SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC. v. THRIFT BIT SERVICE, INC.
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RENDERED:
SEPTEMBER 8, 2006; 2:00 P.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000628-MR
AND
NO. 2005-CA-000656-MR
SIDNEY COAL COMPANY, INC.
v.
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM HARLAN CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE RON JOHNSON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 02-CI-00396
THRIFT BIT SERVICE, INC.
APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
OPINION
AFFIRMING IN PART,
REVERSING IN PART,
AND REMANDING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE; TAYLOR, JUDGE; KNOPF,1 SENIOR JUDGE.
KNOPF, SENIOR JUDGE:
Sidney Coal Company, Inc. (Sidney) appeals
from a judgment by the Harlan Circuit Court awarding appellee
Thrift Bit Service, Inc. (Thrift Bit) damages in a contract
dispute.
From September 1996 through May 2001, Thrift Bit sold
Sidney re-tipped drill bits pursuant to a series of short-term
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Senior Judge William L. Knopf sitting as Special Judge by assignment of the
Chief Justice pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Kentucky Constitution and
KRS 21.580.
contracts.
When Sidney did not enter into a new purchase
contract with Thrift Bit after May 2001, Thrift Bit brought this
action against Sidney for the value of unreturned bit bodies for
re-tipping which had accumulated over the years they had done
business.
The trial court awarded damages to Thrift Bit for the
replacement cost of all of the unreturned bits except for those
during the 1999 contract period.
Sidney argues the trial court
erred in interpreting the contracts between the parties and in
awarding damages to Thrift Bit.
Thrift Bit cross-appeals,
arguing that the trial court erred by excluding the bit deficit
for the 1999 contract period.
We conclude that the trial court
properly considered evidence of the parties’ course of
performance, course of dealing and the usage of trade to
interpret the contract.
However, we also find that Thrift Bit
was only entitled to recover damages for the 2000 contract year.
Hence, we affirm in part, reverse in part and remand for
additional findings and entry of a new judgment.
This Court will not set aside a trial court’s findings
of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. CR 52.01.
On the
other hand, the construction and interpretation of a contract,
including questions regarding ambiguity, are questions of law to
be decided by the court.
First Commonwealth Bank of
Prestonsburg v. West, 55 S.W.3d 829, 835 (Ky.App. 2000).
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Consequently, our review of such matters is de novo.
Id. at
835-836.
Sidney first argues that the trial court erred by
considering evidence of course of performance, course of dealing
and usage of trade to supplement the contract.
Sidney correctly
points out that the first two contracts were silent on the issue
of returning the used bit bodies.
Furthermore, all of the
contracts gave Sidney title to the drill bits.
Sidney thus
contends that the contract cannot reasonably be interpreted to
require it to return used bit bodies which it owned.
While Sidney raises a valid point, we agree with the
trial court that the express terms of all but the 1999 contract
permitted resort to course of performance, course of dealing and
usage of trade to interpret this contract.
As the trial court
noted, KRS 355.2-202 provides that a contract’s terms may be
explained or supplemented by course of dealing or usage of
trade, or course of performance.
Evidence of course of
performance and usage of trade is inadmissible only if the
agreement expressly excludes them in terms “carefully negating”
their introduction.
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co., 451
F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971); D. Leibson & R. Nowka, The Uniform
Commercial Code of Kentucky, 3d ed., § 2.02(2)(a).
Although the purchase agreements stated that they
constituted the “complete and final agreement” of the parties,
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they did not specifically exclude resort to course of
performance or usage of trade.
And while the contract
professedly gives Sidney title to the drill bits, the contract
does not discuss what was to be done afterward with the used bit
bodies.
Thrift Bit introduced substantial evidence showing the
common usage of trade in the industry provides that the buyer
generally returns used bit bodies for re-tipping.
Moreover, the
course of performance and dealing between these parties followed
that practice.
Therefore, the trial court properly considered
such evidence to interpret the contracts.
A&A Mechanical Inc.
v. Thermal Equipment Sales, Inc., 998 S.W.2d 505, 509-10
(Ky.App. 1999).
Nevertheless, we conclude that Thrift Bit was not
entitled to recover for all of the bit bodies which Sidney has
failed to return since 1996.
Thrift Bit and Sidney did business
pursuant to five separate and discrete contracts.
Thrift Bit’s
claim under the 1996 contract was untimely; it failed to
mitigate its damages under the 1997 and 1998 contracts; and the
1999 contract expressly provided that Sidney would not be
responsible for return of any bit bodies.
Therefore, Thrift Bit
is limited to its damages arising only under the 2000 contract.
First, we find that Thrift Bit’s claim for damages
arising from the 1996 contract is barred by the four-year
statute of limitations set out in KRS 355.2-725.
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The trial
court concluded that Thrift Bit’s cause of action did not accrue
until April 1999, when Sidney challenged the language on the bid
sheet specifically requiring return of the bit bodies.
But
while the parties’ business relationship was ongoing, each
year’s contract was distinct.
Furthermore, Thrift Bit admits
that Sidney received more bits than it had returned during each
contract year, including the 1996 contract.
Therefore, Thrift
Bit’s cause of action for the deficit accrued upon the
expiration of each contract.
For the 1996 contract, the cause
of action accrued on May 21, 1997.
Thus, Thrift Bit’s May 21,
2002 complaint for the deficit accruing under the 1996 contract
was untimely.
Although Thrift Bit’s claims under the subsequent
contracts are timely, we agree with Sidney that Thrift Bit
failed to mitigate its damages under the 1997 and 1998
contracts.
It is well-established that a party claiming damages
for a breach of contract is obligated to use reasonable efforts
to mitigate its damages occasioned by the other party’s breach.
Smith v. Ward, 256 S.W.2d 385, 388 (Ky. 1953).
In this case,
however, Thrift Bit’s conduct actually caused it to incur more
damages.
Thrift Bit’s usage-of-trade evidence focused on the
“special nature” of the product.
To keep the price of the drill
bits down for the buyer and to be cost effective and make a
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profit for the seller, the buyer is expected to return used bit
bodies for repeated re-tipping and reuse.
Although Sidney
returned approximately 80% of the bit bodies that it received,
Thrift Bit admits that Sidney accrued a deficit of unreturned
bit bodies during each year of the contract.
Thrift Bit could
have addressed this deficit either by annually invoicing Sidney
for the used bit bodies not returned, or by adjusting its
subsequent year price quotation to reflect the additional costs
incurred, or by declining to accept another bid without an
express agreement from Sidney to return the bits.
took none of these options.
Thrift Bit
Instead, Thrift Bit allowed Sidney
to accrue a growing deficit of unreturned bit bodies and failed
to take any timely action to minimize its losses.
Consequently,
Thrift Bit is not entitled to recover damages for those years.
We further agree with the trial court that Thrift Bit
clearly was not entitled to damages under the 1999 contract.
Beginning in 1998, Thrift Bit’s price quotation sheet to Sidney
included the following language: “The above prices are quoted
with the agreement that our bit bodies will be returned”.
Sidney’s purchasing agent did not object to the inclusion of the
language in 1998.
Thrift Bit’s 1999 price quotation included
the same language, along with a provision stating, “User is
responsible for return of old bit bodies”.
Sidney’s purchasing
agent struck both clauses out when responding to the 1999
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quotation sheet and Thrift Bit modified the second clause to
provide “User is not responsible for return of bit bodies”.
This term was specifically accepted by Thrift Bit’s agent,
Johnny Blanton.
Thrift Bit contends that Sidney’s attempted
repudiation was ineffective because it did not alter its course
of performance during that period.
Nevertheless, 355.2-208(2)
provides that “[t]he express terms of the agreement and any such
course of performance, as well as any course of dealing and
usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as
consistent with each other; but when such construction is
unreasonable, express terms shall control course of performance
and course of performance shall control both course of dealing
and usage of trade (KRS 355.1-205)”.
Given the express term
incorporated into the 1999 contract, the trial court correctly
concluded that the express terms of the contract control over
the parties’ course of performance, and the court properly
subtracted from Thrift Bit’s damages the cost of the bit bodies
which Sidney did not return from April 1999 to February 2000.
Consequently, we must reject Thrift Bit’s cross-appeal.
This leaves only the damages arising from the 2000
contract.
As noted above, the trial court properly considered
course of performance, course of dealing and usage of trade to
interpret the contract.
Furthermore, Thrift Bit price quotation
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sheet for that year included the provision “[t]he above prices
are quoted with the agreement that our bit bodies will be
returned”, and Sidney did not object to the inclusion of the
term.
Given this explicit provision in the contract, the trial
court did not err by allowing Thrift Bit to recover damages for
the bit bodies which Sidney failed to return that contract year.
Sidney next contends that the trial court applied the
wrong measure of damages.
But contrary to Sidney’s argument,
there was no requirement that Thrift Bit lose money or become
insolvent due to the non-performance under the contract in order
to recover.
Rather, the amount recoverable is the amount Thrift
Bit’s expectation damages of what it would have made had the
contract been fully performed.
See Leibson & Nowka, The UCC of
Kentucky, 3d ed., § 2.06(6)(b)(i).
Such damages approximate for
the profits which the seller would have made if the contract had
been performed as anticipated.
In this case, the course of dealing by the parties
requiring Sidney to return the spent bit bodies allowed Thrift
Bit to sell the re-tipped bodies at a lower price.
When Sidney
failed to return the all the spent bits, Thrift Bit was required
to replace the unreturned bit bodies.
Sidney could reasonably
foresee these damages as evidenced by its prior efforts to
return bit bodies to Thrift Bit.
This measure of contract
damages appears to be the only standard that fits the parties’
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situation.
Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s method of
calculating damages.
However, neither the record nor the trial court’s
findings allow us to conclusively determine the amount of
damages to which Thrift Bit was entitled.
The parties
stipulated that Thrift Bit sold 2,028,800 bits to Sidney between
September 1996 and May 2001.
Sidney returned 1,615,236 bit
bodies to Thrift Bit, leaving a deficit of 413,264.
Of this
latter amount, the parties agreed that Sidney failed to return
13,195 bit bodies from 1996 to May 28, 1998, and 93,187 bit
bodies for the contract period from April 19, 1999 to February
8, 2000.
This leaves 306,882 bit bodies for the 1998 and 2000
contract periods.
We have determined that Thrift Bit is only
entitled to recover damages for unreturned bit bodies from the
2000 contract period.
Unfortunately, the record does not
clearly indicate how many bit bodies were not returned during
that last contract period.
Therefore, we must remand this
matter to the trial court for additional findings and entry of a
new judgment.
Upon remand, the trial court shall determine the
difference between the number of drill bits which Thrift Bit
provided Sidney during the 2000 contract year and the number of
bit bodies which Sidney returned for that period.
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The trial
court further found that Sidney is entitled to a credit of onehalf of one-percent, reflecting bit bodies which are normally
lost or destroyed in the course of use.
This allowance is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
Upon
determining the number of bit bodies for which Sidney is liable,
the trial court shall allow Thrift Bit to recover its costs for
replacing the unreturned bits, which the parties stipulated to
be $.67 per bit.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Harlan Circuit Court
is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for
additional findings and entry of a new judgment as set forth in
this opinion.
COMBS, CHIEF JUDGE, CONCURS.
TAYLOR, JUDGE, CONCURS IN RESULT.
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT/CROSSAPPELLEE:
BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSSAPPELLANT:
H. Kent Hendrickson
Rice, Hendrickson & Williams
Harlan, Kentucky
V. Katie Gilliam
Gilliam & Payne Attorneys,
PLLC
London, Kentucky
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