W.H., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN v. COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
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RENDERED:
APRIL 28, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
2005-CA-000673-ME
W.H., A CHILD UNDER EIGHTEEN
v.
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM HENDERSON FAMILY COURT
HONORABLE SHEILA NUNLEY FARRIS, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 04-J-00085-11
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
JUDGE.1
GUIDUGLI AND SCHRODER, JUDGES; HUDDLESTON, SENIOR
SCHRODER, JUDGE:
This is an appeal from an order finding a
juvenile in contempt for violating an order on a status offense,
and committing the juvenile to the Cabinet for Health and Family
Services for residential placement.
None of appellant’s
assignments of error were preserved for review and none rise to
the level of palpable error.
1
Hence, we affirm.
Senior Judge Joseph Huddleston sitting as Special Judge by assignment of
the Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution
and KRS 21.580.
On April 1, 2004, W.H. was found to be a status
offender (habitual runaway and beyond reasonable control of
parents) and a dispositional order was entered setting forth a
number of conditions that W.H. was to follow.
One of the
conditions was that W.H. was to obey all rules of his home,
including a curfew which was 11:00 p.m. on weekends and 9:00
p.m. on weekdays.
On February 14, 2005, W.H.’s mother, Eunice
Hall, swore out a petition alleging that W.H. had violated the
April 1, 2004, order by coming home past his curfew on two
nights and not coming home at all one night.
This was the
eleventh (11th) violation petition filed since the dispositional
order had been entered.
On February 15, 2005, W.H. was brought before the
Henderson District Court for a detention/violation hearing
wherein he was represented by counsel.
During the hearing, the
court located the April 1, 2004, dispositional order and,
without objection from W.H., took judicial notice of it as a
valid order.
W.H.’s mother testified relative to W.H.’s curfew
violations.
Also, Kristi Raley, a worker from the Department of
Community Based Services (DCBS), testified that W.H. had
repeatedly violated conditions of the dispositional order.
Further, Raley testified that all placements outside detention
had been exhausted.
W.H. put on no evidence.
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The district
court found that W.H. violated the April 1, 2004, order and
passed disposition to the Family Court.
On February 17, 2005, W.H. came before the Henderson
Family Court for disposition.
The DCBS worker testified about
all the services that had been offered to W.H. and recommended
that W.H. be committed to them for residential treatment.
W.H.’s counsel objected and asked for more time for the
community services to work.
The court noted that W.H. had a
total of eleven violations, most for curfew violations and drug
use, and that the court had already tried electronically
monitoring W.H. and detaining W.H. for two weeks to control his
conduct.
Considering the totality of the circumstances, the
court ordered that W.H. be committed to the Cabinet for Health
and Family Services (the “Cabinet”) for residential placement.
W.H. now appeals.
W.H. first argues that the district judge in the
detention and violation hearing should have recused himself
because he was biased in favor of the Commonwealth from the
outset.
W.H. concedes that this issue was not preserved below.
RCr 9.22.
Nevertheless, he urges us to review the argument for
palpable error under RCr 10.26.
Under RCr 10.26, palpable error
is error that “affects the substantial rights of a party” and
will result in “manifest injustice” if not considered by the
court.
RCr 10.26.
If upon consideration of the whole case, the
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reviewing court does not conclude that a substantial possibility
exists that the result would have been different, the error
complained of will be held to be nonprejudicial.
Jackson v.
Commonwealth, 717 S.W.2d 511 (Ky.App. 1986); Schoenbachler v.
Commonwealth, 95 S.W.3d 830 (Ky. 2003).
W.H. alleges that certain comments made by the
district judge at the beginning of the detention/violation
hearing demonstrated that he had prejudged the case and had
already determined W.H. to be guilty, citing SCR 4.300, Canon 3,
Section E(1) which requires a judge to disqualify himself from
any case wherein his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.
The remark at issue was, “[W.H.], that’s not all
that hard of a case for me either.
If he’s got eleven status
offenders and he’s charged with being in contempt of court, he
is staying in jail.”
The court and the two attorneys then
engaged in a discussion about whether the court was going to
conduct a violation/adjudication hearing at the same time, and
the court stated:
No, I’m going to adjudicate it as, as I read
the statute, today. It’s a contempt, isn’t
it? Well before you get too far ahead of
me, it’s a contempt on a valid order. I’m
going to adjudicate it, set dispo on it.
She can do whatever she wants with it then.
That is if you can prove it.
While the court did state that if W.H. had eleven
status disposition violations, he would find W.H. guilty, he did
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go on to say that he would only find W.H. guilty if the
Commonwealth proved their case.
During the hearing, the judge
heard the evidence and asked questions of the witnesses, and
there was no appearance of bias in his conduct of the
proceeding.
W.H. also claims that the court demonstrated its bias
in favor of the Commonwealth by asking questions of the
witnesses and essentially acting as prosecutor in the case.
We
would note that no objection to the court’s questioning was made
pursuant to KRE 614(d).
W.H. cites Terry v. Commonwealth, 153
S.W.3d 794 (Ky. 2005), wherein the Supreme Court cautioned trial
courts regarding the questioning of witnesses under KRE 614(b)
to “use this power sparingly” so as to not “unduly influence the
triers of fact.”
Id. at 802 (quoting KRE 614(b), Drafters’
Commentary (1989)).
Specifically, the Court warned against
questioning a witness so as to indicate to the jury the trial
court’s opinion as to the credibility or veracity of the witness
and warned against assuming the role of the prosecutor.
802-803.
Id. at
However, the hearing in the instant case was not
before a jury; the judge was the trier of fact.
“When the trial
court acts as the trier of fact, the extent of examination of
witnesses by the presiding judge is left to the trial judge’s
discretion.”
Bowling v. Commonwealth, 80 S.W.3d 405, 419 (Ky.
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2002).
There was no abuse of that discretion in this case and
no error.
Next, W.H. argues that the district court improperly
transformed the detention hearing into a violation/adjudication
hearing.
Again this alleged error was not preserved, but we are
asked to review it under RCr 10.26.
KRS 610.265(1) provides for
a detention hearing for a child “who is accused of being in
contempt of court on an underlying finding that the child is a
status offender.”
Pursuant to KRS 610.265(2)(b)4.c. and KRS
630.080(3)(c), if the court has available an oral report from
the appropriate public agency at the time of the detention
hearing, “the violation hearing may be conducted at the same
time as the detention hearing.”
In the present case, the oral
report of Kristi Raley from DCBS was available and heard by the
court.
In addition, the court had before it the underlying
valid order adjudging W.H. to be a status offender and heard
evidence from W.H.’s mother regarding his violation of the
order.
KRS 630.080(3)(a) and (b).
Accordingly, the court did
not improperly hold the detention and violation/adjudication
hearing at the same time.
W.H. also maintains that he did not receive adequate
notice of the contempt charge.
We disagree.
The petition filed
by W.H.’s mother on February 14, 2005, explicitly stated that it
was a contempt petition for violation of the April 1, 2004,
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order and alleged specific facts supporting the petition.
The
petition also clearly stated that the hearing on the motion
would be on February 15, 2005.
Further, as stated above, W.H.’s
counsel did not raise the issue before the court on February 15,
2005, that she did not receive adequate notice to go forward on
the violation/adjudication hearing that day.
Accordingly, the
issue was not preserved and there was no palpable error.
W.H. next complains that the February 15, 2005,
hearing did not comport with KRS 610.060(1)(b) because W.H.’s
mother, who testified against W.H., was not advised of her right
to remain silent concerning the charges.
KRS 610.060(1)(b)
provides that at any formal hearing against the child, the court
shall “[e]xplain the right against self-incrimination by saying
that the child, parents, relative, guardian, or custodian may
remain silent concerning the charges against the child, and that
anything said may be used against the child.”
There was one
objection to Eunice Hall’s testimony made by W.H.’s counsel, and
the stated grounds was that she could not testify against her
son.
There was no mention of the court’s failure to advise
Eunice Hall of her right to remain silent.
The court overruled
the objection and no further objection was made.
Because Eunice
Hall was the individual who swore out the petition against W.H.,
it is obvious that she would have testified against W.H. even if
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the court had explained her right to remain silent.
Hence,
there was no palpable error.
W.H. also argues that the court did not have before it
a valid order pursuant to KRS 630.080(3)(a) and KRS
600.020(60)(d) which requires, “before the issuance of the
order, the full due process rights guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States.”
W.H. claims that since he
was not represented by counsel at the original adjudication
hearing on the underlying status offense, the April 1, 2004,
order was not valid.
KRS 610.060(2)(a) provides:
No court shall accept a plea or admission or
conduct an adjudication hearing involving a
child accused of committing any felony
offense, any offense under KRS Chapter 510,
or any offense for which the court intends
to impose detention or commitment as a
disposition unless that child is represented
by counsel.
W.H. was not charged with a felony or an offense under
KRS Chapter 510.
His disposition on the April 1, 2004, order
was not detention or commitment, and there was no indication
that the court had the intent to impose detention or commitment.
Accordingly, under the above statute, W.H. was not required to
be represented by counsel on the underlying status offense for
the April 1, 2004, order to be valid.
Finally, W.H. argues that commitment was not a
possible disposition for contempt of court on an underlying
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status offense.
First, W.H. maintains that he was not given
notice that commitment was a possible consequence of violation
of the April 1, 2004, order as required by KRS 630.120(1)(a).
The language of the April 1, 2004, dispositional order refutes
this claim.
The order states, “Failure to abide by this Order
may result in a contempt finding being made against you by the
court which could result in a fine and/or your being placed in
secure detention or other alternative placement, and/or pickup
order if violations.”
(Emphasis added).
In our view, “other
alternative placement” would certainly encompass commitment to
the Cabinet for residential placement.
Secondly, W.H. argues that the punishment for contempt
on a status offense is secure detention under KRS 630.070 and
KRS 630.080(3), not commitment.
According to W.H., commitment
under KRS 630.120(6) is a possible disposition only for the
status offense itself, not contempt on the status offense.
Again, W.H. concedes the issue was not preserved and seeks
review for palpable error.
Secure detention is certainly a possible disposition
for contempt on a status offense upon a finding that the child
has violated a valid court order.
KRS 630.070; KRS 630.080(3).
However, we believe that commitment is also a potential
disposition for contempt on a status offense pursuant to KRS
630.120(6) which provides:
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(6) When all appropriate resources have been
reviewed and considered insufficient to
adequately address the needs of the
child and the child's family, the court
may commit the child to the cabinet for
such services as may be necessary. The
cabinet shall consider all appropriate
local remedies to aid the child and the
child's family subject to the following
conditions:
(a) Treatment programs for status offenders
shall be, unless excepted by federal
law, community-based and nonsecure;
(b) The cabinet may place the child in a
nonsecure public or private education
agency accredited by the department of
education;
(c) The cabinet may initiate proceedings
pursuant to KRS 610.160 when the parents
fail to participate in the cabinet's
treatment programs; and
(d) The cabinet may discharge the child from
commitment after providing ten (10)
days' prior written notice to the
committing court which may object to
such discharge by holding court review
of the commitment under KRS 610.120.
Although KRS 630.120(1) allows that any child
violating a court order on a status offense “may be subject to
the provisions of KRS 630.080(3)”, there is nothing in KRS
630.120 excluding commitment pursuant to KRS 630.120(6) as
another potential disposition for contempt on a status offense.
(Emphasis added).
Hence, we believe that commitment is an
appropriate disposition for contempt on a status offense.
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Since
the court in the instant case heard evidence that other less
restrictive resources and remedies had been exhausted (KRS
630.120(4) and (6)), the court did not err in ordering W.H.
committed to the Cabinet.
For the reasons stated above, the order of the
Henderson Family Court is affirmed.
ALL CONCUR.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Gail Robinson
Assistant Public Advocate
Frankfort, Kentucky
Gregory D. Stumbo
Attorney General
Ken W. Riggs
Assistant Attorney General
Frankfort, Kentucky
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