LAURA ELIZABETH CECIL v. WALGREEN COMPANY
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RENDERED:
MARCH 31, 2006; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Commonwealth Of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2005-CA-000571-MR
LAURA ELIZABETH CECIL
APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
HONORABLE DENISE CLAYTON, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 03-CI-002086
v.
WALGREEN COMPANY
APPELLEE
OPINION
AFFIRMING
** ** ** ** **
BEFORE:
BUCKINGHAM, JOHNSON, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.
TAYLOR, JUDGE:
Laura Elizabeth Cecil brings this appeal from a
February 8, 2005, order of the Jefferson Circuit Court
dismissing Laura’s claims against Walgreen Company (Walgreen)
allegedly arising under Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 620.030
and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253.1
1
We affirm.
In the complaint against Walgreen Company (Walgreen), Laura Elizabeth Cecil
asserted a civil cause of action derivative of Kentucky Revised Statutes
(KRS) 620.030 regarding Walgreen’s failure to report suspected child abuse.
Laura also asserted a claim against Walgreen for violation of the Protection
of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253).
On November 3, 2004, the circuit court entered summary judgment dismissing
Laura’s civil claim under KRS 620.030. On January 21, 2005, the circuit
court entered a second summary judgment dismissing Laura’s claim under 18
In 2000, Laura, then age fourteen, met via the
internet, Robert Smith, then age twenty-three.
Beginning in
October 2000, Laura would sneak out of her home and meet Robert
to engage in sexual relations.
Robert took photographs of Laura
while she was engaged in various sexual acts.
were processed at a Walgreen’s store.
The photographs
Ultimately, Robert was
convicted for his conduct with Laura under applicable laws and
is presently serving a ten-year sentence at Eddyville, Kentucky.
Sometime during the relationship, Laura’s parents,
Delmer Lee Cecil and Laura W. Cecil, became aware of Laura’s
sexual activities with Robert and further learned of the
photographs taken by Robert.
In March 2003, Delmer and Laura,
as parents and on behalf of Laura, filed a complaint in the
Jefferson Circuit Court against Walgreen, Robert Lewis Smith,
Jr. and Robert Lewis Smith, Sr.2
The circuit court entered
summary judgments on November 3, 2004, and January 21, 2005,
which were made final and appealable by an order entered
February 8, 2005.
This appeal follows.
U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253. Laura filed appeals from both summary judgments
although they were not made final and appealable until the February 8, 2005,
order was entered. The three appeals were subsequently consolidated by this
Court. By Opinion and Order rendered March 10, 2006, the two earlier appeals
were dismissed since Laura had subsequently filed a timely notice of appeal
from the final order entered on February 8, 2005.
2
The Complaint was originally filed by Laura’s parents, Delmer Lee Cecil and
Laura W. Cecil, as Laura had not yet attained the age of majority. Upon
Laura’s reaching the age of majority, the court entered an order substituting
Laura as plaintiff.
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Laura initially contends the circuit court committed
error by entering summary judgment dismissing her claim under
KRS 620.030 against Walgreen.
Summary judgment is proper where
there exists no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to
judgment as a mater of law.
Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel
Service Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991).
KRS 620.030 states, in relevant part, as follows:
(1)
Any person who knows or has reasonable
cause to believe that a child is
dependent, neglected or abused shall
immediately cause an oral or written
report to be made to a local law
enforcement agency or the Kentucky
State Police; the cabinet or its
designated representative; the
Commonwealth's attorney or the county
attorney; by telephone or otherwise.
Under KRS 620.030, a duty to report is imposed upon a person who
knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child is being
abused; thus, the failure to report abuse by a person who knows
or has reasonable cause to suspect such abuse constitutes a
violation of the statute.
However, KRS 620.030 does not impose
a duty upon an individual to discover abuse; thus, the negligent
failure of an individual to discover abuse does not constitute a
violation thereof.
This distinction is pivotal.
In Laura’s complaint,3 she specifically alleged:
3
Laura filed an amended complaint, but the relevant allegation against
Walgreen under KRS 620.030 remained unchanged.
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13. That during the times referred to
herein, the Defendant, Walgreens, directly
and/or by and through its agents, servants,
employees or contractors, processed the
photographs of the minor child, had a duty
to inspect the photographs and to discover
the explicit sexual content of the
photographs as part of the processing
procedures, but negligently failed to
inspect the photographs, negligently failed
to discover the explicit, sexual photographs
of the minor child, negligently failed to
adopt and implement proper policies and
procedures, negligently failed to train and
instruct its employees and negligently
failed to report such photographs to proper
and appropriate legal authorities, all in
violation of K.R.S. 620.030 . . . .
The gravamen of Laura’s complaint is that Walgreen breached a
duty to inspect the photographs and to discover the sexual
content of the photographs.
Essentially, Laura is alleging that
Walgreen negligently failed to discover the child abuse and
report same.4
The negligent failure to discover suspected child
abuse is simply not a violation of KRS 620.030.
Rather, KRS
620.030 only creates a duty to report suspected abuse if a
person knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a child has
been abused.
Accordingly, we hold that Laura failed as a matter
of law to state a cause of action under KRS 620.030 and that the
circuit court properly entered summary judgment dismissing this
4
This opinion should not be misconstrued as requiring certain specific
recitations in the complaint in order to state a cause of action under KRS
620.030. We merely conclude the negligent failure to discover child abuse is
not a violation of KRS 620.030.
-4-
claim.
See Commonwealth Natural Res. and Env’t Prot. Cabinet v.
Neace, 14 S.W.3d 15 (Ky. 2000).
Laura next asserts the circuit court erred by entering
summary judgment dismissing her claim under the Protection of
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 (18 U.S.C. §§
2251-2253).
Specifically, Laura contends:
The alleged violations of the Act
[Protection of Children Against Sexual
Exploitation Act of 1977 18 U.S.C. §§ 22512253] are found in Section 2251 (a) (Sexual
exploitation of children) and Section 2252
(Certain activities relating to material
involving the sexual exploitation of minors)
and Section 2252A (Certain activities
relating to material constituting or
containing child pornography).
Laura’s Brief at 18.
Therefore, our analysis centers upon 18
U.S.C. §§ 2251(a), 2252, and 2252A.
These sections state, in
relevant part, as follows:
Section 2251 –
(a) Any person who employs, uses,
persuades, induces, entices, or coerces any
minor to engage in, or who has a minor
assist any other person to engage in, or who
transports any minor in interstate or
foreign commerce, or in any Territory or
Possession of the United States, with the
intent that such minor engage in, any
sexually explicit conduct for the purpose of
producing any visual depiction of such
conduct, shall be punished as provided under
subsection (e), if such person knows or has
reason to know that such visual depiction
will be transported in interstate or foreign
commerce or mailed, if that visual depiction
was produced using materials that have been
mailed, shipped, or transported in
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interstate or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or if such visual
depiction has actually been transported in
interstate or foreign commerce or mailed.
Section 2252 (a) Any person who-(1) knowingly transports or ships in
interstate or foreign commerce by any
means including by computer or mails,
any visual depiction, if-(A) the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of
such conduct;
(2) knowingly receives, or
distributes, any visual depiction that
has been mailed, or has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign
commerce, or which contains materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or
transported, by any means including by
computer, or knowingly reproduces any
visual depiction for distribution in
interstate or foreign commerce or
through the mails, if-(A) the producing of such visual
depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; and
(B) such visual depiction is of
such conduct;
(3) either-(A) in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or on any land or
building owned by, leased to, or
otherwise used by or under the
control of the Government of the
United States, or in the Indian
country as defined in section 1151
of this title, knowingly sells or
possesses with intent to sell any
visual depiction; or
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(B) knowingly sells or possesses
with intent to sell any visual
depiction that has been mailed, or
has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, or
which was produced using materials
which have been mailed or so shipped
or transported, by any means,
including by computer, if-(i) the producing of such
visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is
of such conduct; or
(4) either-(A) in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or on any land or
building owned by, leased to, or
otherwise used by or under the
control of the Government of the
United States, or in the Indian
country as defined in section 1151
of this title, knowingly possesses 1
or more books, magazines,
periodicals, films, video tapes, or
other matter which contain any
visual depiction; or
(B) knowingly possesses 1 or more
books, magazines, periodicals,
films, video tapes, or other matter
which contain any visual depiction
that has been mailed, or has been
shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce, or which was
produced using materials which have
been mailed or so shipped or
transported, by any means including
by computer, if-(i) the producing of such
visual depiction involves the
use of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct; and
(ii) such visual depiction is
of such conduct . . . .
-7-
Section 2252A(a) Any person who-(1) knowingly mails, or transports or
ships in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer, any
child pornography;
(2) knowingly receives or distributes-(A) any child pornography that has
been mailed, or shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer; or
(B) any material that contains child
pornography that has been mailed, or
shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer;
(3) knowingly-(A) reproduces any child pornography
for distribution through the mails, or
in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer; or
(B) advertises, promotes, presents,
distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign
commerce by any means, including by
computer, any material or purported
material in a manner that reflects the
belief, or that is intended to cause
another to believe, that the material
or purported material is, or
contains -(i) an obscene visual depiction
of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an
actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct;
(4) either-(A) in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or on any land or building
owned by, leased to, or otherwise used
by or under the control of the United
States Government, or in the Indian
country (as defined in section 1151),
knowingly sells or possesses with the
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intent to sell any child pornography;
or
(B) knowingly sells or possesses
with the intent to sell any child
pornography that has been mailed, or
shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or that was
produced using materials that have
been mailed, or shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer;
(5) either-(A) in the special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United
States, or on any land or building
owned by, leased to, or otherwise used
by or under the control of the United
States Government, or in the Indian
country (as defined in section 1151),
knowingly possesses any book,
magazine, periodical, film, videotape,
computer disk, or any other material
that contains an image of child
pornography; or
(B) knowingly possesses any book,
magazine, periodical, film, videotape,
computer disk, or any other material
that contains an image of child
pornography that has been mailed, or
shipped or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer, or that was
produced using materials that have
been mailed, or shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce by
any means, including by computer; or
(6) knowingly distributes, offers,
sends, or provides to a minor any visual
depiction, including any photograph, film,
video, picture, or computer generated
image or picture, whether made or produced
by electronic, mechanical, or other means,
where such visual depiction is, or appears
to be, of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct-(A) that has been mailed, shipped,
or transported in interstate or
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foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer;
(B) that was produced using
materials that have been mailed,
shipped, or transported in interstate
or foreign commerce by any means,
including by computer; or
(C) which distribution, offer,
sending, or provision is accomplished
using the mails or by transmitting or
causing to be transmitted any wire
communication in interstate or foreign
commerce, including by computer,
for purposes of inducing or persuading a
minor to participate in any activity that is
illegal.
We shall address these sections seriatim.
As to Laura’s claim under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a), we
think the circuit court properly entered summary judgment
dismissing the claim.
In reaching such conclusion, we are
persuaded by the reasoning of United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d
824 (2nd Cir. 1984).
processor.
In that case, Petrov was a commercial film
Petrov advertised in adult magazines that he would
provide “‘confidential’ and ‘uncensored’ photo processing
service.”
Id. at 825.
A jury found Petrov guilty of violating
18 U.S.C. § 2251, for processing sexually explicit photographs
of minors.
In reversing this part of Petrov’s conviction, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a commercial photo
processor is not within the ambit of 18 U.S.C. § 2251.
Court reasoned:
Indisputably, Petrov had no direct
involvement in using, employing, or
persuading minors to engage in any explicit
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The
sexual conduct depicted in any of the
photographs Spectra developed. Instead, the
government argues that because processing
film is an integral part of the production
of child pornography, Petrov's position is
not materially distinguishable from that of
the person who actually induces the minor to
be photographed. Consequently, the
government argues, by advertising his
availability to process such “confidential”
photographs, and by repeatedly doing so,
Petrov has conspired to violate § 2251. We
disagree.
The plain language of § 2251(a) defeats the
government's argument. Its proscribed acts
are those of someone who “employs, uses,
persuades, induces, entices or coerces” a
minor to engage in sexually explicit
conduct, and even those acts are not covered
unless done “for the purpose of producing
any visual or print medium depicting such
conduct”. Section 2251(a) does not purport
to proscribe the entire process that creates
child pornography; instead, it is narrowly
drawn to reach only those people who deal
with children directly.
Petrov, 747 F.2d at 827.
We view the reasoning of Petrov as compelling and,
likewise, conclude that Walgreen’s activities, as a commercial
photo processor, are not proscribed under 18 U.S.C. § 2251.5
Accordingly, we hold the circuit court properly entered summary
judgment dismissing Laura’s 18 U.S.C. § 2251 claim.
See Neace,
14 S.W.3d 15.
5
We note that 18 U.S.C. § 2251 was later amended in 1986. In its amended
form, § 2251 is currently applicable to photo processors who advertise their
services to print or reproduce sexually explicit depictions of minors. In
this appeal, there is no allegation that Walgreen engaged in such
advertising; hence, we view United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824 (2nd Cir.
1984) as still persuasive upon the facts of this appeal.
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As to Laura’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252 and
2252A, we also believe the circuit court properly entered
summary judgment dismissing these claims.
To constitute a
violation of either 18 U.S.C. § 2252 or § 2252A, we are
persuaded that the perpetrator must have “knowingly” been aware
of the sexually explicit nature of the visual depiction and the
minor status of the performer.
See United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) and United States v. Pabon-Cruz,
255 F. Supp. 2d 200 (S.D. N.Y. 2003).
As hereinbefore pointed
out, Laura’s complaint alleged that Walgreen breached a duty to
inspect the photographs and to discover the sexual content of
the photographs.
As there is no allegation that Walgreen knew
of the sexually explicit nature of the photographs or of Laura’s
age, we conclude that Laura failed as a matter of law to state a
cause of action under either 18 U.S.C. § 2252 or § 2252A.
As
such, we are of the opinion the circuit court properly entered
summary judgment dismissing Laura’s claims under 18 U.S.C. §§
2252 and 2252A.
See Neace, 14 S.W.3d 15.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the Jefferson
Circuit Court is affirmed.
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ALL CONCUR.
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:
John Allen Taylor
Thomas B. Merrill
Louisville, Kentucky
BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLEE:
Lee E. Sitlinger
SITLINGER, MCGLINCY, THEILER &
KAREM
Louisville, Kentucky
ORAL ARGUMENT FOR APPELLANT:
John Allen Taylor
Louisville, Kentucky
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