PAUL MILLER FORD, INC. v. APPEAL AND WILLIAM CRAYCRAFT
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RENDERED: JULY 8, 2005; 10:00 A.m.
ORDERED NOT PUBLISHED BY THE KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT:
March 15, 2006 (2005-SC-0613-D)
Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO.
NO.
2005-CA-000634-MR
AND
2005-CA-000692-MR
PAUL MILLER FORD, INC.
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL AND CROSS-APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE MARY C. NOBLE, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 01-CI-03258
WILLIAM CRAYCRAFT
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION AND ORDER
(1) DISMISSING APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-000634-MR
(2) DISMISSING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2005-CA-000692-MR
*** *** ***
BEFORE:
MINTON, SCHRODER, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
This matter is before the Court on appellee’s
motion to dismiss Appeal No. 2005-CA-000634-MR and appellant’s
motion for additional time in which to respond to appellee’s
motion.
The Court has considered the motions and ORDERS that
appellant’s motion be GRANTED.
Appellant’s tendered response is
ORDERED FILED and was considered by the Court.
motion to dismiss appeal is GRANTED.
Appellee’s
The ground for appellee’s motion is that the appeal is
premature.
The notice of appeal designates two orders, i.e., an
order entered September 8, 2004, remanding a Better Business
Bureau Arbiter’s Award for lack of completeness and ordering the
arbiter to complete the award with specificity within fifteen
days, and an order entered on March 2, 2005, denying appellant’s
motion to confirm the award, granting appellee’s motion to
vacate the award and remanding to the Better Business Bureau for
de novo arbitration proceedings.
Appellee argues that this
order is not ripe for appeal because the circuit court has
ordered a rehearing and Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS)
417.220(1)(e) provides for immediate appeals from orders
vacating an award “without directing a rehearing.”
Appellant
responds that it is entitled to an appeal pursuant to KRS
417.220(1)(c), which allows appeals from orders confirming an
award or denying its confirmation.
Neither party provides any
citation of authorities in support of his/its respective
argument.
The issue presented to this Court is one of first
impression in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
However, a number
of other state courts have spoken on the matter.
This Court’s
research reveals that, in most reported cases from states which
have statutory provisions identical to those set forth in KRS
417.220, an appeal taken from an order denying a motion to
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confirm an arbitration award and granting a motion to vacate the
award with a remand for a rehearing is not authorized and will
be dismissed.
The Court notes two major concepts at the root of
those decisions.
The first concept is that the order vacating
and remanding is the functional equivalent of an order granting
a new trial.
In many states, as is the case in Kentucky,1 such
an order is not immediately appealable.
An arbitration statute
which implicitly bars appeals from an order vacating an award
when a rehearing is also ordered is consistent with the law
barring an appeal from the grant of a new trial.
When a
rehearing has been ordered, the appeal is premature because the
process has not been completed.
See, Stolhandske v. Stern, 14
S.W.3d 810 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000);2 Maine Dept. of Transp. v. Maine
State Employees Ass’n, 581 A.2d 813 (Me. 1990).
The second concept is that there is no separate basis
that would allow an appeal from an order denying an application
1
See, e.g., White v. Hardin County Bd. of Ed., 307 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1957).
2
That case applied the “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” rule of
construction that is also accepted in Kentucky (See Schwindel v. Meade
County, 113 S.W.3d 159, 168 (Ky. 2003)) to hold that the provision in the
Texas equivalent to KRS 417.220(1)(e) allowing interlocutory appeals from
orders vacating arbitration awards “without directing a rehearing” excludes
an interlocutory review of cases in which the trial court has vacated an
arbitration award but has also ordered new arbitration.
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to confirm an award when a motion to vacate has been granted
because the decision to confirm the award depends on the
determination on the application to vacate it.
If the motion to
vacate was timely, the separate procedure for determining
whether the award should be vacated applies and the motion to
confirm becomes moot.
See Kowler Associates v. Ross, 544 N.W.2d
800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Davidson & Jones Const. Co.,
323 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. App. 1984).
Applying this concept to Kentucky law, we note that
KRS 417.150 provides that:
Upon application of a party, the court shall
confirm an award unless, within the time
limits hereinafter imposed, grounds are
urged for vacating or modifying or
correcting the award, in which case the
court shall proceed as provided in KRS
417.160 and 417.170.
We believe that KRS 417.150, construed in conjunction
with KRS 417.160 and KRS 417.170, compels the conclusion that
KRS 417.220(1)(c) and (e) are not provisions which independently
provide an avenue for appeal and that if section (e) was
triggered by an order vacating and remanding for a rehearing,
section (c) does not provide an alternate route for obtaining an
immediate appeal.
In the case sub judice, the application to
vacate the award was timely and, pursuant to KRS 417.150, that
application became the primary proceeding that mooted the
application to confirm when it was granted.
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In further support of our decision, we note that
arbitration is favored by Kentucky law and that KRS 417.220 only
provides for appeals when arbitration has either been denied or
has already occurred.
The rationale for allowing an
interlocutory appeal in such context is the same as that
articulated for other exceptions to the finality rule, and it is
that, without an appeal, enforcement of the challenged order
would strip the appellant of some right that could not be later
restored.
See, Fayette County Farm Bureau v. Martin, 758 S.W.2d
713 (Ky.App. 1988).
We are of the opinion that interpreting the
statute to prohibit an interlocutory appeal from the denial of
an application to confirm an award when an application to vacate
an award has contemporaneously been granted with a remand for a
rehearing is consistent with Kentucky’s policy favoring
arbitration over litigation.
By construing such an order to be
the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial, the
appealability of the order is only put on hold for the duration
of the new arbitration proceedings and the order may ultimately
be appealed, if needed, after final resolution of those
proceedings.
In other words, no party suffers any irreparable
loss.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that this appeal
was prematurely taken and, therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that
Appeal No. 2005-CA-000634-MR be DISMISSED.
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Likewise, the cross-appeal is also premature and it is
ORDERED, on the Court’s own motion, that Appeal No. 2005-CA000692-MR be DISMISSED.
ALL CONCUR.
ENTERED:
__/s/ Jeff S. Taylor___
JUDGE, COURT OF APPEALS
July 8, 2005
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
Carroll M. Redford, III
MILLER, GRIFFIN & MARKS, PSC
Lexington, Kentucky
Donald R. Todd
TODD & WALTER
Lexington, Kentucky
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