MARCUS ANTWAN CHAMBERS v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
Annotate this Case
Download PDF
RENDERED: MAY 26, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000815-MR
MARCUS ANTWAN CHAMBERS
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE JAMES D. ISHMAEL, JR., JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-CR-00937
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND JOHNSON, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
Marcus Chambers has appealed from a judgment
entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on March 22, 2005, as a
result of a conditional guilty plea to possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree (cocaine),1 fleeing and
evading the police in the second degree,2 and giving a police
officer a false name.3
Having concluded that the trial court did
not err in denying the motion to suppress evidence, we affirm.
1
Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 218A.1415.
2
KRS 520.100.
3
KRS 523.110.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Jarrod Curtsinger
of the Lexington Metro Police Department testified that on July
8, 2004, he was patrolling the “Arbor Grove” area of Lexington
and that this area is HUD property that is marked with “No
Trespassing” signs.
Officer Curtsinger testified that around
2:00 a.m. he observed a vehicle parked in an Arbor Grove parking
lot with two occupants.
Officer Curtsinger stated that neither
occupant was in the process of exiting the vehicle.
Officer
Curtsinger testified that he believed the occupants of the
vehicle were trespassing and stated that the area was “one of
the hottest spots in Lexington for drug activity.”
Officer Curtsinger testified that he drove past the
parking lot and made a loop.
When he returned to the parking
lot, the vehicle was in the same place and with two occupants.
Officer Curtsinger then decided to approach the vehicle, to
investigate the occupants’ purpose for being on the premises,
and to determine whether they lived in the area.
Officer
Curtsinger testified that he pulled into the parking lot and
exited his patrol car.
As he was approaching the vehicle,
Officer Curtsinger was joined at the scene by Officer Morris
also with the Lexington Police Department.
Officer Curtsinger
testified that he approached the driver’s side of the vehicle
and Officer Morris approached the passenger’s side.
-2-
Officer Curtsinger testified that he asked the
occupants of the vehicle if they lived in the area and both men
indicated that they did not.
Officer Curtsinger then asked the
occupants their names and if they had identification.
According
to Officer Curtsinger, the driver, Larry Walker, produced a
driver’s license; however, Chambers, who was sitting in the
passenger’s seat, said he did not have any identification.
Officer Curtsinger stated that he told Chambers it was a crime
to give a police officer a false name and that Chambers told him
his name was “Jeffery Collins.”
Officer Curtsinger also stated
that Chambers gave him a Social Security number that contained
an incorrect amount of numerals.
Officer Curtsinger testified that he checked the
information Chambers gave him over the police information system
and found no match for the name or information Chambers had
provided.
Officer Curtsinger testified that he then motioned
for Officer Morris to remove Chambers from the vehicle to arrest
him for providing a police officer a false name.
Officer
Curtsinger testified that as Chambers exited the vehicle and
Officer Morris began to attempt to place him under arrest,
Chambers broke and ran.
Officer Curtsinger testified that he
ordered Chambers to stop, and after pursuing him on foot found
him hiding in the doorway of an apartment.
Officer Curtsinger
ordered Chambers to come out and he was arrested for giving a
-3-
police officer a false name and fleeing and evading.
Officer
Curtsinger testified that once Chambers was placed under arrest
he conducted a search of Chambers’s person and discovered a
small bag of crack cocaine in his pocket.
An iris scan was
performed on Chambers at the Fayette County Detention Center
which disclosed Chambers’s true identity, and it was determined
that he had an outstanding warrant for a probation violation.
Chambers was indicted by a Fayette County grand jury
on August 3, 2004, for possession of a controlled substance in
the first degree, fleeing and evading police in the second
degree, giving a peace officer a false name and address, and
criminal trespass in the third degree.4
Following his
indictment, Chambers moved the trial court to suppress the
evidence seized following his arrest on the grounds that Officer
Curtsinger did not have a legitimate basis for stopping Walker
and Chambers in the parking lot.
The trial court conducted a
hearing on Chambers’s motion on November 24, 2004, and denied
the motion on December 17, 2004.5
The trial court found that under the circumstances of
this case and pursuant to United States v. Sharpe,6 that Officer
4
KRS 511.060.
5
The trial court’s oral findings at the hearing on December 17, 2004, were
adopted in a written order entered on December 28, 2004.
6
470 U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).
-4-
Curtsinger had sufficient reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot to justify approaching the vehicle
in order to investigate whether Chambers and Walker were
trespassing.
Further, the trial court found that when Chambers
gave Officer Curtsinger a name which Curtsinger was unable to
verify through the police information system as well as a Social
Security number with an incorrect amount of numerals, Officer
Curtsinger had a legitimate basis to investigate further to
determine Chambers’s identity.
The trial court found that once
Chambers broke and ran Officer Curtsinger had a reasonable
suspicion to pursue and to arrest Chambers for fleeing and
evading and the cocaine was then properly discovered during a
search incident to arrest.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress,
Chambers entered a conditional guilty plea7 to possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree, fleeing and evading a
police officer in the second degree, and giving a peace officer
a false name.
The criminal trespass charge was dismissed, and
Chambers was sentenced to prison for one year.
followed.
7
Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 8.09
-5-
This appeal
Our standard of review of a trial court’s decision
regarding a motion to suppress evidence was summarized in
Baltimore v. Commonwealth,8 as follows:
[T]he decision of the circuit court on a
motion to suppress based on an alleged
illegal search following a hearing is
subject to a two-part analysis. First,
factual findings of the court involving
historical facts are conclusive if they are
not clearly erroneous and are supported by
substantial evidence. Second, the ultimate
issue of the existence of reasonable
suspicion or probable cause is a mixed
question of law and fact subject to de novo
review [footnotes omitted].
Chambers does not dispute the facts surrounding the
search at issue in this case.
Rather, he contends that Officer
Curtsinger lacked a reasonable suspicion to approach the vehicle
for purposes of an investigation.
The trial court found, and we
agree, that Officer Curtsinger did have reasonable, articulable
suspicion to investigate whether Chambers and Walker were
trespassing.
Officer Curtsinger testified that he observed the
occupied vehicle in the parking lot in the early morning and
observed that neither occupant was exiting the vehicle.
Based
upon his experience and the fact the housing complex contained
no trespassing signs and was in an area known to him as a high
crime area, Officer Curtsinger had a reasonable, articulable
8
119 S.W.3d 532, 539 (Ky.App. 2003) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)).
-6-
suspicion that criminal activity was afoot.
In Terry v. Ohio,9
the Supreme Court recognized “that a police officer may in
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach
a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an
arrest.”10
It is proper for a police officer to “stop and
briefly detain a person for investigative purposes[.]”11
Thus,
Officer Curtsinger was justified in approaching the occupants of
the vehicle to inquire as to whether they were trespassing.
The facts of this case are similar to those considered
by this Court in Creech v. Commonwealth,12 where Creech and
another person were observed by a police officer sitting in a
truck in the parking lot of a club in the early morning hours.
The officer testified that he saw the occupants hunched over in
the vehicle facing each other.
Citing Adams v. Williams,13 this
Court held that it was “reasonable to suspect, considering the
totality of the circumstances, that Creech and his companion
could have been involved with a stolen vehicle or certainly
9
10
392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
Id. at 22.
11
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1
(1989) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 30).
12
812 S.W.2d 162 (Ky.App. 1991).
13
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
-7-
could have been engaging in some criminal activity at the time
and place [the officer] observed them.”14
As in Creech, the actions of Chambers and Walker
aroused the suspicions of Officer Curtsinger, and his
investigation “was in furtherance of either dispelling or
confirming the suspicions and of maintaining the status quo
while obtaining more information.”15
Upon being asked his
identity, Chambers told Officer Curtsinger that he did not have
any identification on him and said that his name was “Jeffery
Collins” in addition to providing a Social Security number with
an incorrect amount of numerals.
This information further
aroused a reasonable suspicion on the part of Officer Curtsinger
that Chambers was providing false information.
Officer
Curtsinger then ran the information provided by Chambers through
the police information system and discovered that there was no
match in the system for the information Chambers had provided.16
Officer Curtsinger then requested that Officer Morris remove
Chambers from the vehicle to arrest him for providing a false
name to a peace officer.
14
Creech, 812 S.W.2d at 164.
15
Id.
16
Officer Curtsinger also testified that upon further questioning, Chambers
gave him a different date of his birth and could not spell his name, but the
trial court made no factual finding as to this testimony.
-8-
Since Officer Curtsinger testified that Chambers and
Walker were not free to leave after he approached the vehicle to
investigate, a seizure occurred at that time, and we disagree
with the trial court’s finding to the contrary.17
“[A] person
has been seized when, in view of all of the circumstances
surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have
believed that he was not free to leave.”18
Clearly, based upon
Officer Curtsinger’s testimony that Chambers was not free to
leave, a seizure had occurred.
The seizure was lawful under the
totality of the circumstances and was reasonably related to the
scope of the initial intrusion.
Chambers had provided
inaccurate and inconsistent information in response to Officer
Curtsinger’s request for identification.
When Officer
Curtsinger was unable to verify the information provided, he
became further suspicious that Chambers was not being truthful
with him about his identity.
Thus, based upon the totality of
the circumstances Officer Curtsinger was justified in detaining
Chambers further to investigate whether Chambers had committed a
crime by providing a false name.
17
Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003) (noting that an
appellate court will uphold a conviction where the trial court may have
reached the correct result although for the wrong reason).
18
Baker v. Commonwealth, 5 S.W.3d 142, 145 (Ky. 1999)(citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).
-9-
As Officer Morris was getting Chambers out of the
vehicle, Chambers broke away and ran.
This obviously gave
Officer Curtsinger greater suspicion to believe Chambers had
provided false information regarding his identity, and when
Chambers fled he committed the criminal offence of fleeing and
evading a police officer.19
This criminal act justified Officer
Curtsinger’s foot pursuit of Chambers and his arrest.
The
warrantless search of Chambers’s person which followed was
proper under the search incident to arrest exception to the
Fourth Amendment.20
Based upon the foregoing, the judgment of the Fayette
Circuit Court is affirmed.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
DYCHE, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gene Lewter
Lexington, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kristin N. Logan
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
19
We reject Chambers’s argument that his fleeing did not create a substantial
risk of physical injury to a person. See Robertson v. Commonwealth, 82
S.W.3d 832, 837-38 (Ky. 2002) (holding that there was sufficient evidence to
present to the jury the question of fact of whether the defendant who saw an
officer pursuing him knew or should have known that the officer’s death was
rendered substantially more probable).
20
Baltimore, 119 S.W.3d at 538.
-10-
Some case metadata and case summaries were written with the help of AI, which can produce inaccuracies. You should read the full case before relying on it for legal research purposes.
This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.