STELLA HODGE v. RUTH PHILLIPS
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
cRENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 1, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-000871-MR
STELLA HODGE
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
CIVIL ACTION NO. 99-CI-00036
v.
RUTH PHILLIPS
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE: COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; HUDDLESTON AND KNOPF, SENIOR
JUDGES.1
HUDDLESTON, SENIOR JUDGE:
Because we have determined that
Stella Hodge lacks standing to appeal from a Knox Circuit Court
summary judgment, we dismiss this appeal and remand for further
proceedings.
The underlying lawsuit which spawned this appeal began
in 1999 when Henry Sizemore, Sr., sued two of his sons in Knox
Circuit Court.
1
Sizemore’s suit concerned disputes over various
Senior Judges Joseph R. Huddleston and William L. Knopf sitting as Special
Judges by assignment of the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of
the Kentucky Constitution and KRS 21.580.
pieces of real property.
A short time later, Ruth Phillips,
Sizemore’s daughter, sought permission to intervene as a
defendant and to file an intervening complaint against Sizemore.
In her intervening complaint, Phillips alleged that Sizemore and
his late wife had sold ten acres of land to Phillips pursuant to
an oral contract.
Phillips claimed that she had paid the full
purchase price for the property, thereby fulfilling the terms of
the oral contract.
Sizemore denied Phillips’s claim and
objected to her motion to intervene.
In considering the motion
to intervene, the court noted that Phillips had presented no
evidence that the oral contract existed, and the court said
that, even if she had, the Statute of Frauds makes an oral
contract for the sale of land unenforceable.
Accordingly, the
court denied Phillips’s motion to intervene.
After her motion was denied, Phillips appealed to this
Court.
We reversed the order denying intervention and held that
the circuit court was first required to determine whether or not
the parties had entered into an oral contract.
If the answer
was affirmative, the court was required to determine whether or
not Phillips had fully performed the contract, i.e., paid the
purchase price.
If Phillips had fully performed, we held that
she was entitled to specific performance of the oral contract:
conveyance of the disputed property.
further proceedings.
We then remanded for
Despite the fact that she succeeded on
-2-
appeal in 2001, Phillips allowed her cause of action to languish
until 2003.
While Phillips was biding her time, Stella Hodge
became entangled in the dispute between Sizemore and his
daughter.
On May 9, 2003, Hodge entered into a written land
contract with Sizemore in which she agreed to purchase fourteen
acres of land from him.
These fourteen acres included the ten
acres claimed by Phillips.
After the land contract was
executed, Hodge dutifully recorded it, on May 12, 2003, in the
office of the Knox County Clerk.
Shortly thereafter, on May 22, 2003, Phillips filed
notice with Knox Circuit Court that she intended to pursue her
claim against her father, Sizemore.
More than a year later, in
July 2004, Phillips filed an amended intervening complaint
naming Hodge as a third-party defendant.
Hodge filed an answer
to the amended intervening complaint, a cross-claim against
Phillips2 and a counterclaim against Sizemore.
In January 2005,
Phillips filed a motion for summary judgment against Sizemore
supported by an affidavit that Sizemore had signed in June 2004.
In the affidavit, Sizemore swore that he and his late wife had
entered into an oral contract with Phillips to convey the ten
2
In Hodge’s answer to Phillips’s amended intervening complaint, she
presented what she labeled as a cross-claim against Phillips. In actuality,
Hodge asserted a laches defense asserting that Phillips should be estopped
from asserting her claims against Sizemore and Hodge because Phillips had
waited from August 24, 2001, until May 22, 2003, before resuming her claim
against Sizemore.
-3-
acres to her upon payment of the purchase price and that
Phillips had, in fact, paid him the full price.
Although Hodge
was not named in Phillips’s motion for summary judgment, Hodge,
nevertheless, responded to the motion.
On March 30, 2005, the
circuit court determined that there was no material issue of
fact since it was now undisputed that Phillips and Sizemore had
entered into an oral contract providing for the sale of the ten
acres of land to Phillips and that Phillips had fully performed
the contract by paying the purchase price.
Despite having made
this determination, the circuit court did not order the ten
acres conveyed to Phillips nor did it grant Phillips any other
relief.
Nevertheless, the court included in the summary
judgment a finality recital:
“there being no just cause for
delay this summary judgment is final and appealable on these
issues.”
Although the summary judgment did not address
Phillips’s claim against Hodge nor either Hodge’s cross-claim
against Phillips or her counterclaim against Sizemore, Hodge
filed a notice of appeal from the judgment.
Phillips responded
with a motion to dismiss Hodge’s appeal arguing that Hodge
lacked standing to appeal.
On July 26, 2005, a motion panel of
this Court denied Phillips’s motion to dismiss.
Since our July 26, 2005, order was only an interim
order and we now have the benefit of the parties’ briefs and
-4-
access to the complete record on appeal, we chose to reconsider
Phillips’s motion to dismiss Hodge’s appeal.3
The issue of
standing must be decided on the unique facts that surround each
case.4
And the party who is asserting standing must have more
than a mere expectancy in the outcome; she must have a present
and substantial interest.5
Turning to this case, when Phillips filed her motion
for summary judgment, she only addressed her claim against
Sizemore.
And, in the March 30, 2005, judgment, the circuit
court did not address her entire claim against Sizemore.
As has
been noted, the court determined that it was undisputed that
Phillips and the Sizemores had entered into an oral contract
providing for the sale of ten acres of land and that Phillips
had fully performed the contract by paying the purchase price.
However, the court did not order the property conveyed to
Phillips, nor did the court adjudicate any of Hodge’s claims.
Since the court did not address Hodge’s claims, they are still
pending before the circuit court.
The judgment only resolved
two of the several issues in this case and only bound Phillips
and Sizemore.
It is doubtful that any party has standing to
3
See Knott v. Crown Colony Farm, Inc., 865 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Ky. 1993) (An
interim or interlocutory order “is by its nature subject to further review in
the court where the case is still pending, either at the request of a party
or sua sponte, until a final, appealable decision has been entered, whether
by judgment, order or opinion.”).
4
Plaza B.V. v. Stephens, 913 S.W.2d 319, 322 (Ky. 1996).
5
Id.
-5-
appeal since the circuit court did not grant any relief to
Phillips or to Sizemore, but it is certain that Hodge was not
bound by the judgment since none of her claims were adjudicated.
She has no present interest in the judgment and lacks standing
to challenge it on appeal.
It is, therefore, ORDERED that this appeal is
dismissed because Hodge lacks standing to maintain it, and this
case is remanded to Knox Circuit Court for further proceedings.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
September 1, 2006
/s/ Joseph R. Huddleston_______
SENIOR JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Linda J. West
Barbourville, Kentucky
Franklin A. Stivers
London, Kentucky
-6-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.