CALLIE WEHNER v. WILLIAM GORE; GORE TRUCKING, LLC, AND NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
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RENDERED: JULY 21, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-000689-MR
CALLIE WEHNER
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM LAUREL CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RODERICK MESSER, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-00647
v.
WILLIAM GORE;
GORE TRUCKING, LLC, AND
NORTHLAND INSURANCE COMPANY
APPELLEES
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
HENRY AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; EMBERTON,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
Callie Wehner (Wehner) appeals a summary
judgment granted by the Laurel Circuit Court which dismissed her
claim based on the applicable statute of limitations.
We agree
with the circuit court that Wehner’s complaint was filed outside
the limitations of KRS 304.39-230, hence, we affirm.
1
Senior Judge Thomas D. Emberton sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
The facts are uncontroverted.
Wehner was involved in
an automobile accident on September 7, 2000.
She sustained
personal injuries and received medical treatment.
Her no-fault
carrier was State Farm Insurance Company (State Farm) which paid
its last personal injury protection (PIP) payment to the
Nicholasville Road MRI (MRI) on December 13, 2000.
payment exhausted Wehner’s PIP benefits.
This last
State Farm sent Wehner
a notice on December 13, 2000, that she exhausted her PIP
benefits.
State Farm closed its file but sent a second
notification to Wehner on December 18, 2000.
On June 21, 2001,
Wehner requested a copy of the State Farm PIP ledger, which was
sent.
Although State Farm issued Wehner’s final PIP payment
on December 13, 2000, and closed the file, the check was either
not received or lost.
check.
MRI requested State Farm reissue the
State Farm reopened the file, stopped payment on the
original check, issued a new check on August 13, 2001, and again
closed the file.
Wehner filed her complaint against the other driver,
William Gore; the vehicle owner, Gore Trucking, LLC; and their
insurance company, Northland Insurance Company (collectively,
the appellees), on July 14, 2003.
The appellees moved for
summary judgment contending the action was filed outside the
two-year statute of limitations in KRS 304.39-230(6), which
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requires an action be commenced within two years from the date
of injury, or from the last PIP payment.
The appellees
calculated the period from December 13, 2000, to July 14, 2003,
which is outside the two-year period.
Wehner countered that the
period should begin with August 13, 2001, the date the original
check was reissued, which was within the two-year period.
The
circuit court granted summary judgment to the appellees.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the two-year
statute of limitations in KRS 304.39-230(6) had run.
provides:
Section 6
“An action for tort liability not abolished by KRS
304.39-060 may be commenced not later than two (2) years after
the injury, or the death, or the last basic or added reparation
payment made by any reparation obligor, whichever later occurs.”
In Wilder v. Noonchester, 113 S.W.3d 189, 191 (Ky.App. 2003), a
panel of this Court, decided that “the date the PIP provider
issued the check is the date the PIP provider ‘made’ the
payment.”
Id.
In our case, the last PIP payment was December 13,
2000.
Thus, the circuit court was correct that the statute of
limitations had run as of December, 2002, and the complaint
filed on July 14, 2003 was time-barred.
Wehner argues without
authority that the reissuance of the check in August of 2001
extended the statute of limitations to August of 2003.
disagree.
We
Wilder, 113 S.W.3d at 190, makes it clear that the
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date a check is received or deposited has nothing to do with the
date of final payment.
Final payment is the date the last check
is cut, dated, or “made”.
That date was December 13, 2000.
The
August 13, 2001, check was not a check “made” for additional
services, but a replacement check between MRI and State Farm.
Payment on December 13, 2000, was final payment “made” as far as
Wehner is concerned.
There is no contrary authority, thus, we
agree with the circuit court’s interpretation.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Laurel
Circuit Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:
J. Robert Stansbury
London, Kentucky
John G. McNeill
Evan B. Jones
Lexington, Kentucky
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