D.D.Y. v. J.A.G.
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RENDERED:
JANUARY 27, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000803-ME
D.D.Y.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM CALDWELL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE BILL CUNNINGHAM, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-AD-00004
v.
J.A.G.
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; DYCHE AND HENRY, JUDGES.
HENRY, JUDGE:
D.D.Y. appeals from a February 24, 2005 order of
the Caldwell Circuit Court denying his petition to involuntarily
terminate J.A.G.’s parental rights to C.M.G., a minor.
Upon
review, we affirm.
E.B.Y. is the biological mother of C.M.G., who was
born on January 31, 1999.
E.B.Y. married J.A.G., C.M.G.’s
biological father, on December 18, 1999.
After separating in
July 2000, the couple ultimately divorced on January 10, 2001.
At that time, E.B.Y. was granted the sole care, custody, and
control of C.M.G., and child support was set at approximately
$400.00 per month.
J.A.G. was served with process but failed to
make an appearance to contest the custody or child support
issues.
2002.
E.B.Y. subsequently married D.D.Y. on September 14,
C.M.G. has lived with the couple since their marriage.
On February 27, 2003, E.B.Y filed a petition to
involuntarily terminate J.A.G.’s parental rights to C.M.G.
pursuant to KRS1 625.050.2
As grounds for this petition, E.B.Y.
set forth that J.A.G. had abandoned and neglected C.M.G. by
failing to provide for her or to otherwise participate in her
life as a parent. J.A.G. filed an answer challenging the
petition, and the matter proceeded to a hearing that was
conducted on January 10, 2005.
At the hearing, E.B.Y. testified that after she
separated from J.A.G. in July 2000, she and C.M.G. went to live
with her parents in Caldwell County.
J.A.G. apparently made
only two phone calls to schedule visitation with C.M.G. during
the remainder of 2000, and – on each occasion – made
arrangements to pick up the child only to fail to appear at the
appointed time and place.
E.B.Y. further testified that J.A.G.
called only once during 2001 and made no attempts to call or
visit during 2002 and 2003.
1
He did see C.M.G. at his
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
The petition was later amended on June 7, 2004 to include D.D.Y. as a
petitioner and to ask for him to be named as C.M.G.’s adoptive parent.
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grandmother’s funeral in 2002.
E.B.Y. further indicated that
during this period of time, C.M.G. became close to D.D.Y. and
began referring to him as “Dad.”
The only financial support provided by J.A.G. for
C.M.G. from the July 2000 separation up until his incarceration
in March 2002 was an $80.00 purchase at Wal-Mart in August 2000
and an additional $500.00 that was collected by the child
support enforcement office.
When J.A.G. was released from
prison in October 2004, he immediately began paying $50.00 to
$100.00 per week in support and had paid approximately $900.00
as of the hearing; however, he still owed over $5,000.00 in back
support at that time.
The testimony further revealed that J.A.G. began using
methamphetamine in 1999 and was charged with the crime of
knowingly manufacturing methamphetamine in March 2002.
After
being released on bond the following month, J.A.G. was arrested
and charged with additional methamphetamine-related offenses in
June 2002.
He was subsequently incarcerated until finally being
released from prison in October 2004.
parole.
He is currently on
While in prison, J.A.G. underwent a drug treatment
program and currently participates in a twelve-step program.
He
also attends one meeting per week with a case worker.
J.A.G. also testified that he did make some additional
efforts to contact C.M.G. in 2000 and 2001, but was unable to do
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so, due in part to acrimony between himself and E.B.Y.’s family,
with whom she was living at the time.
However, he also admitted
that the primary reason as to why he had previously had so
little contact with C.M.G. and had failed to provide child
support was his methamphetamine addiction.
J.A.G. additionally
indicated that, while in prison, he did write to C.M.G.
approximately five times and sent her two birthday and Christmas
cards containing money.
He also sought visitation with C.M.G.
after his release, but was denied by E.B.Y.
It was also
revealed that J.A.G. had voluntarily terminated his parental
rights to his two other children, but that he now felt that this
was a mistake.
He had consequently begun making efforts to
start a relationship with the children after his release from
prison.
J.A.G. further testified that he wanted to be a part of
C.M.G.’s life and to contribute to her support.
Following the hearing and the recommendation from
C.M.G.’s guardian ad litem,3 the trial court entered findings and
an order denying the petition for involuntary termination on the
general basis that it could not find by clear and convincing
evidence that J.A.G. “had a fixed and intentional design of
3
The guardian recommended that it would be in C.M.G.’s best interests for the
termination petition to be denied. While he acknowledged that the trial
court “would be fully justified in terminating the parental rights of J.A.G.”
because of his abandonment of C.M.G. from August 2000 to early in 2002, he
felt that the efforts made by J.A.G. after his release from prison to reestablish his relationship with her and aid in her support were sincere.
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abandonment of his minor child[.]”
The court’s justification
for its decision reads as follows:
[While] failure to pay child support
does not in and of itself constitute
abandonment, it is a fact that the Court can
consider toward that end. O.S. vs. C.F.,
655 S.W.2d 32 (1983). Incarceration alone
can never be construed as an abandonment as
a matter of law. J.H. vs. Cabinet for Human
Resources, 704 S.W.2d 661 (1985).
The issue of abandonment is a matter of
intent which is proven by circumstances
surrounding the natural father’s failure to
provide child support or make serious
attempts to have a serious relationship with
the child. J.H. vs. Cabinet for Human
Resources, supra.
It is also true that if a father is
dedicated to a criminal lifestyle which
forces him to be imprisoned, such a criminal
lifestyle may serve as a basis for the Court
finding that he has substantially and
continually neglected his child. J.H. vs.
Cabinet for Human Resources, supra.
It does not appear to the Court that
the Respondent/natural father is committed
to a lifestyle of crime and incarceration.
The biological father was 28 years old
before he was convicted of the felonies for
which he was imprisoned. He maintained a
job and according to his own testimony
became hooked on methamphetamine which not
only led to the ruination of his marriage
but also to his subsequent incarceration.
During his incarceration he received drug
treatment to which he has apparently
responded well, and he has been on parole
since October of 2004 without incident and
he is still receiving treatment including
weekly meetings for his drug addiction. In
his appearance and testimony at trial, he
appeared to the Court to be well dressed,
clean, clear headed, honest and forthright—
in short a person who had, at least at this
point in his life, recovered from his drug
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addiction. Remove a short two year period
from this 31 year old’s history—from July of
2000 to his incarceration in March of 2002—
and he appears to have lived a law abiding
upstanding life. At least he hardly seems
to qualify, at least for now, to being
“dedicated to a criminal lifestyle” which
would cause him to be “substantially and
continuously neglectful” of his child. See
J.H. vs. Cabinet for Human Resources, supra.
Up to his criminal misconduct beginning
on March 17, 2002, the Respondent/father had
no criminal record except for some minor
traffic offenses. He appears to have been
employed by the Commonwealth of Kentucky as
a Vehicle Enforcement Officer as well as a
police officer for the City of Princeton
where he was promoted to the rank of
Sergeant. He was shot in the line of duty
while working for the City of Princeton.
It is obvious from his record before
his offense in 2002 and his record since
incarceration that something drastically
altered his behavior for a period of time;
and based upon the Pre-Sentence
Investigation Report as well as his
testimony, it is apparent to the Court that
something was the methamphetamine addiction.
It is common knowledge these days, not
only in the court system and law enforcement
circles, that methamphetamine is the most
lethal and addictive drug that has come down
the illicit substance pike in our lifetime.
While this is not an excuse for neglecting
one’s child, it does provide a reason why
the natural father in this case failed
miserably in his father’s duties. The Court
does not believe that the circumstances and
the time span of his neglect constitute
justification for him to lose his child.
Undoubtedly during this critical period
of time, the natural father was a lousy
father. Termination of parental rights
forever, however, is a drastic decree and
not only deprives the father of a
relationship with his child, but more
importantly deprives a child of a
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relationship with her natural father. In
this case, to allow termination would in
effect eliminate potential for the child to
have two fathers instead of one. The long
range effect of termination upon the child
in this case is of course unknown. It
cannot help but be complicated, however, by
the fact that even though at a tender age,
she must have some recognition and an
eventual recollection of her natural father;
and with them living in the same community,
they are bound to encounter each other from
time to time.
...
A two year hiatus due to the affliction of
drug addiction from an otherwise upstanding
and respectable life combined with an
apparent repentance and rehabilitation cause
this Court to resolve this close question in
favor of the natural father. If the father
has indeed picked up the pieces and resumes
a productive life, this child will not only
benefit by having two fathers but also by
having one which can lend special wisdom and
support to this child based upon his bitter
experiences.
The case law in Kentucky has held that
abandonment is “a matter of intent which may
be proved by external facts and
circumstances.” J.H. vs. Cabinet for Human
Resources, supra. Neither incarceration for
a crime nor drug addiction are admirable
conditions worthy of praise, but they are
both in their own way equally debilitating,
just as prolonged hospitalization is.
Therefore the Court cannot find by
clear and convincing evidence that the
Respondent J.A.G. has had a fixed and
intentional design of abandonment of his
minor child [C.M.G.]. Therefore this
request for termination is DENIED.
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D.D.Y. subsequently filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate on
March 7, 2005, but the motion was denied by the trial court in
an order entered on March 17, 2005.
This appeal followed.
KRS 625.090 governs the termination of parental
rights.
In summary, the statute requires a finding, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the child is an abused or
neglected child pursuant to KRS 600.020(1), and that termination
would be in the best interests of the child.
If this threshold
is met, the circuit court must find the existence of one of the
numerous grounds recited in KRS 625.090(2) (including
abandonment, infliction of serious physical injury or emotional
harm, sexual abuse, or neglect in providing access to basic
survival needs) in order to terminate parental rights.
Cabinet
for Families and Children v. G.C.W., 139 S.W.3d 172, 175-76
(Ky.App. 2004); see also R.C.R. v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Cabinet for Human Resources, 988 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Ky.App. 1998).
However, even if all of these factors are satisfied, KRS 625.090
still leaves the termination decision to the trial judge’s
discretion.
See KRS 625.090(1) (“The Circuit Court may
involuntarily terminate all parental rights of a parent of a
named child, if the Circuit Court finds from the pleadings and
by clear and convincing evidence that....”) (Emphasis added).
“The trial court has broad discretion in determining
whether the child fits within the abused or neglected category
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and whether the abuse or neglect warrants termination.”
R.C.R.,
988 S.W.2d at 38, citing Department for Human Resources v.
Moore, 552 S.W.2d 672, 675 (Ky.App. 1977).
“This Court’s review
in a termination of parental rights action is confined to the
clearly erroneous standard in CR4 52.01 based upon clear and
convincing evidence, and the findings of the trial court will
not be disturbed unless there exists no substantial evidence in
the record to support its findings.”
Id., citing V.S. v.
Commonwealth, Cabinet for Human Resources, 706 S.W.2d 420, 424
(Ky.App. 1986).
“Clear and convincing proof does not
necessarily mean uncontradicted proof.
It is sufficient if
there is proof of a probative and substantial nature carrying
the weight of evidence sufficient to convince ordinarily
prudent-minded people.”
Id. at 38-39, quoting Rowland v. Holt,
253 Ky. 718, 70 S.W.2d 5, 9 (1934).
KRS 600.020(1) defines an “abused or neglected child”
as follows:
(1) “Abused or neglected child” means a
child whose health or welfare is harmed or
threatened with harm when his parent,
guardian, or other person exercising
custodial control or supervision of the
child:
(a) Inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon
the child physical or emotional injury as
defined in this section by other than
accidental means;
4
Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
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(b) Creates or allows to be created a risk
of physical or emotional injury as defined
in this section to the child by other than
accidental means;
(c) Engages in a pattern of conduct that
renders the parent incapable of caring for
the immediate and ongoing needs of the child
including, but not limited to, parental
incapacity due to alcohol and other drug
abuse as defined in KRS 222.005;
(d) Continuously or repeatedly fails or
refuses to provide essential parental care
and protection for the child, considering
the age of the child;
(e) Commits or allows to be committed an act
of sexual abuse, sexual exploitation, or
prostitution upon the child;
(f) Creates or allows to be created a risk
that an act of sexual abuse, sexual
exploitation, or prostitution will be
committed upon the child;
(g) Abandons or exploits the child;
(h) Does not provide the child with adequate
care, supervision, food, clothing, shelter,
and education or medical care necessary for
the child’s well-being. A parent or other
person exercising custodial control or
supervision of the child legitimately
practicing the person’s religious beliefs
shall not be considered a negligent parent
solely because of failure to provide
specified medical treatment for a child for
that reason alone. This exception shall not
preclude a court from ordering necessary
medical services for a child; or
(i) Fails to make sufficient progress toward
identified goals as set forth in the courtapproved case plan to allow for the safe
return of the child to the parent that
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results in the child remaining committed to
the cabinet and remaining in foster care for
fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two
(22) months.
We initially note that the trial court failed to make an
explicit finding as to whether or not C.M.G. was an “abused or
neglected child” pursuant to KRS 600.020(1), although its order
arguably suggests that she was.
Nevertheless, while such a
finding generally should be made in all termination cases, it
was perhaps unnecessary or irrelevant here, as a practical
matter, as the language of the trial court’s order indicates –
albeit implicitly - that it would not be in C.M.G.’s best
interests for J.A.G.’s parental rights to be terminated.
In
this context, the court particularly stated: “If the father has
indeed picked up the pieces and resumes a productive life, this
child will not only benefit by having two fathers but also by
having one which can lend special wisdom and support to this
child based upon his bitter experiences.”
Of particular relevance here is KRS 625.090(3), which
sets forth that, in determining the best interests of the child
and the grounds for termination, the trial court should
consider, among other things, “[t]he efforts and adjustments the
parent has made in his circumstances, conduct, or conditions to
make it in the child’s best interest to return him to his home
within a reasonable period of time, considering the age of the
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child” and “[t]he physical, emotional, and mental health of the
child and the prospects for the improvement of the child’s
welfare if termination is ordered.” KRS 625.090(3)(d)-(e).
We
agree with the trial court that J.A.G. appears to have made a
drastic and commendable turnaround in his life and has gone a
long way in recovering from his methamphetamine addiction.
He
has also taken clear and obvious steps to remedy his past
conduct as it pertains to the care and support of C.M.G. and his
general absence from her life.
The record also does not reflect
any sort of basis for a belief that C.M.G.’s life would somehow
improve if J.A.G.’s parental rights were terminated.
Consequently, we do not believe that the trial court was
“clearly erroneous” in concluding that C.M.G. would benefit from
a relationship with her biological father and that, accordingly,
it would not be in her best interest for his parental rights to
be terminated.
As termination of parental rights under KRS 625.090
requires satisfaction of all factors set forth above, our
conclusion that the trial court was not “clearly erroneous” as
to its best interests determination renders consideration of the
evidence supporting abandonment unnecessary even though D.D.Y.
argues that the evidence strongly supports the fact that J.A.G.
“abandoned” C.M.G.
We acknowledge that the record would amply
support a decision contrary to that reached by the trial court.
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Indeed, were we to consider this matter afresh, we may well have
arrived at a different conclusion.
However, the fact that the
record contains evidence that would support a different result
does not automatically obligate us to reverse the trial court
under the “clearly erroneous” standard – particularly given the
considerable deference and broad discretion that is afforded to
trial courts in these matters.
As noted above, we believe that
the record contains evidence in support of the court’s ultimate
conclusions – specifically that termination would not be in
C.M.G.’s best interests.
Consequently, the court’s decision
should stand.
The judgment of the Caldwell Circuit Court is
affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
NO BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Jill L. Giordano
Princeton, Kentucky
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