V.B., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 28, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000758-ME
V.B., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN1
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE KIMBERLY BUNNELL, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-J-00639-001
v.
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION AND ORDER
DISMISSING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY, JOHNSON, AND SCHRODER, JUDGES.
JOHNSON, JUDGE:
V.B., a child under 18, has appealed from an
order of the Fayette Family Court entered on March 8, 2005,
which released him from custody and placed him under the
supervision of the Division of Youth Services through the
remainder of the 2004-2005 school year.
Having concluded that
it is impossible for this Court to grant actual or practical
relief to V.B., we dismiss the appeal as moot.
1
Because this case involves a juvenile offender, the individuals will be
referred to by their initials to protect the interests of the minor child.
On February 21, 2004,2 the Commonwealth filed a
complaint against V.B. alleging that he was a habitual truant as
described in KRS3 630.020(3).4
As grounds for this claim, the
Commonwealth stated that as of February 17, 2004, V.B. had
withdrawn from Crawford Middle School, but was not attending
Lexington Traditional Magnet School, and had missed 30 days of
the school year in Fayette County without a valid excuse.5
A
promise to appear was signed by V.B.’s mother, A.B., and V.B.
was arraigned on May 4, 2004.
While his adjudication was
pending, V.B. was ordered to attend school.
Following negative reports from school, a contempt
hearing was scheduled in V.B.’s case.
At the hearing held on
May 18, 2004, V.B. was adjudicated, pled guilty, and was ordered
removed from his home and to be placed by the Detention
Alternatives Coordinator (DAC).
V.B. was to be placed by the
DAC at the Bluegrass Regional Assessment Center on May 20, 2004.
2
V.B. was 13 years old at the time.
3
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
4
KRS 630.020(3) provides, in part, as follows:
The court shall have exclusive jurisdiction in
proceedings concerning any child living, or found
within the district, who allegedly:
. . .
(3)
Has been [a] habitual truant from school.
5
Although not entirely clear from the record on appeal, it appears that at
the time of the Commonwealth’s complaint, V.B. was already on diversion, but
had failed to attend school as required.
-2-
A disposition hearing was held on June 1, 2004, at
which time the family court adopted the report and
recommendations of the Division for Youth Services (DYS).
The
report stated as follows:
In the case of [V.B.] I respectfully
recommend that [he] be placed on supervision
with the Division of Youth Services for 180
days with the following terms:
1.
[V.B.] is to attend school daily
without any unexcused absences,
tardies, or suspensions. [V.B.] is to
cooperate with school staff members.
[V.B.’s] progress will be monitored by
DYS Social Worker.
2.
[V.B.] is to continue counseling at
Comprehensive Care and follow any
recommendations made by that program.
[A.B.] is to notify DYS Social Worker
of appointment dates.
3.
[V.B.] is to obey all home rules,
including a curfew to be established by
his mother. [A.B.] is to notify DYS
Social Worker of any noncompliance.
4.
[V.B.] and his mother are to cooperate
and complete any program deemed
necessary by DYS Social Worker.
The family court judge handwrote on the court’s docket sheet
“[a]dopt report” and ordered V.B. released from custody.
Although no formal order was entered or served on V.B., he does
not dispute the fact that the family court verbally advised him
of the conditions of his release and the consequences of
violating those conditions.
-3-
On November 15, 2004, V.B. was charged with violating
court orders when he failed to attend day treatment on two
separate occasions.
He was arraigned on November 16, 2004.
V.B. was adjudicated and pled guilty on December 21, 2004.
A
disposition hearing was held on the same day wherein the family
court again adopted the DYS recommendations, which stated that
V.B. should “remain on supervision to the Division of Youth
Services for 120 days with the previously ordered terms.”
Again, the family court made a written notation on its docket
sheet stating “[a]dopt report”.
No formal order was entered or
served on V.B.
On February 18, 2005, a juvenile custody order was
issued against V.B. for contempt of court for failing to attend
school on three separate occasions.
V.B. was placed in custody
at the Fayette County Juvenile Detention Center.
An
adjudication hearing was held on February 22, 2005, wherein V.B.
admitted his truancy.
However, V.B. objected to the proceedings
and argued that the prior orders of the family court were not
“valid court orders” and as such could not be used as the basis
for detaining him for contempt of court.
The family court
disagreed and entered a juvenile status offender order6 which
stated, in part, as follows:
6
V.B. concedes in his brief that this order “met the criterion for being a
‘valid court order.’”
-4-
3.
As a result of this hearing, you are
ordered as follows:
Do not leave your home without
custodial permission;
Obey all rules of your home, including
a curfew which is (set by parent);
Attend all school sessions on time,
have no unexcused absences and no
behavior problem at school;
You are to violate no law;
You are not to consume, use or possess
any alcoholic beverages, tobacco
products or illegal drugs [emphases
added] [.]
V.B. was detained pending a disposition hearing.
On March 8, 2005, a disposition hearing was held, at
which time the family court released V.B. from custody and
adopted the recommendations of the DYS, which stated as follows:
In the case of [V.B.] this worker
respectfully recommend that he remain on
supervision with the Division of Youth
Services days with the following terms:
1.
[V.B.] to regularly attend school daily
without any unexcused absences,
tardies, or suspensions. [V.B.] is to
cooperate with school staff. Absences
will be excused by a doctor’s statement
only. [A.B.] must return [V.B.] to
school after he visits the doctor
unless the doctor informs her in
writing that he is to be absent from
school [emphasis original].
2.
[V.B.] to cooperate with the following
Division of Youth Services’ therapeutic
groups: Domestic Violence, Anger
-5-
Management, and Decision-Making.
Worker will inform [A.B.] of the dates
and times of the group. [A.B.] will
provide transportation to the group.
3.
[V.B.] to continue counseling at the
Comprehensive Care Center and follow
any recommendations made by the
program. [V.B] to regularly take his
prescribed medications.
4.
[V.B.] is to obey all home rules,
including a curfew to be established by
[A.B.] [A.B.] is to notify DYS’ worker
of any noncompliance.
5.
[A.B.] is to schedule and cooperate
with a Parent Assessment and any
recommendation(s) of the assessment at
the Center for Women, Families, and
Children.
6.
[V.B.] and [A.B.] are to cooperate and
complete any programs deemed necessary
by DYS’ worker.
The family court extended the DYS supervision of V.B. until the
end of the 2004-2005 school year.
This appeal followed.
On appeal, V.B. argues that the family court erred by
finding him in contempt and by detaining him based on an invalid
court order.
He claims that because the family court’s order
was not written or served upon him it was unenforceable.
The
Commonwealth counters by alleging that the issue on appeal is
moot because V.B. has already been released from supervision.
While we agree with the Commonwealth that the issue on appeal is
moot, we note that V.B. is correct that the requirements for a
-6-
valid court order were not present in two of the family court’s
orders.
It is well-established that the juvenile court has the
inherent authority to punish violations of its orders through
its contempt powers.7
Furthermore, there is express statutory
authority which anticipates that a juvenile court has the power
to hold a child in contempt.
Indeed, KRS8 610.010(10)
specifically provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall
prevent the District Court from holding a child in contempt of
court to enforce valid court orders previously issued by the
court.”
KRS 600.020(60) provides the definition for a valid
court order as follows:
“Valid court order” means a court order
issued by a judge to a child alleged or
found to be a status offender:
(a)
Who was brought before the court and
made subject to the order;
(b)
Whose future conduct was regulated by
the order;
(c)
Who was given written and verbal
warning of the consequences of the
violation of the order at the time the
order was issued and whose attorney or
parent or legal guardian was also
provided with a written notice of the
consequences of violation of the order,
which notification is reflected in the
record of the court proceedings; and
7
Young v. Knight, 329 S.W.2d 195, 200 (Ky. 1959).
8
Kentucky Revised Statutes.
-7-
(d)
Who received, before the issuance of
the order, the full due process rights
guaranteed by the Constitution of the
United States.
Our Supreme Court addressed the issue of mootness in
Kentucky High School Athletic Association v. Runyon,9 where it
dismissed the KHSAA’s appeal as moot because the basketball
season had ended and the student-athlete’s eligibility to play
was no longer at issue.
The Supreme Court stated:
As we have held, “[t]he classic occurrence
which necessitates a court’s abrogation of
jurisdiction for mootness is a change in
circumstances in the underlying controversy
which vitiates the vitality of the action.”10
It is apparent that two of the family court’s orders
did not meet the requirements of a “valid court order” under the
definition found in KRS 600.020(60).
However, at this point in
time, the 2004-2005 school year is well over and V.B. has been
released from supervision by DYS.
Thus, there is no controversy
remaining to be addressed by this Court.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court ORDERS that this
appeal be and it is hereby DISMISSED.
HENRY, JUDGE, CONCURS.
SCHRODER, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT ONLY.
9
920 S.W.2d 525 (Ky. 1996).
10
Runyon, 920 S.W.2d at 526 (quoting Commonwealth v. Hughes, 873 S.W.2d 828,
830 (Ky. 1994)).
-8-
ENTERED:
_______________________________
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Timothy G. Arnold
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Kevin R. Branscum
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
-9-
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