RAMON ADAMS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
DECEMBER 15, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000853-MR
RAMON ADAMS
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE LISABETH HUGHES ABRAMSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-001483
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; GUIDUGLI AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Ramon Adams has appealed from the final
judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered on March 24,
2005, which sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment pursuant
to his conditional guilty plea to assault in the third degree.1
Having concluded that Adams was properly prosecuted under
sections (1)(a) and (b) of KRS 508.025, we affirm.
On May 19, 2004, Adams was indicted by a Jefferson
County grand jury for assault in the third degree, terroristic
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 508.025.
threatening in the third degree,2 and for being a persistent
felony offender in the first degree (PFO I).3
The charges arose
from an incident that occurred while Adams was held at the
Jefferson County Detention Center.
Officers had removed Adams
from his dorm after he had threatened another inmate.
Because
he was acting violently, Adams’s hands were cuffed behind his
back and his feet were shackled together.
Adams was led onto an
elevator by two officers so he could be transported to the
Intake Bullpen.
When one of the officers, who was leading Adams
from behind, attempted to force Adams off the elevator and down
the hallway, Adams thrust his hips into the officer’s midsection
and grabbed the officers’ testicles.
The officer pushed Adams
against a wall and used a vascular restraint to subdue Adams,
until he finally released his hold on the officer.
On November 23, 2004, Adams filed a motion to amend
the first count of the indictment to include only section (1)(b)
of KRS 508.025.
He claimed that KRS 508.025 is ambiguous
because it provides “two different and conflicting standards
with respect to both the mental state and the criminal act.”
He
further claimed that if the statute was not ambiguous then the
plain meaning of the statute was that Adams, a person confined
in a detention center, could only be charged with and convicted
2
KRS 508.080.
3
KRS 532.080(3).
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of assault in the third degree if he actually caused physical
injury to the officer, under section (1)(b) of KRS 508.025.
The
trial court orally denied Adams’s motion.
On November 30, 2004, Adams entered into a plea
agreement with the Commonwealth and pled guilty to assault in
the third degree and terroristic threatening.
I was dismissed.
The charge of PFO
Adams reserved his right to appeal the trial
court’s denial of his motion to amend the indictment.
The trial
court entered an order on December 2, 2004, accepting Adam’s
guilty plea.
The trial court then entered its final judgment on
March 24, 2005, sentencing Adams to four years’ imprisonment.
This appeal followed.
The crux of Adams’s argument concerns the
interpretation of KRS 508.025.
On review, it is the duty of
this Court to construe the statute “so as to effectuate the
plain meaning and unambiguous intent expressed in the law.”4
Because the proper interpretation of KRS 508.025 is purely a
legal issue, our review is de novo.5
KRS 508.025 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)
A person is guilty of assault in the
third degree when the actor:
4
Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu v. Transportation Cabinet, 983 S.W.2d 488, 492 (Ky.
1998).
5
Floyd County Board of Education v. Ratliff, 955 S.W.2d 921, 925 (Ky. 1997);
Bob Hook Chevrolet Isuzu, 983 S.W.2d at 490.
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(a)
Recklessly with a deadly weapon or
dangerous instrument, or
intentionally causes or attempts
to cause physical injury6 to:
. . .
2.
An employee of a detention
facility . . .
[or]
(b)
Being a person confined in a
detention facility . . . inflicts
physical injury upon or throws or
causes feces, or urine, or other
bodily fluid to be thrown upon an
employee of the facility.
Adams argues that because he was “a person confined in a
detention facility” he could only be prosecuted under section
(1)(b).
A great portion of Adams’s argument on appeal goes to
how this Court should interpret KRS 508.025 based upon his
belief that it is ambiguous and conflicting; and he cites the
legislative history of KRS 508.025 as support for this position.
However, we conclude that the statute is clear, based upon its
plain meaning, and thus we do not have to look outside the
statute for its interpretation.7
6
Statues relating to assault do not provide a definition of physical injury.
See Covington v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 560, 564 (Ky. 1992). However, KRS
500.080(13) defines physical injury as “substantial physical pain or any
impairment of physical condition.”
7
See Lamb v. Holmes, 162 S.W.3d 902, 909 (Ky. 2005) (stating that “[w]e have
issued many decisions expressing the common rule that the ‘plain meaning’ of
statutes controls when interpreting statutory language. . . . And the only
time the ‘plain meaning’ rule is not to be applied is when doing so ‘would
constitute an absurd result’” [citations omitted]); see also Brown v.
Commonwealth, 40 S.W.3d 873, 875 (Ky.App. 1999) (stating that “[w]hen
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By reading the statute and acknowledging its plain
meaning, we conclude that the Legislature intended for prisoners
to be prosecuted for assault under either section of the
statute.
The words “employees of a detention facility”
contained in section (1)(a)2 are clear.
It was permissible for
our Legislature to enact a section of a statute to specifically
criminalize the conduct of an inmate who physically injures an
employee of a detention center, even though that same statute
also contains a general provision regarding prosecution for the
same criminal conduct.8
When two statutes apply to criminalize
the same conduct, it is constitutionally permissible for the
Commonwealth to proceed under either statute, or both statutes
if it so prefers.9
We reject Adams’s contention that because section
(1)(b) contains a requirement of proof that a physical injury
occurred, whereas (1)(a) does not contain the same requirement,
that the two sections of the statute are conflicting.
Although
only section (1)(a) expressly designates a culpable mental
state, this Court has held that if the criminal conduct
necessarily involves a culpable mental state, one of the four
interpreting a statute, we look to the statute’s express language and overall
purpose. . . . The task begins with the language of the statute itself. When
a statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce
it according to its terms’” [citations omitted]).
8
See Covington v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 560 (Ky. 1992).
9
See Commonwealth v. McKinney, 594 S.W.2d 884, 887 (Ky. 1979).
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mental states is applicable to some or all of the material
elements of the offense, even if the statute does not expressly
so state.10
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that the
Legislature intended for both sections of KRS 508.025 to apply
to inmates being housed in a detention facility, even though
section (1)(b) provides for an occurrence of actual physical
injury, whereas under section (1)(a) the inmate could be
convicted even if he only attempted to inflict physical injury
on an employee of a detention facility.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit
Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Frank W. Heft, Jr.
Louisville, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Wm. Robert Long, Jr.
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
10
See, e.g., Covington, 849 S.W.2d at 562 (KRS 508.025(1)(b), when read in
conjunction with KRS 501.040, has intentionally or wantonly as the culpable
mental state).
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