil died testate on September
18, 2000, and left his entire estate to his widow, Shirley L.
Fields, appellee herein, and his two step-children.
Appellee
claimed the household furniture under the spousal exemption of
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 391.030.3
On August 12, 2002, appellant filed a motion in the
Boyd District Court in the Estate of Phil E. Fields seeking to
recover the household furniture.
On January 21, 2003, the
district court entered an order dismissing appellant’s claim as
being time-barred.
The district court held that a claim against
the estate was required to be filed within six months after
appointment of the personal representative.
The personal
representative was appointed December 5, 2000, and June 5, 2001,
was the final date to file such a claim.
Appellant’s August 12,
2002, motion was clearly outside the statute of limitations, and
the district court dismissed the action.
Appellant did not
appeal the dismissal.
2
Appellant alleges the furniture belonged to his and Phil E. Field’s brother,
John Bert Fields, who died testate on May 18, 1983. Appellant also alleges
that he and John’s other heirs agreed to let Phil use the furniture as long
as Phil lived in the “old home place” that he had purchased from John’s
heirs.
3
The will of Phil E. Fields was prepared by appellant. The order probating
will and appointing executor was entered by the Boyd District Court on
December 5, 2000. The original petition to probate the will and appoint
executor was filed by appellant, Robert C. Fields, as attorney. Shirley
Fields obtained private counsel in December 2001, and asserted her claim to
the furniture at that time in the probate proceeding.
-2-
On February 18, 2003, appellant filed the instant
declaratory judgment action in the Boyd Circuit Court against
appellee seeking to recover the household furniture.
On April
13, 2005, the circuit court entered summary judgment dismissing
the action as time-barred.
This appeal follows.
Appellant contends the circuit court committed error
by entering summary judgment dismissing the action as timebarred.
Summary judgment is proper where there exist no
material issues of fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center,
Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
Resolution of this appeal
primarily focuses upon issues of law.
Specifically, appellant contends the circuit court
erred by concluding that KRS 391.035 was inapplicable to his
claim against the property.
KRS 391.035 states, in part, as
follows:
(1) If real or personal property passes by
the laws of intestate succession, or under a
will to a beneficiary not named in the will,
proceedings may be had in the District Court
to determine the persons entitled to the
property.
(2) (a)
If an estate is in process of
administration, the executor,
administrator, or any person
claiming an interest in the
property may file a motion in the
District Court where
administration is in process. If
there is no pending administration
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or administration has been
dispensed with, any person
claiming an interest in the
property may file a motion in the
District Court of the county in
which the decedent last resided
or, if the decedent was not a
Kentucky resident, in the District
Court of the county in which the
property, or the greater part
thereof, is located;
(b)
The motion shall set forth all of
the facts known to the movant
relating to the matter, including
the names, ages, and addresses of
all persons who are or may be
entitled to share in the property
and their relationship to the
decedent or to the class of
beneficiaries entitled to share.
The motion shall also describe the
property under consideration and
an estimate of its value.
Under its plain language, KRS 391.035(1) clearly limits its
application to property that passes either by intestate
succession or by will to a beneficiary not named in the will.
In this case, Phil’s property passed to beneficiaries named in
Phil’s will, which were appellee and Phil’s step-children.
Accordingly, we do not believe that KRS 391.035 was applicable.
Appellant next argues the circuit court committed
error by concluding that his claim was time-barred under KRS
413.125.4
KRS 413.125 states as follows:
4
The circuit court did not reference KRS 413.125 in its order granting
appellee’s motion for summary judgment; rather, the court stated the claim
was time-barred because it was not brought before September 18, 2002, two
years after Phil’s death.
-4-
An action for the taking, detaining or
injuring of personal property, including an
action for specific recovery shall be
commenced within two (2) years from the time
the cause of action accrued.
Thereunder, an action for the taking of personal property must
be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued.
Appellant asserts that his cause of action under KRS
413.125 accrued when he received a letter dated December 1,
2001, from appellee’s attorney.
Appellant argues that he had
until December 1, 2003, to file his lawsuit.
We disagree.
Appellant alleges in the complaint and in his brief
filed with this Court that the basis for Phil’s use of the
household furnishings arises from an agreement reached between
Phil and his siblings in 1983, after the death of their brother
John Bert Fields.
This agreement is described in paragraph 8 of
the complaint as follows:
In addition to the real property the
surviving heirs made an agreement with the
decedent to permit him to have the use of
the household furniture and furnishings so
long as he lived in the old family homeplace
[sic] which he purchased from the surviving
heirs of John Bert Fields.
Assuming that the terms of the alleged contractual relationship
between Phil and the heirs of John Bert Fields are accurate as
set forth in the complaint, then it is undisputed that the
contract would have terminated by its own terms upon the death
of Phil on September 18, 2000, as he would have no longer been
-5-
living in the old family home place.
Additionally, it is
undisputed that appellee was not a party to this contractual
agreement between Phil, appellant, and other heirs of John Bert
Fields and thus, was not bound by any terms of said agreement.
Accordingly, upon the death of Phil and the
termination of the agreement, appellee assumed sole possession
of all household furniture described in the agreement adverse to
the ownership interest of appellant and any other heirs of John
Bert Fields.
Appellant and the remaining heirs had actual
knowledge of appellee’s possession of the household goods and
that possession was assumed without protest or objection by
appellant.
Therefore, any cause of action to recover the
property from appellee would have accrued upon the date that the
agreement terminated, that being upon the death of Phil on
September 18, 2000.
Appellant’s argument that the time for asserting a
cause of action against appellee accrued when her attorney wrote
the letter to appellant dated December 1, 2001, claiming the
household furniture under the spousal exemption is totally
without merit.
Again, assuming that a contractual agreement was
the basis for Phil’s use and possession of the household
furniture, the fact that appellee claimed the household
furniture under the spousal exemption of Phil’s estate is
totally immaterial to the actual date for a cause of action
-6-
against appellee.
Appellant, who is also an attorney who
represented Phil’s estate in the probate proceeding, knew that
the agreement with John Bert Field’s heirs had terminated upon
Phil’s death and that appellee retained possession of the
household furniture.
Even upon receipt of the letter in
December 2001, appellant had over nine months to bring an action
against appellee to recover the property that would have been
timely pursuant to KRS 413.125.
Failure to file the complaint
by September 18, 2002, was therefore fatal to any claim for the
household goods against appellee.
Appellant also argues that the authority set forth in
Codell Construction Co. v. Commonwealth, 566 S.W.2d 161 (Ky.App.
1977) supports his position that the claim accrued on December
1, 2001.
Appellant’s reliance upon this legal authority is
completely misplaced.
In Codell, the Court addressed the
statute of limitation found in KRS 44.310 that pertained to a
construction contract entered into with the Commonwealth of
Kentucky.
This statute has no relationship whatsoever to KRS
413.125, nor is the language of the statutes similar as argued
by appellant.
In fact, KRS 44.310 was repealed and reenacted in
1978 (effective January 1, 1979) as KRS 45A.260.
This statute
is specifically limited to construction contracts executed and
administered by the transportation cabinet and provides that
claims will be commenced in the Franklin Circuit Court within
-7-
one year from the time that the Commonwealth has determined
final pay quantities and issues a final pay estimate to the
contracting party or when the Commonwealth issues a final
adverse decision, whichever occurs later.
There is absolutely
no similarity or relationship between the statute of limitations
found in KRS 45A.260 and in KRS 413.125.
Accordingly, we conclude that appellant’s action was
time-barred under KRS 413.125.
In sum, we hold the circuit
court properly entered summary judgment dismissing appellant’s
action as time-barred.
We view appellant’s remaining contentions to be moot
or without merit.
For the foregoing reasons, the summary judgment of the
Boyd Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Robert C. Fields, Pro Se
Frankfort, Kentucky
Pamela H. Potter
Ashland, Kentucky
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